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ABSTRACT
The theology of the cross is both a method of doing evangelical 
theology, as well as an evangelical confession of the Chrsitian Faith.
It is universal in scope, and it is set within the context of the 
Reformation doctrine of the Two Kingdoms. It, therefore, insists that 
while the Kingdom of the world and the Kingdom of Christ are to be distin­
guished from each other, nevertheless, they constitute an intrinsic unity.
Marx's concept of man and his theory of history constitute his peculiar 
atheistic Weltanschauung. This preoccupation with man as an alienated 
being is paralleled by the concern for man's salvation as expressed in 
the theology of the cross. However, Marx's anthropology remains one­
dimensional in scope, and is thereby placed within the realm of the 
Kingdom of the world.
The Marxian claim that man is the centre of himself and the final
and sole arbiter of his own destiny, and that God is a totally human idea 
which
/ ultimately enslaves man, challenges the Church to proclaim and "incar­
nate" the liberating message of the Gospel anew today. The Church is 
called to articulate a theology of the cross in which God is confessed 
as being pro-man. The Church points to the cross of Christ where it 
sees God paradoxically revealed in suffering, shame and death. Where God 
seemed (and seems) to be most absent, it is precisely there that He is 
most present, actively struggling on behalf of man. Cross and Resurrection 
are bound together. The Christian life is therefore a life of celebration 
and hope sub cruce.
/ Caribbean
Caribbean theology is at the crossroads: it is historically connected
with Western theology and finds some "natural" affinities with Liberation 
Theology. However, while it may and should attempt to draw from the 
richness of both theologies, it should guard against capitulating to 
either of those forms. It must articulate an indigenous theology of the 
cross which maintains the tension between identity and relevance of the 
Gospel. To do otherwise would lead to a theology (or ideology) of glory.
In short, Caribbean theology's primary concern must be the proclamation 
and "incarnation" of the message that the Triune God, through the praxis 
of love in His Son, and through the witness of His Spirit, is present in 
suffering and death, wrath and judgement, working on behalf of man and 
his reconciliation.
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INTRODUCTION
As the title of this thesis indicates, we are concerned with
three areas of study: the theology of the cross; Marx1 concept of
•]man; and Christianity, Marxism and the Caribbean, In the actual 
development of the thesis the order of those areas will be altered.
We will begin with a discussion of Marxfe anthropology which will then 
be followed by the argument for a theology of the cross, and finally 
with a discussion of the Caribbean and how theology may be done there. 
The overriding motivation in undertaking such a thesis is 
existential; i.e., it is an attempt to respond to the ongoing challenge 
to the Church to articulate the Christian .faith in a manner that is 
intelligible and relevant to con temporary man. Implicit in this 
challenge is a recognition of the temporal and historical nature of 
the Church's statements of the faith throughout the centuries in 
various societies, under various and sometimes divergent conditions.
It is also a tacit confession of the dynamic activity of the Spirit 
who has called the Church into being and who sustains and preserves 
it through His activity in the Word and sacraments.
It is assumed, moreover, that confessing the Faith in a way that 
is intelligible to contemporary man is ah intrinsic demand of the 
Gospel itself. The message of God's reconciling love through the 
suffering, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ is mediated through 
the Spirit in Word and Sacrament, Thus, the Scriptures, the Creeds, 
and the traditions and teachings of the Church, which have come down 
to us through the ages, are not viewed as the objects of faith, but 
as the necessary vehicles through which the message of the Gospel is 
communicated and clarified. The mission of proclaiming the Gospel
today will not be effectively and evangelically met by simply 
articulating so-called modem creeds which are more 1 suited1 to the 
spirit of the times (Zeitgeist)♦ than the old formulations are,
2According to Pannenberg, that route would be "the cheap way out11,
Christian identity is bound up with the Scriptures, the Creeds and
traditions. This is not to deny that there has not been distorted
and even dehumanizing uses of them. But genuine evangelical confession
requires us to take due account of them. Speaking about this dilemma
in relation to the Apostles1 and Nicene creeds, Pannenberg writes:
The more or less obscure discomfort with certain formula­
tions should not lead to the cheap way out - to the exclud­
ing of the Creed from use in Church and its replacement by 
other, supposedly more contemporary formulae, which at best 
could never fulfil the function of the old creeds - that 
through them the individual Christian can enrol himself in 
the communion with all Christendom. But even as regards the 
content of faith, nothing is gained by a change of words.
What is needed is an exploration and understanding of the 
things of the Christian Faith, which have found their 
expression in the ancient credal formulations. To reject 
these formulations simply because we find them incomprehen­
sible is uneducated,,.. We could only justify their 
rejection if they had to be discarded because they were 
simply wrong. But today* s widespread lack of comprehension 
of the credal formulae is a call, not for their abolition, 
but for their explanation. 3
As will be seen below, this lack of comprehension of 11 the credal 
formulae1 and of the Scriptures as a whole concerning the God of 
Abraham, Isaac, Jacob ... and of Jesus Christ is' acutely present in 
the Marxist challenge to evangelical theology. Both Marxists and 
Christians need to be reminded that God, Father of the Lord Jesus 
Christ, works on behalf of man for man*s total reconciliation. We 
will therefore point the way to the cross of Christ where we find 
God, through the death and resurrection of His Son, engaged in His 
most definitive and decisive activity on behalf of man. It is God*s 
nature to love, a love which includes suffering. Thus, the event of
the Cross and Resurrection is an expression, the unique expression, 
of God* s love for man. Through Word and Sacrament the Holy Spirit 
hears witness to God’s reconciling love through the crucified and 
risen Jesus Christ. Thus, the theological response we will advocate 
is trinitarian in form.
The concern with the task of Christian confession, in word and 
deed, in the Caribbean is unique: it must be done in dialogue with
Marxism, within societies whose alienated identity is bound up with 
colonialism, slavery and indenture. Caribbean man’s identity is 
bound up with the Judeo—Christian tradition in two significant ways. 
Firstly, it emerged from the colonising impact and influence in the 
Caribbean of Western—European civilisation upon peoples from Europe, 
Africa and Asia - the population of the indigenous peoples in the 
islands were soon decimated after the arrival of the first Europeans, 
Secondly, it also emerged from the salvific efficacy of the Gospel 
upon many among the oppressed who experienced the love of God in Christ 
in the midst of their enslavement and suffering, some of whom were 
inspired to express their freedom by working to undermine the oppressive 
syst.em under which the masses lived. Unfortunately, the message of the 
Gospel was experienced very often as Law and not as Gospel for the 
Gospel was often used to make slaves and members of the lower strata 
of society docile and manipulable. This fact cannot be overlooked 
by the Church in its attempt to carry out its mission of reconciliation 
through Jesus Christ. At the same time, however, the Church must not 
be afraid to proclaim the scandal of the cross which gives it its 
peculiar identity as an eschatological community with historical 
relevance and concreteness.
In the face of the ambiguous experience of the Judjeo—Christian
tradition, it is not surprising, that Marx’s anthropocentric philosophy 
with its emphasis upon man's "salvation" through his own liberating 
oraxis-theoria activity, might be, and, in fact, is appealing to many 
people in the Caribbean, not least among significant sectors of the 
intelligentsia, including the political leadership. It is to be remem­
bered that Marx stands within the Judeo-Christian tradition. Whereas, 
on the one hand, the Church must (and does) evaluate and judge its 
action in terms of the Law, on the other hand, Marx's philosophy judges 
the Church and society in terms of its "principle of ideology". At 
times the two will coincide, but this does not provide the basis for the 
Church either to dispense with the use of the Law in preference to Marx's 
"principle of ideology", or to turn a blind eye to the Marxian critique. 
In the freedom of the Gospel, the Church can find the courage to adopt 
a critical, not compromising attitude towards Marx's philosophy, in­
cluding his concept of ideology.
This, therefore,leads us to an enunciation of our primary thesis 
on Marx: Marx's philosophy of man and his theory of history are regar­
ded as an anthropocentric theory of a real, historical and ultimate way 
of salvation. This means that his philosophy is viewed as a Weltan­
schauung. According to our argument, in his early writings, Marx 
sketched out his world-view which was intrinsically atheistic and 
anthropocentric. This world-view remained implicit throughout his life, 
even in his mature writings. Furthermore, in relation to alienated 
Caribbean man, living in an explosive situation, it is argued that 
this Weltanschauung: promises not merely a way out of the economic 
morass in which Caribbean man finds himself, but a radically different 
self-understanding and conception of total reality which is in 
contradiction to a theocentric (trinitarian) view of
reality. This new self-understanding, according to Marx, can only 
result from a radical transformation of the productive process from 
which all superstructures, including consciousness, are derived.
Marx’s world-view is totally immanental. Thus, the only meaning 
given to transcendence is that of historical transcendence through 
human praxis. In this process man acts in harmony and in conjunction 
with the material forces of history, i.e. the mode of production.
Thus, man's future, his "ethical’' standards, his whole society, are 
to be entirely the product of his own activity. Only man is capable 
of ultimately liberating himself and the whole of society completely. 
This outlook stands in polar contrast to the Christian view of reality 
where transcendence is defined in terms of God and where man’s ultimate 
future is not his to create, but is a gratuitous gift of God to be 
received in faith. Whereas Marx sees man’s alienation as historically 
produced, which will be therefore historically transformed through 
man’s revolutionary recreation of the productive process, Christian 
theology sees man as being fundamentally alienated from God and that 
he can be and is reconciled only through the loving praxis of God 
through the suffering, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Yet, 
Christian theology does admit that man, and certainly Caribbean man, 
stiffers from socio-economic and political alienation which the Church 
must both verbally denounce and practically strive to minimize if not 
totally eliminate. This it does on behalf of the neighbour. In a 
curious and ambiguous way, the Church’s credibility (and its message) 
in Caribbean society is bound up with its response to this challenge 
in the name of the Gospel for the sake of the suffering in society.
In presenting Marx's anthropocentric, atheistic world-view, we 
will suggest that there is a continuity between the "early" and
"mature" Marx, We will show that this continuity surrounds Marx's 
use of the term alienation, and his indebtedness to Hegel and Feuerbach, 
It will be shown that this concept is not peculiar to Marx, or Hegel, 
or Feuerbach, for both before and after their time, the concept was used 
in varying and different senses from theirs. Moreover, Marx's 
preoccupation with man leads us to consider his critique of religion, 
atheism, and false consciousness as a whole, followed by an attempt 
to piece-together Marx's definition of human nature, which Marx assumes 
could not be defined a priori since it is always being historically 
created by man. We will conclude Marx's description of man as an 
alienated species-being, with Marx’s projection of the unalienated 
future of man which will be created by man alone,
A discussion of Marx's theory of history naturally follows the 
discussion of his concept of man for the two are inseparably bound 
together. Here it will be shown that Marx viewshistory as universal 
history. He posits history as the de—alienating and ultimately free 
creative activity of man in community. All alienating forces are 
totally historical. In this presentation we will note the dialectical 
interplay between the mode of production and human activity - i.e. 
between historical materialism and proletarian messianism. Finally, 
we conclude this section with a consideration of the question of a 
Marxian ethics.
What we wish to achieve in our discussion of Marx’s concept of 
man and his theory of history is aptly summarized by Pannenberg who 
notes:
A critique that only zeros in on one or another of Marx’s 
conclusions, whether it be the prophecy of the demise of 
capitalism or the utopia of the communistic society of the 
future, would be a critique that would not do him justice.
His thought draws its power from its anthropological 
roots. 4
Therefore, in our account of Marx's anthropocentric world-view, we 
will attempt to show the interrelatedness of Marx's "prophecy of the 
demise of capitalism" and his prophecy of "the utopia of the communist 
society of the future" which are derived from and built upon his 
preoccupation with alienated man and his transcendence of alienation. 
Following the discussion of Marx's concept of man and his theory 
of history, we will then argue for the theology of the cross as an 
evangelical response to the challenge of Marx's anthropocentric 
We1tanschauung . Such a response stems from the conviction that 
God is neither absent from nor unmoved by human suffering. Moreover,
His freedom and sovereignty do not dehumanize man nor work for man's 
alienation but for his salvation and reconciliation. It is precisely 
because He is both the God of wrath and the God of love that He stands 
above man as judge and suffers on behalf of man in history. To 
speculate about who this God is, it will be argued, leads to a theology 
of glory. This God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and of Jesus Christ, 
reveals Himself in the cross and resurrection of His Son, On the 
cross God the Father suffers the forsakenness of His Son and His Son 
experiences the forsakenness of His Father for he cries out "My God, 
my God, why have you forsaken me?" Jesus Christ suffers death and 
the grave because of the love of God for man, and because of the Son's 
love of the Father. Jesus' suffering and death on the cross is seen 
in the context of this manifold nature of God's love, Jesus pays the 
price of human sin including alienation, and breaks the power of the 
forces of evil that have held man and the whole of creation in captivity. 
This means that the triumph of God’s activity through Christ is in both
Cross and Resurrection. The two are held together, Tims, when we 
speak of a theology of the cross, we include both the suffering and 
death of Jesus, and His resurrection.
Because of this salutary event of Jesus Christ, Christian theology 
dares to speak of God in the face of Marx's challenge to theology.
We will therefore argue that in the midst of man's historical experience 
of all forms of alienation, God is not absent, even when it appears 
that He is. His presence is in hiddenness, in suffering and shame, 
in weakness and humility, in love and freedom. The paradox of His 
revelation is that He reveals in the contrary. This is intrinsic to 
the scandal of the cross.
In arguing for a theology of the cross as an evangelical response 
to Marx's Weltanschauung ,'we will look at Luther’s theologia crucis, 
followed by a discussion of Moltmann's "Trinitarian, political theology 
of the cross". Finally, we will turn to a critical consideration of 
the "Theology of Human Brotherhood" in Liberation Theology in Latin 
America. In this critique, Luther's theologia crucis, and to a lesser 
extent Moltmann's "Trinitarian, political theology of the cross" will 
be used as the criteria for evaluating Liberation Theology's way of 
talking about God.
It was pointed out above that the geo-cultural area in which we 
are concerned to explicate the Christian Faith is the area comprising 
the Commonwealth Caribbean. Therefore following our discussion of the 
theology of the cross, we will focus our attention on the meaning of 
alienation in this area. We will pay special attention to colonial 
history and its legacy, alienation and pluralism, as well as to some 
of the specific characteristics of alienation in the region and among 
its peoples. This picture will form part of the background against
which we will sketch out the directions which Caribbean theology might 
pursue as expressed in the "tentative" suggestions made by certain 
ecumenical voices in the Caribbean "Church". In tracing some of the 
implications for doing theology in the Caribbean arising from these 
"tentative" suggestions we will look at the question of the theological 
understanding of alienation in the Caribbean, The task of maintaining 
inherent unity between faith in God and love of neighbour, as well as 
the tension between the "already" and the "not yet" (i.e. between 
prolepsis and eschatological fulfilment) which the Church has, leads 
us to a critical treatment of Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms. 
Finally, we will conclude with a summary sketch of the total picture 
that emerges from the thesis.
Chapter I,
Marx' s Concept of Man
A,
The "early" and the "mature" Marx
In our attempt to uncover Marx's anthropology we are confronted 
by the unavoidable problem of deciding where in the plethora of Marx's 
writings we should look for the description of his concept of man.
This problem poses a crucial hermeneutical task for the student of 
Marx, since the primary and more significant works of his youth were 
not published until the 1930’s, Among these were his primary philo­
sophic. writings which have come to be known as the Economic and
5Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* The relative neglect of these
early texts meant that only Marx's later works which have been labelled
"mature" and "authentic", and which we re already published and in use,
came to be regarded as authentic writings of official Marxism.^ In
the Soviet Union, for example, it was the Communist Manifesto, German
Ideology, and above all Das ICapital, which were all published after
1844, that were considered to be the literary corpus of authentic
Marxism, Marx's thought was therefore crystallized around these 
7works, and any attempt to deviate from them was not merely dis-
Qcountenanced by the authorities, but radically supressed by them.
But despite a rather pervasive dismissal of the early texts by 
both the guardians of official (mature) Marxism and the non-Marxist 
critics of official Marxism, the twentieth century saw the emergence 
of a growing and sustained interest in these so-called "corrupt" 
Marxian writings. Indeed their publication in 1932 was both a sympton
of this interest, as well as an added stimulus to it. As Schaff 
explains, there was a growing realization among scholars that "a 
fuller knowledge of the young Marx* s intellectual evolution is 
necessary for the deeper understanding of the origins and development 
of Marxism ... [and that] ... false political considerations (had] 
militated against the discussion of early Marxian humanism.” Schaff 
adds that a ”second reason for the topicality and attraction of” 
the young Mara may be described as "existential”. He notes, for 
example, that in the current ideological struggle in Poland there 
was a commonality of interest in man in the young Marx and in the 
concerns and struggles of young Poles. He tells us;
rhe young Mara, as is easily understandable against the 
background of his age and his personal development, 
wrestled with the problem of the human individual and 
his relationship to socidty and nature (the world) ...
It is not surprising that in circumstances of psycho­
logical shock and ideological chaos, they (young people] 
began to interpret the ’newly discovered1 Mara in their 
own way, although in fact, because of textual difficulties 
and complicated connections between Mara and the young 
Hegelians, unknown to our readers, they simply did not 
understand him. 9
The ’’rediscovery” of the ”early” humanistic Mara created an
e
illogical and a methodological problem. To those who had gradually 
become disenchanted with the cold, scientific and impersonal Mmature” 
Mara of official Marxism, the salutary concern of the early, 
philosophic Mara for the individual provided new impetus to the 
study of Marx’ s philosophy. ”Early” Marx was seen as a necessary 
corrective to the excesses of official Marxism. According to them, 
it was a philosophy that was first and foremost concerned with man - 
man in his present predicament of alienation under the capitalist 
system. This was a Mara that argued for the relativeness of ’’ideology” 
which meant that no programme for the transformation of society could
10legitimately be considered, applicable for all time. Naturally
such an understanding of this "unhistoricaT'1 and "subversive” Marx
was a serious threat to the hitherto existing "historical” Marxism.
For example, as Fetscher reports, "Lukacs and Korsch were reproached
by those from the side of the social democratic and communist orthodox
11writers for their undue interest in the young Marx.'1 The summary
dismissal of the early writings by the guardians of the authentic
Marx could not and did not avert the ideological crisis within the
Marxist bloc. On the contrary, the protective action which was taken
by the authorities to correct this heretical tendency merely intensified
the crisis. Moreover, western interest in existentialist themes,
especially alienation, a theme which was Marx’s focus in his early
writings, contributed, albeit indirectly, to the crisis.
In the debate on how to rightly appropriate the early philosophic
writings there emerged two apparently antithetical halves of Marx’s 
12thought. This accentuated the crucial question, which had emerged
during the foregoing debate, of the relevance and accuracy of the
15existing general method of historical investigation. Critical 
questions were raised: Of what value is the thought of the young
Marx for an accurate understanding of the writings of the mature 
Marx? Contrariwise, of what value is the thought of the mature Marx 
for an accurate appraisal of the thrust of the thought of the young 
Marx? Are all the writings of Marx to be treated as a whole on the 
assumption that there is an implicit (and explicit) continuity of 
thought throughout Marx’s works? Is there continuity within dis­
continuity? It is to these and other questions we now address 
ourselves.
13.
Continuity within dis-continuity in Marxfs thought.
There is unanimity among scholars that in his early texts Marx
displayed a youthful preoccupation with philosophical anthropology
14and a "corresponding critique of human culture". However, there 
is no such unanimity that in his mature writings Marx is primarily 
concerned with "philosophical anthropology". Scholars argue, instead, 
that in those writings Marx’s primary concern is with enunciating the 
inherent weaknesses within the capitalist system which, he is 
convinced, would eventually undermine it and lead to its ultimate 
collapse. The lack of unanimity stems from the dispute over the 
continuity in Marx’s philosophic perspective; that is, the extent 
to which Marx is seen as a philosopher even during the writing of his 
later works. There is general agreement among scholars that in his 
later writings Marx was more the economist, sociologist and political 
scientist than the philosopher. As Aron tells us, "It might be said 
that, from 1848 until the end of his life, Marx apparently ceased to
15be a philosopher and became a sociologist and above all, an economist."
Furthermore, Aron points out the centrality of Marx’s economic analysis
in Marx’s thought, when he states;
Marx's thought is an interpretation of the contradictory 
or antagonistic character of capitalist society. In a 
certain sense, Marx’s whole canon is an attempt to show that 
this antagonistic character is inseparable from the funda^- 
mental structure of the capitalist system and is, at the 
same time, the mechanism of the historic movement. 16
There seems to be a contradiction between what Aron says here
and his suggestion elsewhere that Marx "until the end of his life .,.
remained in a certain sense a philosopher," The contradiction may be
corrected by noting that for Aron the distinction between the economist
of the later writings and the philosopher of the early works hinges
upon what is central to Marx at a particular time in contrast to what
may he nascent and secondary, or obsolete.Ibr Aron, whereas Marx the
economic theorist was in his nascent state in the early Marx, Marx the
17philosopher was more obsolete than merely hidden in the later Marx.
Daniel Bell, who argues that, "Having found the answer to the
’mysteries' of Hegel in political economy,' Marx promptly forgot all
18about philosophy”, seems to corroborate Aron’s arguments. For Bell,
Marx ceased being the abstract speculative philosopher when he realized
that philosophy could be realized and hence transcended only in
economics. But this did not mean that he ceased being a practising
philosopher. Indeed, Bell adds, Marx was never really interested in
economics. Bell sums up Marx’s excursus into economics thus:
Ihe question why men were propertyless turned Marx to 
economics. For a man whose name is so linked with the 
’dismal science,' Marx was never really interested in 
economics. His correspondence^ with Engels, in later 
years, is studded with contemptuous references to the 
subject (which he at one time referred to as the 'economic 
filth'), and he resented the fact that his detailed 
explorations in the economic mechanisms of society prevented 
him from carrying on other studies. But he continued 
because, for him, economics was the practical side of 
philosophy - it would unveil the mystery of alienation - 
and because he had found in the categories of political 
economy the material expression of that alienation: the
process of exploitation, 19
Marx’s pursuit of economic theory, then, was the result of his more
fundamental preoccupation with alienation. Beneath his elaborate and
often vague and laborious discussion of political economy was the
primary motivating consideration: the condition of man in capitalist
society.
It would seem natural and useful for us to proceed to establish 
that the theme of human alienation is the primary and overriding concern 
of both the early and later Marx, Bell's argument does appear on the
surface to support this conclusion, However, on another occasion Bell
argues that the ’’historical Marx” rejected the concept of alienation.
He notes that in the early Marx there was a double vision of aliena-
20tion: economic and humanistic. However, he continues, ”Marxist
thought developed along one narrow road of economic conceptions of
property and exploitation, while the other road, which might have led to
21new, humanistic concepts of works and labour, was left unexplored.” The
implication here is that in the movement of the concept of alienation
from the purely speculative, philosophic, and humanistic realms to the
categories of economic analysis of property relations under capitalism,
22a split occurred between the early and mature Marx. This implication is
inconclusive. The unveiling of the mystery of alienation in order to
reveal the concrete reality of economic exploitation did not mean that
’’alienation’* ceased being the primary motif in Marx’s thought after 1844*
Rather, it persisted throughout his writings, and, this recognition is
crucial for a more balanced treatment of the concept.
Despite the argument for a continuity in Marx’s thought, the
debate concerning Marx’s and Engels’ attitudes, after 1844* towards
the early writings of Marx continues to be inconclusive. It is not
clear whether Marx did in fact abandon his early writings, deeming
them inaccurate in their description of his mature thinking. McLellan
points out that:
Certainly he [Marx} did not care much about the fate of his 
early manuscripts. In the preface to his Critique of 
Political Economy, he said that he and Engels had abandoned 
the manuscript of The German Ideology (1846) ’to the gnawing 
criticisms of the mice all the more willingly as we had 
achieved our main purpose - self-clarification’. 23
Even in the pre-1844 years Marx understood that in his early writings
he was aiming at self-clarification. He was attempting to provide the
philosophic basis for his later economic discussions. In explaining
the aims of the journal, Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbucher, Marx declares,
So we can summarize the tendency of our journal in one words 
self-understanding (equals critical philosophy) by our age 
of its struggles and wishes. This is a task for the world 
and for us. It can only be the result of united forces.
What is at stake is a confession, nothing more. To get its 
sins forgiven, humanity only needs to describe them as they 
are, 24
Speaking about the reform of consciousness, he further explains the
aim of seeking self-clarification:
The reform of consciousness consists solely in letting the 
world perceive its own consciousness by awaking it from 
dreaming about itself, in explaining to its own actions.
Our whole and only aim consists in putting religious and 
political questions in a self-conscious human form, as is 
also the case in Feuerbach’s critique of religion. 25
It would be stretching the point to suggest that having achieved the
objective of "self-clarification” in his early writings, Marx was able
to move on to something totally new. Instead of claiming that there
was such a radical break, it would seem more reasonable to argue that
the explicit philosophy in Marx’s early writings continued to provide
the basic framework for his later, economic analysis of capitalism.
There is general agreement among scholars that the continuity in
Marx's thought depends upon the fundamental and persistent influence
of Hegel upon Marx, Though Marx came to reject Hegel’s primary thesis
that reality was the self-positing of Absolute Spirit, he, nevertheless,
26continued to use Hegelian categories in both his early and later works. 
Admittedly, he was attempting to realise philosophy through revolutionary, 
historical praxis. But, he sought to do so precisely by attempting to 
place Hegel "right side up,” Consequently, Marx's writings are to be 
seen as an attempt to dispute Hegel’s claims by replacing them with his 
own philosophical, and, later, economic interpretations. Commenting
on the pervasiveness of Hegel’s influence throughout Marx’s writings,
Tucker writes:
This inversion of Hegel's dialectic of history was the 
constitutive act of original Marxism, And now, in 1873 > 
Marx describes it as the constitutive act of the mature 
Marxian dialectic. The plain implication is that he 
considered the manuscripts of 1844 the birthplace of 
mature Marxism, the founding documents of scientific 
socialism. 27
Tucker concludes that the presence and influence of the Hegelian
dialectic in its materialist form, in both the early and the later
writings of Marx, clearly shows that for both Marx and Engels ’’there
were not two Marxisms but one," He concedes, however, that there is
some truth in the argument for two Marxisms, i.e., only "in the
peculiar and limited sense in which the adult may be said to be a
different person from the child," Tucker explains that according to
Marx and Engels:
... Scientific socialism, embryonic already in Hegel’s 
Phenomenology, was delivered into the world in Marx’s 
manuscripts of 1844. The philosophical terminology of
the latter was simply the umbilical cord binding the new­
born child to its philosophical parent. And mature 
Marxism was the baby grown to adulthood. Consequently, 
it was perfectly proper to speak of the mature doctrine 
in terms applicable to original Marxism. 28
This'developmental" view of the unity in the Marxian corpus of 
writings appears somewhat similar to Bell’s view discussed earlier. 
Both Tucker and Bell seem to espouse the view that Marx's later 
writings arose out of his early philosophical thought. However, 
whereas Tucker sees no discontinuity between the philosophy of the 
early Marx and the political economic theory of the later Marx, Bell 
argues that Marx abandons the early philosophy. This would lead one
to conclude that the later Marx was only minimally a Hegelian if at
all. On the other hand, it is true, as McLellan points out, "that
Marx always remained in some sense a Hegelian; and that the early
writings are important since they document the formation of Maine1 s
29attitude to Hegel’s philosophy.” But the argument may be advanced
even further where it can be said with Lenin, "it is impossible to
fully grasp Marx’s Capital and especially the first chapter, if you
have not studied or understood the whole of Hegel’s Logic.
Consequently, none of the Marxists for the past half century has 
30understood Marx! ”
The publication of the Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen
Qekonomic (Elements of a Critique of Political Economy) 1857/8, for
the first time in 1939 * revealed the fundamental influence of Hegel
upon the later Marx, Problems and concepts, such as’’alienation” and
"objectification” , which Marx had reflected upon, especially in his
1844 Manuscripts, were also considered at great length in the Grundrisse.
Viewed as the Preface to Capital, it certainly bridges the apparent
hiatus between the early philosophic writings and the mature writings
of political economy. But to conceive of the Grundrisse as such an
intermediary link is to suggest that Capital was the centrepiece of
Marx’s writings. This suggestion is disputed, McLellan writes,
The Grundrisse, of which the Critique of Political Economy 
and Capital are only partial elaborations, is the centre­
piece of Marx’s work. It is the basic work which permitted 
the generalizations in the famous Preface of the Critique 
of Political Economy, The Preface is not matched by the 
work that follows it, Marx himself describes it in a letter 
to Lasalle as: ’the result of fifteen years' research, that
is to say the best years of my life' .3 2
It is not our concern to enter into the debate about the correct
location of the Grundrisse and Capital in the pyramid of Marx's
writings. We are content with pointing out that, along with the
1844 Manuscripts, it shows a continuity in Marx's thought which is
firmly bound, up with Hegel’s influence upon Manx*
In the above, mention was made of Marx's preoccupation with
"alienation" and rtobjectification1' which shows his intellectual and
philosophical attempts at coming to grips with the Hegelian system*
We shall now attempt to demonstrate briefly that the problems of
’’alienation” and "objectification” which occupied his attention and
energies in his 1844 Manuscripts, and which display Marx's anthropology,
remained his concern throughout his mature works. As Thielicke notes,
the young Marx' s "doctrine of man which is not only not concealed but
34is even set forth programmatically" permeates the entire corpus of 
his writings, Ihe early philosopher who later became an economist, 
a sociologist, and a political scientist in the years following the 
writing of the 1844 Manuscripts, did not abandon his humanistic 
concerns; he did not cease being a philosopher for he did not conpletely 
dispense with Hegel's influence upon him. These components, when 
bound together with Marx's analysis of "alienation" and "objectification", 
serve to demonstrate the continuity within discontinuity in Marx’ s 
thought.
Like the 1844 Manuscripts, the Grundrisse is somewhat fragmentary
in nature. But this does not prevent the Hegelian categories, in
which Marx formulates his thought, from being obvious to the reader
of this work, "Questions that were prominent in Marx' s writings in
1844 - such as the true nature of labour and the resolution of the
conflict between individual and community - are taken up again and
35filled out with a wealth of detail." The following quotation gives
an indication of the tone of the Grundrisse:
Thus the ancient conception, in which man always appears 
(in however narrowly national, religious or political a
'Z "Z
definition) as the aim of production, seems very much more 
exalted than the modern world, in which production is the 
aim of man and wealth the aim of production. In fact, how­
ever, when the narrow bourgeois form has been peeled away, 
what is wealth, if not the universality of need, capacities, 
enjoyments, productive powers, etc, of individuals, produced 
in universal exchanges? What, if not the full development of 
human control over the forces of nature - those of his own 
nature as well as those of so call ’nature’? What, if not 
the absolute elaboration of his creative dispositions, without 
any preconditions other than antecedent historical evolution 
which makes the totality of this evolution - i.e. the evolution 
of all human powers as such, unmeasured by any previously 
established yardstick - an end in itself? What is this, if not 
a situation where man does not produce himself in any determined 
form, but produces his totality? Where he does not seek to 
remain something formed by the past, but is in the absolute 
movement of becoming? In bourgeois political economy - and in 
the epoch of production to which it corresponds - this complete 
elaboration of what lies within man, appears as the total aliena­
tion, and the destruction of all fixed, onesided purposes as the 
sacrifice of the end in itself to a wholly external compulsion, 36
In this extended extract, we are confronted by a number of themes which
were prominent in the early Marx's description of man's alienated
condition. Here we note the emphasis on man as a creature of "needs,
capacities, enjoyments, productive powers, etc," Man, we are told,
produces himself through his productive labour. He is described as
being more fully himself when he gains control of the forces of nature,
'He produces, i.e. "objectifies", what lies within him. Unfortunately,
this man, in bourgeois society, is alienated, and is manipulated by
forces external to him.
Having pointed out that the- mature Marx of the Grundrisse remains
preoccupied with many of the philosophical themes and problems of his
youth, it still remains to be shown that in Capital, Marx's primary
economic work (written during his mature years), the concern with man
and "alienation" still persists, and, indeed, in spite of the cloudy
37mists of economic details and categories, remains a primary concern.
It is here that we have Marx's most elaborate and significant attempt
at realizing philosophy through political economy, which is based upon
a philosophic anthropology that is spelled out in the 1844 Mauscripts,
and partly reiterated, and further developed in the Grundrisse. It
is to be noted that the term "alienation* occurs and/or its meaning is
38described several times in Capital. For example, Marx writes, "the
character of independence and estrangement which the capitalist modes
of production as a whole gives to the instruments of labour and to
the product, as against the workman, is developed by means of machinery
39into a thorough antagonism.McLellan adds that
... It is not only a question of terminology; the context, 
too, of Capital is a continuation of Marx’s early thoughts.
The main theme of Volume 1 of Capital, surplus-value, rests 
on the equation of work and value that goes back to the 
conception of man as a being who created himself and the 
conditions of his life - a conception outlined in the Paris 
Manuscripts. It is man's nature, according to the Marx of 
the Paris Manuscripts, to be constantly developing, in 
cooperation with other men, himself and the world about 
him. 40
When we come to Capital, McLellan asserts, we find that here Marx is 
describing
... How this fundamental role of man, to be the initiator 
and controller of the historical process, has been trans­
ferred, or alienated, and how it belongs to the inhuman 
power of Capital. Moreover the counterpart to alienated 
man, the unalienated or ’total’ man of the Manuscripts, 
also appear in Capital. In the chapter of Volume 1 on 
’Machinery and Modern Industry’ Marx makes the same contrast 
between the effects of alienated and unalienated modes of 
production in the development of human potentiality. 41
Concluding his argument for continuity between the Marx of the
1844 Manuscripts and the Marx of Capital, McLellan rightly draws
attention to the fact that "the section of Capital that most recalls
the early writings, is a final section of Chapter I, entitled "Fetishism 
A2of commodities". ' In McLellan's estimation, "the whole section is 
reminiscent of the section on alienated labour in the Paris Manuscripts
and of the notes on James Mill which Marx composed in 1844. On 
the question of labour’s objectification of itself in its products, 
Marx writes:
A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because 
in it the social character of man’s labour appears to them 
as objective character stamped upon that labour; because the 
relation of the producers to the sum total of their own 
labour, is presented to them as a social relation, existing 
not between themselves, but between the products of their 
labour. 44
We began by acknowledging that the apparent existence of an 
’’early" and a "mature" Marx, presents a hermeneutical problem as 
regards the source of information related to Marx’s concept of man.
It was argued that, whereas the early Marx was more the philosopher 
than the later Marx, who was ostensibly more the political economist 
(than the speculative philosopher), this did not detract from the 
essential unity that exists between the early and later Marx, This 
unity, it was noted, is centred around Hegel’s influence on Marx 
which is most clearly seen in the early (and mature) Marx’s discussion 
of the themes of ’alienation" and "objectification" . There is no 
doubt that Marx in his mature writings came to speak of ’alienation' 
in concrete terms such as the "fetishism of commodities". But his 
attempt at grounding "alienation" in the material base of the produc­
tive process is also to be found in his 1844 Manuscripts, albeit in a 
nascent state,^
We therefore agree with those scholars who argue that there is a 
continuity within a discontinuity in Marx’s thought. The continuity 
is to be found in the persistence of Marx’s concern with alienation 
which is described in philosophic terms in his early writings, and in 
economic terms in his mature works. At the same time, we find that 
even in his early writings, Marx devotes some attention to the problem
of grounding philosophy in the material process of production. By 
the same token, we find that the philosophical anthropology of his 
early writings continues to provide the basic framework within which 
he analyses bourgeois capitalism. In the movement from an explicit 
to an implicit philosophical anthropology, there is a break for a 
shift in emphasis occurs in his mature work, especially Capital, he 
is concerned with "alienation" in relation to the inherent "laws" 
of capitalism that would lead to its eventual demise and the end of 
all "alienation". There is therefore a continuity within a dis­
continuity in Marx’s thought,
Finally, our primary concern in the preceding analysis of the 
unity between the early and mature Marx, was to show that, viewed 
as a whole, Marx’s writings has as its primary concern, man as the
I
creator of his own history. Despite the developmental changes that
46take place in Marx's concept of man, nevertheless, the anthropology 
of the early Marx remains the presupposed functional anthropology 
of the mature Marx, Axelos expresses this case succinctly when he 
writes,
The building of Marxian doctrine is a methodical 
development around the theme of man as endowed with a will 
capable of taking hold of the world by virtue of technique,,,, 
Marx believes he has brought about the permanent collapse of 
a heaven now empty, its gods gone; and he can hardly allow 
that heaven continue to overshadow earth, Marx is determined 
that his anthropology and philosophy of history, as well as 
his programme of salvation and his, shall we say, eschato- 
logical vision, be altogether real and deeply, radically 
immanent. 47
His anthropology and philosophy of history, so rooted in socio­
economic realities, attempts to ignore metaphysics. As we shall see 
below, this attempt was unsuccessful. In asserting that man creates 
himself (and history, for history is the account of man’s creative
activity), through his interaction with nature, Marx boldly declares 
that salvation - the transcendence of alienation - will be ushered in 
by man. Thus, whatever may be said about Marx as philosopher, economist, 
sociologist, political scientist, etc., it is to be concluded, above 
all, that his philosophy of man (and concomitantly of history) was 
pivotal for his understanding of reality.
B.
A O
Alienation in Popular Usage.
In the discussion on the unity in the early and mature Marx, 
it was argued that the inherent unity in Marx’s writings hinged upon 
Hegel’s influence upon him, especially in the former's use of the 
word "alienation". It was claimed that Marx’s anthropology was built 
around his concept of alienation and its historical transcendence.
For Marx, man, whether worker (proletariat) or bourgeois capitalist 
(owner of the means of production), was in a state of alienation.
This alienation had reached its apogee under the modem industrial 
capitalism of Marx's day. To define what man is, albeit without 
arguing for a fixed essence of man, inevitably involves the concept 
of alienation. The centrality of this concept in Marx's anthropology 
therefore leads us to an examination of the meaning(s) the term had 
for Marx,
But before we do so we must take note of the problem of definition 
that attends the concept "alienation". We are bombarded by a wide­
spread and variegated usage of the term, not only by contemporary 
writers, but also by writers, thinkers, artists, etc., throughout the 
centuries. In fact, it is argued by some, that the popularity of the
term today did not stem primarily from Marx’s usage. Rather, it came
49down to us via another route. Be that as it may, no one could 
seriously dispute the impact of the publication of the 1844 Manuscripts, 
in which the concept is very much central, upon the popularization of 
the term. Indeed, the availability of the 1844 Manuscripts in 1932 
(in English in the 1950’s), coupled with a renewed interest in Hegel
50served to further the popularization of the use of the term ’’alienation”.
The popularization of any concept which is employed with relative
ease and frequency by writers who represent many varied disciplines and
different points of view, certainly does not allow for any systematic
and precise meaning of the term. Not only do the phenomena being
described by the concept vary with each discipline, but, also, even
within a particular discipline the term may be applied to phenomena
of a significantly varied kind. Needless to say, this makes it
impossible to delineate any one precise meaning of the term. An
analysis of the usage of "alienation” quickly reveals this inconsistency
and imprecision in its use, Frank Johnson offers a useful summary of
this problem when he says,
Most terms which possess scientific bite are characterized 
by a reasonable specificity of denotation, a clarity of 
meaning within particular disciplines, and an absence of 
serious internal paradox or ambiguity. None of them adhere 
to the word, alienation. Alienation is used to denote a 
great variety of often quite dissimilar phenomena. More­
over, its meaning within separate disciplines are confus­
ingly interrelated, and the word, of course, is stricken 
with severe inconsistency and vagueness, 51
Let us now look at some illustrations of the variation and ambiguity
in the meaning of the term "alienation". We will follow mainly Arnold
Kaufmann’s discussion on the subject, and, to a lesser extent, Richard
Schachts as well. The vagueness and inconsistency in the meaning of
the term is very much evident when it is used as an ontological category
in the conception of reality. In relation to this usage ICaufmann tells
us, ” ’alienation’ and ’Entfremdung’... [are) ... a human state of
being - the state of being alienated or estranged from something or 
52somebody,"-^ He justifies the usage of the term as an ontological
category by pointing out that,
The verb 'alienate’ is transitive like its two German 
equivalents, and its literal meaning is ’to make strange, 
to make another’s.’ But the noun ’alienation' like the 
German Entf remdung and unlike Bnf&usserung. does not usually 
bring to mind an activity, except in special contexts where
it functions as a technical term. 53
The use of the term "alienation” in the young Marx and the early Sartre
illustrates the active sense of separation which the term connotes.
It is also to be noted that there is a real difference between the
54way the term is used by the two thinkers. As Kaufmann explains, on
the question of describing human nature as alienated;
The main difference between the young Marx and the early 
Sartre is not the one has such a concept of human nature 
while the other rejects it; it is rather that Sartre 
concentrates on the psychological processes that lead men 
to see themselves as objects, as things, as unfree, while 
Marx concerns himself with the economic processes that 
lead to much the same result. Both are concerned with 
man's loss of freedom, but Marx sees the unfree as victims 
while the early Sartre insists that we are our own victims, 
that we really are free, and that we are at fault for not 
realizing it. 55
Here we see that the same phenomenon - lack of freedom - is described 
by Sartre in psychological terms and by Marx in economic terms. This 
distinction is very significant, for, as we will see below, Marx views 
psychological alienation as a derivative of the more basic, "infrar- 
structural", socio-economic alienation of the mode of production.
Yet another meaning of alienation is provided by Plato who 
represents the discipline of philosophy, indeed the primeval state 
of Western philosophy. Plato’s description of the meaning of alienation 
is well illustrated in his conception of man. With Schacht we note;
Plato does not merely divide man into body and soul; he 
further divides the soul into three parts, and he argues 
for the existence of the three parts by calling attention 
to instances in which they are at odds with each other and 
pull us in different directions* Thus Plato also knew the 
experience of the divided self. He felt at home neither 
in his body nor with his appetites, $6
Man’s divided self, whose separate parts exist in antagonism to each
other, seeks release from "alienation" through separation of body
from soul. It is to be noted that whereas Marx speaks of alienation
in historical and existential terms, Plato uses ontological categories
to describe the conflict between body and soul in man. It is a fair
conclusion that Marx argues for a more dynamic concept of human nature
57in contrast to Plato’s concept which is rather static.
A somewhat different use of the concept of alienation is to be
found in the Judeo-Christian tradition. Here we will follow Kaufmann's
discussion. He notes that in Judaism and Christianity, the individual
was to be constantly reminded that he was a pilgrim, an alien in this
world, Kaufmann explains further that both religions,
agree in their original challenge to men to alienate them­
selves from nature, society and themselves. The individual 
is not supposed to feel altogether at home in nature;
Judaism lifted man out of nature and stressed the discon­
tinuity between man and nature, the cardinal differences 
between man and animal. Moreover, it is one of the leit­
motifs of the Hebrew Bible that the people are not supposed 
to be 'like all the nations' but a people apart. Theoreti­
cally, this could have meant that their sense of community 
compensated them entirely for their alienation from all 
other nations,... We find in the Hebrew Bible a succession 
of imposing figures who not only tell their people that they
should be different but who are themselves thoroughly alienated
from their own society. 58
In contrast to the negative connotation of the term in Marx and Sartre,
"alienation" is used here in an obviously positive sense. The believer
is to pursue "alienation" or "separateness" in order to minimize if not
totally avoid, the corrupting influences of the outside environment
upon him. The communities of Judaism and Christianity are to be closed
off from evil and. corrupting influences and forces. But even within
each community there were some like the Jewish prophets, Moses, Elijah,
Amos, Hosea, and Jeremiah who found that they were strangers among 
59their own people.
On the contemporary scene there are several writers who argue
that, in spite of the fact that "alienation" has Been employed in many
different contexts, nevertheless, certain common features may be
60discerned from its various uses, Arnold Kaufmann, for example,
asserts: "rTo claim that a person is alienated is to claim that his
relation to something else has certain features which result in
61avoidable discontent or loss of satisfaction’," Lewis Feuer, to
take another example, declares that "the word ’alienation’ is used to
62describe the subjective tone of self-destructive experience." He"
adds, "’Alienation' is used to convey the emotional tone which
accompanies any behaviour in which the person is compelled to act
65self-destructively." Finally, Kenneth Kenniston argues that "most 
usages of ’alienation' share the assumption that some relationship 
or connection that once existed, that is ’natural’, desirable, or 
good, has been lost," Schacht rightly concludes that "while each of 
these general analyses may be plausible, they are by no means identical," 
In our brief survey of the concept "alienation" it was noted that 
the term is used in both an active and a passive sense. With the 
exception of its use in the Judeo-Christian tradition, its use is to 
describe an undesirable state which must either be transformed radically 
or accomodated creatively. In the active sense "the individual 
experiences something as ’other1 or separated from him," Here he is 
conscious of the state of his existence and both his thoughts and his 
feelings tell him that he is either a stranger, or else something or
someone is a stranger to him. In contrast to the active sense, the
passive sense of the term "alienation" is seen in the situation "in
which the individual is alleged to exist in a condition of separation
from something, of which he may be unaware," Schacht provides a
perceptive analysis of the difference between the two senses in which
the term "alienation" is used, and points to the problem of achieving
a precise and unambiguous definition of the term. He says:
It is possible to speak of an 'alienness* in both cases; 
but the nature of the alienness is quite different. In 
the first case, feelings of alienness are involved; certain 
things are apprehended as separate, or strange, or different, 
or remote, or indifferent, or incomprehensible, or dis­
tasteful, etc., by the individual termed 'alienated*. In 
the second case, on the other hand, feelings of this sort 
are not the issue. The alienness in question is rather 
the individual’s purportedly factual separation from some­
thing, which is detected through an objective comparison
of his actual state with a conception of what the rele.vant
sort of unity or identity would be like. While neither 
general use of the term *alienation* is inherently objection­
able, it is hard to imagine a situation more conducive to 
confusion than one in which the term is allowed to function 
in both ways. For if the same terminology may be used in 
both cases, there will be a tendency to blur this important 
distinction. 66
As we shall see later, Marx’s use of the term "alienation" shares 
in this ambiguity for he combines the two senses of the term in his 
analysis of "alienation in its totality" as he sees it in bourgeois 
capitalism.
From the differing usages of the term "alienation" to characterize 
a situation of separation, and/or a loss of unity, one is led to ask 
whether there was an essential state of unity and harmony which was 
disrupted; and/or whether it is possible to regain or attain that lost 
unity. Notice that the first question may imply the second, but not 
necessarily so. In fact, writers who conceive, albeit vaguely, of a 
primeval unity, do not necessarily envisage a return to such unity. 
Instead they seek to understand the separation in order to find ways
and means of living creatively with the disharmony and lack of -unity. 
On the other hand, writers who argue for a struggle for the attainment 
of unity and end of separation do not necessarily conceive of a lost 
state of non—alienation.
In relation to man, the question of alienation raises the issue 
of whether man is separated from his "essence". In other words, in 
speaking of alienated man, as Marx does, for example, is it being 
suggested that alienation arises out of a disparity between man’s 
"essence" and his "existence"? What is self-alienation, we may ask? 
These are difficult questions which have not been adequately answered 
with any notable degree of consistency in the use of the term 
"alienation". It is clear from our discussion that popularization 
of the term does not allow for its clarity and precision of meaning. 
Rather, inevitably, there occurs a proliferation of different and 
conflicting meanings which is a serious obstacle to any attempt to 
understand a particular writer’s usage of the term. In our case, 
Marx's concept of alienation needs to be stripped of the un-Marxian 
over-coating in which it has been dressed in consequence of the 
popularization of the term. This is not to deny that in comparing 
and contrasting Marx's use of the concept with those of others we are 
not aided in the process of understanding Marx. Having shown that 
the term lacks precision in its usage, we now move on to Hegel's 
description of alienation, for it v/as Hegel, more than anybody else 
that influenced Marx's use of the concept.
51.
C.
Hegel’s Usage of Alienation,'
It is generally accepted that Marx’s philosophy of praxis is
built upon the premise that Hegel’s philosophy marked the culmination
67of the development of Western philosophy, Hegel was seen as the 
68modem Aristotle. Speculative philosophy had reached its zenith, 
and, therefore, according to M a m  it must be transcended by realizing 
it. This meant that the synthesis in thought which Hegel had pursued 
and achieved must be actualized in reality. For Marx, this actualiza­
tion and realization of philosophy was to be achieved in the socio­
economic realm. Let us look briefly at the dilemma which Hegel faced 
and what he tried to achieve.
Taylor, in his moriimental work on Hegel, attempts to give ,fan
idea of the fundamental problems and aspirations which Hegel’s
69philosophy was addressed to,” He suggests
that we can best see these in the light of the yearning of 
his time to find a \<r&y of life and thought which would 
unite two powerful aspirations, which were both connected 
yet opposed. One (of those aspirations} is that unity 
with nature, other men and himself which man demands as an 
expressive being; the other is to the radical word autonomy 
which reached paradigm expression in Kant and Fichte. "JO
Hegel's realization by the early 1800's that "these two aspirations
were opposed to each other” led to the further discovery "that freedom
required the breaking up of the expressive unity, of the original
undivided wholeness within man and communion with other men and
nature, which he, like many contemporaries, attributed to an earlier
71age - principally that of ancient Greece. " 1 This fragmenting process
was inevitable and necessary "for the full realization of man as
72rational and free agent. " 1
Indeed, this "necessary division was to be healed in a higher 
73reconciliation." This reconciliation was already immanent in the 
process of fragmentation.
Taylor seems to be correct in his conclusion that "the major task
of philosophy for Hegel can be expressed as that of over-coming
opposition. The oppositions are those which arise from the breaking
74up of the original expressive unity,"' Thus, in Hegel’s view philosophy 
was primarily concerned with Intfremdung and Aufhebung , "alienation" 
and "reconciliation". This philosophical basis was certainly very 
attractive to Marx, who was concerned with man as he was in the bourgeois 
capitalist society of his day.
Explaining Hegel’s dialectic, Taylor points out that Hegel posits
75the universe "as the conditions of existence of God or Geist."
Absolute Idea or Spirit undergirds everything that exists. It is
necessary for the existence of Spirit that it creates the conditions
whereby it becomes manifest. This means that Spirit does not exist
apart from the vehicles in which it becomes manifest. The primary
embodiment of Spirit is man. Through man Spirit is manifested as finite
7 6being though it remains infinite. Taylor points out,
If Geist as subject is to come to rational self-awareness 
in freedom, then the universe must contain, first, finite 
spirits. Geist must be embodied. But bodily reality is 
external reality, it is partes extra partes, extended in 
space and time. Hence for consciousness to be it must be 
located, it must be somewhere sometime. But if a cons­
ciousness is somewhere, sometime, it is not somewhere else, 
sometime else. It thus has a limit between itself and what
is not itself. It is finite, 77
Einiteness becomes necessary for Spirit’s consciousness of itself as 
real. Spirit's existence therefore requires the rational conscious­
ness of itself as being embodied and expressed in man.
This whole process of Spirit's self expression is inextricably
bound up with the rational expression of freedom. Spirit is free to
realize itself through expressing itself in finite being. Taylor draws
attention to this fact when he declares:
But freedom, on the expressivist view is the condition in 
which the self is adequately expressed. Hence full self- 
awareness is impossible without freedom. If we add to this 
the notion that self-awareness is of the essence of the 
subject, then the converse proposition is also true: freedom
(that is, full self-expression) is impossible without self- 
awareness. Now Hegel would add to this common basis of 
expressivist theory, the thesis that the essence of subject­
ivity is rational self-awareness, that self-consciousness 
must be in the clear medium of conceptual thought and not 
in cloudy intuition or ineffable vision. Hence rationality, 
too, is for him a condition of integral expression or freedom, 
and reciprocally, 78
Now in the process of externalizing itself in finite being, Spirit
gradually comes to conceive of the finite as being separate from it.
The Infinite (Spirit) stands opposed to the finite. Though finite
of
proceeded from, and, hence, is a part/Absolute Idea, it finds itself 
in opposition to Geist. Extemalization has led to alienation. The 
necessity for Spirit's existence in the finite has led inevitably to 
separation and opposition. This alienation and its projected unity 
is known through the activity of consciousness.
In his description of this separation or alienation, Hegel has 
a two-fold usage of the concept of alienation. In categorizing this 
two-fold usage, Schacht speaks of 'alienationlj, where Hegel "uses it 
to refer to a separation or discordant relation, such as might obtain 
between the individual and the social substance, or (as 'self-alienation') 
between one's actual condition and essential nature;" and of 'alienation'2 
where Hegel "uses it to refer to a surrender or sacrifice of particularity
and wilfulness, in connection with the overcoming of alienation, and
79 ^the reattainment of unity,"'
In the first sense of alienation ('alienation'), Kegel is
1
considering the situation in which separation occurs after there was
a state of unity. Spirit, for instance, in coming from universality
to particularity through embodiment in man, is at first at one with
itself - i.e., there is unity between universality and particularity.
However, in the course of time the particular person, the individual,
comes to conceive of himself as being distinct and separate from the 
80social substance. Schacht notes that "Hegel considers this to be a
desirable development, in that it marks the emergence of a dimension
of distinct individuality and independent existence, which is necessary
81if man’s essential nature is to be realized completely." This process
of 'alienation1 results in ’self-alienation'. For Hegel, man is 
1 1 
essentially spiritual. Therefore, as Schacht notes, "loss of universality
thus has the result that one 'thereby alienates himself from his inner
82nature and reaches the extremity of discord with himself1." When the
individual loses his universality through a disunion with the social
substance, he no longer possesses his essence. In consequence, he
alienates himself from his essence and thereby exists in the state of 
83’self-alienation'.
1
Hegel uses the term 'alienation' in a sense different to that of
'alienation', when he attempts to describe how 'alienation', and
1 184'self-alienation* will be transcended. ^ This usage which Schacht 
1
labels 'alienatio.n* is intended to connote an act of wilful surrender 
£
on the part of the alienated person. The alienated individual can 
attain a higher unity with the social substance and his 'essence' 
only if he wilfully gives up his assertion of individuality which he 
had hitherto asserted. The individual can no longer insist upon the 
supreme importance of his individuality at the expense of universality; 
rather, he must surrender "the possession of an individual will which,»,
has not yet... been surrendered qua will." The following is Hegel’s
summary of this relinquishment:
For the power of the individual consists in making himself 
conformable to that substance, i.e., in relinquishing his 
self, and thus establishing himself as the objectively 
existing substance, 86
For ’alienation’ and its consequent unity with the social substance 2
to occur, the individual must surrender his particular interests, 
desires and inclinations to the extent where universality is not 
lost to or submerged in particularity, but is in fact realized thereby.
85
Marx’s Criticism of Hegel
It should not come as a surprise that Marx who wrote, "The
philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways; the point,
88however, is to change it," considered Hegel’s analysis of alienation 
and its transcendence to be too abstract and speculative. In his 
evaluation of Hegel’s description of alienation, Marx argues that 
Hegel concentrated his thought on the abstract categories of conscious­
ness and self-consciousness. He asserts:
For Hegel,,.#the alienation of self-consciousness is not 
regarded as the expression of the real alienation of man’s 
essence reflected in knowledge and thought. The real 
alienation (or the one that appears to be real) in its 
inner concealed essence that has first been brought to the 
light by philosophy, is nothing but the appearance of the 
alienation of the real human essence, self-consciousness. 89
Hegel, Mane adds, conceives of alienation as an awareness of finite
being, who, as consciousness embodied in man, comes to think of himself
as being alienated. There seems to be no grounding of alienation in
the social conditions in society. Transcendence of alienation therefore
requires a mere change in self-awareness. All this, says Marx, is too
abstract and more apparent than real. Speaking about this transcendence 
he says:
On the one hand, this supersession is a supersession of 
something thought and thus private property as thought is 
superseded in the thought of morality. And because this 
thought imagines that it is directly the opposite of itself, 
sensuous reality, and thus also that its action is sensuous, 
real action, this supersession in thought that lets its 
object remain in reality believes it has really overcome 
it. On the other hand, since the object has now become for 
it a phase in its thought process, it is therefore regarded 
in its real existence as being a self-confirmation of thought, 
of self-consciousness and abstraction, 90
Alienation conceived of in terms of consciousness is not real aliena­
tion; its transcendence conceived of in terms of a change in conscious­
ness is illusory. Throughout the process of supersession it is only 
abstract self-consciousness that is confirmed in its existence,
Marx finds a circularity in Hegel’s argument that reality is the
91self-positing of Spirit. Noting that the process requires ”an agent,
a subject" which "only comes into being as the result,,. the
subject knowing itself as absolute self-consciousness,,. God, absolute
92spirit, the idea that knows and manifests itself," Marx draws the
conclusion that
Real man and real nature become mere predicates or symbols 
of this hidden, unreal man and unreal nature. The subject 
and predicate to each other is thus completely inverted: 
a mystical—object or subjectivity reaching beyond the object, 
absolute subject or a process (it externalizes itself returns 
to itself from its extemalization and at the same time re­
absorbs its extemalization); a pure and unceasing circular 
movement within itself, 93
Richard Schacht and Richard Norman, among others, question the
full validity of Marx’ s arguments that for Hegel alienation and its
94transcendence were conceived in thought only, Schacht draws attention 
to a contrary example in which Hegel describes alienation in terms of 
a separation between the social substance and the individual. In this 
situation, it is the ’thought’ that is the reality of alienation.
Schacht adds,
The individual regards the social substance as something 
alien as a result of conceiving of himself in a certain way.
He ceases to do so when he comes to see himself and the 
substance in a different light. All of this takes place at 
the level of 'consciousness and self-consciousness’ , and 
would be inconceivable in any other terms. 95
Schacht therefore concludes that it is
no objection to Hegel’s discussion that it is cast in these 
terms, even if there should prove to be phenomena of a more 
'concrete* nature which are also characterizable as instances 
of alienation, 96
Norman, in his argument, si^ests
that Hegel sees the overcoming of alienation in thought as 
requiring the return of pure thought to the real world, and 
therefore as depending on the overcoming of social aliena- 
tion, 97
Having said this, however, Norman goes on to add that at a deeper.level
Marx is correct in his criticism of Hegel, He points out that
The trouble with Hegel’s account is that, having brought the 
alienation of pure thought back to its roots in social aliena/- 
tion, he then treats social alienation as itself an alienation 
of consciousness. (Norman’s emphasis). 98
The difference between Hegel’s conception of alienation and Marx’s is 
brightly limned in the contrast between the conception of the independ­
ence of the social substance from the individual as only an activity 
of consciousness, on the one hand, and as an actual separation in the 
worker’s relation to the social product, on the other. Marx insists 
that when the individual does in fact come to see the social product 
as alien to him, it is because it is foreign and belongs to another.
Finally, it is to be noticed that Marx seems to understand Kegel's 
use of alienation to mean objectification equals separation, i.e., 
opposition. Spirit, in realizing itself through externalizing itself 
in finite being, inevitably finds itself alienated from finite being. 
Finite being, which shows spirit to be real at the same time posits
spirit as being in opposition to it, "What is supposed to be the
essence of alienation that needs to be transcended," sdys I-'larx, "is
not that man1s being objectifies itself in an inhuman manner in opposition
to itself, but that it objectifies itself in distinction from, and in
99opposition to, abstract thought,"
D.
Marx’s Use of the Term "Alienation",
Richard Schacht points out that under the influence of Hegel’s
usage of alienation as "separation" and "alienation" as "wilful
surrender", Marx proceeds to combine the two images in a single
general sense of "separation through surrender" , ^ 00 Schacht explains
that this fusion of meaning was not a deliberate act. Instead it xvas
the result of Marx’s failure "to distinguish them in his discussion 
101of Hegel", Schacht's summary of this synthesis is very useful:
His own use of the term is the result of a (perhaps fruitful) 
confusion of them, through which the ideas of both 'separa^ - 
tion’ and ’surrender' come to be suggested. He gives the 
term many different applications. In each case, however, 
it is used to suggest the existence of a separation of some 
sort. And in each case, the separation to which the term 
‘’alienation’ refers is related in some way to a certain 
surrender: namely, the surrender of one’s control over
one's product and labour. This affords a contrast with 
Hegel’s two senses of ’alienation'-. In Marx, the separation 
is the result of the surrender; whereas in Hegel's discussion 
of the relation of the individual to the social substance 
the separation (alienation.) is overcome through the surrender 
(alienation). 102 (Schacht's emphasis)
In seeking out the specific meaning of the term in Marx' s use of 
it, one needs to bear in mind that Marx took the liberty to apply the 
term to numerous and different situations. Though its basic sense of 
"separation through surrender" remains fairly consistent, care must 
be taken to distinguish the various contexts in which the term is
applied in order to grasp some of the depth of meaning which the term 
possesses in Marx's thought.
As its name implies, the 1844 (Economic and Philosophic) Manuscripts, 
clearly shows that Marx was concerned with the interrelationship between 
philosophy and economics. Steeped in Hegelian philosophy and confronted 
by the exploitative character of modem industrial capitalism, Marx 
could not avoid the question of "alienation". Indeed he attempts to 
face the socio-economic and political plight of the worker, albeit in 
philosophic categories, as he proceeds to analyse the concept of 
"alienation".
Marx argues that there are essentially four categories of alienar* 
tion which are all related to production - man's creative work. Firstly, 
man is alienated from his product. In political economy, he notes, the
worker suffers from increasing poverty the more he produces. He is a
mere worker whose product is in the hands of someone else, the capitalist, 
the man of means. As the worker produces the capitalist is enriched 
since the former's compensation for his labour is not commensurate to 
the value of the product produced. This disparity is engendered by the 
capitalist. The capitalist exploits the surplus value of the worker's 
labour. The man of means acquires his wealth precisely because of the 
exploitative nature of production which he is able to manipulate to his 
advantage but to the worker's detriment. The product which the worker 
expends his labour to produce is alienated from him because someone else 
usurps his right to its " v a l u e " , M o n e y ,  which specifies the demeaning 
value of the worker's laboxir objectified in his product, is the impersonal 
link between the worker and his labour. In the productive process the 
worker is preoccupied with the wages he receives. His value is not in
the beauty and quality of his product. Though the product is the
physical substance of his labour, the worker is not free to use or
105dispose of it as he wills# To the capitalist the worker’s value 
is in his capacity to produce. He views the worker as a mere producer 
of commodities. The worker, for his part, internalizes this estimate 
of his worth, and comes to see himself as being valued at the level 
of his wages. Marx puts this degeneration of the worker very aptly 
when he says,
The worker becomes a commodity that is all the cheaper the 
more commodities he creates. The depreciation of the human 
world progresses in direct proportion to the increase in 
value of the world of things. Labour does not only produce 
commodities; it produces itself and the labourer as a commodity 
and that to the extent to which it produces commodities in 
general, 106
In producing commodities the labourer creates himself as a commodity
as well. Thus, in actual fact he is the architect of his own alienation.
To illustrate the hostility which the worker experiences between
himself and his product which now stands over against him, Marx writes,
... the object that labour produces, its product, confronts 
it as an alien being, as a power independent of the producer. 
The product of labour is labour that has solidified itself 
into an object, made itself into a thing, the objectification 
of labour. The realization of labour is its objectification.
In political economy this realization of labour appears as a 
loss of reality for the worker, objectification as a loss of 
object or slavery to it, and appropriation or alienation as 
extemalization, 107
The worker's creativity, objectified in production, is experienced by
him as loss because he is producing not for the sake of the object 
108but for the wages; and it is not he himself that appropriates the 
use and value of the products. The capitalist, who is considered a 
non-worker, dominates the worker and his products. Under the exploit­
ative capitalist system, the product is not an affirmation but a denial 
of the human value of the worker. Marx concludes, therefore, that, 
the extemalization of the worker in his product implies
not only that his labour becomes an object, an exterior 
existence but also that it exists outside him, independent 
and alien, and becomes a self-sufficient power opposite him, 
that the life that he has lent to the object affronts him, 
hostile and alien, 109
110Secondly, the worker is alienated from the activity of production.
The whole process is dominated by the capitalist who is driven by ego­
istical greed. Production is therefore geared to maximise profits and 
not for the human benefit of the worker. Consideration of the worker’s
welfare is secondary to the amassing of wealth - the primary motive of 
111production. The man of means occupies his dominant position not
because he himself has expended his physical energies to produce.
Rather, it is the result of his relegation of the worker to material
production which involves the expenditure of physical energy, while he
himself elevates himself to the position of authority and expends only 
112mental energy. It is this division of labour that serves to perpetuate 
113alienation, Marx sums up this kind of alienation thus:
Therefore he does not confirm himself in his work, he denies 
himself, feels miserable instead of happy, deploys no free 
physical and intellectual energy, but mortifies his body and 
ruins his mind. Thus the worker only feels at home outside 
his work and in his work he feels a stranger. He is at home 
when he is not working and v/hen he works he is not at home.
His labour is therefore not voluntary but compulsory, forced 
labour. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need but 
only a means to satisfy needs outside itself, 114
The worker1s activity is turned into passivity, his power of creativity
has become his wealmess. It is no wonder then "that when there is no
113physical or other compulsion, labour is avoided like the plague".
This, says Marx, is the epitome of the worker's alienation from the 
productive process.
Thirdly, the worker is alienated from his species-being ,
Man's species-life is turned into a means toward his individual life.
Like other animals, man has physical needs; but unlike other animals
man has "species-needs" - needs related to man’s expression of the being 
he is. The physical, animal functions of eating, drinking and pro­
creating, etc., which man shares in common with other animals are met 
by man in such a way that he shows himself to be a creative self-
conscious being, which other animals are not. He can freely express
117his creativity as he satisfies these physical needs. But satisfaction 
of mere egoistic, animal needs are not his primary concern. In produc­
tion, man is primarily concerned with the expression of his "essence" which 
118is freedom. Man, Marx declares, has a capacity for culture and for
119the cultivation and appreciation of the aesthetic. In Hegel’s
terminology, man is concerned with the "spiritual", in addition to and
120above his concern with the "physical".
Unfortunately, in his present state, man has become primarily
concerned with the satisfaction of physical needs. The "spiritual"
has become subordinated to those selfish ends. Acknowledging that
"eating, drinking, procreating, etc, are indeed truly human functions,"
Marx immediately points out that even so "in the abstraction that
separates them from the other round of human activity and makes them
121into final and exclusive ends they become animal." Marx concludes
that, in its alienated state, labour "alienates species-life and
individual life, and ... in its abstraction it makes the latter into
the aim of the former which is also conceived of in its abstract and 
122alien form," Man’s vital activity and productive life work are 
seen by man only as the means to the satisfaction of physical needs 
so that physical existence may go on. In contrast, unalienated produc­
tive life is species life. It is life that produces life, instead of 
impersonal things which are devoid of human essence.
In an effort to heighten the contrast between man as unalienated
species-being and man as alienated worker, Marx draws further upon
the difference between man and animal. He asserts that, unlike the
animal for whom there is no distinction between itself and its vital
activity, "man makes his vital activity itself into an object of his
will and consciousness. He has a conscious vital activity. He is not
123immediately identical to any of his characterizations," Only man
is capable of perceiving himself as the being he is; the animal cannot
do this. It is this consciousness that distinguishes him from "animal
vital activity," and makes him a species-being. It is only man who
sees his own life as an object to himself. Therefore unalienated man
is able to act according to his species, and in so doing affirms his
"species-nature". Thus his activity is free activity. On the other
hand, "alienated labour reverses this relationship so that just because
he is a conscious being, man makes his vital activity and essence a
124mere means to his existence," Whereas unalienated man can and does
see his species as well as other species as objects without thereby
being estranged from either of them, alienated man's objectification
of himself leads to his perception of such objectification as separate
from and alien to him. Likewise, the worker views his "essence", i.e.
his species-being, as alien and hostile to himself. He also has a
similar experience of his fellow-workers. Marx argues that man no
longer relates to "himself as to the present, living species," that
125is, "to himself as to a universal and therefore free being."
Instead, he relates to himself as to a particular, enslaved being.
Furthermore, man is not only capable of perceiving his needs, of 
assessing his resources to satisfy those needs, but he is also capable
126of deciding how those needs may be met. He is capable of "technique".
He can and does build "mediations" between himself and nature. He
interacts with nature, the organic objective world, which he fashions
and shapes, and which, in turn, fashions and shapes him as well. This
127is a process of mutual interaction. Nature is therefore perceived
by man, who is both a physical and a species-being, in two complementary
ways, It is the source of the resources for his survival, and it is a
part of him. This is how Marx describes this creative tie between
man and nature:
Physically man lives solely from these products of nature, 
whether they appear as food, heating, clothing, habitation, 
etc. The universality of man appears in practice precisely 
in the universality that makes the whole of nature into his 
organic body in that it is both (i) his immediate means of
subsistence and also (ii) the material object and tool of
his vital activity. Nature is the inorganic body of man, 
that is, in as far as it is not itself a human body. 129
It would appear from Marx’s argument here that unalienated man will
live in creative harmony with nature. Even now, albeit in an alienated
way, he organizes the productive process, whereby he "fashions things
130according to the laws of beauty," Moreover, he fashions things not
only according to the standards and needs of the species to which he
belongs, but also according to the measure of every species. He
"knows everywhere how to apply its every species inherent standard to
131the object." Advanced technology and "human" ways of using such 
technology are integral tothis complex process.
The sad commentary on the condition of man in capitalist society, 
Marx makes clear, is that advanced and advancing technology have seen 
the continued degradation of man. Alienation has torn man from his 
creation, and from nature, and vice versa. In the image of the world 
he has created, alienated man does not see that he has duplicated him­
self, both intellectually and actively in reality. He is t o m  from 
the object of production, including his "mediations", and from his
species-life, "the real objectivity of his species." Moreover,
alienated labour has turned "the advantage he ... (had]) over animals
into a disadvantage, in that his inorganic body, nature ... (has been}
133t o m  from him." This process continues ineluctably.
Finally, Marx speaks of the alienation of man from man. "Every
self-alienation", Marx declares, "of man from himself and nature
appears in the relationship in which he places himself and nature to
134other men distinct from himself."  ^ It is only through the real
interpersonal relationships between men that alienation can appear
in the practical, real world. Organization of the productive process
entails organizing social roles and distribution of workers, IToting
the active tole man plays in the ensuing relationships, Marx asserts;
Through alienated labour then man creates not only his 
relationship to the object and act of production as to 
alien and hostile men; he creates too the relationship 
in which other men stand to his production and his product 
and the relationship in which he stands to these other 
men. 135
In his alienated state, man continues to produce further alienation.
His perception of reality is distorted, and his actions are selfish
and hostile. This is certainly a strong case for man being the
architect of his own destiny, albeit an alienated one. It was also
the worker who made possible the position occupied by the capitalist,
a position diametrically opposed to, and dominant over that of the 
13 6worker. There is no doubt in Marx’s mind that the man of means
is himself alienated; and, even as he proceeds to exploit the worker
to his advantage, he furthers both his own and the worker’s alienar- 
137tion, Marx sums up the foregoing description thus:
Just as he turns his production into his own loss of reality 
and punishment and his own product into a loss, a product 
that does not belong to him, so he creates the domination 
of the man who does not produce over the production and the
132
product. As he alienates his activity from himself, so he 
hands over to an alien person an activity that does not 
belong to him. 1J8
This fourth usage of alienation incorporates Marx’s concept of 
159man as a social being. Man, we are told, knows that he is the
being he is, a species-being, in contrast to mere animal. He also
knows that he is distinct from other species-beings. In his pursuit
of the satisfaction of needs of the species-being, both physical and
spiritual, he acts within a community.^0 He affirms himself within
a community and not apart from it. In unalienated society, unalienated
man experiences concord and harmony with his fellows. There is mutual
exchange of creative activities without the concomitant dehumanization
of the workers which characterizes alienated, capitalist society. This
fact is brought into clear focus when Marx says,
Exchange, both of human activity within production itself 
and also of human products with each other, is equivalent 
to species-activity and species-enjoyment whose real, 
conscious and true being is social activity and social 
enjoyment. Since human nature is the true communal nature 
of man, men create and produce their communal nature by 
their natural action.,,, 141
Here we have a glimpse of Marx’s vision of the communal harmony that 
would characterize the future communist society. This sanguine apocalypse 
is in polar contrast to his description of the disharmonious, non­
affirmative inteimpersonal relationships which exist among workers, 
and especially between the capitalist class and the proletarian masses.
It is in relation to this antagonism between the two classes that he 
makes the following summary:
The first remark to make is that everything that appears in 
the case of the Hia^worker to be a state of extemalization, 
of alienation appears in the case of the non-worker to be a 
state of extemalization, of alienation.
Secondly, the real, practical behaviour of the worker 
in production and towards his product (as a state of mind) 
appears in the case of the non-worker opposed to him as
theoretical behaviour. Thirdly, the non-worker does every­
thing against the worker that the worker does against him­
self but he does not do against himself what he does against 
the worker, 142
It does appear here that true praxis is reserved for the worker, and 
that the state of the non-worker is more static than dynamic, hence the 
ontological description of his condition,
E.
Religion, Atheism and Raise Consciousness,
The unwary reader of Marx may be easily misled into concluding 
that there is no significant place for ’ theory1 in Marx’s concept of 
reality. This misunderstanding is often the result of the dichotomy 
that seems to exist in his thinking concerning praxis and theoria . 
Marx, it will be recalled, accuses Hegel of conceiving of reality in 
terns of theoretical consciousness, the mere activity of the mind. 
Drawing on Feuerbach’s reduction of Hegel’s Geist to man as a species- 
being, Marx came to realize that man and not Geist is the centre of 
the universe. Despite Feuerbach’s positive influence on Marx, Marx 
himself later criticized Feuerbach for not having gone far enough in 
his reductionism. He had not been radical enough in that he failed 
to conceive of real sensuous man. He was still very much wrapped up 
in his idealism and man was therefore limited to an object of contempla­
tion, This is how Marx sums up Feuerbach’s deficient conception of 
reality;
The chief defect of all previous materialism - that of 
Feuerbach included - is that things (Gegenstand), reality, 
sensuousness, are conceived only in the form of the object, 
or of contemplation, but not as human sensuous activity,
practice, not subjectively. Hence it happened that the 
active side, in contradistinction to materialism, was set 
forth by idealism - but only abstractly, since, of course, 
idealism does not know real, sensuous activity as such,
Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, really distinct from 
conceptual objects, but he does not conceive human activity 
itself as objective activity. In Das Vfesen des Christenthums, 
he therefore regards the theoretical attitude as the only 
genuinely human attitude while practice is conceived and 
defined only in its dirty-Jewish form of appearance. Hence 
he does not grasp the significance of 'revolutionary1 , of 
practical-critical, activity. 143
Marx’s insistence on praxis as the basis of all forms of conscious-ah— — „ — —
ness, does not negate the importance of consciousness. Indeed, as he 
himself admits, praxis and "theory" are bound together. Consciousness 
is derived from praxis, but then praxis is in turn shaped by consciousness. 
There is therefore a relational dynamic operating between the two.
Now, in his description of man, Marx is preoccupied with man as 
an alienated being who must be (and who will be ultimately) rescued 
from his dehumanized and depersonalized state. Man suffers from total 
alienation; his consciousness of himself and the world is distorted and 
demeaning. The capacity to perceive his \^ orld, to know that he is the 
being he is distinguishes man as a species-being from animal, Hut, 
though man still retains the quality of knowing who he is, and that 
he lives in society participating in activities of the species, he, 
nevertheless, suffers from illusions and distorted perceptions and 
conceptions of reality. His thinking mirrors his alienation and serves 
to perpetuate it even further. Both the capitalist and the worker 
suffer from such false consciousnesses. The capitalist’s attempt at 
micro—reform are doomed to failure from the very outset. He is not 
radical in his thinking for he merely seeks to reform society after 
having accepted it as it is. The legitimacy of his dominant and 
exploitative position in society is never questioned. He is unable
to see that all his efforts at reform are only "patchwork" relief, 
which are incapable of reducing, let alone ultimately ending political 
and religious alienation. Despite the capitalist’s efforts at reform, 
socio-economic alienation remains intact. This means that human 
emancipation is still a far cry from historical realization, Marx 
is convinced that the capitalist would not embark on a radical socio­
economic transformation of society which would endanger his dominance 
over the worker - his labour, his product, his consciousness, etc.
The worker, for his part, is still unaware that he is both the architect 
and victim of his own alienation. He is forced in his imagination to 
make real what is not. He suffers from ideology which is imposed upon 
his consciousness by the bourgeoisie,”^
Thus alienated, the worker (and the non-worker) responds by
creating various and sundry fetishes, "Imagination", Marx says, "bom 
of desire gives to the fetish-worshipper the illusion that an ’inanimate 
object’ is about to abandon its natural character and acquiesce in his
lusts. Therefore the crude desire of the fetish-worshipper smashes the
145fetish when it ceases to be its docile servitor," This process 
recurs again and again and serves to re-inforce and further man's 
alienation. Because he is alienated man's needs and desires do not 
accurately reflect the needs and desires of his species-being. Indeed, 
they are distorted reflections of his "essence", and in his attempt to 
satisfy these needs and desires, his creativity is turned to alienating 
ends. He is constantly creating fetishes, pouring upon commodities and 
other objects of his own creation, awe and power, and noble and highly
esteemed qualities which rightfully belong to himself. His experience
of his products, both practically and theoretically, is that of aliena­
tion, Having a sense of something higher and superior to what he
presently experiences,' he continually fails to see and acknowledge 
that it is an integral part of himself that has become separated from 
and dominant over him,
Marx had a healthy appreciation of the tenacious grip ideas can 
come to have over the mind. He therefore argued that alienating ideas 
which distort reality must be radically rooted out. This is no simple 
task. In his initial reactions to French socialism we gain a fairly 
illuminating picture of Marx’s understanding of the power of ideas.
He states:
We are firmly convinced that the true danger does not lie 
in the practical attempt to carry out communist ideas but 
in their theoretical development; for practical attempts, 
even by the masses, can be answered with a cannon as soon 
as they become dangerous, but ideas that have overcome our 
intellect and conquered our conviction, ideas to which 
reason has riveted our conscience, are chains from which 
one cannot break loose without breaking one’s heart; they 
are the demons that can only by overcome by submitting to , 
them. 146
It was only later that Marx came to hold the view that ideas are 
part of the super structure which is built upon the socio-economic 
base of society. Then he realized that it is only in transforming 
the socio-economic base, especially the mode of production that the 
mind will be freed of enslaving and alienating ideas. Marx became 
convinced that, however much people are coerced into giving up their 
practices and ideas, such an attempt at ending alienation would still 
be an abstraction and an ideological imposition. The question of 
force and ideology takes us into the realm of ethics which is another 
subject. We will forego our discussion of this crucial area of Marx's 
thought at this point so that we may take up the question of religion, 
Marx’s radical criticism of ideology as false consciousness meant 
that religion did not escape his scathing denunciation. Like philosophy,
51.
religion was seen by Marx as alienating consciousness. He was not 
as charitable as Hegel in his estimation of "this abstract, speculative 
system of ideas. Whereas Hegel saw religion as expressing inadequately 
what philosophy expressed adequately, Marx came to regard religious 
consciousness as the nadir of false consciousness, the most extreme 
form of alienation. Before we present his treatment of religion, 
however, we must first look at Feuerbach’s anthropological reductionism 
of religion for it was via the latter that Marc attempted to turn Hegel 
right side up.
Perhaps the two concepts in Feuerbach’s philosophy which Marx
found most attractive and appealing were those of "projection" and 
147"alienation". According to Feuerbach, man is continually projecting
his nobler self onto God, a creation of his consciousness. Thus, the
question of the nature of God is really the question of the nature of
man, Wartofsky notes that "for Feuerbach, the question of proving
God’s existence becomes a meaningless question once it is revealed
that the ’existence of God’ is the unconscious religious metaphor for
1A8the existence of man’s self-consciousness." It is the self-
149consciousness of man that is real and not God, The existence of
)
God is therefore a derived and dependent existence functionally related 
to man’s self-consciousness,
Feuerbach goes on to argue that the projection of a supreme Being 
who is superior to man, is both necessary and inevitable. It becomes 
necessary for man to create God since man needs man. The need for 
God reflects men’s indispensable need for each other. This is because 
man cannot know himself to be the species-being he is, apart from the 
other. As a being of consciousness, he requires objects, predicates, 
to know himself in distinction from other beings. Wartofsky provides
a useful summary of this argument when he says:
Man needs God because man needs man. Thus, the creation of 
God by the praxis of belief is an expression of the depend­
ence of human beings on each other. According to Feuerbach, 
consciousness of an other as a being like myself, in the 
I-Thou relation, is the species nature. The very recognition 
of oneself as a species being is the very act of species 
being that constitutes the species itself as a species. But 
this is only the form of species being. Its content is the 
need for the other, the dependence upon the Thou as an 
existential condition. In this interpretation the essence of 
species being is not species consciousness as such, but the 
dependence of man on man, which expresses as species conscious­
ness. The activity of species consciousness, its praxis, is 
its expression, or its objectification of this dependence. 150
Therefore to be a species-being means that man has a need for other 
species-being. However, because the existential conditions do not 
fully conduce, but do in fact militate against the experience and 
enjoyment of harmonious inter-personal relationships, man is faced 
with the critical question of his being: what is its true nature?
He suffers from alienated consciousness and is consequently moved to 
project his noble qualities onto a being who gradually comes to be 
regarded as superior to and independent of man. He posits God,
Thus "projection" is inevitable. Man has created his "essence", 
albeit in an estranged form.
We see here an attempt by Feuerbach to give Hegel’s concept of 
reality as the self—positing of Geist an anthropological centre. 
Understanding Hegel to be arguing that Geist is the most "real" and 
that man is the "finite", transitory self-manifestation of Spirit, 
Feuerbach "stands Hegel upon his feet" by positing man and his self- 
consciousness as a species-being as what actually constitutes reality.
The concept of self-positing Geist is illusory for it is a mere projec­
tion of man’s alienated consciousness. Wartofsky notes that conscious-
151ness for Hegel "is the ontological ground of its manifestation."
Thus, according to Hegel, consciousness is dynamic, not static; relative
to man’s ’^ essence”, it is consciousness that is ultimately the basis of
man’s being. Feuerbach, on the other hand, argues that the ‘’essence1’
1 52of man is in the process itself - i.e., in the dialectic. Noting
this difference in Hegel’s and Feuerbach’s conception of consciousness,
Wartofsky writes:
The species concept is not the living nature in itself, but 
only as it is reflected upon as the object for consciousness. 
Hegel wants to find the ontological ground for the very
possibility of such a species consciousness in the nature
of consciousness itself. Thus, living nature is, for him, 
nothing but the external form, the projection, and thus, the 
objectification of the nature of consciousness itself, 
Feuerbach’s move has a Kantian flavour: he finds his onto­
logical ground for the possibility of species consciousness 
in limiting the 'living nature’ that embodies this species 
to human nature. Moreover, the dialectical relation between 
consciousness and its object, in Feuerbach, rejects the 
notion of a prior essence either in the object, mankind as 
living nature, or in the subject, the consciousness of man.,.* 
In the dialectic as an evolutionary process, man creates 
himself as man, in the very process of coming to self- 
consciousness. 155
There'is therefore no Absolute Spirit in Feuerbach which stands 
over and above man to whom man owes the source and power of his being, 
rather the dynamic-nature of man continues to change as new needs arise. 
He argues that because those needs are alienated needs, then, inevitably, 
man’s ’’nature” becomes manifest in the act of projection, especially 
in religion, where man’s predicates are projected onto God, Thus 
religion itself is transformed. Since God- is ultimately man’s own 
perception of himself, then, in order to understand and grasp the 
nature of man, one has to equate the divine attributes with the higher 
and ’’ideal” attributes of man. With this anthropological reduction of
religion before him, Marx proceeded to describe religion as a phenomenon
.  .  1 „  „  .  154 -a n s m g  o\it of the socio-economic case,
Marx, we have been arguing, was primarily concerned with man - 
man as a creative, historical being. It was noted that man’s ’hssence”
is not fixed, having been derived from outside of man and history,
and unrelated to the economic mode of production. On the contrary,
Marx is concerned with man whose "nature" is ever changing and is
inextricably related to the material base of reality. Like Feuerbach,
Marx argues that it is self-consciousness which is real and which
creates God who is merely a figment of the imagination. God’s
existence is dependent upon the recognition of the world’s imperfections.
Man is faced with the perpetual need to cope with alienation, and in
the process his alienated consciousness creates gods who ostensibly
make alienated life less burdensome, but, who, in actual fact, robs
man of his "being", dwarfing him into a despicable creature whom he
comes to abhor. Religion then furthers rather than halts alienation.
Man’s consciousness is made captive to the caprice of illusions about
reality. As Parsons explains, Marx argues that religion deflects
"man’s attention from the conditions and problems of his real life,
1and rivets man to a ’fantastic’ and ’illusory’ happiness." He is
deceived into believing that his condition is improved by positing
God as being the ultimate creator of all. The degeneracy of man in
consequence of God’s increasing rise in stature, majesty and power,
constitutes real idolatry. Parsons writes,
For Marx idolatry consists in man’s production of a god on 
which he depends, which commands his devotion without his 
entirely knowing that it does, which man accepts with a 
certain degree of consciousness (and hence choice) as the 
centre of his life, and which progressively destroys man 
because it stands in the way of man's free, unalienated 
labour, his fulfilment, and the creative transformation of 
the economic and social order. 156
In this situation, man is no longer the centre of his life and of the
universe. Instead, God - his own creation - is.
As the epitome of false consciousness, religion blinds man to his
possibilities as a creative being. His potentialities lie dormant,
•unrecognized by men, even as he robs himself of his higher capacities
by transferring them to the bfeing of God. Moreover, as Parsons points
out, "In religion, man is still unconscious of himself, of the conditions
of his enslavement, of his possibilities, of the need and possibility
157of his liberation, and of the way of his liberation," Hot only is
man incapable of seeing the wretchedness of his alienation because
religion as ideology dulls his senses even as it legitimates his
exploitation and dehumanization, but he is also unaware that the
possibility for liberation exists, and, indeed, it exists with him.
Furthermore, Marx tells us that man, suffering as he does under
alienation, finds in religion an opiate which eases the burden of
158living under such depressing and depersonalizing conditions, Man,
whose nature is not only to have needs, both physical and spiritual,
but also to have the intellectual (and other) capacity to satisfy those
needs creatively, wastefully lavishes his creativity in furthering his
alienation. Creative.freedom is turned against him and intensifies
159his need of religion. But to take Marx's assertion that religion 
"is the opium of the people", by itself, apart from its context, as 
the definitive appraisal of the function of religion is blatantly to 
misconstrue Marx, and deprive religion of the redeeming quality that 
it has in his estimation. Taken within its context the quote reads 
thus:
Religious suffering is at the same time an expression of 
real suffering and a protest against real suffering.
Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the feeling 
of a heartless world and the soul of soulless circumstances.
It is the opium of the people.
The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of 
the people is the demand for their real happiness. The 
demand to give up the illusions about their condition is a 
demand to give up a condition that requires illusion. The
criticism of religion is therefore the germ of the criticism
of the valley of tears whose halo is religion, 160/
Here we see Marx at the height of his polemic on religion. Having
denounced religion as illusory, he now turns and says that it is
invaluable as a sympton of alienation. He argues that as long as it
exists, alienation will continue to exist. Moreover, it is not just
an alienation of consciousness, but a total alienation v/hich is rodted
in the distorted mode of production. Marx reminds his readers that
though in and through the human cry of despair and suffering, of
protest and call to action*, it is man's alienated religious consciousness
that is expressing itself, nevertheless, the cry is real and so are the
protest and suffering. Religion, then, can and does both hide suffering,
.and expose it. Once again, Marx repeats his central thesis concerning
revolutionary praxis: if the cry is heard and radically understood,
then it will be seen that it is a demand to relinquish and transform
those conditions - materially based - through v/hich illusions eventuate,
A natural question that may be raised at this stage is: what is
the function of a philosophy of atheism in counteracting and eventually
eradicating the influence and. existence of religion? Marx, it will be
remembered criticizes Hegel for conceiving of alienation only within
consciousness. He also criticized Feuerbach for not being fully radicad
in his reduction of God to man. He felt that the latter was still too
abstract since he had not reduced religious self-alienation to its
secular base, This secular base, Marx claims, "must itself, therefore,
first be understood in its contradiction and then, by the removal of
1the contradiction, revolutionized in practice," 1 In Marx's estimation, 
Feuerbach had failed to conclude his reductive process in such revolu­
tionary praxis. Beaming this attitude in mind, i.e., of Marx to Hegel's 
and Feuerbach's conceptions of reality, it is not surprising to find
that Marx does not advocate a philosophy of atheism to eradicate 
162religion. This does not mean, however, that he denies that theoretical 
and ideological atheism have no value in minimizing the influence of 
religion. What it does mean is that atheism is a mediation which 
must itself be replaced when alienation at the socio-economic base is 
transcended. Marx asserts:
Once the essential reality of man in nature, man as the 
existence of nature for man, and nature for man as the 
existence of man, has become evident in practical life and 
sense experience, then the question of an alien being, of 
a being above nature and man - a question that implies an 
admission of the unreality of nature and man - has become 
impossible in practice. Atheism, as a denial of this 
unreality, has no longer any meaning, for atheism is a 
denial of God and tries to assert through negation the 
existence of man; but socialism as such no longer needs 
this mediation; it starts from the theoretical and practical 
sense-perception of man and nature as the true reality, 163
It is instructive at this stage to ask what was the primary concern 
of Marx in his criticism of religion as false consciousness. The answer 
is unmistakably man, universal, social and sensuous being. In his 
description of man’s "essence" he points out that freedom is a 
characteristic of man which will come to full expression after aliena­
tion has been transcended. Religion denies man his autonomy and 
impinges upon his freedom. It mars his dignity. Atheism, as a 
theoretical activity, is not an end in itself but a transitory stage 
in man's quest for de-alienation, Marx is not primarily concerned 
with religion. Such a concern would only lead to further alienation 
since religion is part of the superstructure. Rather, he is concerned 
with man's historical "becoming" as he shapes and influences, and is 
shaped and influenced by the productive process in society. Since 
Marx denies the ultimate existence of anything which transcends man 
to which he is held accountable, then it is logical that he would 
attack religion. This attack upon religion is therefore a consequence
of Marx’s anthropological concern and not the reverse, Norris is
correct when he notes that, for Marx, religion "is grounded not in
political or scientific negations of religion, but squarely in the
164.affirmation of human autonomy.” We gain a fairly illuminating 
picture of alienated man’s dilemma of losing his autonomy in religion 
when Marx, in reference to Creation, says:
A being only counts itself as independent when it stands 
on its own feet and it stands on its own feet as long as it
owes its existence to itself. A man who lives by grace of
another considers himself a dependent being. But I live 
completely by the grace of another when I owe him not only 
the maintenance of my life but when he also created my life, 
when he is the source of my life. And my life necessarily 
has such a ground outside itself if it is not my own creation.
165.
Having seen that Marx does not attack consciousness per se but 
only religious and other ideological forms of consciousness, we will 
now turn our focus on Marx’s description of human nature. This 
consideration is most crucial for it brings us to the central issue 
in our study: Marx’s concept of man. How does Marx define man without
reference to .God?
F.
Marx’s Concept of Human ’’Nature” (’’Essence”),
The following discussion will attempt to show that Marx fails to 
define in precise and unambiguous terms exactly what he means by human 
’’nature” (’’essence”). It is obvious that he was convinced that man was 
not what he ought to be, and certainly not what he will be in the 
future, unalienated society. Moreover, it is inconclusive to argue 
that Marx found a satisfactory and comprehensive definition of man’s
nature in what God, especially the "God-man” in Christianity,is. It 
is evident that this was a guide, but Marx refused to accept such a 
definition as binding for all time for that would be too static a 
definition. It would be a priori and would be contrary to his principal 
thesis that consciousness - and this would include any definition of 
man’s nature - is socio-economically determined. To do otherwise would 
be anti-revolutionary and would mean contributing to the alienating 
autonomy of consciousness. In short, certain forms of consciousness 
would then remain absolute, instead of being relative and eventually 
becoming obsolete in another era when the socio-economic base of society 
has been transcended and a new matrix of material conditions were then 
obtaining.
Marx, we have been arguing, was primarily concerned about man.
He perceived the world with man at the centre, no longer subservient
to God, but in command of his own destiny. He did espouse Feuerbach’s
description of his own doctrine:
My doctrine in brief (says Feuerbach) is as follows: theology
is anthropology. I.e., that which reveals itself in the 
object of religion - in Greek, called Theos, in German, Gott - 
is nothing other than the essence of man. In other words, 
the God of man is nothing other than the divinized essence, 166
However, Marx went beyond Feuerbach in positing that man's essence
was socio-economically determined. In his estimate, Feuerbach had not
been radical enough in his anthropological reductionism. In his sixth
thesis on Feuerbach, he wrote:
Feuerbach resolves the religious essence into the human.
But the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each 
single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of 
social relations.
Feuerbach, who does not attempt the criticism of the real 
essence, is consequently compelled:
1. To abstract from the historical process and to fix the 
religious sentiment as something for itself and to presuppose 
an abstract - isolated - human individual.
2. The human essence, therefore, can with him be comprehended 
only as 'genus* ,, as a dumb internal generality which merely 
naturally ionites the many individuals. 167
Here we find that Marx is insisting that there is no fixed "essence"
or "nature" in man, "What constitutes the human person is not to be
abstracted from outside of man. There is no God or other power external
to and separate from man that determines man's "essence". His "essence"
is created by man even as he participates in productive activity.
It is disputed whether Marx’s argument that there is no fixed
"essence" in man is unambiguously laid out in Marx's writings. Let
us recall his use of the term "self-alienation", Schacht points out
that in using the term "self-alienation", Marx "has in mind both the
separation from a person of something which is very much a part of him,
168and the resulting separation'of the person from his essential nature."
On the one hand, Marx uses "self-alienation" "to characterize more
profoundly the alienation of labour, and occasionally, that of the 
1 t o  —product." ^  it will be recalled that in Marx’s system, labour is a
man’s life which becomes objectified in the product produced. Now
when both the labour and the product are alienated from him, then it
is his own "self" which is alienated from him. Schacht draws attention
to the fact that:
In ’the relationship of the worker to his own activity as 
something alien and not belonging to him* , Marx argues, it 
is 'his personal physical and spiritual energy, his personal 
life' that is alien to him - 'for what is life but activity?'
170.
Schacht rightly concludes that, according to Marx, when the labourer’s
"’personal physical and spiritual energy,’ as manifested in his productive
activity or labour, is subjected to the direction of another, his very
171-life is no longer his own. He is therefore, 'self-alienated’,"
172This is the first sense of "self—alienation" in Marx’s usage.
On the other hand, Marx speaks of "self-alienation” when he wishes
173to convey "the idea of !a total loss of humanity1." ' Alienated labour
produces man as both spiritually and physically dehumanized. Schacht
notes that here self-alienation "is virtually synonymous with
17A’ dehumanization’ flfritmenschung). "
The second understanding1 of "self-alienation" as being a separation
of essence and existence raises the question whether Marx was undecided,
or not, about man having a fixed and constant "nature" spanning all 
175time, ICamenka raises this issue for us when he notes an "obvious
distinction between Marx’s conception of alienation in the Paris
Manuscripts and his later conception. He states:
In the Manuscripts , he still sees man as alienated from a 
generic, social being which is at once the universal nature 
common to all men and the essential nature underlying man’s 
empirical development. In the Theses on Feuerbach , the 
German Ideology and the Communist Manifesto he rejects 
this conception specifically. There is no eternal or essential 
human nature from which man has become alienated, no ’Man in 
general, who belongs to no class, has no reality, who exists 
only in the misty realm of philosophical fantasy' . 177
ICamenka contrasts what Marx says in his sixth thesis on Feuerbach
(which was quoted above) with Marx’s description of man as a species-
being. Whether or not man has a fixed "essence" will not preclude man
from displaying what is uniquely his "species-nature" vis-a-vis 
17S"animal nature". It is only man that has the capacity for culture.
He alone is capable of recognizing himself to be the creature he is;
and in so doing he "becomes" the being he is. Man can and does create
"mediations" between his needs and the means whereby he may satisfy 
179those needs. How, despite this summary of Marx’s argument tha,t 
man is a species-being, man’s nature still remains an enigma in Marx's 
writings.
Plamenatz gives us a poignant description of this dilemma of
discerning whether Marx argues for a fixed in contrast to a created
nature in man. He argues:
To hold that we cannot explain how living and working together 
with others of his species affects man in ways in which it does 
not affect other animals without attributing to him capacities 
which are peculiar to him and yet not products of social inter­
course (though developed by it) is one thing; to hold that 
these are among his social activities some (namely, those that 
constitute ’material production’) which determine in general 
that character of the others, is quite another, 180
Plamenatz admits that "both these assertions might be true," He claims,
however, that the truth of the first assertion does not consequently
imply the truth of the second assertion, Marx, he points out, does
not explicitly say this. According to Plamenatz, "Marx does not even
distinguish between the two questions. Rather, he seems at times to
vacillate between the two, as if he thought them equivalent," In
Plamenatz’s opinion, Marx's disciples follow their master in maintaining 
181this ambiguity.
It would seem logical to conclude that since Marx argues against
a fixed "nature" of man, then, man’s nature is relative, i.e., it is
182both relative to and a function of the economic mode of production.
Man becomes what he is through work, which is his creative activity.
His essence therefore arises out of the constellation of variables 
such as the relationship to his species-being, to his product, to the 
activity of production, to other species-beings, etc. He is motivated 
by needs, both spiritual and physical, and it is in satisfying these 
needs that his "nature" is formed. Culture, which reflects the state 
and level of his nature, influences his needs and his creative activity, 
and is in turn influenced and shaped by them. In each succeeding 
generation, new needs arise and old ones disappear: these needs are
reflective of the nature and level of the productive process. 
Consequently, man's "essence" becomes transformed and evolves to
succeedingly higher levels. I-lany questions still remain unanswered: 
what is universal ’’essence”, and what is particular ’’essence”? What 
is the relationship between the two? What are the specific criteria 
for delineating what is human ’’nature”? These are crucial questions. 
This is noticed especially when they are seen in the context of Marx1s 
projection of man's revolutionary transformation of both himself and 
the material conditions of existence.
The question of criteria raises a further significant question:
From where does the criteria come? In Marx’s thought, it is clear 
that he believes that they are immanently present in the socio-economic 
base. This answer is far from satisfactory or helpful, and it does not 
demonstrate that Mar:?: was the thorough "empirical” materialist he
•IQ /
assumed he was. However, it is also obvious, that religion and other
forms of ’’false consciousness” cannot provide the criteria. They are
themselves alienated and alienating forms of consciousness.
This vagueness is illustrated in Marx’s discussion of morality
and law. In anticipation of the unalienated society, Marx gives the
impression that there will be harmony in the "essence” of alienated
beings, For example, Marx suggests that the laws of the "future"
society will reflect the inner core of man’s essence - freedom. A
"true” lav/ therefore indicates the existence of freedom, and not the
absence or suppression of it. Marx asserts that it is
only when his (man's] behaviour has actually shown that he 
has ceased to obey the natural lav/ of freedom,.,, ■(jfchat] 
the state law compels him to be free. Similarly physical 
lav/s only appear alien to me when my life has ceased to be 
the life/these lav/s, when it is sick. Thus a preventive lav/ 
is a meaningless contradiction, 185
It seems appropriate to ask: Would a "true" lav/ become a preventive
law when it is transferred from one age to another? Man?: leaves us
without an answer.
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It is a vain search to find Marx's definitive answer to the critical 
question of what constitutes man's "nature". We may find answers which 
show what it is not: for example, it is not a metaphysical abstraction
related to God, But v/hat it is remains an enigma to us, Marx is 
as dogmatic as he is vague in his description of man's "nature",
Axelos catches sight of this dilemma when he sums up Mane's anthropology 
thus:
It is man v/ho produces man, according to Marx. By producing 
his life, man produces himself, Man owes his (human) being, 
his essence and his existence to his productive labour alone. 
Man is created neither by God nor by Nature. As man, he has 
created himself, Marx's humanism is altogether radical. He 
recognizes no court of determination higher than that of 
human productivity. Productivity is an absolutely thetic 
pov/er; in it resides first positing action. Production is 
as v/ell the motor force of negativity, and it develops anti­
thetic pov/ers. Finally it is in production,and by production, 
that the supreme synthesis is worked. 186
The student of Marx is left to wonder at the precise meaning of
the concept of man as the "realizer" of his "essence", and also as the
creator of that "essence". Does man realize v/hat he essentially is?
Does he become what he is? Or does man become v/hat he creates? ’We
return once more to the question of "essence" and "existence", and are
without a definitive resolution of the issue. We are left to
tentatively summarize the foregoing discussion thus: The creative
power of man is his "essence". This "essence" is freedom — creative
freedom to transform nature and to satisfy physical and spiritual 
188needs. In the process of satisfying needs, man's "nature" v/hich 
is comprised of "spiritual" needs, becomes a new matrix of human needs,
and so on. Thus it is through his work that man expresses his "essence". i
G,
Communism, the Future Society and the End of Alienation:
Marx’s Utopian Vision.
In our discussion so far, we have attempted to show that Marx's 
concept of man is inextricably bound up with his concept of alienation. 
Man, we are told, is alienated from himself, from his fellow human 
beings, from the productive process and from his own product. The 
picture of alienated man reflects the state of the worker in nineteenth 
century bourgeois-capitalist society in Western Europe. Inevitably, 
Marx’s description reflects the visionary in him even though he claims 
objectivity for his analysis. But perhaps it is in his speculations 
about unalienated society, communism, that we see Marx's utopianism 
at its best. Convinced beyond any doubt that alienation was histori­
cally produced, Marx dared to predict that it would likewise be 
historically eradicated.
It will be recalled that Marx argued that man's rightful place 
is at the centre of creation, i.e., at the centre of the universe.
While nature provides the raw materials for man's creative activity 
and acts upon and shapes man, it is man who gives the world its shape 
as he transforms nature. History then is the history of the mutual
interaction between man and nature which leads to the humanization of 
190nature. This presupposition about the humanization of nature
undergirds Marx' s postulation of the de-alienation of man and the
complete transcendence of alienation. It is here we glimpse an optimism
that befits the Jewish prophet rather than the cold, calculating
empiricist who refuses to project a future beyond that which can be
191verified by the objective data available. Unfortunately, Marx
neither described, in full the future society he envisaged, nor did 
he articulate in clearly defined terms the path to be trod and the 
means to be used in the achievement of the transcendence of aliena­
tion and the realization of free, uninhibited, humanized, creative 
192man. Nevertheless, the glimpse that we are able to catch sight 
of provid® an indispensable insight into his understanding of history 
which will eventually tell a history of (even as it will be) man’s 
transcendence of alienation and his creation of his truly human 
’’essence'’.
However, before we embark on our discussion of history and the
transcendence of alienation, we must first piece together some of the
fragmentary descriptions of the unalienated society that Marx gives 
193us. It should be noted that Marx is here describing a reality that
has never been known in the history of the universe. According to
Marx, it is not a ’’picture" of a lost paradise which is about to be 
194.regained, Marx does not speak in such static terms; for him, the
future is ever open and yields the dynamically new,
Marx argues that in the future, free society, there will be no
longer any state which acts as an "intermediary between man and his 
195freedom," The emergence of the future society will mean that the 
state has disappeared. So long as the state exists, even when it 
facilitates the experience of an increasing measure of freedom for 
its citizens, man is still alienated for he is thereby made to recognize 
himself by detour - i,e, through the state. According to Marx, even in 
a state in which its citizens have gained political emancipation, the 
communist society is still a far cry. Remembering that Marx saw religion 
as a phenomenon - part of the superstructure - whose presence in any 
so-called "free" state is a blatant reminder that alienation still
plagues such a society and its people, his criticism of the situation
in the North American states is to he noted. He says,
The question is: what is the relationship of complete
political emancipation to religion? The fact that even 
in the land of completed political emancipation we find 
not only the existence of religion but a living existence 
full of freshness and strength, furnishes us with the 
proof that the existence of religion does not contradict 
or impede the perfection of the state itself, 196
Marx, therefore, concludes that the future, unalienated society is 
nowhere in existence not even where there has been political emancipa­
tion, Political emancipation is not human emancipation, and hence
religious emancipation is still to be effected even when political
197emancipation has been legislated into operation,
Marx points out that in the perfected political state dichotomies
continue to exist; in fact, they are integral to the existence of such
a state. For instance, there is the opposition between the "species-
life of man" and his "material life". Egoism remains unchecked and
is even fostered by civil society which stands opposed to the state.
This is how Marx describes the situation:
The perfected political state is by its nature the species- 
life of men in opposition to his material life. All the 
presupposition of this egoistic life continue to exist in 
civil society outside the sphere of the state, but as proper 
to civil society. When the political state has achieved its 
true completion, man leads a double life, a heavenly one and 
an earthly one, not only in thought and consciousness but in 
reality, in life. He has a life both in the political community, 
where he is valued as a communal being, and in civil society 
where he is active as a private individual, treats other men 
as means, degrades himself to a means and becomes the play­
thing of alien powers. 198
Marx adds that the political state cannot extricate itself from
the insiduous and perpetual domination of religion which, even at its
best, is profane and limits man’s experience of freedom. He claims:
The political state has just as spiritual an attitude to 
civil society as heaven has to earth. It stands in the 
same opposition to civil society and overcomes it in the
same manner as religion overcomes the limitations of the 
profane world, that is, it must likewise recognize it, 
reinstate it and let itself once more be dominated by it,
Man in the reality that is nearest to him, civil society, 
is a profane being. Here where he counts for himself and 
others as a real individual, he is an illusory phenomenon.
In the state, on the other hand, where man counts as a 
species-being, he is an imaginary participant in an imaginary 
sovereignty, he is robbed of his real life and filled with an 
unreal universality, 199
However, political emancipation is not without any positive value.
It is a necessary step towards complete human emancipation. As Marx
explains, "Political emancipation is of course a great progress.
Although it is not the final form of human emancipation in general,
it is nevertheless the final form of human emancipation inside the
200.present world order." The problem with political emancipation is 
that it is mistaken for real human emancipation.
It is to be noted that Marx’s description of his conception of 
"human emancipation" and the "future society" forms part of the core 
of his argument that man is the measure of man whose rightful place in 
the world is as the Subject and Centre of history. On the question of 
human emancipation, Marx argues:
All emancipation is bringing back man's world and his 
relationships to man himself.
Political emancipation is the reduction of man, on the 
one hand to a member of civil society, an egoistic and 
independent individual, on the other hand to a citizen, a 
moral person.
The actual individual man must take the abstract citizen 
back into himself and, as an individual man in his empirical 
life, in his individual work and individual relationships 
become a species-being; man must recognize his own forces as 
social forces, organize them and thus no longer separate 
social forces from himself in the form of political forces.
Only when this has been achieved will human emancipation be 
completed, 201
This is yet another illustration of Marx’ s rhetoric concerning the need 
for man to assume control of the forces of history which are intrinsically
his. V/hat Marx makes clear here is not how man will achieve this utopia;
rather, he reiterates his thesis that as long as man is not in control
of those forces, he is still alienated and unfree.
Noting that, for Marx "the true communist revolution could not
be political, as was the bourgeois revolution, but is human and social,"
Eostas Axelos makes the following comment about human emancipation:
It is in ceasing to be the alienated worker and the abstract 
citizen that man can become what he is: species being. It
is in ceasing to be the egoistic individual that he can 
regain his community essence. The recovery by man of all 
his properties, the abolition of the worker and the citizen 
in favour of the real man, the regaining by species being 
of all activities: this is the meaning of human emancipa^-
tion. Such was Marx’s thinking when he tried to exorcise 
the ghost of political communism. 202
The anticipated erruption of human emancipation will usher in 
freedom hitherto unexperienced in the world. Whereas under capitalism, 
the worker was reduced to a mere wage-eamer, enslaved by private 
property which is his own crystallized labour estranged from him, 
under communism, he will be free to choose whatever occupation he 
desires. In this way, he will be able to develop himself in a holistic 
way and not be inhibited by restraints in either the mode of the produc­
tion or the relations of production. The world here described sounds
more like a fairy-tale, an idyll, rather than as a reality in the 
actual, material conditions of life. In the German Ideology, Ilarx 
and Engels provide a vivid contrast between the alienated work situation 
and the unalienated, free world of productive and creative human activity
And finally, the division of labour offers us the first 
example of the fact that, as long as man remains in naturally 
evolved society, that is, as long as a cleavage exists 
between the particular and the common interest, as long, 
therefore, as activity is not voluntarily, but naturally, 
divided, man’s own deed becomes an alien power opposed to
him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him.
For as soon as the division of labour comes into being, each 
man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is 
forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a 
hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and
must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of 
livelihood; whereas in communist society, where nobody has 
one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become 
accomplished in any branch he v/ishes, society regulates 
the general production and thus makes it possible for me 
to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the 
morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, 
criticize after dimer, just as I have a mind, without ever 
becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic. 203
Whereas in natural society (naturwuchsigen Gesellschaft), man’s activity
is naturally not voluntarily divided, thereby making man’s own labour
into an alien power that subjugates and depersonalizes him, in the
"free” society, man will exercise freely the will to choose among an
innumerable variety of activities that will facilitate his humanization
rather than promote his alienation. History — man’s creative activity
with nature - will show man’s humanization of nature; no longer will
the primitive natural order persist and dominate man. Axelos provides
a useful summary of Marx’s sanguine vision here when he says,
In the world of planetary technique and the most powerful 
development of the totality of productive forces, in the 
world that will have completely transformed nature into 
history and stripped all that is of natural character, in 
the world that will no longer know the distinction of labour 
into mechanical work and spiritual work nor the opposition 
of city and country, the communist man will be able, follow­
ing his will and good pleasure, to give himself to these 
primitive ancient, and medieval activities; he will be able
raise livestock, and criticize. 20-4
One of the crucial problems with Marx’s description of the future 
society is that it arises from alienation itself. It is therefore 
logical to ask whether his claims that he is promoting the humanity of 
man are plausible. Is his perspective not inherently ideological, 
legitimating fundamental dehumanising tendencies in both man and society? 
Axelos grasps this dilemma when he asks: "Is not this anticipatory
vision of total man’s activities in total society, such as is expressed 
by the fanatic opponent of all ideology and every utopia, itself ideo­
logical, touching as it may also be in its naivete and its rural idyllic
tones?" The implication is certainly to be noted, even when it is 
also appreciated that Marx was thinking in universalistic terms that 
spanned all of humanity and human history and not only the industrial 
societies of his time.
Marx argues that with the State abolished, and private property, 
division of labour, money, etc, that perpetuated manfs alienation 
transcended through communism, the triumvirate of the "essence" of 
reality - society, nature, and man - will become free to work coopera­
tively and harmoniously, Man’s nature will be "restored" and through 
mutual interaction with nature, and with society, he will continually 
develop his authentic "nature". It cannot be othewise, for, as Axelos 
explains:
The realization of man's naturalism along the axis of 
the humanism of nature can take place only by way of society 
and through the life and social activity of men. Nature 
must not be given a privileged position at the expense of 
man and society, nor man at the expense of nature and society, 
nor society at the expense of nature and man, 206
In short, all hierarchical systems must be and will be abolished in
the future society. Marx assumes that the three - society, nature and
man - are interrelated and form a "common being"; hence, they must not
be separated from each other. Axelos draws attention to the fact that:
Properly speaking, one must not even distinguish here these 
three aspects of the same thing, of common being, of the 
being - in - becoming of totality, Indivisibly naturalistic, 
humanistic, and socialistic, communism will reconcile what 
was in conflict. 207
Marx’s concern about the future society draws its inspiration from
his primary preoccupation with man as a social being. The future
society is there not postulated a.s an abstraction which will replace
the present alienating and abstract society.
The society of the future will therefore be naturalistic, humanistic
and socialistic. Man will be no longer dominated by envy, greed, egoism,
205
physical need that seek utilitarian gratification; rather, he will
ever pursue that which makes for human self-realization. Under
communism, man’s focus will be on the future, Axelos tells us:
When man will have overcome his fragmentation and the duality 
that arises between the sensuous and material aspect of 
beings and things and their meaningful, spirit-order (spiritual) 
aspect, thereby finding the unified expression of the unity 
proper to his essence, then will he be able to appropriate his 
being in a universal way by appropriating at the same time 
the universal essence of all that is, 208
Everything, man, nature, society, will be in a state of perpetual change
being impelled by the future which will not be bogged down by the past
which is plagued by alienation. The future, as I-larx conceives it, will
ever bring new and harmonious mutations conducing always to reconciliar- 
209tion. The enigma in describing this future is well illustrated by 
Axelos’s criticism of Marx’s failure to bother himself with the extreme 
difficulty of achieving a reunification of what has become separated.
He points out:
Marx pays scant attention to the difference that separates 
any original unity from an enterprise of unification, and 
he does not let himself be bothered by the extreme difficulty 
involved in any attempt to reunite what was senai?ated4 when 
he conceived active humanism as generating total man and total 
society, and the total activity of man as inserting organically 
into Totality, 210
Disregarding the alienated state of affairs that currently obtains, 
Marx envisages a future that will be free of exclusiveness, acquisitive­
ness and having. He argues:
Similarly the positive supersession of private property, 
that is, the sensuous appropriations by and for man of human 
essence and human life, of objective man and his works, should 
not be conceived of only as direct and exclusive enjoyment, 
possession and having, Man appropriates his universal being 
in a unified manner, as a whole man. Each of his human relation­
ships to the world - seeing, hearing, smell, tasting, feeling, 
'thinking, contemplating, willing, acting, loving - in short 
all the organs of his individuality, just as the organs whose 
form is a. directly communal one, are in their objective action, 
or their relation to the object, the appropriation of this
object. The appropriation of human reality, their relation­
ship to the object, is the confirmation of human reality, 211
Han, the architect of his own liberation, the centre of the universe,
will, in the future society, rightly appropriate subject and. object and.
thereby realize his human essence which is universal human essence.
The description of ''communism'' which we gain from Marx’s writings
serves to further clarify his picture of human emancipation. Our
concern throughout has been with the picture Marx gives of the society
which he calls unalienated, and which he envisages will supersede the
present alienated one. Because the term "communism" may be easily
construed to mean a static state to be achieved, he substituted the
term "future society" instead, for the most part. But "future society"
is not without its ambiguity and like "communism" does allow for a
connotation of a goal to be achieved which suggests a static fixture.
However, when Marx uses the term "communism" he is certainly thinking
of a future not yet present, but it is a future that is "naturalistic,
212humanistic, and socialistic," It is a future that is dynamic, and,
as Axelos explains, it
is the movement whose burden it is to accomplish the task of 
universal reconciliation and to allow the full satisfaction 
of the totality of human needs, needs that renew themselves 
endlessly as they are satisfied. 213
It has already been stated that Marx was convinced that alienation
can and will be transcended through human activity. Hot only was alienar-
tion created by man, but it will also be historically superseded by him,
Marx bases this hypothesis on the premise that
Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be 
established, an ideal to which reality will have to adjust 
itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes 
the present state of things. The conditions of this move­
ment result from the now existing premise, 214
As could be expected from one who wished to realize philosophy in praxis,
Marx insists that communism is a practical movement of negating that
which negates the human "essence". It pursues the satisfaction of
practical needs and does so by practical means. It involves practical-
critical activity and not one or the other, in isolation from the
other. As Axelos sums it up:
It is in movement and its "essence" is mobile. It posits 
negation as negation in order to negate the world as it 
exists, the world that nevertheless provides it with its 
preconditions; and it comes to posit the negation of nega­
tion as a new and unprecedented position, as the point of 
departure for the movement that moves toward the total, 
practical appropriation of all that really exists. 215
The future to which it moves is an open future which is characterised
by the ongoing process of the negation of the negation, Marx implies
that it is a positive process which man knows and understands fully,
for he is (will be) simultaneously the creator and the created. Marx
himself points out,
Communism represents the positive in the form of the negation 
of the negation and thus a phase in human emancipation and 
rehabilitation, both real and necessary at this juncture of 
human development. Communism is the necessary form and 
dynamic principle of the immediate future, but communism is 
not as such the goal of human development, the form of human 
society. 216
The final goal, then, is not communism, necessary (and inevitable) 
though it is for human emancipation. It is a phase in the process of 
human development which will be eventually transcended. It is therefore 
limited. Failure to recognize this will lead to distortion of the 
liberation process, and will stultify human growth. Such a failure 
would be castigated by Marx as being ideological - demeaning of man, 
and alienating in its consequences on man, nature and society. To 
avoid such a blatant retrogression, communism must be taken for what 
it is. Axelos therefore concludes:
Though it is the movement of victory over Totality and of 
the (re) conquest of the essence of human totality, it hardly
escapes limitation. Communism will be in turn transcended., 
but not before it has been completely realized, 217
Finally, it should be noted that Marx’s optimistic, utopian vision 
is based upon his acceptance and transformation of the Hegelian dialectic 
As we pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, Marx was influenced 
by Hegel throughout his life. The most pervasive influence is in 
relation to the concept of alienation and its dialectical transcendence 
Though Marx applies the dialectic to socio-economic categories in the 
first instant in his attempt to realize philosophy, he, nevertheless, 
continues to view reality in dialectical terms, i.e., in terms of 
inherent contradictions which possessed their own solution (higher 
synthesis). Unlike Hegel, he envisages a historical transformation of 
alienation and the emergence of the emancipated society. However, he 
continues to base his theory of history upon the Hegelian dialectic.
It would seem that the ongoing process of future contradictions will 
not lead to further alienations but to ever higher syntheses and the 
realization of an ever widening freedom. With this in mind, we turn 
next to a discussion of Marx's theory of history.
Chapter II,
Marx’s Theory of History
A.
Premises for Transcending Alienation, (History as Universal History)
No one reading Marx’s description of alienation, with its 
wretchedness and dehumanization, juxtaposed to the unfinished, 
speculative picture of the future society to be ushered in by 
communism, can help but wonder at his optimism about the historical 
transcendence of alienation. It cannot be disputed that his descrip­
tion of alienation, one-sidedly economically determined thought it 
is* is a most perspicacious analysis of nineteenth century society.
Marx has really captured the state of man-in-alienation in bourgeois 
capitalist society.
But, by the same token, it cannot be seriously disputed that his 
description of communism, fragmentary though it is (and must be), 
takes us into realms hitherto unexperienced in human history. Nov/here 
has man been able to completely avoid alienation, not even in primitive 
societies. History, for Marx, has always been a history of human 
alienation. His expectation, therefore, that alienation will be 
transcended by human activity, leaves us wondering: how will this
be achieved? Indeed, the significance of our query is sharpened when 
it is realized that Marx did not have a clearly defined plan of action 
whereby man will liberate himself and the whole of human history.
In our feeble attempt at piecing together the unfinished indica­
tions of how reconciliation will be achieved, we are led to investigate 
Marx’s theory of history since it is man’s alienated creation, and also
because it -will eventually become authentic human history. Are there 
forces, both human and impersonal, which will collaborate to abolish 
alienation? What are the premises upon which Marx bases his optimism? 
Is the solution to the human predicament inherent in the situation? 
These and other crucial questions will be taken up in the following 
pages.
It is fairly clear that the premises upon which Marx bases his 
argument for the historical transcendence of alienation are not 
completely empirical in content. As Axelos points out, Marx’s primary 
premise is not empirical but metaphysical. Neither before, during, 
nor after Marx’s time have there been found a group of historically 
and empirically verifiable premises to demonstrate conclusively that 
Mstory - and this includes human activity - has been, is following, 
and will follow patterns which are empirically calculable. This does 
not rule out the possibility of discerning certain tendencies of and 
within history. Admittedly, Marx is concerned with the concrete 
activity of real men and with the concrete, material forces of produc­
tion, We note, for example, his theory of history as universal history 
of alienation, as well as his argument that the abolition of private 
property is a crucial step towards the transcendence of'alienation. 
However, this is not the same as saying that Marx provides a scientifi­
cally verifiable programme of de-alienation. We therefore agree with 
Plamenatz’s conclusion that Marx’s optimism about man’s transcendence 
of alienation and his creation of the ’’free" society is a significant 
reminder of a latent prophetic zeal characteristic of the prophets in 
the Judeo-Christian tradition,
Attention was drawn earlier to the fact that Marx was convinced 
that speculative philosophy has reached its culmination in Hegel,
There was no way beyond that point that is not ideological, except 
through praxis. This was the gist of his eleventh and final thesis 
on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in
various ways; the point is to change it," The translators of the 
Collected Works, (Volume V) note that "Marx himself separated this 
thesis from the preceding ten, as though underlining its summarizing 
character. We must understand the world in order to change it, instead 
of interpreting it one way or another in order to reconcile ourselves
2with what exists. Such in substance is the true meaning of this thesis,"
Moreover, they add, there is another thought, which is organically
bound up with the foregoing one:
The world cannot be changed by merely changing our notions 
of it,, by theoretically criticising what exists; it must be 
understood, and then, proceeding from this, transformed by 
effective action, material revolutionary practice. This thesis 
concisely formulates the fundamental difference of Marxist 
philosophy from all earlier philosophy, including pre-Marxian 
materialism. It concentrates into a single sentence the 
effective, transforming character of the revolutionary theory 
created by Marx and Engels, its inseparable connection with 
revolutionary practice. 3
This revoluttionary praxis which Ilarx has in mind is not confined
to any particular sector of mankind - not even to Germany, or to
bourgeois capitalist society. It is universal in scope. Over the
years through successive epochs, the base has been broadening until
the whole of humanity is finally divided into two camps - two classes,
the exploited and the exploiters,^ Marx illustrates this argument in
his discussion in German Ideology of the connection between "the ideas
of the ruling class" and "the ruling class itself", when he says:
For each new class which puts itself in the place of one 
ruling before it is compelled, merely in order to carry 
through its aim, to present its interest as the common 
interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed
in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of univer­
sality, and present them as the only rational, universally 
valid ones. The class making a revolution comes forward from
the very start, if only because it is opposed to a class, 
not as a class, but as the representative of the whole of 
society, as the whole mass of society confronting the one 
ruling class, 5
This pretenfie of universality is not without substance since the non­
ruling class does, if it is successful, gain benefits, not only for 
for
itself but also/a wider mass of alienated humanity, "Its victory, 
therefore, benefits also many individuals of other classes which are 
not winning a dominant position, but only insofar as it now enables 
these individuals to raise themselves into the ruling class." Piece­
meal, temporary "victories" are achieved, but the mass of humanity 
continues to suffer alienation, with the small elitist ruling-class 
feeding parasitically off the former1 s own energy and creation. The 
growing intensity of this inhuman struggle seemingly continues unabated, 
for, according to Marx and Engels:
Every new class, therefore, achieves domination only on a 
broader basis than that of the class ruling previously; on 
the other hand the opposition of the non-ruling class to 
the new ruling class then develops all the more sharply and 
profoundly. Both these things determine the fact that the 
struggle to be waged against the new ruling class, in its 
turn, has as its aim a more decisive and more radical negation 
of the previous conditions of society than (33) all previous 
classes which sought to rule could have, 7
At the very heart of this class conflict is the basic socio­
economic conflict out of which all other conflicts in history arise. 
Discussion of class conflict which Marx predicts will culminate in the 
proletarian revolution will be taken up later, but it should be noted 
en passant that Mane argues that conflict leading to change arises when 
changes in the mode of production leads inevitably to disharmony be Ween 
the forces of production and the relations of production. It must not 
be forgotten that Marx’s optimism for a resolution of alienation rested 
a great deal upon the new possibilities contained within the womb of 
ever advancing technology. Prior to and up to the present day every
succeeding generation found "itself in possession of the productive 
forces won by the previous generation which serve it as the raw material
Q
for new production." All of history is inextricably linked together
and history is the history of all mankind. Moreover, this process
occurs even when the mass of humanity is unconscious of its participa­
tion. Even during the decadence of alienation the resolution of the 
conflict is occurring, albeit in a hidden and obscure way, rioting 
Marx’s letter to Annenkov, Brussels, December 28, 1846, Jean Hyppolite 
explains that during (and because of) this inter-generational trans­
mission of the productive forces,
... A connection arises in human history, a history of humanity
takes shape which has become all the more a history of humanity
since the productive forces of man and therefore his social 
relations have been extended. Hence it necessarily follows: 
the social history of men is never anything but the history of 
their individual development, whether they are conscious of 
it or not. 9
This ignorance of its role in history will not characterize the 
proletarian class at the moment of its messianic overthrow of the 
alienated (and alienating) productive process. For then it will be 
fully conscious of its salutary activity for the benefit of the whole 
of humanity. Of course, during these preparatory epochs, parochialism, 
rationalism, and other exclusivistic and separatist attitudes and 
tendencies will be the order of the day. In spite of this, Marx is 
able to perceive history in i'fcs intrinsically universal scope and to 
proceed with optimism to announce the coming of de-alienation and 
human reconciliation.
Marx’s argument that history is universal history of human aliena­
tion and development is also related to his concept of human "essence" 
as being comprised of needs. It will be recalled that mention was 
made of the fact that man, like other animals, has certain ba.sic
physical needs which he seeks to satisfy through his encounter with
nature. Unlike other animals, man is able to create culture which he
transmils from generation to generation. Culture is a human deposit
of man’s creative use of nature to satisfy his needs. This process
has the effect of giving rise to new and higher needs vrhich are peculiar
to the human—species and are directly related to the level of technology
that obtains at each particular stage of socio-economic development.
Yet he speaks of needs of the species-being as if he is -conceiving of
universal species-being. The needs therefore of these species-beings
are envisaged to be the same everywhere (or at least it is assumed that
they will reach that point during communism, if not before). I Ian as
worker who is alienated in the ways discussed earlier, finds that the
essence of all his needs is in the universal desire for freedom and
redemption. This concept of history tracing out the cry of the species-
being for the satisfaction of his pervasive need of reconciliation and
de-alienation is yet another indication of Mane’s understanding of
history as universal history.
The question of the history of nature prior to human presence in
it and their mutual interaction with each other is an abstract and
speculative question. History has its origin in man’s encounter with
nature, ’’"When you enquire about the creation of the world and man,"
10Marx suggests, "then you abstract from man and the world,” With his
emphasis upon history being the creation of man, Marx categorically
denies the creation of man or nature by any grand designer or heavenly—
or spirit-creator. As he himself says, "spontaneous generation is the
11only practical refutation of the theory of creation." Further on 
he concludes:
But since for socialist man what is called world history is
nothing but the creation of man by human labour and the
development of nature for man, he has the observable and 
irrefutable proof of his self-creation and the process of 
his origin. Once the essential re’ality of man in nature, 
man as the existence of nature for man, and nature for man 
as the existence of man, has become evident in practical 
life and sense experience, then the question of an alien 
being, of a being’ above nature and man — a question that 
implies an admission of the unreality of nature and man - 
has become impossible in practice, 12
Marx does not subscribe to any metaphysical idea of or belief in a 
being who existed prior to creation. That would be tantamount to a 
denial of human autonomy and \vould thereby further alienation. To 
posit creation as the act of some being or agency outside of man-in- 
nature, is to deny that history is man's creation generated by human 
impulse, Man's roots would then be outside of himself and his 
experience of de-alienation would be subject to the caprice of some 
paternal benefactor. But this is mere abstract and speculative think­
ing, which has no grounding in the real and actual, conditions of life.
It would not be scientific, and Marx wants to be certain that his theory 
of history is seen as being fully empirical, Axelos sums up Marx's 
argument here very appropriately when he says;
The origin of man is nature, his nature is human; the Nature 
with which he is involved is always social, and its becoming 
is historical. (Cosmic) Nature and (human) nature, (social) 
technique and (historical) becoming are therefore inseparably 
bound and manifest themselves together from the very beginning. 
The visible beginning of all that is, the originating act of 
the World, is human history, for 'history is the true natural 
history of man', and 'only naturalism is capable of comprehend­
ing the act of world history', The originating act of all that 
is, the plan from which it all can be grasped, is this point 
of intersection of the 'humanism of nature' and the naturalism 
of man. 13
In his survey of the state of capitalist society of the nineteenth 
century, Marx discovered what he took to be the arch-enemy of human 
freedom; private property. The worker had created his own alienation 
which is tangibly and potently present in the form of estranged surplus 
production owned by the non-working employer. There is no mistaking
that all around, him the worker feels totally alienated. According to 
Marx, this phenomenon will "become universal ’even as capitalism spreads. 
But the function of private property in society is ambiguous. Marx 
tells us,
Precisely in the fact that division of labour and exchange 
are embodiment of private property lies the twofold proof, 
on the one hand that human life required private property 
for its realization, and on the other hand that it now 
requires the suppression of private property. 14
cV/e return to the problem of the cii^ fularity of Marx' s argument concern­
ing the causes and effects of alienation. Private property, Marx 
informs us, arose out of the exploitation of the worker by the capitalist 
who kept back a disproportionate part of the worker1s production for 
himself. It arose out of an already existing mode of production. This 
alienated mode contributed to the further development of succeeding 
alienated modes of production throughout history up to and until the 
emergence of the capitalist mode which, Marx points out, is the most 
.alienated of all previous modes. According to Marx, such an alienated 
pattern of development was historically necessary and inevitable.
Private property, for its part, since its existence was tied to the 
productive process, also grew and spread, becoming increasingly pervasive 
over each succeeding society. Along with the development in the mode 
of production and private property, the development of "techniqueM also 
occurred. However, the satisfaction of human needs was only partial.
As Axelos explains:
Technique served up till now to provide a partial, select, 
and fragmentary satisfaction of human needs, but that all 
took place within the world of private property wherein 
subjects were separated from objects. The abolition of 
private property will permit man to regain his human, that 
is, social, existence in the satisfaction of the totality 
of needs in a human way, 15
Marx concludes that, when the usefulness of private property is ended
and it therefore becomes inverted, then, the worker, acting in solidarity 
with all other workers, must engage in a revolutionary transformation of 
the productive process in order to abolish the alienating existence of 
private property.
Once again we are confronted by Marx's enigmatic description of 
the abolition of private property in actual "human" history. Fired by 
his sanguine vision of the historical transcendence of alienation and 
the "restoration" of everything to full and authentic human use, Marx 
boldly asserts:
The supertession of private property is therefore the complete 
emancipation of all human senses and qualities, but it is this 
emancipation precisely in that these senses and qualities have 
become human, both subjectively and objectively. The eye has 
become a human eye when its object has become a social, human 
object produced by man and destined for him. Thus in practice 
the senses have become direct theoreticians. They relate to 
the one thing for its own sake but the thing itself is an 
objective human relationship to itself and to man and vice 
versa, (i can in practice only relate myself humanly to an 
object if the object relates itself humanly to man.) Heed and 
enjoyment have thus lost their egoistic nature and nature has 
lost its mere utility in that its utility has become human 
utility. 16
The abolition of private property, we are told here, will effect a total
human self-transformation. However, nowhere has this been achieved
before. With the abolition of private property, man will be no longer
enslaved by egoistic need and enjoyment, and mere utilitarian satisfaction
of such selfish desires. Everything, the human senses, relationships,
17and human "essence" will be fully humanized. However much we may
criticize Marx's vision as being utopian and naive, and, indeed, such 
18it is, we cannot escape noticing his persistence in firmly anchoring
his de-alienated future in man whose creative power is necessary for
both his own humanization as well as the humanization of need and 
19property. As Axelos notes, "This can all actually take place in 
historical time, because the subjective and objective nature of man,
the human essence of all that is, both allows it and requires it,"
At this point it will serve our purposes to ask: What is the
nature of the fundamental premise that allows for the historical trans­
cendence of alienation? This question is implicit in the following 
quote from Axelos where he provides a summary answer to it:
The fundamental premise that allows the transcendence of 
alienation, namely, the essence of man (something that has 
never yet been empirically found), is metaphysical in nature.
And it is metaphysical in the traditional sense of that term, 
since it goes beyond the data of experience, Marx has never 
been able to establish the empirical existence of this natural, 
social, human, species essence of man - an essence whose history 
is but the history of alienation and which will show itself for 
the first time in the kingdom of universal reconciliation, 21
The use of the term "metaphysical in the traditional sense", at a first
glance, strikes us as being odd and inaccurate, for Marx himself does
castigate the presupposition of an other-worldly creator standing over
and above man regulating the affairs of man. But the term is appropriately
used since, as Axelos rightly points out, there is no empirical evidence
for the "utopia" that Marx envisages. It is therefore an "other-worldly"
picture of the future of this actual and real, sensuous material world.
We are surprised even further to learn from Axelos that Marx was unaware
22of "the metaphysical dimension of his thought". In the Genian Ideology 
under the caption "Premises of the Materialist Conception of history",
Marx writes:
The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not 
dogmas, but real premises from which abstraction can only be 
made in the imagination. They are the real individuals, 
their activity and the material conditions of their life, both 
■those which they find already existing and those produced by 
their activity. These premises can thus be verified in the 
pure empirical way, 23
Commenting on this text Axelos raises serious doubts about Marx*s
assumption that the premises are empirically verifiable. He asks:
But can the species essence of man, natural, social, human 
being, which is its own foundation, an essence never yet
20
realized but nevertheless the thing that makes possible and 
necessary the transcending of alienation - can this basic 
metaphysical presupposition be verified in a purely empirical 
way? Can the prospect of radical dealienation, faith in the 
possibility of the total transcending of all alienation, and 
hope in the future universal reconciliation be sustained on 
the basis of the data of experience? Are all those things 
implied in the wondrous development of technique as liberated 
from all impediments? 24
Though the answer to these questions is in the negative, we shall put
off making a final assessment of Marx' s theory of history until after
we have discussed some of the other significant facts of this theory.
B.
The Evolutionary Development of the Mode of Production.
In the preceding section it was noted that Marx was not totally 
immune to non-empirical ideas, even when he was dealing with alienation 
under capitalism and the necessity and possibility of its transcendence 
through man's initiative. The bourgeois capitalist societies of his 
day provided the primary "data" for his formulations about the actual 
state of man. Every concern and focus were directed towards under­
standing the alienating influence of capitalism. No consideration was
25seen in isolation from capitalism. This peculiarly Marxian outlook 
is directly related to his thesis of history as universal social history. 
Pre-capitalist formations, which Marx argues there were, were regarded 
as being in some way related to the emergence of the industrial 
capitalism of the nineteenth century. Moreover, the ambiguous historical 
development of human "nature" also took place prior to the birth of 
capitalism. As Marx himself claims, history has always been the 
history of human alienation, hence, even as technology advanced and
culture was transmitted, from generation to generation reflecting a
real development of human "nature", alienation gradually became worse
until it reached its nadir under capitalism.
The history of alienation, Marx tells us, begins not with
capitalism, but prior to that period, with the "pre-capitalist
26economic formations". However, as Hobsbawm explains, "Marx concen­
trated his energies on the study of capitalism, and he dealt with the
rest of history in varying degrees of detail, but mainly in so far as
27it bore on the origins and development of capitalism," 1 Hobsbawm
states further, "How it is generally agreed that Marx's and Engels'
observations on pre-capitalist epochs rest on far less thorough study
28than Marx's description and analysis of capitalism," In his study 
of the development of capitalism, Marx assumed a priori that the move­
ment of history prior to the emergence of modem bourgeois capitalism 
had a definite link with capitalism. For Marx, his study of pre­
capitalist economic formations confirmed this assumption. However, 
he did not demonstrate conclusively how the connection may be empiri­
cally verified. The Hegelian influence on Marx may be held accountable 
for this intuitive rather than apparent unity which the title "Pre- 
Capitalist Economic Formations" verbally connotes,
Eric Hobsbawm provides a useful analysis and summary of the main 
ideas of the Formen. Noting that "the Formen are both more general and 
more specific than the Preface, though they too ,,, are not 'history'
in the strict sense," Hobsbawm argues that Marx is concerned here
29with establishing "the general mechanism of all social change," y
Hobsbawm explains further that this mechanism is
the formation of social relations of production which 
correspond to a definite stage of development of the
material forces of production; the periodic development of 
conflicts between the forces and relations of production; 
the Epochs of social revolution1 in which the relations 
once again adjust themselves to the level of the forces.
This general analysis does not imply any statement about 
specific historical periods, forces and relations of 
production whatever, 30
Commenting on Marx* s inclusion here of pre-capitalist formations in
his view of history as universal history, Hobsbawm notes that Marx
71does so "on a materialist and not an idealist basis,
Secondly, Hobsbawm says that in "the Formen (Marx) seek (s) to
formulate the content of history in its most general form. This
32content is progress," By progress, Hobsbawm continues, Marx means
"something objectively definable, and at the same time pointing to
33what is d e s i r a b l e , I t  would appear that Hobsbawm, taking Marx’s
general description of progress at its broadest, interprets him as
34meaning "the triumph of the free development of all men,"^ According
to Hobsbawm, Marx takes it as axiomatic that the phenomenon of "progress"
(or emancipation), will be objectively seen and recognized as such,
Hobsbawm notes, "Progress of course is observable in the growing
emancipation of man from nature and his growing control over nature."^
Moreover, that the "triumph" is not only desirable but inevitable, is
not a matter of abstract, ideological hope and longing, but a matter
of the empirical accuracy of Marx’s analysis. Hobsbawm puts it thus:
The strength of the Marxist belief in the triumph of the 
free development of all men, depends not on the strength of
Marx’s hope for it, but on the assumed correctness of the
analysis that this is indeed where historical development 
eventually leads mankind, 36
In the period described as "pre-capitalist" Marx distinguishes 
four principal historical periods directly related to the socio­
economic "progress" of society. These are the "Asiatic, ancient, feudal
37and modem bourgeois". It is to be noted that the four periods
followed in a natural progression from one to the other, "beginning
with the Asiatic, which gave rise to the ancient, which gave rise to
the feudal out of which the modem bourgeois society finally emerged.
Marx himself admits that there were periods in which different societies
were in differing socio-economic stages. However, he was more convinced
that the so-called "Germanic system" - a particular manifestation in
feudalism - was "the direct ancestor of bourgeois society" than of any
other connection between any two of the other forms of society.
Admitting to the difficulty in ascertaining from Marx’ s notes an
accurate schematization of the historical stages, Hobsbawm suggests
the following summary interpretation:
The oriental (and Slavonic) forms are historically closest 
to man's origins; since they conserve the functioning primitive 
(village) community in the midst of the more elaborate social 
super structure, and have an insufficiently developed class 
system,,,. The ancient and Germanic systems, though also primary 
- i.e. not derived from the oriental - represents a somewhat 
more articulated form of evolution out of primitive communalism; 
but the "Germanic system" as such does not form a special socio­
economic formation. It forms the socio-economic formation of 
feudalism in conjunction with the medieval town (the locus of 
the emergence of the autonomous craft production). This 
combination then, which emerges during the Middle Ages, forms 
the third phase. Bourgeois Society, emerging out of feudalism, 
forms the fourth, 39
Being aware of the ambiguity of the foregoing summary in terms of
leaving the erroneous impression of a "unilinear view of history",
Hobsbawm immediately adds the cautionary word:
The statement that the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and bourgeois 
formations are ’progressive* does not therefore imply any 
simple unilinear view of history, not a simple view that all 
history is progress. It merely states that each of these 
systems is in crucial respects further removed from the primi­
tive state of man. 40
Hobsbawm concludes that for Marx, the relevance of his (Marx's) analysis
of "particular socio-economic formations" is in the light it throws on
41the "long-term transformation". To speak in chronological terms, as
Marx conceives of it, is to embrace centuries and continents in a
42broad sweep of thought.
Our repeated assertion of Marx’s thesis that history has always
been the history of alienation, leads us to ask: what picture of man
does Marx give us here? The "progress" which Marx argues occurs in
history, the growing emancipation of man which Marx sees arising out
of the changing productive forces, is one of "human individualization,"^
Beginning with the time of man in his original natural conditions
down through the centuries until the eruption of modem bourgeois
society, man has suffered the paradoxical experience of increasing
isolation and alienation (from communal ownership, etc.) even while
at the same time he was gradually moving closer to "the ideal of free
individual development" until in bourgeois society that ideal is closer
to its realisation "than it ever was in all previous phases of history".^
Reflecting upon the error of imagining primeval man’s subservience to
man as a natural condition, Marx tells us,
It is of course easy to imagine a powerful, physically superior 
person, who first captures animals and then captures men in 
order to make them catch animals for him; in brief, one who
uses man as a naturally occurring condition for his reproduc­
tion like any other living natural thing; his own labour being 
exhausted in the act of domination. But such a view is stupid, 
though it may be correct from the point of view of a given 
tribal or communal entity; for it takes the isolated man as 
its starting point. 45
Note that Marx is positively attracted, to this perspective on primitive
society because it makes isolated man "its starting point".
In support of his argument that individualism was more characters tic
of
of man in bourgeois political economy, than/man at any other stage in 
history (and certainly not of man at the "beginning" of "pre-history"), 
Marx boldly asserts, once again (using the strong adversive "But") that 
"man is only individualised through the process of history. Moreover,
Marx continues, "He originally appears as a generic being, a tribal
being, a herd animal - though by no means as a ’political animal' in
the political sense. Exchange itself is a major agent of this individuali-
47sation. It makes the herd animal superfluous and dissolves it," ' We 
are left in no doubt that Marx intends us to understand that the social 
relations in which man originally functioned were transformed for the 
communal relations eventually gave way to individualism and separation,
Hobsbawm states that Marx was convinced that in this state of total
48alienation, there are "immense possibilities for humanity." In support
of this conclusion, Hobsbawm points to a passage which he describes as
49"full of hope and splendour." Marx writes:
Thus the ancient conception in which man always appears (in 
however narrowly national, religious or political a defini­
tion) as the aim of production, seems very much more exalted 
than the modem world, in which production is the aim of man 
and wealth the aim of production,... In bourgeois political 
economy - and in the epoch of production to which it corres­
ponds - this complete elaboration of what lies within man 
appears as the total alienation, and the destruction of all 
fixed, one-sided purposes as the sacrifice of the end in 
itself to a wholly external compulsion, 50
Here Marx argues that despite the fact that man in bourgeois society 
experiences "the universality of needs, capacities, enjoyments, produc­
tive powers, etc.," as "total alienation", nevertheless, these powers 
are still latently hidden within bourgeois society. This is the 
occasion for hope in the future transcendence of alienation, Maine 
concludes that the future is dialectically present.
c.
"Crude Communism" to"Final Communism": De-alienation through History
We have already noted that, for Marx, abolition of one or more
but not all of the forms of alienation - for example, economic, political,
social, religious, or ideological alienation - still leaves alienation
intact with man the victim of all dehumanizing activities. However,
to treat all forms of alienation as being equal in relation to the '
source of alienation is misleading and ultimately unfruitful for the
total transcendence of alienation. What needs to be recognized is that
alienation is at the base socio-economically determined, and to begin
from there. Consequently this leads to an attack on private property
which is of the very nucleus of capitalism. This process is a historical
one just as the process of pre-capitalist economic formations was.
Therefore the movement from capitalism to "final communism ^  the
movement for the total transcendence of alienation and the de-alienation
of man, and the birth of real, "human" history — covers a path of
inauthentic or crude communism to begin with. In other words, the
process does not occur over-night; it takes time. There is a gradual
51humanization of man and society. With the parallel between the process
of pre-capitalist formations that finally led to capitalism, and the
movement from capitalism through "crude communism" to "final communism",
in mind, we now turn our attention to the development of communism which
Marx discussed at some length in the 1844 Manuscripts. In describing
this development, Marx refers to three stages or forms of communism.
To begin with, "crude communism", in its attack on private property,
52appears "first of all as generalized property."^ As Marx himself goes 
on to explain, "In its original form (it is} only a generalization and
completion of private property," Marx explains that at this stage
its appearance has
a dual forms firstly, it is faced with such a great domina­
tion of material property that it wishes to destroy every­
thing that cannot be possessed by everybody as private property 
it wishes to abstract forcibly from talent, etc. It considers 
immediate physical ownership as the sole aim of life and being. 
The category of worker is not abolished but extended to all 
men. The relationship of the community to the world of things 
remains that of private property, 54
In the stage of "crude communism", private property is taken to its
logical conclusion, Marx calls the stage "only community property".
The primary difference between this state and the previous one which
it has negated, is not that alienation has ended; rather, as Axelos-
points out, it is in fact "that the community continues to maintain a
55relationship of ownership with the world of things.""^
Proceeding with his description of the "nature" of this form of
communism, Marx considers the degeneration of women in marriage to a
universal state of prostitution as analogous to the universalization
of private property. He says:
this process of opposing general private property to private 
property is expressed in the animal form of opposing to 
marriage (which is of course a form of exclusive private 
property) the community of women where the woman becomes 
the common property of the community. One might say that 
the idea of the community of women reveals the open secret 
of this completely crude and unthinkable type of communism.
Just as women pass from marriage to universal prostitution, 
so the whole world of wealth, that is the objective essence 
of man, passes from the relationship of exclusive marriage to 
the private property owner to the relationship of universal 
prostitution with the community, 56
Private property is the crystallized "essence" of the worker* s labour 
which is in the hands of the non-worker. By universalizing this 
"essence" man gains control over his property, thereby ending aliena­
tion, Before this stage occurs, however, in the intermediate state of 
"crude communism", the phenomenon of private property in the hands of
53
a few becomes widespread everywhere, and is therefore no longer confined 
to a few select societies. The meaning of Marx's analogy of prostitution 
to explain this development in the development of private property is 
not clear. It appears that Marx sees the parallel in terms of the 
relative increase in freedom: the woman in marriage, by becoming the
property of the community, is freed from her husband who had hitherto 
had exclusive rights over her, Marx infers that this change in the 
status of the woman is parallel to community-ownership of the means of 
production. The ambiguity of this freedom is seen in the .fact that the 
woman is reduced to prostitution. Freedom from the single capitalist 
(husband) leads to enslavement to the whole community. Prostitution 
is therefore not a final stage. The woman must eventually be freed 
from the community. Interpreted this way, Marx’ s analogy of prostitution 
supports his argument that "crude communism" is only a transitional stage 
which must be overcome by "final communism".
Under "crude communism", the alienated "essence" of man - his needs,
desires, etc. - are also universalized. Marx writes:
Universal envy setting itself up as a power is the concealed 
form of greed which merely asserts itself and satisfies itself 
in another way. The thoughts of every private property owner 
as such are at least turned against those richer than they as 
an envious desire to level down. This envious desire is 
precisely the essence of competition. 57
He explains further that this process of competition must run its
course before it can be transcended. Thus he states:
Crude communism is only the completion of this envy and 
levelling down to a preconceived minimum. It has a peculiar 
and limited standard. How little this abolition of private 
property constitutes a real appropriation is proved by the 
abstract negation of the whole world of culture and civiliza­
tion, a regression to the unnatural simplicity of the poor 
man without any needs who has not even arrived at the stage 
of private property, let alone got beyond it, 58
Such a process may be rightly called "generalized capitalism" since
its principal intention is towards universalized private property. "
It is to be noted that everything that "cannot be possessed by all as
60private property" will be abolished. Furthermore, since "crude
communism" is characterized by a real degeneracy, it is therefore
limited in scope and should not be confused with "final", positive
communism which will usher in the age of de-alienation, of real and
not "sham universality", where man "is the -universality and power of
61society" and not capital, as is definitely the case in the former.
In summing up his description, then, Marx declares;
The first positive abolition of private property, crude 
communism, is thus the only form in which appears the ignominy 
of private property that wishes to establish itself as the 
positive essence of the community. 62
Should transcendence end with "crude communism", alienation will still
continue to plague man and society. This is a sober warning to those
who optimistically argue that the fundamental problems of man will be
(almost) solved if private property is abolished through a radical
programme of state nationalization in society. It is an un-Marxian
optimism, which, it must be stressed, however, is not unrelated to the
ambiguity in Marx' s thought concerning the relation between the abolition
of private property and the transcendence of alienation. It is helpful
to see nationalization of all property and industry as a form of
"generalized capitalism" under "crude communism", for, in doing so,
we are able to maintain the dynamic of this process which is certainly
the way in which Marx's thought of it.
The second form of communism which he points out is political in
65nature and it is either democratic or despotic. He claims that
though the state may be subsequently abolished, political communism
still remains incomplete and is "still under the influence of private
6/1property, i.e. the alienation of man." In spite of these deficiencies,
59
however, communism with or without the state, "knows itself already
to be the reintegration or return of man into himself, the abolition
66of man’s self-alienation.” J There is certainly a most decisive and
significant difference between the first two forms of communism. Yet,
Marx warns, as we have just noted, optimism must not run so high that
the transitory and limited nature of this second stage is forgotten or
consciously overlooked. The inveterate enemy is private property whose
alienating influence persists almost irrevocably. As Marx explains!
"But since it has not yet grasped the positive essence of private
property or the human nature of needs, it is still imprisoned and
contaminated by private property. It has understood its concept, but
66not yet its essence.” The point is that, at the- stage of political 
communism, proletarian awareness of the situation has not as yet matched 
the revolutionary praxis which is explicitly and implicitly being called 
for. Theoria and praxis do not as yet constitute that dialectical 
and revolutionary unity which is necessary for total human emancipation.
It is therefore the third form of communism that will finally 
achieve this. Here, "final communism” is the solution to the riddle 
of history and knows itself to be this solution,” Private property is 
abolished, and alienation is transcended. We have already discussed 
this above,
D.
The Class Struggle and the Proletarian sense of Messianic Mission 
to 'Idberate humanity and create authentic, unalienated human history.
In his critique of Hegel’s conception of reality as the self- 
positing of Absolute Idea, and of the historical movement as a movement
of consciousness, Marx argues that it is the socio-economic conditions 
that determine consciousness, and not consci’ousness that determines 
the socio-economic conditions. Therefore, to conceive of the trans­
cendence of alienation simply as an act of consciousness, and not in 
the real transformative movement of the mode of production leads to 
further alienation. However, having said this, Marx goes on to assert 
that consciousness, theoria arising out of and inextricably bound up 
with praxis is indispensable for the abolition of all forms of aliena­
tion, This liberating consciousness is the consciousness of real, 
living human beings. Such an emphasis safeguards Marx from the accusa­
tion of being a dialectical materialist who sees the productive process, 
with man as part of it and not man himself as the centre of it, as the 
centre of human existence.
We recall that Marx does not subscribe to the view of an independent
67Nature following its own inherent course of historical development,
Man, Nature, and Society are all bound together in a mutually inter- 
68active process. As Marx sees it, history is the product of human 
activity. In the context of his anthropology, history is therefore 
the alienation of man. This is pre-history as opposed to real history 
which begins with the eventual transcendence of alienation. When history 
is viewed only as the process of dialectical materialism then the 
"conscious-shaping" influence of man upon history - that is, his 
conscious transcendence of alienation and his consequent creation of 
a dynamic, non-alienated future - is denied reality. Hence, instead 
of speaking of dialectical materialism we prefer to speak of historical 
materialism to describe Marx's conception of history. The latter does 
not deny the dialectical nature of history; rather it acknowledges 
the primacy of man1s shaping influence especially in the transcendence
of alienation, in the very dialectical movement of history.
With this in mind, we are now free to explore Marx's description 
of the messianic mission of the proletariat in the overcoming of aliena­
tion. In our description of Marx's concept of alienation, it was made 
very clear that both the capitalist and the worker were alienated, 
suffering from alienating consciousness. The capitalist was driven 
by egoistic, limited desires, and was unaware of the alienating influence 
of the productive process as the root of all alienation. Through ideology 
(false consciousness) the capitalist safeguarded his position even while 
he attempted to alleviate the burden of the worker; but his efforts were 
to no avail in ending alienation and effecting human emancipation, which, 
Marx argues, he did not, and could not really grasp. The worker, for 
his part, was ignorant of his condition and was, for the most part, the 
unsuspecting victim of ideological imposition by the dominant class in 
society, Marx points out that the worker did not possess a liberating 
awareness of his condition as a member of a wider socio-economic grouping. 
Marx repeatedly insists that "other worldly" liberation was projected 
because of this ignorance of his real state, its origin and the possibility 
of its historical transcendence. Such degradation reached its nadir 
under bourgeois capitalism,
Notwithstanding this depressing state of human existence, Marx 
boldly announces that there is "good news"; capitalism was carrying 
within its womb the necessity and real possibility of a proletarian 
revolution which would overthrow capitalism and its alienating strangle­
hold on man and society.
In the Manifesto of the Communist Party, Marx and Engels wasted 
no time in announcing the new dawn that was about to arise under the 
auspices of the proletarian class. History, they argue, has been a
history of class struggles:
Freeman and slave, politician and $lebian, lord and serf, 
guildmaster and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and 
oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, 
carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, 
a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary 
reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin 
of the contending classes, 69
History has been characterized by conflict, revolution, transformation
and ruin. Society was never conflict-free and this conflict and contrar-
diction has intensified over the centuries until the class straggle has
polarized the bourgeois (capitalist) and the proletariat (working class).
But, they insist, the good news is: "Our epoch, the epoch of the
bourgeois, possesses, however, this distinctive feature: It has simplified
the class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up
into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each
70other — bourgeois and proletariat,"
Both classes are the products of the socio-economic development
of society. For example, in a rapid and cursory description of the
development of the bourgeousie, we are told, "the modem bourgeoisie
is itself the product of a long course of development, of a series of
71revolutions in the modes of production and of exchange,"' Marx and
Engels continue, "Each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was
72accompanied by a corresponding political advance of the class."
This advance was made through revolutionary action on the part of the 
bourgeois class. Its role there is in marked contrast to its present 
reactionary and anti-revolutionary role. Marx and Engels note that, 
for instance, in the transition from feudalism to capitalism, it reduced 
every relationship to its base-money relation and economic exploitation - 
even as it facilitated the gradual destruction of all forms of deference. 
Marx and Engels explain further:
The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put
an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It 
has pitilessly torn assunder the motley feudal ties that 
bound man to his 'natural superiors,' and has left no other 
bond between man and man than naked self-interest, than 
callous 'cash payment,' It has drowned the most heavenly 
ecstacies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, 
of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical 
calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange 
value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered 
freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom - 
Free Trade, In one word, for exploitation, veiled by 
religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, 
shameless, direct, brutal exploitation. The bourgeoisie has 
stripped of its halo every occupation hitherto honoured and 
looked up to with reverent awe,- It has converted the physician, 
the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science, into 
its paid wage-labourers. 73
Returning once again to the contemporary scene, Marx and Engels 
state that in order for the bourgeois class to continue to exist it 
constantly has to revolutionize "the instruments of production, and 
thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations 
of s o c i e t y . T h e  bourgeois class is convinced that they must be in 
the driver's seat if it is to survive, and its dominance in all areas 
of life to be perpetuated, Marx and Engels inform us that its impregn­
able and dominant status was achieved because over the years it has 
rapidly expanded and exploited a world market, improved the productive 
process and the means of communication, in addition to having "created
enormous cities, ... greatly increased the urban population as compared
75with the rural,,.." Its record during its relatively short rule of
about one hundred years is most impressive. Summing up this record,
Marx and Engels write;
The bourgeoisie ,., has created more massive and more colossal 
productive forces than have all preceding generations together. 
Subjection of nature's forces to man, machinery, application 
of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, 
railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents 
for cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole populations 
conjured out of the ground - what earlier century had even a 
presentiment that such productive forces slumbered in the lap 
of social labour? 76
This situation is obviously explosive and, as far as Marx and Engels
77were concerned, was in need of immediate radical redress. The time
is ripe for the bourgeoisie are no longer able to maintain their
ascendancy. ’’The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism
78to the ground are now turned against the bourgeoisie itself.”'
In theological language, it may be said that Marx and Engels
envisaged that under capitalism the ’’fulness of time" had come. Prior
to this time, there was no point where the contradiction between the
forces and relations of production coincided with the emergence of
the proletarian class which was so totally alienated. Marx insists
that only when this coincidence occurs in history will the messianic
and salvific proletarian revolution occur. Returning to the German
Ideology, we are reminded that this epocal moment in history is not
like previous moments in history in which the revolution was conceived
and hatched in the minds of the philosophers. Commenting on this fact
Marx and Engels state:
This sum of productive forces, capital funds and social forms 
of intercourse, which every individual and every generation 
finds in existence as something given, is the real basis of 
what the philosophers have conceived as ’substance’ and 
’essence of man’, and what they have deified and attacked: 
a real basis which is not in the least disturbed, in its 
effect and influence on the development of men, by the fact 
that these philosophers revolt against it as ’self-conscious­
ness’ and the ’unique’ . 79
The bourgeoisie have disturbed the real basis of society but they were
unable to effect the abolition of alienation. The moment had not
arrived for this to be enacted. Only when the socio-economic conditions
80are fully "ripe" will the great "leap” forward occur. As Marx and
Engels explain:
These conditions of life, which different generations find 
in existence, determine also whether or not the revolutionary 
convulsion periodically recurring in history will be strong
enough to overthrow the basis of everything that exists.
And if these material elements of a complete revolution 
are not present - namely, on the one hand the existing 
productive forces, on the other the formation of a revolu­
tionary mass, which revolts not only against separate 
conditions of the existing society, but against the existing 
’production of life' itself, the 'total activity’ on which 
it was based - then it is absolutely immaterial for practical 
development whether the idea of this revolution has been 
expressed a hundred times already, as the history of communism 
proves. 81
Even in their own time, Marx and Engels made triumphalistic
pronouncements concerning the dawning of precisely such a ’’kairos".
In the Communist Manifesto they write, "But not only has the bourgeoisie
forged the weapons that bring death to itself, it has also called into
existence the men who are to wield those weapons - the modem working
8 2class - the proletarians." We rightly wonder about what it is that
07
makes the proletariat so unique. Marx explains that they are the 
most debased class, and are therefore the only class which, in seeking 
to emancipate itself from its conditions is capable of emancipating the 
whole of humanity and of ending all alienation. In Kantian terms, only 
they, that is, the proletarian workers, are capable of making the move­
ment from a class "in-itself" to a class "for itself" into a movement 
of universal consequences. Axelos explains Marx's argument here when 
he writes:
Deprived of all property and all satisfaction the working 
masses, even though they activate productive forces and 
produce the wealth, take account of the fact that they have 
only to overturn those who hold the means of production and 
direct the relations of production in order to gain access 
to a human existence. Being reduced to a state of sub humanity 
and crushed by inhuman powers, the majority of mankind is the 
motor of the movement that leads to the appropriation of man 
by man and for man. The individuals that compose this class 
are no longer empirical, particular individuals. They are 
nothing and they have nothing in the present world. 84
It is in the face of such utter alienation that Marx and Engels sound
their clarion call; "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their
chains. They have a world to win. Workingmen of all countries,
•unite’,
But the proletarians can only emancipate themselves and the whole
of humanity if they have a transformation of consciousness, Marx does
86imply that he anticipates such a transformation. In his peculiar 
from
"sketchy” style,/what he says about philosophers, bourgeois capitalist 
thinkers, etc., the following conclusion concerning the proletarian 
consciousness suggests itself: Unlike those who conceived of real
movement in thought alone, the proletariat conceive of historical move­
ment in terms of the real, sensuous, material conditions of life which 
are firmly rooted in the production process. Whereas their historical 
precursors before this time never fully saw themselves as having the 
messianic mission to emancipate the whole of humanity, the proletariat
are fired by the vision of the possibility and inevitability of an
87unalienated future. This future is only theirs to create through
their liberating praxis. They are no longer the victims of a false
consciousness which leads them docilely to accept their lot in silence.
88There is a feeling of solidarity and mutual interdependence among them.
The proletariat is the only class in the history of man that is capable
of discerning the readiness of the objective conditions for the abolition
of all alienation, and only that class can take the necessary steps to
turn the productive process towards a communist future which will in
89turn be transcended. In seeking to establish a connection between
the proletarian consciousness which Marx envisages and Hegel’s notion
of the awakening of consciousness, which is so important in the dialectic
of Hegel’s Phenomenology, Jean Hyppolite clarifies the nature of the
proletarian consciousness when he notes:
The awakening of consciousness is not the passive reflection
of some state of affairs. It is that which alone can embody
the dialectical contradiction and at the same time demand 
its resolution. The action in which the proletariat becomes 
conscious of the alienation of man’ signifies a contradiction 
within man himself. This contradiction is a real one and 
demands a solution precisely for the reason that it is at 
once objective and sub.jective. It expresses an empirical 
situation - man posited, as it were, outside himself, like 
an object - and the negation of that situation - man as an 
inalienable subject for whom it is impossible to recognize 
himself as a mere object. For Marx the proletariat is the 
subject that experiences to- the extreme the extreme of the 
human condition and is thereby capable of resolving it 
forever. 90 (Emphasis mine.)
Only the proletariat is capable of this active, revolutionary self-
consciousness.
Our presentation of this transformed consciousness of the proletariat
the subjective side of the conditions preparatory for the revolutionary
91emancipation of alienation - has a strong note of inevitability. As 
we have already noted, Marx does speak in terns that would suggest that 
the revolution is a fore-gone conclusion. He anticipates, as we said 
before, that both the objective and subjective conditions of the 
revolution will occur (and have in fact occurred) simultaneously under 
bourgeois capitalism. In spite of this, Avineri raises the question of 
whether the awakening of the revolutionary consciousness in the pro­
letariat is indeed inevitable, given the objective conditions. He
argues that such a question takes us back once again to the problem
92of "determinism versus voluntarism.” He adds, that in his view this
dilemma is transcended by the dialectical nature of the revolutionary
consciousness of the proletariat. However, he insists that, instead
of providing any guarantee concerning the success of the revolution prior
to its occurrence or simply assuming a priori that the revolution will
93succeed, Marx "only indicates its possibilities historically,"" That 
is, he indicates that the revolution will occur provided that there is 
a unity of theory and praxis , of the subjective and objective conditions
in history, Avineri sums up his argument thus;
If a revolutionary consciousness exists, then the revolution 
is bound to happen. The activist and practical elements of 
this consciousness imply that circumstances will change with 
the self-change of the proletariat. In other words, under 
these conditions the revolution is already taking place. If, 
on the other hand, such a consciousness is lacking, then the 
revolution lacks its main impulse and is stillborn. If the 
proletariat has self-consciousness, it will sustain the 
revolution. Its self-consciousness is already a major 
component of the revolutionary situation. If, however, the 
proletariat is still unaware of its own historical position, 
if it does not possess an adequate world view, then the 
objective conditions by themselves will not create the revolu­
tion until and unless the proletariat grasps that by shaping 
its own view of the world it also changes it. 94
Thus, since the proletarian revolution is a contingent revolution, then, 
as Avineri explains, Marx is not concerned primarily with predicting 
the inevitability of the revolution without paying regard to the nature 
and state of the revolutionary forces in history.
This interpretation of Marx is of special significance for our 
analysis of Marx's teaching about the historical inevitability of the 
revolution precisely because it raises the following questions; Will 
the proletariat really possess such a consciousness? If they do not, 
and, consequently, the revolution remains in the womb of history or is 
stillborn, do they still qualify for the title "proletariat" in the 
Marxian sense? Given that the capitalist class will not be able to 
go beyond a certain point in preventing the revolution, and that "sin" 
is nothing more or less than historical alienation which man will 
ultimately transcend, who will ultimately bear the blame and responsi­
bility for the failure of theory and praxis to unite? Furthermore, 
what if men like Marx and Engels from the bourgeois class, or, more 
accurately, the bourgeois intelligentsia, are possessed of a messianic 
consciousness, but obviously are not the most deprived and dehumanized 
people in the world, do they qualify for the description "proletariat "?
In the latter case (as well as in the former) the question might be 
raised as to whether the "objective" conditions actually do obtain in 
either society, or not.
The proletarian revolution has not occurred as yet; it remains
eschatological. Consequently the questions above remain rhetorical.
However, they are critical, not only for an historical appraisal of
Marx’s "predictions", but also for a realistic and honest appraisal
of all "revolutions" which are in one way or another connected with
Marx's philosophy. All too often "revolutions" which were ostensibly
have
advocated and enacted on behalf of the "proletariat"/resuited in a 
state of oppression against man. While in some instances such failure 
leads to cynicism, disenchantment, and even despair, in others it stirs 
the utopian zeal to lead the "true proletarian revolution". In short, 
Marx’s "proletarian soteriology" continues to entice both proletarian 
worker and bourgeois revolutionary, self-styled or real.
E.
Marx and Engels - Dialectical and Historical Materialism.
Until now we have dealt with the "pre-capitalist economic formar- 
tions" and the development of communism from "crude communism" to 
positive, emancipating communism, as "separate" movements in history 
leading to the birth of bourgeois capitalism and as arising out of 
and abolishing capitalism totally, respectively. Such a separation 
is chronologically necessary since they occur in two different time 
periods: pre- and post-capitalist. However, they are bound together
in an inseparable unity since their movement is dialectical. By this
107.
is meant the actual movement in history of one "mode" out of the one
immediately preceding it which contained the necessary ingredients in
its womb. Of course, from Marx’s standpoint these "modes” are to be
understood in terms of their socio-economic bases from which all
superstructures are dialectically derived. Dialectic also involves
negation, for what comes out of it is something new and different from
95its immediate precursor.  ^ Nevertheless, an essential unity exists 
between the two modes. This negation, for Marx, borrowing from the 
Hegelian dialectic, is the negation of the negation: the negation of all that
negates man as authentic being, that which alienates man making him- a 
mere thing, ^
This dialectical conception of reality - real, material, sensuous
reality - is the primary argument used in support of the view that Marx
was no determinist, be it teleological, economic, materialist, techno-
97logical or mechanical. As Avineri explains:
Marx’s approach to communism demonstrates his belief that 
the crystallization of socialist forms of society cannot be 
achieved through a deterministic teleology, but grows out of 
the causal analysis of existing social forces. If communism 
cannot be understood otherwise than by its emergence from 
capitalist society, then the study of capitalism provides 
the best means to comprehend the development that will 
ultimately bring communism about. Moreover the emergence 
of communism from the womb of capitalist society draws 
attention to the dialectical relationship between the two 
societies. The possibility for a development in the direc­
tion of communism thus depends on a prior development of 
capitalism, 93
It was noted earlier that, according to Marx, this dialectical relation­
ship between capitalism and communism also characterized the emergence 
of capitalism from its "pre-capitalist economic formations". Avineri 
concludes that "communism is nothing else than the dialectical abolition
of those hidden potentialities which could not have been historically
99realized under the limiting conditions of capitalism." Avineri’s
interpretation does in fact take note of Marx's implicit assertion,
in the Communist Manifesto, that "what the bourgeoisie produces is
above all its own grave diggers. Its fall and the victory of the
proletariat are equally inevitable. ” 100 Commenting on this passage,
Avineri says, "Capitalism thus creates urges that it cannot itself
satisfy and it is in this sense that Marx refers to its digging its 
101own grave," It would be instructive for our purpose to examine in
some detail the attempts by scholars to interpret Marx's ."dialectic"
in light of the apparent controversy concerning the "inevitability"
with
of communism. We shall concern ourselves/the works of two scholars:
William Shaw and Eertell Oilman,
In one of the most recent studies on Marx's theory of history,
William H, Shaw declares his intention "to champion a technological-
102determinist interpretation" in his- work. This interpretation, he
explains further, "credits the forces of production with the determining 
103role in history," Finally, he attempts "to illuminate more precisely
the primacy of the productive forces and their explanatory role within
historical materialism. " 104 At first glance it would appear that
Shaw's exposition of the foregoing purpose would be better placed
under our discussion of Marx's materialist conception of reality.
This conclusion follows the obvious concern of the writer with the
primacy of the productive forces over all other forces in the historical
movement of man and society. According to Shaw, "Marx believes that
the introduction of new relations of production is contingent on the
development of the productive forces in a way in which those forces
105are not dependent on the relations," Shaw..adds that Marx was
convinced that "without a sufficient level of productivity, communal 
production relations would only result in stagnation and decline in
109.
in the mode of production - from which class distinctions would re- 
106emerge,” In anticipation of criticism of this Marxian hypothesis,
Shaw states furthers
A critic, even if he accepted this, might argue that given 
an adequate high level of the productive forces, certain 
supers true tural elements are still necessary for a change 
in production relations. In a sense Marx would agree with 
this, but he avers that the presence of those other factors 
stem from the existence of the new productive forces. The 
emergence of these forces (and, one supposes, men’s 
consciousness of this) both stimulates and makes possible 
the introduction of new relations of production, 107
But the conclusion that Shaw was concerned with Marx* s- materialist
conception of history, does not rule out the possibility of his
discussion of the dynamic change that Marx sees occurring in man,
108society and nature through their dialectical inter-relationship.
But, do these changes in the relations of production and all
forms of superstruetural activities simply arise out of changes in
the mode of production in a simple and direct relationship of cause
and effect? Shaw replies in the negative arguing that Marx did not
109propound an economic determinism. To conceive of the above relation­
ship. in direct and not dialectical terms would invariably lead to the 
postulation of ’’laws of development” which would mean that society 
simply'follows an evolutionary process governed by pre-determined, 
inexorable laws. This woujd rule out the efficacy of human decision­
making and creativity in determining and shaping society. Man would 
be simply a mechanistically-determined being whose ’’nature” is continu­
ally characterized by alienation with no hope of real and total trans­
cendence, In short, man would not be the centre, as well as in control 
of human history. On the question of economic determinism, Shaw has 
this to say:
Just as for Marx there are no substantive general laws of 
economic life, though each period has its own, so with the 
connections between the economic structure and super- 
structural relations. It is a law for Marx that the super­
structure is derived from the base, but this is a law about 
laws: in each social formation, more specific laws govern
the precise nature of this general derivation. Engels seems 
to have appreciated this: 'All history must be studied afresh,
the conditions of existence of the different formations of 
society must be examined individually before the attempt is 
■ made to deduce from them the political, civil-law, aesthetic, 
philosophic, religious, etc. views corresponding to them'. 110
Here we find that according to Shaw’s interpretation, Marx sees
the connection between the "economic structure and the superstruetural
relations" not as being governed by inexorable "laws" which stand
objectively outside of the particular historical epoch being considered.
Rather, Marx sees these "laws" as integral and unique to the particular
epoch in which they operate. Therefore in using the term "laws", Shaw
seeks to point to Marx's conception of historical processes as dynamic
rather than static relations. Moreover, when Shaw refers to Marx's
thesis that "the superstructure is derived from the base" as "a law for
Marx", it is not to be interpreted to mean a law in the natural sciences.
It cannot be tested by using the empirical framework of the natural
sciences. Indeed it would be more appropriate to speak of presupposition,
111premise or assumption rather than law in this respect. It is 
certainly evident throughout Marx’s works that the thesis that base 
is prior to and also gives rise to superstructure is central to his 
presuppositional framework.
On the question of the functional relationship between the base 
and superstructure, Marx argues that it is dialectical. This means 
that not only does the base influence the superstructure, but the 
reverse process also occurs. This process, Marx states further, is 
characterized by progress which arises out of the conflict between base 
and superstructure, or, more precisely between the mode and the relation
of production which are in perpetual conflict. According to Shaw,
Marx also assumed that this conflict did not contain its own resolution,
Shaw writes, "Marx held that any specific capitalist society would in
112fact be racked by the contradictions which his theory delineates,”
He adds, however, that Marx "would not have maintained that it would
proceed acquiescently to the end point of those contradictions in order
113to be redeemed by the negation of the negation,” This conclusion
conflicts with Marx's explicit and implicit statements about the
historical transcendence of alienation through communism.
In his explanation of his interpretation of Marx, Shaw asserts:
The point is not just that capitalism is prevented by the 
intervention of the proletariat from proceeding to its final
collapse, but there is no final contradiction followed by
disintegration. Capitalism begets contradictory tendencies, 
which increase in strength, but it neither contains within 
itself the possibility of their reconciliation nor permits 
the final triumph of one over the other: each violent
disruption only restores the disturbed equilibrium. The
increasingly antagonistic propensities of capitalism render
it historically untenable: they do not imply that the system
must ’self-destruct' — that is, that its continued existence 
becomes logically impossible, 114
The problem with Shaw’s argument here is that in refuting the "deter­
ministic” expounders of Marx's theory of history, he minimises the use
115Marx made of Hegel’s dialectic. This minimization of the influence of
Hegel’s dialectic upon Marx's conception of historical reality inevitably
distorts Marx’s conception, Shaw's distortion of Marx naturally follows
from the notable omission of Marx’s philosophic perspective from his
116(Shaw’s) analysis, Shaw’s conclusion should therefore be viewed in 
the light of the historical distance between Marx’s time and the present, 
and, especially in the light of the fact that the proletarian revolution 
has not occurred in that interim period and that it seems unlikely to
occur as Marx had predicted. Where the accuracy of Marx’ s analysis and
prediction are being brought into question, Shaw's argument provides
plausible grounds for changing Marx*s imminent eschatology to a less 
imminent one,
Contradictions in contemporary capitalism are certainly more 
varied and complex than those of the "modem" capitalism of Marx' s 
day. These contradictions have accompanied the unprecedented techno­
logical development that has occurred since then. But to be guided 
by such a perspective does not allow for an accurate assessment of 
Marx’s projection of historical de-alienation arising out of the 
contradictions in capitalism. This is a type of "revisionism”.
Moreover, despite Shaw’s decision to stay clear of the "philosophical” 
Marx, it is clear that his analysis has a noticeable Hegelian influence. 
It should be remembered that it was Hegel who conceived of reality as 
the self-positing of Absolute Spirit which externalises itself in order 
to realize itself in the process of which objectification is conceived 
as alienation which is then subsequently transcended. This process 
continues ad infinitum with each succeeding transcendence attaining 
a level higher than the one previously attained. But in Hegel alienation 
is an ineradicable part of reality. Marx, on the contrary, conceives 
of both alienation and its transcendence as historical phenomena. This 
means therefore that alienation could be abolished completely. Despite 
the deficiency in Shaw's treatment of Marx’s conviction that the 
dialectical transcendence of alienation is inevitable, Shaw opens up 
for us the crucial question of whether transcendence is dependent not 
only on the forces of production and the proletariat working harmoniously 
but also on some force "outside” of the material conditions of life.
As Shaw himself said, "capitalism ... neither contains within itself 
the possibility of their (contradictions} reconciliation nor permits 
the final triumph of one over the other", and, again, "they (antagonistic
propensities} do not imply that the system must * self-destruct1 
Contradiction is inherent in ’'dialectic'1, and, for Marx, reality is 
dialectical, hence, there is no final, inevitable resolution of 
contradiction - that would be the end of the dialectici
Bertell Oilman provides a provocative analysis of Marx1s theory 
of history based on a "relational" concept of reality. He recognizes 
that Marx openly acknowledged that a conceptual framework was indispens­
able to man’s revolutionary transformation of history, Marx, he continues,
saw that concepts were absolutely essential for man to have a compre-
119hensive grasp of the whole of historical reality, Marx himself 
demonstrates the need for concepts in his own analysis of the condition 
of man in history. This fact is illustrated throughout our study of 
Marx, Moreover, Oilman does not find that Marx’s approach, properly 
understood, contradicts Marx’s materialist conception of reality. With 
this presupposition in mind, Oilman proceeds to elaborate a "relational" 
view of reality which, he areues, is central to Marx's thought.
Noting that Marx draws attention to the "distinction between 
subject and categories", "in his unfinished Introduction to the 
Critique of Political Economy," Oilman points out the indispensable 
function of concepts as mediators of reality, "This distinction," 
he says, "between subject and categories is simple recognition of the 
fact that our knowledge of the real world is mediated through the 
construction of concepts in which to think about it; our contact with 
reality, in so far as we become aware of it, is contact with a conceptu­
alized reality.
Oilman's interpretation of Marx's understanding of concepts reminds
us of the definition of symbol as that which participates in the reality 
121it describes. For example, having pointed out that Marx declares
the categories he is describing T,to be ’forms’, ’manifestations’ and
’aspects’ of their own subject matter," and that "the categories of
bourgeois society ’serve as the expression of its conditions and the
122comprehension of its own organization'," Oilman concludes that the
categories "express the real conditions necessary for their application,
but as meaningful, systematized and understood conditions. This is
not merely a matter of categories being limited in what they can be
used to describe; the story itself is thought to be somehow part of
123the very concepts with which it is told." Oilman summarizes his
argument in another way when he states:
... Marx grasped each political-economic concept as a com­
ponent of society itself, in his words as an 'abstract one­
sided relation of an already given concrete and living 
aggregate’; that it is intimately linked with other social 
components to form a particular structure; and that this 
whole, or at least its more significant parts, is expressed 
in the concept itself. 124
It is to be noted here that Oilman assumes that Marx's presupposition
that concepts are derived from the socio-economic basis of society is
a sound one. In fact, according to Oilman, the intrinsic unity between
the socio-economic base and the concepts used to describe it is clearly
conveyed by the concepts themselves. He therefore concludes that the
unity must not be broken and the two components divorced from each
other. 125
Oilman asserts further that the distinctiveness "in Marx's concep­
tion of social reality ([indeed all reality} is best approached through
126the cluster of qualities he ascribes to particular social factors."
He illustrates his argument by referring to Marx’s conception of
"Capital". He points out that "where capital 'is something purely
127material, a mere element in the labour process’," Marx portrays 
it as "’that kind of property which exploits wage-labour, and which
cannot increase except on condition of getting a new supply of wage
128 *labour for fresh exploitation1." In contrast to the view expressed
here where the inherent relational unity of the social factors is absent,
Oilman makes the following suggestion:
What requires emphasis is that the relation between capital 
and labour is treated as a function of capital itself, and 
part of the meaning of ’capital1, This tie is extended to 
cover the worker as well, where Marx refers to him as 
’variable capital’ , 129 The capitalist is incorporated into 
the same whole: ’capital is necessarily at the same time
the capitalist .,. the capitalist is contained in the concept 
capital'. 130
What Oilman is attempting to demonstrate through these references to
the varied conceptions of capital is that there is "a conception of
capital,” which, he argues, Marx offers, ”in which the factors we
generally think of as externally related to it are viewed as co-
131elements in a single structure”. In summary, then, Oilman’s thesis
is: ’’Every factor which enters into Marx’s study of capitalism is a
132’definite social relationship1.”
Oilman applies the ’’relational” model of reality to Marx’s analysis
of the world which is in a state of perpetual change. In his application,
he assumes that each social factor is ’’internally related to its own
past and future forms, as well as the past and future forms of surround- 
133ing factors." He explains that Marx sees the world as a "Totality” 
comprising of social factors that are constantly changing, thereby 
producing new and different matrices of social relations. Consequently, 
the."Totality" is not static but is rather in a state of perpetual 
change, acting and being acted upon by its constituent factors. A 
useful analogy of the dynamic state of both the "Totality” and its 
constituent factors is that of the image of the earth spinning on its 
axis while it rotates around the sun, the former movement being a 
smaller movement within a wider movement. Present, past, and future
are all related and should be conceived of as a unity which in fact
they are. Summing up the foregoing explication, Oilman writes:
The present, according to this relational model, becomes 
part of a continuum stretching from a definable past to 
a knowable (if not always predictable) future. Tomorrow 
is today, extended. To speak of such a relation between the 
present and the future, within the context of formal logic 
would indicate belief in a vitalistic principle, divine will 
or some other metaphysical device. But, here, all social 
change is conceived of as a coming to be of what potentially 
is, as the further unfolding of an already existing process, 
and hence, discoverable by a study of this process taken as 
a spatial—temporal Relation. 134
The fluidity in this relational model certainly facilitates a 
deeper and more functionally fruitful conception of Marx’s vision of 
the underlying unity in history - of man, nature, and society. It is 
a constant critique of any attempt at rendering static Marx’s "open” 
view of reality. In fact, we are better able to understand his world­
view as a process which is open to dynamic change. This view also 
makes Marx’s conviction of an historical transcendence of alienation 
seem more realistic, for it posits the Marxian dialectic of progress 
as arising out of the contradictions inherent in capitalism. However, 
there are some significant short-comings. They are centred primarily 
around the interpretative accuracy of Oilman’s exposition of Marx’ s 
conception of historical reality. It is to be emphasized once again 
that Marx himself claims that ultimately all manifestations in society 
are socio-economically determined, that is, they arise from the changes 
in the mode of production. The crucial priority of the socio-economic 
"base is certainly impaired in Oilman’s relational model. In arguing 
that Marx did in fact conceive of reality in relational terms, Oilman 
obfuscates the causal connection that exists between the socio-economic 
base and the factors that are derived from it. The thrust of his argu­
ment allows of the tendency of the levelling down of both groups of
factors in the process of the historical transcendence of alienation.
Shaw provides a perceptive summary of the foregoing critique of Oilman’s
interpretation of Marx when he notes:
Oilman, for example, takes the line that Marx views the 
capitalist system in all its economies, social, political, 
and ideological aspects, as an organic whole without assign­
ing causal primacy to any single realm. This absence of 
causality seems to be dictated in Oilman’s mind by the very 
organicism of Marx’s outlook. Not only do Oilman and others 
of similar persuasion appear to operate with a billiard- 
ball model of cause and effect, but they make the mistake 
of supposing that the conceptual interrelatedness of events 
or social relations forbids their causal connection. Marx 
did have a very ’organic1 conception of society, yet causal 
notions are integral to his social and historical views and 
to the scientific work which he believed himself to be 
carrying out. 135
So far we have seen that Marx’s ’’historical materialism” means 
that the forces of change and development are immanent within the very 
contradictions in society. It v/as noted that, in Marx's view, trans­
formation is inherent in the process of history of bourgeois capitalism, 
that is, it is self-evident that the new socio-economic conditions that 
emerge out of the conflict have latent if not manifest de-alienating 
forces which will eventually eradicate all alienation. But we are not 
told why the process operates in this way. The answer to that question 
would lead to metaphysical speculations;a divine mover, the force or 
power that undergirds everything. For Marx, to take that route would 
be to return to the enslavement of human consciousness, and of man as 
a whole - man as a material, sensuous being. Marx preferred to have 
Hegel's dialectic of the negation of the- negation as a law of human 
existence without the reality of Absolute Spirit. Despite Marx's 
preference, the question of God remains valid. For Christian theology, 
this question arises both in response to the challenge presented by 
Marx, as well as prior to Marx’s challenge, that is, as a response of 
faith in the crucified and risen Lord, Jesus Christ. There is a
distinction here which must not he forgotten. But there is also a 
unity in the two-faceted Christian response which must be preserved 
for gift and response are of the very character of the Christian faith.
We will turn to the question of God shortly, but, first, let us look 
at the question of a Marxian "ethics11. This question points, once 
again, to the interplay between the metaphysical and philosophic 
thought of Marx, on the one hand, and his economic and "materialist" 
thought, on the other,
F,
Marx and Ethics,
Throughout our discussion of Marx's philosophy that spanned both
the "early" and the "mature" Marx, we have centred our focus on Marx's
anthropology. This task has led us to the consideration of the concept
of alienation which was central to Marx's thought, both early and later
Marx, though latterly the concept was more implicitly present than
explicitly discussed, and was also replaced by other terms such as
136"exploitation" and "fetishism",  ^ These terms certainly reflected 
the shift in interest in Marx's thought from philosophy to political 
economy. It was argued above that the crux of Marx's Weltansschauung 
was elaborated as early as 1844* and with the exception of a few changes, 
this world-view persisted throughout his entire career.
The explication of Marx' s concept of man and his theory of history 
have led us to a consideration of alienation and its transcendence 
through the abolition of private property under communism. It was 
made obvious that Marx's analysis contained antithetical terms and ideas 
which demonstrated, on the one hand, that there was a state of human
existence that was to be condemned, particularly that which obtained
under capitalism. On the other hand, there was a state of human
existence that was to be commended, namely, that under communism.
These notes of condemnation and of commendation therefore raise the
unavoidable question of whether Marx was an ethicistj Bid he have
a system of ethics that was peculiarly his? What were the criteria
upon which he made his obvious evaluations? These and other related
questions on ethics are critical for a balanced perspective of Marx’s
world-view . Moreover, they gain added significance when they are
raised in spite of (and even because of) Marx's claims to being scientific
in his analysis of man and society,
Marx was convinced that when he criticized philosophy and religion
as being ideological his premise- was historical and scientific rather
137than moral or ethical. Thus, when he argues that the workers must 
overthrow the existing mode of production, he does so on the basis of 
his assumption that the very forces of history would make the revolution 
possible. According to Marx there is a diametric difference between 
his philosophy of revolutionary praxis and a philosophy of ethics on 
how to "behave" in this world under the present order of things, that 
is, under the existing mode and relations of production, private property, 
money, division of labour, and all that he condemned as alienating man 
from his species-being. But by the same token we wonder on what grounds 
Marx justifies his critique of bourgeois political economy that prevents 
it from being labelled ideology as well. For him, the crucial difference 
between praxis-the ori a and bourgeois ethics is that the former 
advocates a revolutionary transformation of the very base of society, 
while the latter merely attempts to preserve the status-quo. The latter 
is the product of alienated, false "consciousness". Even when it sees
the acute need for change in society to alleviate human suffering, it 
merely appeals to men's consciences. It is therefore ideology. However, 
despite these differences, it is difficult not to speak of Marx's philo­
sophy in terms of an ethical system. This difficulty may be formulated 
in the following questions: On what grounds does Marx make and justify
his critique of bourgeois political economy that preserve his critique 
from being itself critiqued as false consciousness and ideology? How 
can one criticize, condemn or advocate a particular form of human 
behaviour, as Marx does, without using some ethical or moral standards 
by which to do so?
With the foregoing consideration in mind we now turn to a 
discussion of •Marx and ethics. It should be noted from the outset 
that our concern is with the, ethical teachings in Marx' s works that 
pertain to his anthropology. We shall therefore not attempt a detailed 
and critical study of the subject which has been so well done by 
Eugene Kamenka in his two well-known studies. In fact, we shall be 
drawing a great deal upon the resources made available in Kamenka's 
works.
We recall that Marx claimed that the root of alienation lies in
the alienated productive process which has been alienated since the
beginning of history, that is, since man’s interaction with nature
began. This productive process did not exist in a static but in a
dynamic state. The arrival of the capitalist mode of production brought
with it the total and complete alienation of man, Marx spared no effort
in voicing his invectives on the system and its perpetrators. His
condemnation, in the opinion of Karl Popper, "is fundamentally a moral 
138condemnation," Kamenka points this out even as he notes that Popper
139was "a critic not at all interested in alienation," Popper argues
The system is condemned, for the cruel injustice inherent in 
it which is combined with full ’formal1 justice and right­
eousness. The system is condemned because by forcing the 
exploiter to enslave the exploited it robs both of their 
freedom, Marx did not combat wealth, nor did he praise 
poverty. He hated capitalism, not for its accumulation of 
wealth, but for its oligarchical character; he hated it 
because in this system wealth means political power in the sense 
of power over men. Labour power is made a commodity; that 
means that men must sell themselves on the market, Marx 
hated the system because it resembled slavery. 140
While accepting Popper’s argument that Marx’s critique of capitalism
was moral in nature, Kamenka is quick to point out that this confrontation
was not made on the basis of ”a moral principle established independently
141of his inquiries." Furthermore, capitalism was not being condemned
142"for not being ’what it ought to be'." Kamenka argues that, on the
contrary, "the distinction between dependence and freedom ... rests ...
143on an empirical basis," Explaining his conclusion, he writes:
If Marx and his readers are drawn toward freedom and repelled 
by dependence and alienation, this is not because he has striven 
to show what they ’ought to be'. It is rather because some
goods, at least, operate in Marx and in many of his readers,
so that the morality of freedom, the sympathies and antipathies 
of goods themselves, are something he and they can also feel. 144
Kamenka's suggestion here is that the feelings of antipathy and sympathy
naturally effuse from man. This is in keeping with Marx's thesis that
man is the measure of man. What neither Marx nor Kamenka tells us is
how to determine whose feelings are correct. It is certainly not self-
evident that the capitalist and the proletariat cannot and do not share
the same feelings about many significant things, while simultaneously
having different and conflicting reactions to other significant
phenomena, 1^5
Capitalism is judged and condemned for being primarily geared to 
protect the interests of the ruling class. Marx, it will be recalled, 
argues that the whole socio-economic base of society must be revolutionized
that:
completely, and capitalism overthrown and totally abolished. The
premise for this argument was not external -£o actual conditions of
life, but was intrinsic to them, Marx and Engels claim that they had
discovered the "laws” of history which show that history was moving
towards the proletarian revolution. Consequently, Marx, "in his
mature work as much as in his earlier work, wants to go somewhat further
1 Af>than” stating natural feelings of antipathy and sympathy. As Kamenka 
explains i
He (Marx) wants to show that history is inevitably working
toward freedom, toward the Communist society where men’s
production will no longer enslave them, but will become part 
of them, where tools will cease to be men’s masters and become 
their servants. But however unfounded this view may be, it, 
too, is not — in Marx's sense - a moral view. It neither 
presupposes nor establishes a new moral obligation in place 
of those which Marx exposed. 147
Despite Marx's assumption to the contrary, it is, nevertheless, obvious
that Marx's condemnation of the bourgeois capitalist class, and his
advocacy of the cause of the proletarian class are based on a peculiarly
Marxian ethics. Marx’s ’’ethics" are unique for they attempt "to put
1 /lftthe thought of science at the service of the proletariat." It is
a proletarian ethic.
The question of Marxian ethics being a proletarian ethic takes us
back to the thorny problem in Marx's thought of determinism and freedom;
that is, to the question of the inevitability of the revolution, and
the place of proletarian initiative in ensuring the successful occurrence
of the revolution. This dilemma has resulted in the polarisation of
the interpreters of the ethical content of his thought into two schools:
149t&e ethical and a-ethical. One notable student of Marx who shares 
the view that there are two such schools is Stojanovic. He explains 
that he "... represents the view that Marx’s thought contains ethical
values which can serve as a point of departure for a Marxist ethics."150
He adds, "Marx also gave occasion for the contrary - a-e'thical - 
151interpretation." This ambiguity in Marx’s writings inevitably creates 
problems of interpretation of his thought. Sto.janovic states, "This 
ambivalence creates difficulties for any Marxist-oriented philosophy 
of morals. In addition, however, there is one more, significantly
152larger obstacle, i.e., Marx’s understanding of historical determinism."
Let us look at some of the evidence in Marx’s works that support
the argument that he was a^ethical in his philosophy, Marx himself
points out that a change in his earlier outlook took place in the mature
years of his life. He describes the change as a movement from the
realm of speculative philosophy into the region of "real, positive 
155science," Stojanovic explains that Marx’s later development was
the latter1s attempt "to establish a scientific socialism, as opposed
154to the moralizing-utopian socialism which had existed previously." ^
He notes further that the proponents of the "a-ethical interpretation 
of Marx’s thought" base their argument upon passages like the ones 
quoted below:
Communists cannot preach any kind of morality at all, some­
thing that Stimer does altogether too much. They cannot 
pose any kind of moral demands at all to people: love one
another, do not be egoists, etc. On the contrary, they know 
very well that egoism, just as well as self-sacrifice, is 
in specific conditions a necessary form of individual self- 
affinflation. 155
Communism is for us not a stable state which is to be 
established, an ideal to which reality will have to adjust 
itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes 
the present state of things. 15&
Law, morality, religion, are to him (the proletarian) so 
many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just 
as many bourgeois interests. 157
In the first passage it is noticed that Marx reiterates his conviction
that "egoism" and "self-sacrifice?' are firmly tied to the "specific
conditions" from which they arise, as superstructure is tied to base.
Therefore to call upon people to be loving and altruistic would be to 
demand of them something that may be desirable but not realistic in 
view of the alienated socio-economic base of society. The second 
passage reminds us that Marx does not conceive of communism as an ideal, 
fixed state of human existence. He thinks of communism in terms of 
movement or process which means that it is a dynamic and not a static 
condition. Thus, morality, which posits fixed, eternal standards, is 
anathema to Marx. Finally, the third passage illustrates the point 
made earlier that "law, morality, religion" are tied to particular 
classes, and so they lack universality. They have the character of 
representing and appealing to particular vested interests.
In contrast to those who advocate the view of Marx’s thought as 
being "a-ethical", Stojanovic tells us, there are those who use passages 
like the following to illustrate the ethical content of Marx' s 
philosophy. 1
The criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that 
man is the highest being for man, that is, with the cate­
gorical imperative to overthrow all circumstances in which 
man is humiliated, enslaved, abandoned and despised, 
circumstances best described by the exclamation of a 
Frenchman on hearing of an intended tax on dogs: Poor
dogs'. They want to treat you like men I 159
The social principles of Christianity preach cowardice, 
self-contempt, abasement, submission, humility, in short, 
all the qualities of the canaille, while the proletariat, 
not wanting to be treated as canaille, needs its courage, 
pride, and sense of independence much more than its daily 
bread. 160
The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society;
The standpoint of the new is human society, or social 
humanity, 161
In the first passage it is to be noted that Marx uses the imperative 
"categorical". This is a highly moral exhortation. The clarion call 
to'the proletariat to usher in the revolution is sounded. The second 
passage deals with the contrast between the qualities, such as "cowardice,
self-contempt, abasement, submission, humility", etc., which vulgarize 
man, and those, such as "courage, pride, and* sense of independence" - 
in short, freedom and dignity — which characterize authentic, un— 
alienated man who is not simply reduced to the level of mere natural 
needs such as hunger. Man is totally alienated and dehumanized. As 
the second passage indicates, Marx believes that the ethics of 
Christianity promotes the alienation and debasement of man. It 
endorses and sanctions "all the qualities of the canaille". In contrast 
to this, Marx asserts that the proletariat are motivated by a revolu­
tionary zeal which leads them to reject the condition of the "canaille" 
even if their physical needs are not met. In this ethics of freedom,
"162"courage, pride, and sense of freedom" are valued above "daily bread,"
It is not surprising that Marx does have a system of ethics, nor that 
the ethics he articulates are peculiarly humanistic in intention. As 
Stojanovi6 points out, "Prom his earliest through his latest works,
165Marx wrote as an heir of the great European humanistic-ethical tradition." 
This fact, Stojanovi6 adds, has been conceded by "many non-Marxist 
thinkers.
The discussion of some of the passages in Marx's works which 
illustrate the ambiguity in his thought - that is, the conflict between 
scientific, a-ethical statements and his ethical injunctions and 
evaluations - suggest that Marx did not construe the terms "scientific" 
and "moral" to mean "value-less" and "value-laden," respectively. The 
distinction he makes between these two concepts is based on his materialist 
conception of history. In this conception, "scientific" refers to the 
material conditions of life, while "moral" refers to whatever is 
abstracted from the real situation. But this distinction does not 
refute the argument that Marx's outlook is ethical as well as scientific.
In Marx’s thought, Sollen and Sein form a dialectical unity. Stojanovi'c 
states:
From Marx’s belief in the scientific character of his own 
teaching, of course, it does not at all follow that this 
teaching was not ethically colored. The point is that Marx 
did not take ’science' to mean 'value-free' intellectual 
activity, which is what certain Marxologists have in mind 
when they speak of 'science' , Marx never drew the kind of 
distinction between cognitive and value statements which 
would place the latter outside of the realm of science. We 
can never overlook the fact that Marx was a student of Hegel, 
and that Hegel had rejected Kant's dualism because he was 
convinced of the unity of the Is and the Ought, of Sein and 
Sollen. 165
It is therefore to be concluded that only by maintaining the 
dialectical unity between ethical and scientific, in Marx, can a really 
Marxian interpretation of Marx's writings be made. Such an interpreta­
tion argues for an interrelational dynamic in the functioning of the two 
groups of concepts. Therefore, while Marx's ethics do take seriously the 
material conditions of life that obtained under capitalism, by exposing 
and condemning its intrinsic evil in moralistic terms, it also serves 
the interests of the "scientific" analysis of capitalism. Further­
more, it is intended to aid the proletariat in awakening its radical 
consciousness. At the same time, Marx's "scientific" analysis will 
promote the ethics of revolutionary praxis. Marx, it will be recalled, 
is convinced that the socio-economic dissolution of the capitalist mode 
and relations of production would lead to a moral revolution. Moreover, 
he argues that complete and total human emancipation cannot and will 
not occur if appeal is made only to the moral consciousness of man 
without the concomitant attempt to both understand and change the mode 
of production,
Marx's conviction that moral exhortations are impotent to effect 
the proletarian revolution best explains why he did not formulate
a systematic ethical theory. As Stojanovic explains:166
In contrast to moralists, Marx held, no illusions about the 
efficacy of moral judgements which do not coincide with real 
interests, and although he evaluated capitalism from a
humanistic standpoint, he did not feel the need to formulate
and explicate the principles upon which he had based these 
judgements. Marx was a critic, and an ethical critic at 
that, but he was not a systematic ethical theorist. 167
There is a great merit in recognizing the ethical content in
Marx's thought. This recognition is crucial for a more accurate
picture of Marx’s emphasis upon human creativity and responsibility
for the abolition and the transcendence of all forms of alienation.
It is important that the centrality of human activity is not obscured,'
neither partially nor totally. When this is allowed to occur the
struggle of man for the redemption of man is left to the caprice of
’’accidents” in the historical forces. We return once more to the
argument that Marx conceives of human creativity and the material
forces of production as existing in a dynamic and dialectic unity.
The argument is well illustrated in the two passages below which are
taken from Marx's writings:
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as 
they please, they do not make it under circumstances chosen 
by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, 
given and transmitted from the past. 168
World history would indeed by very easy to make if the 
struggle were taken up only on condition of infallibly favour­
able chances. It would on the other hand be of a very mystical 
nature, if ‘'accidents’ played no part. These accidents naturally 
form part of the general course of development and are compen­
sated by other accidents. But acceleration and delay are very 
much dependent upon such 'accidents' , including the 'accidents' 
of the characters of the people who first head the movement. *169
Marx's preoccupation with man as subject of history who will be 
self-determined when freed from alienation, naturally leads to his 
rejection of any utilitarian concept of man. Utilitarianism lacks
the ethics of human freedom to create the new instead of merely seeking
to live in harmony with its environment by simply adapting to and
becoming accommcdated by the given situation. Kamenka writes:
Por utilitarianism takes the desires and expectations of man 
at any given moment as an ultimate; Marx's morality seeks to 
transform and 'enrich' his wants, to increase his expecta^- 
tions, to prevent him from finding 'happiness' by tailoring 
his demands to his satisfactions, by learning to like what he 
gets. Utilitarianism works within a given social and politi­
cal system and criticises it only where it fails to satisfy 
demands expressed within the system; Marxian humanism is 
prepared to transcend the system, to criticise the system 
itself for the wants and demands it creates. 170
But despite the greater possibilities for human realization and
fulfilment in the ethics of "Marxian humanism" vis-a^-vis the ethics of
utilitarianism, (and of Christianity as Marx's conceives it to be), it
must be remembered that the Marxian ethics must have checks placed upon
it. These checks are necessary in order to prevent the Promethean
171tendency in man from displaying the demonic side of its "nature". 1
This argument takes us beyond Marx's ethics, and, indeed, beyond his
concept of man. It takes us to the fundamental short-comings in Marx's
172concept of man. "The horrifying excesses of Hitler and Stalin", to
take two modem illustrations, are stark reminders that any Promethean
ethics, whether Marxian or not, which is allowed to operate freely without
realistic restrictions, would degenerate into a demonic power that
threatens the very existence of man. It is this fear, Kamenka argues,
which has led many scholars from various fields to advocate an anti—
Promethean ethic as a check against the destructive potentialities 
173within man. Summing up the situation, Kamenka says:
Man's potentialities are for good or for great evil; it is 
best if he does not become drunk with his own power, but 
proceeds little by little, respecting the actual, empirical 
desires of others and keeping within rules meant to restrain 
his passions and his experiments. This is the - anti-Promethean 
message of a great deal of contemporary moral and political 
writing. It appeals greatly to the increasing number of
(middle-class non-’coloured’) men who are reasonably comfort­
able in their own existing society and believe in the capacity 
of a system that has institutionalized change and techno­
logical progress to deal with strains and injustices without 
major dislocation or revolutionary outbursts. 174
Unfortunately, the anti-Promethean ethic promotes the interests 
and welfare of a small, privileged and influential minority whose 
institutionalization of change is seen and experienced today, by a 
growing majority, as alienating, oppressive and dehumanizing. It is 
an explosive situation which, Marx would agree, calls for a radical 
proletarian ethics. Indeed, it is not surprising at all that various 
versions and "brands11 of Marx’s ethics are currently being propagated 
in so many areas of the world where alienation is being felt to the 
very hilt. It is precisely within this turmoil that the question of 
God is seen as ludicrous, or as anachronistic and presumptuous; but, 
also, as the only way of hope, both within, and beyond historical 
existence. This attempt at pointing the way to God, before whom man 
lives, is intrinsic to an evangelical theology of the cross. We shall 
therefore turn our attention to such a theology.
Chapter III*
Marx’s Weltanschauung: and the God who is pro-man: Towards
a theology of the cross*
Introduction
In our discussion of Marx’s concept of man and;his theory of history 
as a Weltanschauung, it was emphasized that Marx’s fundamental concern 
was with alienated man and his future liberation. This concern for human 
liberation was crystallized in a radical philosophy of praxis which, 
according to Marx, was unlike all hitherto existing philosophies, i.e., 
instead of merely calling for a new understanding of historical reality 
in order that man may accommodate himself to the existing socio-economic 
and political structures, Marx’s philosophy called for a revolutionary 
tranformation of the socio-economic base of society. It was a philosophy 
that was intended to fire the imagination of the proletariat - the most 
debased class in society - and move them to liberate all of humanity from 
the alienated and alienating mode and relations of production.
Marx’s dismissal of religion as the epitome of false consciousness, 
and his concomitant emphasis upon the transcendence of alienation through 
human praxis, naturally brought his philosophy into conflict with theology 
His explicit atheism, in the form of his anthropocentric world-view, was 
construed by theologians as a critical challenge to the future of theology 
To replace God with man, and the praxis of God with the praxis of man 
certainly raised the crucial question: How might theology continue to
talk about God? If man can do the work hitherto associated with God, 
what is there left for God to do? If man changes the conditions that 
give rise to talk about God, then God is not only obsolete or irrelevant,
He is dead for He has served His historical usefulness.
Talk about God did not die as Marx predicted it would. On the 
contrary, it has continued for almost a century and a half since Marx's 
day to today. Moreover, it has shown great awareness of various challenges, 
including the Marxian challenge, to Christian faith. In the encounter 
between Christian faith and Marx's world-view, for example, some theologians 
have sought ways and means of making "talk about God" "come of age", even
» -jas man, according to Bonhoeffer, has "come of age". Does this therefore 
mean that theological maturation occurs when talk about God merely reflects 
the "spirit of the times"? Does theology necessarily lose its evangelical 
soundness in this process of re-interpretation and rejuvenation? How 
might we speak about God in response to the Marxian challenge?
These are crucial questions which are not confined to the challenge 
of Marx's Weltanschauung to theology? However, in the face of the 
Marxian challenge, they cannot be avoided. They are of central signi­
ficance to our discussion below since our response to Marx will not be 
in terms of a Christian apologetic, or an analytical appraisal of the 
accuracy or inaccuracy of Marx's claims. Rather, our response, which 
is mainly theological and doctrinal in nature, is in terms of a formu­
lation of the central features of a theology of the cross which provides 
a solid basis for any apologetical undertaking. Such an undertaking is, 
however, beyond the scope of this thesis.
In the first section of this chapter we will attempt to point to
the need for a theology of the cross as a way of continuing talk about 
God which is both evangelical and relevant in the face of Marx's call 
for the liberation of man in history. We shall therefore speak about
the praxis of God as a way of emphasizing the dynamic and gracious activity
of God - the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob ... and of Jesus Christ.
This means that the praxis of God is salvatory, and it is therefore noted 
in contrast to the praxis of man which, in terms of Christian theology, 
is not saving in relation to man’s ultimate future coram Deo, Man's 
praxis is the response of love for the sake of neighbour; it is not a 
way of salvation.
Following our argument for a theology of the cross, we shall turn 
our attention to a discussion of Luther's theologia crucis. Luther is 
generally considered the principal exponent of the theology of the cross 
since the Apostle Paul. In fact he saw his own theology as a return to 
Biblical theology which is none other than theology of the cross. The 
underlying assumption in our treatment of Luther's theology - which we
have sub-titled: theology of "radical reversal" - is that it is crucially
relevant to the ongoing mission of the Church in the face of the various 
challenges which she continually encounters; more specifically, in the 
face of the challenge presented to it by Marx's world-view. Moreover, 
by returning to the sixteenth century Reformer, we are able to maintain 
the dialectical unity between the confession of faith today and the 
confession of faith in Luther's day. Consequently, talk of God is seen 
as a historical faith which is not captive to the "spirit of the times" 
even as it faces the ongoing challenges in history.
Our aim in this chapter as a whole is to show that man's liberation
in history and beyond history is inextricably bound up with the God who 
reveals Himself in the cross of Christ. It will be shown that instead 
of enslaving man further as a "Zeus—like" god would, the God of, and 
who is also Jesus Christ always acts on behalf of man. Such a God is 
not threatened by man's humanization; nor does He wish to threaten man 
and prevent him from realizing his authentic humanity. He is totally 
pro-man.
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A.
The Praxis of God and the Salvation of Man,
It should be made clear at the very outset that in meeting the 
Marxian challenge, theologians cannot simply resort to arguing the case 
of theism vis-a-vis atheism. It would be speculative and abstract if 
the argument is characterized by the antitheses: "God exists" and
"God does not exist". In spite of Marx's materialistic conception of 
reality, there is no way of empirically verifying that religion is a 
mere projection of alienated man. Indeed, because of the very nature 
of Marx's conception which, as we have seen, is not devoid of meta­
physical elements, such empirical verification must be ruled out as an 
impossibility. But, by the same token, Christian theology cannot 
demonstrate that God exists. The implication of this dilemma for evan­
gelical theology is that it must go beyond confessing that God is, to 
an elaboration of the confession of faith concerning who God is, and 
where He is, Christian faith is apostolic faith. Thus it proclaims 
that God is Father, Son and Holy Spirit. God is the Triune God who 
creates, redeems and sanctifies life. We have looked at Marx's struggle 
on behalf of man, we must now show that Christian faith is not less 
concerned about man; indeed, because of the nature of the God of the 
cross of Christ, it goes beyond Marx in seeking the historical as well 
as the transcendent salvation of man.
When we look at the sporadic and, consequently, ambiguous criticisms 
of religion in Marx's writings, it becomes clear that his protest against 
God was made in order that man might be man. Marx's atheism was there­
fore a form of "protest" atheism. "The essence of Marx's atheism,"
Van der Bent notes, "was not the theoretical denial of God. Instead,
it resulted from the necessity of fighting against the church and political 
2clericalism." When Marx argues that God does not exist, it is his way of 
protesting against the God whose existence dehumanizes man. God exists 
at the expense of man. Thus, in Marx’s view, to deny the reality of God
is a negative way of affirming man as the measure and end of what is
human.
This point raises the question of whether Marx’s atheism was
.methodological by nature, and, hence, derivative, Migue'z Bonino, on the
one hand, has noted that Father Guilio Girardi supports such a reading
of Marx. According to Girardi, atheism is a secondary and not a primary
thesis in Marx, This means that Marx's atheism is a negative way of
asserting "the absolute value of man over against a diminution of man
which would be implicit in the acceptance of God. If the disjunctive
God/man should prove false, atheism would cease to be necessary for
•z.Marxism,""^ Czech Marxist, Mian Machoved, noting the transitory nature
of Marx's atheism, adds weight to Girardi's argument:
Atheism has meaning only as a critique, limited in place and 
in time, of certain dominant models used in contemporary 
religious faith. Marx developed his ’atheism' as a critique 
of the conventional nineteenth-century representations of God, 
and should these change, then the genuine Marxist would have 
to revise his critique, 4
Henry J. Koren, on the other hand, claims that Marx's atheism is
a priori for it precedes the development of his philosophy of man and
of history. He rejects the conclusion that Marx was a methodological
atheist. In support of his argument, Koren reminds us:
In one of his earlier works he (Marx) even called the negative 
critique of religion 'a presupposition of all other critique'.
In later life, however, he no longer ascribed such a funda­
mental role to the critique of religion, but was -satisfied with 
incorporating it into his general theory of estrangement as an 
’opium for the people’ and an instrument of power in the hands 
of oppressors. 5
In the light of Marx's assertions of the primacy of the socio-economic
infrastructure in his conception of reality, it seems more logical to 
accept the argument that Marx was a methodological atheist. This fact, 
however, does- not necessarily invalidate the contrary argument that 
Marx a priori assumes atheism as a guiding hypothesis. It is not an 
either/or questions Was Marx a methodological atheist? or Was he an 
a priori atheist? There is a relational dynamic connecting these two 
opposing views of Marx* s atheistic position. His overriding anthropo- 
centric concern is premised upon the Feuerbachian argument that the 
truth of God is man. He therefore assumes an atheistic position which,
in his view, he methodologically demonstrates to be true by placing man
at the centre of human existence.
Marx's atheism does have a place in the "talk about God" for it
raises the question of which God, Zeus or some other, is for and not
against man. If God is like Zeus, or some other being, who, though
possessing all power, is incapable of "pathos", then man would be better
off without him. In such a case, Marx's Promethean man’s defiance of
the gods \iOuld be appropriate. As Moltmann explains:
A man who experiences helplessness, a man who suffers because 
he loves, a man who can die, is therefore a richer being than
an omnipotent God who cannot suffer, cannot love and cannot
die. Therefore for a man who is aware of the riches of his 
own nature in his love, his suffering, his protest and his 
freedom, such a God is not a necessary and supreme being, but 
a highly dispensable and superfluous being. 6
We recall that Marx was convinced that religion, in spite of its real
protest against real suffering, was a potent means of furthering man’s
alienation. God was seen as being removed from, and oblivious to the
suffering of man.
It is obvious that in his writings, Marx's ’’protest” atheism was 
not designed to remind theology of its evangelical roots in the God of 
the Bible, i.e., the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who is also the
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God. of, and is Jesus Christ. Harx did not attempt to explicate the 
Christian confession that God suffers with and for His people. Rather, 
his "protest” atheism was aimed at pointing* man to the need to liberate 
himself from all forms of alienation. Harx regarded it as only a 
temporary phase in the historical movement from alienation to de-alienation 
and the emergence of free, unalienated man in the free, unalienated society. 
However, despite its transient nature, "protest" atheism was still 
considered by Marx to be thorough-going atheism. It was intended to 
lead to a radical doctrine of "man for man" and not to a pure doctrine 
of "God for man". Koltmann argues that this anthropocentric reductionism 
which Marx derived in part from Feuerbach led to the deification of man.
He concludes that that was de facto a reverse form of theism. Thus, 
while acknowledging the value and necessity of such an "atheism" that 
opposes a conception of God apart from the cross of Christ, Moltmann 
soberly reminds us:
But atheism in rebellion against this kind of political, 
moral and philosophical theism has long been nothing more than 
a reversed form of theism, especially in modem times. It has 
not been able to break free from its opponent. ' It thinks of 
man at God1s expense as a powerful, perfect, infinite and crea­
tive being. 7
The obvious antithesis and polarity between man and God in Marx!s
atheism is bound up with his "materialist" conception of reality, Milan
Machovec supports this argument when he says:
The materialism of Marx means unambiguously the supremacy of 
man and of the human principle in the cosmos. It is not that 
Marx and his followers turn lifeless matter into a Counter 
ideal1 to God, but rather that man with all his intellectual
and spiritual gifts and values fulfils this role. 8
Marx assumes that religion is epiphenomenal in essence and is 
therefore transitory. He is convinced that with the transcendence of 
the alienated socio-economic base in society man will no longer be
religious. There will be no need for God. Christian faith, on the
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other hand, declares that man is not the centre of the cosmos, God is.
Therefore, to posit man as the measure of himself and the ultimate source *
of his being and the meaning of his existence, is not only idolatrous, 
but enslaving of man. Thus, Christian faith claims that the question j
of man contains the hidden question of God, In the light of this,
Moltmann asserts that "only a revolution in the concept of God" could 
make this fact clear, and "free" both God and man for liberating fellow­
ship with each other.
Without a revolution in the concept of God, however, there 
will be no revolutionary faith. Without God’s liberation from £
idolatrous images produced by anxiety and hubris, there will -
be no liberating theology, Man always unfolds his humanity in 
relation to the divinity of his God, and he experiences himself 
in relationship to what appears to him as the highest being, ;
He directs his life toward a highest value. He decides who he 
is by his ultimate concerns. As Martin Luther said: ’Where |
you put the trust of your heart, that in fact is your God, 1 
That holds true for the Christian faith just as for every 7
secular faith. 9 *
Whereas Marx claims that only the consciousness of God and not God 
Himself is real, for God is man’s consolatory projection, Christian faith ,i
argues that not only is the "consciousness of God" real, but God Himself. J
Indeed, man’s consciousness of God results from God’s self-disclosure. 5
Thus God exists prior to the emergence of human consciousness of him, ,i
This means that Christian theology is based upon the presupposition that 
man asks the question of God because it is intrinsic in his very "nature" 
to do so. Therefore, according to Christian theology, to speak of God 
as being only a projection of human consciousness, as both Feuerbach and ,
Marx do, is to distort the truth about man and God. !;
However, there is a sense in which talk about God is "human talk".
For example, all talk about God is done by man. What man says about 
God is always expressed in human language. Thus theological statements 
suffer from inadequacies inherent in all discourse. But talk of God is ii
i
not an empty projection as Feuerbach suggests it is, God is a necessary
idea for man. As Russell Norris correctly pbints out:
It is a necessary idea because it is inherent in human nature 
to look for meaning and fundamental reality outside and beyond 
the phenomenal world. This reality, beyond all that we can 
measure, predict, and control, meets man and transcends every­
thing sensible, 10
Thus man continues to be man only as long as he continues to perceive
his "essence" as being rooted in God, Now, having said this, we must
immediately add that Marx’s atheism confronts Christian faith with the
crucial question: Which God? Who .is this God?
So far in our discussion, we have tried to show that the challenge
to theology posed by Marx’s atheistic world-view cannot be effectively
met by merely advocating a theistic world-view. We have seen that,
through the influence of Feuerbach, when Marx speaks about human nature
he paints a picture of man in possession of the attributes hitherto
associated with God alone. This means that "anthropocentric" faith has
11replaced the theistic faith of Marx’s day. In its attempt to refute
such a pervasive tendency and affirm the truth of Christian theology’s
confession of faith in the Triune God who suffers for and with His people
Christian theology cannot simply resort to a speculative philosophy, or
point to the moral conscience or to mystical contemplation as the means
of knowing who this God is. That would only lead (and has in fact led)
to the "death of God", As Migue'^ Bonino explains;
Liberal theology, whether idealistic, Kantian or existentialist 
has carried this purification (of Yahweh’s essence) to its 
logical conclusion. The fundamental presupposition is always 
the same: there is an essence of God which we can know through
philosophical speculation, moral conscience or mystical contem­
plation before meeting the specific manifestations and concrete 
demands in which God comes - and has come to us. It is only 
natural that, when these philosophies prove untenable, and the 
’essence’ of God vanishes, we shall have a theology ’of the 
death of God1, the Christian faith will be reduced to some form 
of philanthropic activity and Jesus left hanging in the air as 
an example. 12
Bonino is convinced that knowledge of God arises out of the praxis
of God. Any knowledge that speaks about God’ in static terms is not
knowledge of the God of the Bible. Such knowledge, Bonino claims, is
unrelated to man, and is degrading of man. In contrast to this knowledge
of God, he points to the true knowledge of God who becomes known through
His praxis on man’s behalf.
... It is precisely the characteristic of the Lord that he 
manifests his identity by announcing an action which involves 
man in an active relationship with his neighbour and with the 
world. There is no manifestation of God in Scripture in which 
a specific form of action is not included. God does not speak 
merely to inform or to notify: he speaks in order to invite,
to command, to forbid a certain course of action. And this 
action is always related to a particular historical content - 
to men, nations, things, events. 13
God makes Himself known to man through His praxis. ' When He does so, He
always takes the welfare of man with utmost seriousness.
Guilio Girardi argues that when we speak of God as seeking the welfare 
of man, as showing his "essence" through praxis, we are thereby positing 
a relationship between God and man which is characterized by a "dialectic 
of love" and not by the "dialectic of master-slave". In this "dialectic 
of love", the freedom of man, though subordinate to the freedom of God, 
does not reduce man but upholds and builds him up. Girardi suggests that 
even from the Marxian point of view, not all subordination to ends, per se, 
is excluded, but only those forms which further alienates man by reducing 
him to a means. Marx's radical concern for man does not transcend Christian 
faith's concern for man, Girardi argues that this is seen when the "master- 
slave dialectic" is transformed into a "dialectic of friendship" by 
Christian faith which sees the latter as the interpretative key for under­
standing our total dependence on God, Accordingly, the transcendence of 
the alienation between man and God does not mean the destruction of one 
by the other for it results from a transformation of the relationship
between man and God, This situation is analogous to that between men 
who overcome alienation through transformation of their alienated 
relationship.
The affirmation of God would, in fact, be alienating if our 
relationship with him were exhausted in the master-slave 
dialectic, e,g,, in a voluntarism that would expose man and 
his destiny to the divine free will; but it ceases to be so 
if the relationship is understood in terms of a dialectic of 
love, as an encounter between two liberties. Finally, religious 
alienation, like every other form of alienation, must be fought 
in the name of religion, 14
Our discussion of Girardi’s argument brings us to the point where
the freedom of man raises the question of the congruency of the freedom
of God with human freedom. Instead of accepting Marx’s thesis that man
realizes his humanity through his own initiative alone, Christian faith
points to God who is "for man" and through whom man becomes truly human,
"But in order to satisfy man’s expectations God must be God, In other
words, God must be the totality of being and of value, and must, for
this very reason, be infinitely superior to man, totally other than he
15and his complete master." Thus the transformation of the "dialectic 
of master-slave" into the "dialectic of love" does not negate the relation­
ship of subordination of man to God, Making man an equal with God would 
thrust upon him demands which would transcend man’s creaturely limitations. 
In spite of man’s exaltation, alienation still persists. At the same time, 
elevation of man would mean that God would not be God any longer. It 
follows then that God must be God if man is to be truly man. The awe­
someness of God’s greatness and majesty are not aimed at man’s annihila­
tion, "In reality, God’s greatness does not destroy that of man but 
forms the basis of it. Man cannot be great unless there is someone
infinitely greater. His destiny must be in the hands of infinite love." 
This is therefore a rejection of Marx’s thesis that all of reality is 
ultimately socio-economically determined, and that man's need of God is
16
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not a genuine human need, but a dehumanizing and transitory need that 
arises out of his alienation. Marx's thesis is rejected on the grounds 
that it is one-dimensional in scope.
Henry Koren perceives that Marx's limitation of man's existence to
the immanent, socio-economic base of society denies man his more authentic
humanity which is only possible under the aegis of the transcendent God
confessed by evangelical Christian theology. He says:
On the contrary, we must ask ourselves whether Marx's a priori
limitation of man's humanity to earthly existence does not
violate man's integral humanity for Marx simply dismisses the
possibility that man can have a fundamental orientation to a 
Supraz-worldly God. 17
The question of God raises the question of the conception of human
nature in relation to God. Such a conception is far more complex than
and transcends Marx's materialistic conception of human nature, In the
light of this, it is to be concluded that it is not God's existence but
His absence that would mean man's alienation and diminution. Without God,
man would not fulfil himself but ultimately destroy himself. "Having
18killed God, man would not succeed in outliving him."
At this point, it is well to recall that in our discussion of Marx's
theory of history it was noted that there is a tension between human 
autonomy in shaping its own destiny, in transcending alienation and creat­
ing its own free, human essence, and the dialectical understanding of
historical materialism. Marx's thesis is: man creates in relation to
the possibilities inherent in the level of the economic mode and relations 
of production. Man is therefore both the subject of the historical process 
as well as the prime agent for historical change, Koren reminds us of 
Marx's dilemma of deciding between historical necessity and human freedom, 
i.e., whether the laws of historical development or human initiative and 
creativity take precedence over the other, in the historical transformation
of nature, society and man, when he says:
Marx’s key statement in this matter is that man’s produc­
tion of his life is of necessity determined by the development 
of the material means of production. Is this development of 
production a physical process governed by laws that can be
determined ’with the precision of natural science’? Or is it
a development in which man’s freedom plays a role, a history 
that implies the exercise of contingent human activities? Marx 
disagrees with Marx in this matter. When he states his funda­
mental perspective, he opts for the former, but when he concretely
describes the development of the means of production, he specifi­
cally introduces the human subject with his ideas, will, purposes 
and intentions. 19
According to Marx, man does not need to seek recourse to any higher 
agent or power than man himself in order to fulfil his messianic role.
To do so would be tantamount to further enslavement. But, as we have 
already pointed out, dependence upon and subordination to God (’’Infinite 
Love”) is liberating and not a curb on human initiative. Nevertheless,
there are forms of dependence which Christian theology must reject.
For example, Christian theology must reject that form of dependence 
upon God which has no place for human creativity in shaping the world
and one’s own life in it. Dependence upon God does not mean that man
is reduced to an instrument or thing. Ironically, in rejecting such 
a dependence, Christian theology is engaging in a form of "protest” 
atheism.
From the foregoing discussion, the following conclusion suggests 
itself: In response to Marx's world-view, Christian theology must
therefore exercise a two-fold critical function - on the one hand, 
denouncing the limited one-dimensional conception of man, and on the 
other hand, rejecting any conception of the divine-human relationship 
which is contrary to the dialectic of love.
It should be clear by now that the concept of God which is being 
advocated here is one in which God is seen as pro—man. He is the God 
of Abraham, of Isaac and of Jacob ... and of Jesus Christ who is always
acting on man1 s behalf and with whom man can enjoy a relationship 
characterized by the "dialectic of love". With this concept of God 
in mind, it would seem reasonable to ask whether Marx would have still 
propounded an atheistic world-view,- This question gains increased signi­
ficance for a theological response to Marx’s world-view if we accept 
Koren’s argument that "Marx tacitly assumes Zeus is the typical image 
of God," Koren adds:
Zeus, however, is a primitive, intraworldly god, a god who is 
jealous of man’s aspirations for independence and self-sufficiency 
a god who wishes to keep man in slavery. In the eyes of an 
authentic believer such a god is merely a pseudo-god, not the
God who transcends the world, 20
The Christian should therefore not hesitate in joining the Marxist in
his appreciation of Prometheus, who promotes human self-realization, and
in his rejection of Zeus who enslaves man. However, in doing so, the
Christian needs to remember that his/her stance is a response to the
transcendent God who has called him/her to "subdue the earth" (Genesis 1:28)
It would seem reasonable to argue that Marx might have evaluated religion
more positively if he had not conceived of God in terms of Zeus but in
terms of the free, liberating God who acts on man’s behalf, i.e., the
God who is transcendent yet immanent, who has called man "to subdue the
earth". But we have no conclusive evidence to suggest that Marx would
have been less an atheist and a materialist whose view of the world would
have been other than anthropocentric. Even if we were to speculate and
suggest that Marx could have held a theistic world-view, in which God
were seen as the God of the Bible, we must inevitably conclude that his
theistic world-view would have been ultimately transcended by an atheistic
world-view - perhaps similar to the one he did in fact formulate. In the
former, God would have become man’s agent for humanization and would
have therefore eventually rendered himself obsolete when man had attained
to M s  "full stature”. We need constantly to remember that Marx's
atheism is inextricably tied to his fundamental assumption that historical
materialism and anthropocentric reductionism constitute the dialectic of
historical reality.
Let us return to Marx’s one-dimensional conception of man. Here
man is reduced to a worker and producer, Koren provides a perceptive
critique of Marx's reduction of man to productive activity when he sayss
If man's self-realization is considered to be attained solely 
through productive work, man's existence is viewed as encom­
passed by being-a-worker. Work, then, is not merely a means 
of life but the way of life.... Marx, however, through his 
neglect of the other dimensions of a meaningful existence, 
practically reduces man to nothing but a worker. Thus the 
relative value of work is absolutized, which results in a 
distortion of man's being. 21
In spite of this limitation, Christian theology is confronted with a 
radical concept of work - the dynamic of praxis. It is with the view 
to change and transformation that man undertakes to understand history 
qua universal history. In this understanding, which is always a dia­
lectical process, man is constrained to act, to lead history to the 
realization of human liberation. Man is involved as both subject and 
object of the creative and shaping dialectical process of history. But 
it is man, Marx seems convinced, who will be able ultimately to take 
the reins of history and lead it to a liberating telos. Man's capacity
to both perceive and understand, and act are seen as a unity. This
concern with liberation and transformation of the Mstorical process 
is succinctly expressed by Donald MacKinnon when he says:
The Marxist is concerned less to understand than to change; 
his concern with understanding is the concern of a servant 
of change, a servant who seeks to grasp the interior dialect­
ical movement of historical events, in order that he may work
upon the opportunity which they provide to the effective 
mastery of their deepest tragedy. 22
It is Marx's emphasis upon human praxis that prompts Lochman to
argue that "there is a place for Prometheus in our teaching about God,"
"in our doctrine of evil" and "in the Christian message of grace and
.justification," Lochman argues that when it is placed in the right
perspective, human praxis is not in conflict with the will of God for
man and the world. He adds that praxis for liberation is congruent with
the God of biblical faith [for He} does not intend to keep a 
man in his place in an ontocratic chains; the God of the exodus 
and resurrection opens up the way out of all the human captivity, 
also out of the captivity of death, God is the God of freedom, 
the liberating God, 24
Consequently, there is a place for Prometheus in Christian theology,
i,e., in terms of man’s creative response to God’s command to "subdue
the earth", Grace calls to faith active in love. However, when the
creaturely response of man becomes separated from the gift of God and
is raised to an absolute position so that God is displaced, and man now
becomes the centre of his existence and the sole architect of his own
destiny, then there is no place for Prometheus in a theology of grace,
Grace and human endeavour are not in congruence with each other, but in
opposition to each other. Thus the dialectic of love is destroyed.
This is precisely what happens in Marx’s Weltanschauung where we find
human praxis is removed from the ethical realm - response to God - and
made the central means towards human liberation and fulfilment.
This foists an "unnatural" burden upon man. Consequently, man’s
work ultimately becomes enslaving rather than liberating. As Peter
Hodgson reminds us, concerning Ebeling's sober reflections on the legacy
of the Reformation: "To be free from God would be the deepest bondage,
for then we should have to judge and save ourselves, which is an impossi- 
25bility," Ulrich Simon writes in the same vein as Ebeling when he 
sombrely reflects on the message of Auschwitz concerning man, Man, he 
argues, is made in the divine image, and, hence, to define human freedom
in totally anthropocentric and atheistic terms is a denial of real human
freedom, Simon notes that to he made to he like God, though never God,
26places man in "a unique place in the divine economy," However, to 
argue for man's attainment of his authentic humanity outside of and apart 
from God, and thereby to make of man some "superman", is futile and 
dehumanizing.
The doctrine of the divine superman died at Auschwitz, and 
with it anthropology as a disguise for theology. The self- 
exhaltation of man and the definition of reality in exclu­
sively human terms lead to the denial of freedom which 
obliterates the human image, 27
The promethean mission of man which Marx expounds is premised upon
a one-dimensional understanding of man, Man's future is found entirely
within history. According to Christian theology, however, man's humanity
transcends history for it has a uniquely eschatological dimension that
transcends the history of man. It is a history that is inseparable from
the grace of God in the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ, This
grace has an indispensable eschatological dimension, Lochman writes:
In Christian perspective, the hope of salvation is inseparably 
connected with the one name of Jesus Christ and with what his 
name stands for, that is, with the liberating involvement of 
the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, He is the God of the 
exodus, and the Father of Jesus Christ, His hope of salvation 
means history; it is, however, not the sum total of that energy 
and work. It inaugurates an eschatological revolution; it is, 
however, an eschatological revolution: the possibilities of
the Ultimate are not our ultimate possibilities. In one 
sentence: The hope of our salvation is in the liberating
transcendence of God’s grace. 28
There is therefore a diametric difference between Marx's emphasis upon 
the "absolute" transcendence of human praxis and Christian theology’s 
confession of the transcendent grace of God, "The emphasis on the trans­
cendence of grace as the final dimension of human life is the essential
point in which Christianity and Marxism part their ways in the inter-
29pretation of the biblical heritage."
It is worth repeating that Marx radically disagrees with the pro­
position that man’s search for meaning "beyond the ’’phenomenal" world 
raises the question of God. While he does conceive of an "open" future 
which is characterized by an anticipation of the dialectically new and 
surprising, he, nevertheless, limits his vision to that future which 
will arise from the liberating possibilities that will obtain when human 
praxis-theoria and the forces of history harmoniously combine. That is 
the Marxian historical telos toward which the dialectic of history is 
moving. Those "liberating possibilities", which Marx considers to be 
infinite in number, are in fact finite possibilities - they do not 
transcend the possibilities which are borne in the womb of history.
Marx’s future is not as open as we are led to believe. Christian faith, 
on the other hand, argues that the future of man is infinitely greater 
than that which is historically possible through human praxis. The 
future which Christian faith articulates is the future of the transcendent
God who brings it in, and, who, in the words of some theologians is Himself
30
the Absolute Future. Therefore, according to the understanding of God as 
Absolute Future, the possibilities of human liberation latent in history 
are taken up and transformed by God so that the newness that is promised 
is not the result of man’s effort. It is the gift of God. There is 
therefore a disjunction between future in history and the future beyond 
history.
Throughout the preceding discussion we have been trying to establish 
a case for a particular form of discourse about God. It was agreed that 
Marx’s atheistic and anthropocentric Weltanschauung raises the question 
of God: Who is He? We noted that to talk about the God of the Bible is
to talk about a deeper and/comprehensiye understanding of human nature 
than that presented by Marx in his materialist conception of reality.
God is not an obstacle to human freedom. On the contrary, He is seen 
as the only One through whom man is able to experience a total, liberating 
humanity, Man’s future, in the light of God, is far more open than the 
future projected by Marx which emanates from human history, for God trans­
cends history, and He brings His Absolute Future into history from outside 
of it. To speak of the transcendent God, who is immanent for the sake of 
man, is to posit hope for man and the world. Only the transcendent God 
of the Resurrection, who is, at the same time the immanent God of the 
Cross, can provide hope in the midst of the ambiguities of human existence.
In theological terras, Marx’s concept of man and philosophy of history
might be considered a form of a ’’theology of glory". There is an explicit
triumphalistic note in Marx’s world-view which is integral to it. In
spite of the "process of negation" in his concept of the dialectic of
historical materialism, there is a pervasive optimism about the successful
51transcendence of alienation. This "philosophy of success" has no satis­
factory means of dealing with evil, suffering, defeat, death, etc. It 
does not tell us how such negating experiences will be destroyed. We are 
therefore left to speculate that they will somehow be abolished with the 
transcendence of the basic socio-economic forms of alienation. In the 
absence of God
The penultimate becomes ultimate for man. His total destiny 
then depends on his accomplishments. He lives with the possi­
bilities of happiness and euphoria in the moments of his 
success. But he also lives under the law of frustration and 
despair in the face of defeat and guilt. 52
In contrast to a "theology or philosophy of glory", in which human 
progress can be unambiguously identified and acclaimed, some Christian 
theologians, such as Paul, Luther and Moltmann, speak of a "theology of 
the cross" where healing and wholeness are seen as being paradoxically 
present even where they are seemingly hidden from "human" sight. This
perception is an act of faith, and it is bound up with a theology of 
grace, of divine praxis for the sake of man.’ Lochman explains that in 
this theology "our salvation does not depend on the success or on the 
failures of our efforts. What is ultimate is not our accomplishments. 
The ultimate is not our failure and not even our death. The only 
ultimate, the proper future of man, is grace."  ^ Freedom and salvation 
of man are real for they are rooted in God’s grace in Christ.
Now, to speak of a "theology of the cross" vis-a^-vis a "theology or 
philosophy of glory" implies that there is an understanding of God, and, 
consequently, of man in the former, which is in contradiction to that in 
the latter. As we have already noted, only a radical concept of God 
can meet the Marxian challenge to talk about God. Despite its failures 
to take fully seriously the ambiguity of suffering, evil, death, etc., 
the Marxian analysis of alienation challenges Christian theology to 
return to a theology of suffering and healing, i.e., a theology of the 
cross. In the theology of the cross the resurrection is not absent but 
is present in the praxis of the crucified Jesus Christ whose presence 
in the world, with broken, sinful, alienated man is the presence of 
God. V/e are therefore talking about the God who is both present with, 
and is, simultaneously, the crucified Christ. He is the God who suffers 
for the healing of man and the world.
There is no escaping the fact that the theology of the cross is 
essentially paradoxical. In this theology, it is affirmed that contrary 
to "natural" appearances, where God appears to be-absent He is most 
present, where He appears to be weak as in the cross in Christ, He is 
most strong. This kind of talk about the strong and powerful God who 
is most present when He seems to be absent from the world and from the 
lives of people, especially of believers, is rather foolish and. absurd.
It is not without contradictions which, in the eyes of Marx, might well 
be described as "opium for the people". Mystery and hiddenness are 
inherent in this peculiar talk about the God of the cross of Christ.
Again, in the light of Marx’s critique of ideology as "false
consciousness", it would seem appropriate to dismiss the theology of
the cross as being simply another theological manifestation of "false
consciousness". According to this argument, the theology of the cross
is no more than a reorganization of consciousness, a mental change in
viewing the world without the necessary accompanying radical praxis
to transform the real and actual conditions of life. Furthermore, in
terms of the Marxian critique of ideology, the theology of the cross
may be denounced as a legitimation of the status quo. Here suffering
is glorified and the promise of the future kingdom of God is an illusory
hope, a consolatory device to curb the "natural" revolutionary tendencies 
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But this is a distortion of the truth about the God of the cross. 
Whereas for Marx this theology is ideological because it is seemingly 
divorced from (or even devoid of) liberating praxis, according to 
Christian theology, the praxis intrinsic to this theology is the most 
radical of all prax£is» Moltmann argues that the theology of the cross 
embraces a conception of reality which transcends the depths of socio­
economic and political conditions of life which it also includes. It 
is concerned first and foremost with the praxis of the God of love who 
suffered His Son to die on the cross. It is a praxis whose efficacy is 
through the contradiction of love in the crucifixion for the sake of 
the enemy. In Marx, it is the proletariat who are expected to carry 
out the revolution to abolish alienation and usher in the future society 
of freedom and love. But nowhere does Marx tells us how dehumanized
human "nature" will become loving in its revolutionary activity.
Undoubtedly, love and solidarity are b o m  out of common suffering,
but there is no way of guaranteeing the continuation of such love and
solidarity after the revolution has been successfully completed (or
defeated). In short, the love of man for man cannot come from within
man himself; it must come from without, from the suffering God, As
Moltmann tells us, "the believer experiences his freedom and the new
possibility of his life in the fact that the love of God reaches him,
35the lowless and the unloved, in the cross of Christ."^ The purpose
of this \love is freedom. Thus it cannot coerce anyone to love, nor
"prohibit slavery and enmity". Instead, it must suffer the contradiction
between its freedom to create its own conditions, in which it is open
to the loveless, and its impotence to force anyone to love. It suffers
grief over this contradiction and, in so doing, protests against it.
This love is not an abstract, eternal principle. It is a historical
event - the event of the cross. The "contradiction in men" is met by
"unconditional love", i.e., by God Himself.
God is unconditional love, because he takes on himself grief 
at the contradiction in men and does not angrily surpress this 
contradiction, God allows himself to be forced out. God 
suffers, God allows himself to be crucified and is crucified, 
and in this consummates his unconditional love that is so full 
of hope. But that means that in the cross he becomes himself 
the condition of this love,.,. The fact of this love can be 
contradicted. It can be crucified, but in crucifixion it finds 
its fulfilment and becomes love of the enemy. 36
Here we are not talking about a God who has taken His flight from the
world and left man in his predicament. Bather, we are presenting a
picture of God who is for man, whose suffering for the sake of man
infinitely outstrips man’s suffering, including his suffering for the
sake of others. This God is not the occasion of man's suffering - man
is. Instead, He is seen as the only hope for man in his suffering, and
beyond his suffering1. This is the message of the cross and resurrection 
of Christ.
This talk about the God of the cross is not simply another form
of theism in which the nature?i>and activity of God are the objects of
speculation. The theology of the cross is trinitarian. It is there-
37fore not a theology which is reduced to Christology. This fact will 
become clearer especially when we come to discuss the doctrine of the 
Two Kingdoms, In the cross, Moltmann asserts, "The loving Father has
a parallel in the loving Son and in the Spirit creates similar patterns
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of love in man in revolt,"^ The event of the cross is the event of
the Trinity. When we posit the freedom of man as being rooted in God
alone, we are conceiving of a dynamic God, i.e., the God of the Bible, 
of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and of Jesus Christ. This concept of God 
in relation to His activity in history is fully dynamic and comprehen­
sive only when it is trinitarian in essence. The Trinity is not the 
occasion for a speculative discourse on the "substance" of God’s nature; 
rather, it is the occasion for a proclamation of the activity of God, 
both within Himself and within history, Moltmann claims that there can 
be no "evangelical" talk about the God who acts in history which is not 
simultaneously about the God who acts within Himself.
Between the Trinity in its origins before time and the 
eschatological glorifying and unifying of God lies the whole 
history of God’s dealings with the world. By opening himself 
for this history and entering into it in his seeking love 
through the sending of Christ and the Spirit, God also experiences 
this history of the world in its breadth and depth. 39
Moltmann insists that "we must drop the philosophical axioms about the
nature of G o d , S u c h  axioms distort the truth about God for they
represent Him in static, abstract terms as One incapable of feeling,
especially of "feeling" suffering. God must be described in dynamic
terms which point to the centrality of "suffering" in His "nature".
God is not unchangeable, if to be unchangeable means that he 
could not in the freedom of his love open himself to the 
unchangeable history of his creation. God is not incapable 
suffering if this means that in the freedom of his love he 
would not be receptive to suffering over the contradiction of 
man and the self-destruction of his creation, God is not 
invulnerable if this means that he could not open himself to 
the pain of the cross. God is not perfect if this means that 
he did not in the craving of his love want his creation to be 
necessary to his perfection, 41
Thus the concept of the Trinity becomes integral to our talk about the
suffering God for it connotes the dynamic within the Godhead whose praxis
as Father, Son and Holy Spirit is not divorced from man's suffering;
42it fully embraces this suffering, taking it up into itself.
Trinitarian talk about God conceives of God as embracing the whole
of reality: God embraces the whole of reality for He is both immanent
and transcendent. But Christian theology must not stop here since even
Hegel's God does the same. Rather, Christian theology must emphasize
that unlike Hegel's God who is incapable of suffering, the Triune God
of the theology of the cross shows Himself to be the God who suffers
for the sake of Love. As Kazoh Kitamori points out, this distinction
is crucial to a Christian understanding of the God who brings salvation
to man and the whole of creation precisely because He suffers pain which
Hegel's God is incapable of.
In the gospel message, God suffers pain because he embraces.
But in Hegel, God does not suffer pain although he embraces. 
Even if Hegel's God allows individuals to wound one another, 
he remains a universal being, undisturbed and invulnerable.
This God protects himself from being disturbed by 'cunning of 
reason' (List der Vemunft). By cunning of reason, Hegel's
God never suffers wounds. Thus the abstractness of Hegel's
philosophy lies not in his portrayal of God as embracing the 
world, but in his portrayal of God as a being without pain. 
Because of this abstractness, Hegel's rationalism cannot bring 
salvation to our reality. 43
The question of speaking about God in response to the challenge 
posed by Marx's atheistic and anthropocentric world-view imposes a heavy 
strain upon the Christian faith. The dilemma may be summed up in terms
of’making the faith relevant to the needs of man and his world without 
losing the identity of the faith in the cross of the crucified and 
risen Christ. In the discussion above we attempted to point out that 
the Church may face this dilemma by talking about the "suffering" of 
God for the pain of man in order to heal him. This theme of the 
hidden presence of God in the suffering world permeates our study 
of the theology of the cross as an evangelical response to the challenge 
which Marx* s Weltanschauung presents to theology. Before we turn 
to Luther1s theologia crucis, we will attempt to summarize our argument 
thus far.
In our appraisal of the challenge of Marx's world-view to Christian 
theology, it was pointed out that Marx's "radical humanism" calls for a 
radical concept of God. We pointed out that this radical concept of 
God is found in a trinitarian understanding of the suffering God of the 
cross. It was emphasized that this theology of the cross is not a 
reduction of theology to Ghristology. On the contrary, it is the way 
of speaking of the praxis within God, and of God within history for the 
sake of man. A theology of the cross was conceived of in contrast to 
a theology or philosophy of glory. Whereas the former took with radical 
seriousness the human condition, which is understood in more than, but 
including the socio-economic and political conditions of life, and is 
paradoxical in nature, the latter was triumphalistic in essence, with 
its emphasis on unambiguous success. Classifying Marx's world-view as 
a "philosophy of glory" seems a logical conclusion in the light of its 
express optimism about, as well as emphasis upon the ultimate success 
of human effort at ultimate and total self transformation within history. 
It is a form of justification through human praxis vis-a-vis justification 
through the transcendent grace of the suffering God. It was maintained
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that it is inherently triumphal!stic in spite of Marx's radical concern 
with the pervasiveness of alienation and of human degradation. Admittedly, 
Marx takes man's suffering most seriously but not seriously enough, for 
his understanding of man is severely limited. Man, we noted, is both 
the estimate of what is human and the architect of his own destiny. 
Everything about him is therefore limited to his own creation within 
history.
The theology of the cross, on the other hand, provides a radical 
understanding of man which arises out of its radical concept of God,
Here, man's future is not confined to the history of his own creation.
His future is bound up with the future of the "crucified" God who
transcends history. Yet, human praxis within history, as well as the
whole of history are given their correct meaning in the light of the 
cross. This meaning surpasses that given in Marx's historical material­
ism. Man's freedom is not denied by the freedom of God, but is found 
only through the freedom of the suffering God who suffers his Son to
die for the sake of man and the whole of creation.
This "suffering" God is not found or met through human speculation.
On the contrary, it is He who finds man, comes to man and meets him in 
suffering and paradox. Though apparently absent, yet He is fully present 
for He reveals Himself in His hiddenness. Thus, when it may appear that 
God is absent from the tragedy of the human situation, He is most present, 
though not necessarily in the triumph of human success and accomplishment. 
Indeed, He is really most present in nihil. He suffers in and with the 
suffering.
Moreover, we are concerned that speaking about the suffering God 
does not lead to the glorification of suffering, and that the presence 
of God in suffering is not reduced to a mere identification of God with 
fellow sufferers.^ Indeed, we wish to show that the presence of the
suffering God is salvatory for man because the God of the cross is also 
the God of the resurrection. Therefore, in ’the suffering of the cross 
there is the resurrection hope. At the same time, we wish to point out 
that talk about resurrection hope apart from its grounding in the cross 
seems illusory and triumphalistic, in short, a theology of glory. How­
ever, without the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, the cross 
remains the symbol of tragedy and doom. Thus, in the light of the cross 
and the resurrection, there is hope for alienated and sinful man: hope •
in the world, and hope beyond death and the world.
As we shall see below, the theology of the cross does not call man 
to quietism, and apathy based upon a reactionary ethic of the status quo. 
This will become especially clear when we finally discuss the doctrine 
of the Two Kingdoms, To speak of the praxis of transcendent grace is 
to exhort to radical praxis to transform the inhuman conditions which 
might mean, in many parts of the world, the transformation of the socio­
economic and political conditions of life. Moreover, to accept that our 
ultimate future is in the hands of the suffering God, is not to dismiss 
or reduce the necessity of and import for a more "human1' future of human 
praxis. On the contrary, radical forgiveness through the cross of Christ 
calls Christians to radical praxis. This praxis, which is always in 
danger of becoming legalistic, and of reducing the Gospel to a form of 
Law through the justification of man by his works, must be complemented 
by the praxis of celebration: celebration of the future of God which is
already here in the presence of the crucified and risen Christ Jesus.
At the Lord’s table we are called to partake of the messianic banquet 
which is given proleptically in the Eucharist. Moltmann captures this 
indispensable sense of joy and celebration, which is also characteristic 
of a theology of the cross, in Theology and Joy .
In contrast to Marx's critique of religion as belonging "merely to the
realm of necessity as the groaning of the creature in bondage," Moltmann
argues that it is only partially so, for "it (religion) also and more
properly belongs to the realm of freedom as the play of remembrance, as
an expression of joy, and as the imaginative hope of man's basic and
45final humanity before God." It would seem that such talk about joy
and celebration in the crucified God in the midst of alienation could
arguably be called "ideological" in the Marxian sense of the term.
However, Moltmann maintains that
Religious myths and images are not just ideological tranquil­
izers which compensate for unbearable conditions or mitigate 
suppressed misery. They are daydreams of human communities in 
which the totally-other is made manifest, no matter how inappro­
priately, and where consequently the transformation of the here 
and now is already being anticipated. These communities are 
already celebrating that creative play which heavy-laden and 
labouring mankind longingly desires when it desires liberty, 46
We conclude, therefore, that the liberating power of the crucified 
and risen Jesus Christ is present in the anticipatory celebration of 
the transformation of sin and alienation. The genuine urge for wholeness 
emanates from God, It is therefore not the product of historical circum­
stances, It is not the result of human achievement; nor is it sustained 
and even heightened by optimistic hope in man's capacity to transform 
ultimately the human condition. It is through the Holy Spirit that man 
"becomes" the power and love of God in Christ in the world. Openness to 
God is completely and totally the gift of the Triune God who brings the 
Absolute Future and who is none other than the God of the cross. But 
this does not deny the celebration of the real liberating divine-human 
activities in history. To do so would be to distort the theology of the 
cross by making it appear and actually become a form of docetism. The 
cry for wholeness in history is the cry for the salvific presence of 
God in history which is already available to the "eyes" of faith.
According to this view, God is not confined to history even as He 
’’participates" in the suffering in history. It is a cry whose primary 
presupposition, contrary to Marx’s atheistic and anthropocentric world­
view, is not only that God is, hut, above all, that He hears the cry of 
suffering man. The epistemological centre of Christian faith is the 
revelation of God in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. 
Thus, Marx’s proletarian cry; "The philosophers have only interpreted 
the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it," finds 
its true and most radical meaning and expression, not in Marx's prole­
tarian revolutionary praxis-theoria, but in the loving praxis of the 
suffering God of the crucified and risen Jesus Christ.
B.
Luther’s Theologia Grucis: A theology of "radical reversal".
In our examination of the challenge which Marx's atheistic, anthro­
pocentric and materialistic Weltanschauung presents to theology, we noted 
that the question of God \/as primary. We claimed that a radical concept 
of God not only meets the Marxian demand for the emancipation of man 
and for an "open" and "free" future, but also redefines human freedom 
and the future of man and the world. In this redefinition, man and the 
future are liberated not only from socio-economic and other contingent 
alienating forces but from a reality limited to an immanent, historical 
materialism. In short, Marx’s concept of the immanent freedom of man 
is taken up and transformed in Christian faith's concept of the trans­
cendence of God, Here we find that immanence is neither absent nor 
taken lightly. To do that would lead to a dehumanizing distortion of
reality which would result in an insipid form of docetism. On the 
contrary, in the concept of the transcendence of God, both immanence 
and transcendence are taken seriously. As we shall see below, in Luther* s 
theology of the cross, talk about God is simultaneously talk about man, 
his condition, his suffering, his salvation and his future, Luther 
repeatedly reminds his readers that God revealed in the cross of Jesus 
Christ is God pro-me. , Consequently, man is not subsequently brought 
into the theology of the cross following the discussion about God: man
is present from the very beginning.
Furthermore, as the discussion in the previous section showed, it 
was accepted that there are ways of talking about God which do not 
conduce to man’s liberation but to his enslavement. In such cases, 
Christian theology might find itself supporting the ’’protest” atheism 
of Marx (and others). When this happens, Christians are (should be) 
motivated by altogether, and, ultimately, different reasons from those 
of Marx or any other "protest” atheist. The Christian theologian wishes 
to protest in the name of the revealed truth about the "crucified" God, 
and, in consequence, in the name of man. His protest is prompted by 
the love of God in Christ and is aimed at pointing to the meaning and 
implication of that love for the Church and the world at large. This 
is a cathartic and evangelical protest. On the other hand, Marx wishes 
to protest exclusively in the name of man whom he claims creates himself 
and is the ultimate and only measure of himself, Marx's protest is 
rooted in his humanistic passion for man whose enslavement is pervasively 
tied to his (man’s) subordination to God. There is no doubt about Marx’s 
intention to liberate man from his dependence upon God or any other 
deity or power to whom man is slavishly held accountable. The funda­
mental difference between Christian faith and Marx’s philosophy is most
vividly and critically expressed in the theology of the cross. It is 
precisely in such a theology that the question about the God who frees, 
who suffers, who is for and not against man, which, we have been arguing 
is raised by Marx, finds its most evangelical explication. This explica­
tion is by nature paradoxical as we shall see when we turn to Luther's 
exposition of his theological method: theologia crucis.
There is no way of escaping the fact that there is a historical 
distance between Luther and Marx: Luther lived in the sixteenth century
and Marx in the nineteenth century. But this is not the only crucial
issue which should be considered when any attempt is made to establish
a hermeneutical dialogue between the two thinkers. Of even greater 
significance is the basic difference between their respective ways.of 
looking at historical and eschatological reality. Whereas, on the one 
hand, Luther was a theologian for whom the existence of God was not the 
question - he accepted the existence as basic to his own existence -
on the other hand, for Marx, the existence of God was a priori and
methodologically rejected, Luther, we are told, had been burdened by
the crucial question: How do I find a righteous and gracious God? For
Marx, the question was: How do we find free, unalienated, autonomous
man? This undisputed difference between Luther's and Marx's "ultimate" 
questions is made even more acute when we consider the attitude of Marx 
the economist to Luther's works. Per Frostin informs us:
Already in Marx's early works, Luther is an object of his 
interests. He is described as a revolutionary, who was never­
theless unfulfilled. Also in Kapital and the Grundrisse Luther
is often quoted, but there in a new perspective. Indeed Luther
is probably the German economist most quoted by Marx in Kapital, 
and this with considerable agreement with his views. According 
Grundrisse he is the ^earliest national, economist*. In 
Theories of Surplus Value, i.e. in the closing volumes of Kapital 
Luther is frequently quoted with agreement. For Marx it is not 
Luther's moral commitment nor his pathos in the fight against 
incipient capitalism that is important, but his economic analysis.
He is portrayed in contrast to Proudhon, who showed no lack 
of moral pathos during his revolutionary phase. Marx indicates, 
however, that the sixteenth century Luther saw something in 
developing capitalism that Proudhon did not discover in the 
fully developed capitalism of the nineteenth century, namely, 
that capital consists of accumulated surplus value. 47
Marx’s preoccupation with economic categories leads him to see Luther's
main positive contribution to the liberation of man in Luther's analysis
of the evils in capitalism. Needless to say, this interpretation is far
from the central thrust of Luther’s concern with a gracious God who is
pro-man. As we have already shown, Marx, through the influence of
Feuerbach, criticizes the concept of man held by Luther (and others),
in which man is seen as utterly depraved before the righteous and holy
God who alone can save man from sin, death and the power of the devil.
In the process of doing so, he posited his own peculiar anthropocentric
and atheistic world-view. It is precisely this overriding concern with
man that opens up the way for a critique of his world-view from the
standpoint of Luther’s theology of the cross.
Luther's theologia crucis is a ’’practical method”; it is not abstract
and speculative. Though his concept of man, as well as his understanding
of reality as a whole differ fundamentally from Marx's Weltanschauung,
there is, nevertheless, a common element in their "living" concern with
man. It is this "living" concern in Luther that draws us to him as we
seek to articulate a radical concept of God in the face of the challenge
which Marx's world-view presents to theology. Thus our concern with
Luther's concept of God is existential, and this is paralleled, not only
in the situation described by Walter von Loewenich in which he notes
that we are "today experiencing a return from a theology of glory to a
48theology of the cross similar to the one we observe in Luther," but 
also in the very fact that Luther's theology arose out of the existential 
need for a gracious and loving God.
Luther refused to reduce theology to anthropology. Yet he insisted
that any talk about God is simultaneously tsLlk about man. It is
"relational" talk: the relationship between God and man for the sake
of man. As Gerhard Ebeling points out, it is impossible to speak about
God in such a way that what is said is not at the same time "the direct
concern of man," This "relational" talk occurs because "what is said
49of God is addressed to man,"
Through Christ, God's address to man is salvific. This is apprehended
through faith in Christ which is the gift of God initiated and sustained
through the Spirit and the Word. Faith then is "certainty": "certainty"
that God's address to man through the cross of Christ is a gracious call
and "certainty" that it is God, in the first place, who makes such an
address, Ebeling writes: "For Luther certainty is the essence of God’s
being with man and therefore of man's being with God. In the presence of
God, and there alone, there is no uncertainty. But uncertainty is man's
50sin, and certainty is salvation."
When we turn to Marx’s world-view we find that the conviction that 
God's address to man is salvific - it is precisely the means whereby man 
is made free from sin and all that enslaves him - conflicts with Marx’s 
argument that man's autonomy is lost when it is made subject to any 
heteronomous power. This question of the "freedom" and "bondage" of the 
will will be taken up at a later stage in our discussion of Luther's 
theology of the cross. However, it is instructive here to briefly look 
at another Christian theologian's approach to the problem of autonomy 
and heteronomy.
In his discussion on the Christian ethic "as essentially an ethic 
of redemption," Norman Robinson tells us that the "collision" between 
heteronomy and autonomy is inevitable. He continues:
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... the Christian ethic is necessarily related in a quite 
•explicit manner to God’s remedial .activity in Jesus Christ, 
to the saving Word of God in Christ and so to the revelation 
of the divine grace. If, however, the Christian ethic is an 
ethic necessarily and explicitly related to the self-revelation 
of God that fact in itself is the immediate occasion of questions 
and difficulties which are largely concerned with the problem 
of autonomy and heteronomy, 51
Marx, it should be noted, is heavily dependent upon Kant’s definition of
autonomy for his own understanding of that concept. Kant, Robinson tells
us, describes human autonomy in terms of the situation in which ’’man
himself and by himself can produce from his reason or from any other
part of himself, the practical principles and the guiding stars by which 
52he should live.’’ Thus, for Kant, as well as for Marx, man’s autonomy
as a free.agent becomes, and is, in fact, impaired by positing the autonomy
of God who reveals Himself in Jesus Christ. In relation to the autonomous
will of God, man’s will is made secondary, and he is seen as standing in
55a creature/Creator (and Redeemer) relationship vis-a-vis God, J Robinson 
therefore concludes that in light of the "gift of the Gospel, which is, 
when seen from within the original or rather from within what man has 
made of it, the quite unimagined and unimaginable restoration of man by 
the act and intervention of God and the creation of a kingdom of love 
within a self-willed world of man’s devising," there is a place for 
creaturely autonomy. He states:
Accordingly the idea of autonomy is right, but it is the 
autonomy of the creature, a secondary and derivative autonomy 
which combines the valid elements of both sheer heteronomy and 
pure autonomy, it is the autonomy of one whose nature it is to 
stand by grace in the presence of God his Creator, 54
Needless to say, Robinson’s conclusion would represent for Marx a 
"bourgeois" Christian compromise because man’s absolute autonomy is 
not only not affirmed and God’s autonomous power not declared non­
existent, but man’s autonomy is subordinated to the will of God whose 
real existence is a primary assumption in the whole argument.
Returning to Luther's argument that God is pro-man, it is to be 
noted that when we make the assertion that God is pro-man, our concern 
is not with establishing Luther's proof of God's existence. Instead, 
we are attempting to demonstrate that in the concept of God of Luther's 
theologia crucis, the essence of both God and man is defined in dynamic, 
not static terms. Moreover, it is also assumed that any definition of 
human nature which is not derived from and rooted in the "crucified" 
and risen God is deficient and dehumanizing. To posit- any other relation­
ship, as Marx does, in which man is the centre of his life, is to distort 
the fundamental truth about reality; God stands over against man but He 
is simultaneously pro-man. The theologian of the cross must be completely 
radical in his declaration of the truth. As Luther explains, "The
theologian of glory says bad is good and good is bad. The theologian
55of the cross calls them by their proper name." The latter is not afraid 
to recognize reality for what it is - distorted and sinful, and seemingly 
Godforsaken, He is convinced that in cross and shame, there man actually 
"finds" the gracious and loving God.
Despite this crucial polarity between Luther and Marx, there is a 
sense in which their respective concepts of "radical criticism" of reality 
agree. Admittedly, Marx advocates the doctrine of man's "justification" 
through human creative activity which finds an indirect parallel in the 
mediaeval offer of salvation through the sale of indulgences which Luther 
criticizes and outrightly rejects. However, when the implication of 
Marx's atheism is seen in terms of "protest" atheism it may be argued 
that he was standing on common ground with Luther who attacked the religion 
of indulgences on behalf of a theology of the cross. Thus both Luther 
and Marx attacked forms of religion which were offering counterfeit goods; 
according to Marx an opiate, and according to Luther consolation and
peace to stricken consciences through the sale of indulgences. The
grace of God is not "opium"; but Marx did not recognize this, and he
could not giveahis a priori and methodological atheism. Again, the 
grace of God is not for sale, and it does not call man away from the
world but drives him into it. In the theology of the cross, man is
reminded that he can courageously face the brokenness and sinfulness 
of the world and humanity. He does not have to fearfully hide from 
them. Above all, man is able in faith to behold the healing and saving 
God in the Christ of the cross. The parallel between Luther and Marx 
should therefore not be pushed too far; it is a limited and qualified 
parallel.
We noted earlier that talk about God was not exclusive of talk 
about man; rather, the two are mutually bound together. The human 
condition is taken completely seriously even as the essence of the 
"revealed" God is being exposed. Care should be taken, however, to 
ensure that Luther's insistence upon talking about the God "for us" 
does not lead to the reduction of God to a mere human projection, 
manipulated and manipulable. This is a constant danger which, never­
theless, Luther was able to avoid. According to Luther, to speak about 
the God who is "for man" is a paradoxical statement for it is of the 
essence of God's freedom that He appears weak and impotent when He acts 
on man's behalf through the cross of Christ, It is in this light that 
the following statement by Alves on Luther's understanding of the God 
"for us" should be understood, Luther, Alves tells us, "stubbornly 
refused to allow the language of theology to be concerned about a God 
who had not given himself historically to man. To speak correctly 
about God is to speak about One who does not have any other mode of 
determination save that of being for man. For Luther, consequently,
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the language of theology was simply the description of a historical
56person who exhausts the self-determination of God: Jesus Christ."
Therefore when Luther talks about the God "for man" he does not
wish to eradicate the qualitative distinction between God and man, between
Creator and creature. Paul Althaus points this out clearly when he notes
"the close connection which Luther establishes between the theology of
the cross and man's sinfulness". He adds that this "does not nullify
that fact that this theology is also intimately connected with and
57expresses Luther's understanding of God's being God."^ Thus the salva/-
tion of man is bound up with the "being" of God. Because God is who
He is, man’s salvation is guaranteed; man's need of salvation occasions
the revelation that God is "for man" even to the extent of suffering
death - the death of His Son on the cross. When Luther therefore speaks
about God who is pro-man, he is speaking about God who is known through
Christ and His cross.
Theologia crucis is therefore a peculiar theology; but it is not
one theology among various possible theologies. For Luther it is the
only true theology. As V/alther von Loewenich reminds us:
For Luther the cross is not only the subject of theology; it 
is the distinctive mark of all theology. It has its place not
only in the doctrine of the vicarious atonement, but it con­
stitutes an integrating element for all Christian knowledge.
The theology of the cross is not a chapter in theology but a 
specific kind of theology. The cross of Christ is significant 
here not only for the question concerning redemption and the 
certainty of salvation, but it is the center that provides 
perspective for all theological statements. Hence it belongs 
to the doctrine of God in the same way as it belongs to the 
doctrine of the work of Christ, 58
Elsewhere in this illuminating and scholarly work, von Loewenich identifies
the thesis which he discusses and defends in his book:
... the theology of the cross is a principle of Luther's
entire theology, and it may not be confined to a special
period in his theological development. On the contrary, as
in the case of Paul, this formula offers a characteristic 
of Luther* s entire theological thinking. 59
This interpretation of Luther1s outlook represents a landmark in Luther* s 
scholarship which is clearly shown in the normative place which it 
occupies in modem Luther studies. It forms the basis of our own under­
standing of Luther1s theologia crucis, as well as our attempt to formulate 
a theology of the cross in response to Marx's world-view. Accordingly, 
we shall discuss the theme of the "bondage of the will" in our presenta­
tion of the contrast between the theology of the cross and the theology 
of glory in Luther's thought.
The most comprehensive description of Luther's theologia crucis is 
given in his theses on "The Heidelberg Disputation" (26th April, 1518)» 
where he contrasts the theology of the cross with the theology of glory. 
But there are other references to a theology of the cross, both before 
and after "The Heidelberg Disputation", For example, of special note 
are his "Lectures on the Epistle to the Hebrews 1517~1518’% an<i two of 
his later writings, The Bondage of the Will and "Lectures on Isaiah" 
(1527-1530). It is beyond the scope of our present study to trace the 
development of Luther's theological method. We shall therefore confine 
our attention to a brief description of its main characteristics. Some 
of them have already been mentioned, and they will continue to be used 
in our development of a theology of the cross in response to the challenge 
which Marx's Weltanschauung presents to theology.
In keeping with Luther's search for a gracious God, the emphasis 
in Luther's theology is upon knowledge of God which is saving knowledge. 
For him, such knowledge is to be found in the God who reveals Himself 
through Christ and His cross. This revelation is characteristically 
veiled and hidden, since man is incapable of seeing God in his nakedness. 
God is always "clothed" when He.reveals Himself, In terms of the saving
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knowledge of God, man is confronted by God who is ’’clothed" in the 
humanity of Christ who rests in His mother’s arms, and who eventually 
hangs upon the cross. In contrast to a speculative knowledge of God, 
which is derived through reason, true knowledge of God in the theology 
of the cross is available only to faith which allows God to be God and 
which seeks God where He is to be found: in the humanity of Christ.
Furthermore,.this indirect and "concealed" revelation of God is seen 
in terms of suffering and the cross - both the cross of Christ and the 
cross of the Christian, The two belong together. Though they must be 
distinguished from each other, they must not become separated. The 
theology of the cross is practical and existential. As von Loewenich 
explains:
The cross of Christ and the cross of the Christian belong 
together. The meaning of the cross does not disclose itself 
in contemplative thought but only in suffering experience.
The theologian of the cross does not confront the cross of 
Christ as a spectator, but is himself drawn into this event.
He knows that God can be found only in cross and suffering..., 
For God himself is ’hidden in suffering' and wants us to worship 
him as such.... If we are serious about the idea of God and the 
concept of faith in the theology of the cross, we are faced 
with the demand of a life under the cross. 60
In his comments on Hebrews 12:11, "For the moment all discipline 
seems painful rather than pleasant; later it yields the peaceful fruit 
of righteousness to those who have been trained by it," (R.S.V.), Luther 
provides a useful illustration of his argument that the theology of the 
cross is a theology of faith which perceives the saving presence of God 
in the midst of the experience of its opposite.
Frequently in the Scriptures there are two opposite ideas 
side by side. For example, judgement and righteousness, wrath 
and grace, death and life, evil and good. This is what is 
referred to in the phrase, 'These are the great works of the 
Lord.1.,, ’An alien work is done by him so that he might effect 
his proper work' (Isa. 28:21).,,. For in a wonderful way he 
makes the conscience glad, as it is expressed similarly in 
Ps. 4:1: 'In tribulation thcu hast made me greater,’ that
means, thou hast made more of me, improved me. Now this is 
v/hat infusion of grace means. As i,t says in Rom, 5s4-s 
’Experience worketh hope and hope maketh not ashamed,1 Here 
we find the Theology of the Gross, or, as the Apostle expresses 
it: ’The word of the cross is a stumbling block to the Jews,
and foolishness to the Gentiles' (1 Cor. 1:18, 23)» because it 
is utterly hidden from their eyes. ’It is withdrawn from their 
eyes and is taught in hiddenness. This means that it is not 
manifest but is hidden as in the midst of a tempest.’ 61
Luther preserves the sovereignty of God in his talk about the revealed 
God when he points out in The Bondage of the Will that there is a double 
sense in which God remains hidden: as the One who is revealed in the
hiddenness of the cross, and as the One who remains Wholly Other whose 
mystery faith does not and cannot penetrate. To faith, there are not two 
Gods but one. However, the concern of faith is with the God who is 
revealed in Christ. (’’proper work”) who saves, and not the hidden God 
(’’alien work") who is awesome and inscrutable.
With these thoughts in mind, let us turn our attention to the contrast 
between the theology of the cross and the theology of glory as we continue 
our response to Marx’s world-view.
a,
Theologia Crucis contrasted with Theologia Gloria
In our discussion so far, we have implied rather than explicitly 
stated a theology of glory which Luther castigated even as he articu­
lated his theology of the cross. This is not at all surprising since 
Luther’s writings do not contain any comprehensive formulation of a 
theology of glory. According to Luther, the theology of glory is derived 
from speculation and abstraction which are contrary to evangelical theology 
theologia crucis. Like the theology of the cross, a theology of glory
is an orientation, a way of talking about the activity of God.
Luther claims, in thesis nineteen of "The Heidelberg Disputation", 
that "he is not worth calling a theologian who seeks to interpret the
62invisible things of God on the basis of the things that have been created." 
This means that the knowledge about God derived thereby is not true know­
ledge for it arises out of man* s speculation and is not the consequence 
of God’s revelation in the cross and suffering of Christ. As Luther tells
us in thesis twenty, "But he is worth calling a theologian who understands
63the visible and hinder parts of God to mean the passion and the cross."
The knowledge of God which the theologian of glory offers through his
study of "the invisible things of God" is not salvific. The theologian
of glory speaks of God’s "strength, his divinity, wisdom, righteousness,
goodness and the like. Knowledge of all these things does not make a
6Aman worthy or wise," Luther argues that, on the contrary, "The sort 
of wisdom which sees the invisible things of God in known good works 
simply inflates a man, and renders him both blind and hard." J The way 
of the theology of glory, in Luther’s estimation, is the way of triumph, 
and of human self-glorification and self-centredness. However, in spite 
of his great power and awesome majesty, the God of the theology of glory 
is, nevertheless, subject to human manipulation. He is an ideological 
God who legitimates the way of salvation and human development chosen by
man without reference to God’s revelation in Jesus Christ. Such a God
is a threat to genuine human salvation. He stands so far above man that 
he is de facto absent from the world of human suffering. Man’s striving 
for self-liberation and self-affirmation, in the theology of glory, is 
never satisfied and is ultimately dehumanising. Luther’s comment in thesis 
twenty-two of "The Heidelberg Disputation" is helpful to our argument here;
For since it is clear that they [theologians of glory} know 
nothing about the cross and even hate it, then of necessity 
they love the opposite, that is wisdom, glory, power and the 
like. Therefore by such a love they become more and more 
blind and hardened. For it is impossible for cupidity to be 
satisfied with the things it desires when it has acquired 
them. For just as the love of money grows as fast as the 
wealth increases, so it is with the thirst of the soul, the 
more it drinks the more it thirsts. As the poet said, ’The 
more the waters are drunk the more they dry up.' The Book 
of Ecclesiastes says the same: ’The eye is never satisfied
with what it sees nor the ear with what it hears* (Eccl. 1:8),
The same is true of all longings and desires. 66
The remedy which Luther recommends for this insatiable longing for
’’wisdom, glory, power”, is rather strange. It is a remedy which the
casual reader, or the reader who is not acquainted with the paradoxical
nature of Luther's thought, would find ridiculous and foolish. The
remedy for the theology of glory is the theology of the cross1 The two
are dialectically related to each other. But they must be distinguished
from each other since they are fundamentally opposed to each other. Thus
Luther's remedy for a theology of glory is premised upon a reversal of
those very things which human wisdom has come to value as being of
ultimate significance for man’s.wholeness. He states:
It is not cured by satisfying it (insatiable longing for ’wisdom, 
glory, power'but by destroying it. That is, that he who 
wishes to become wise should not go forward and seek wisdom 
but should become a fool, go back and seek foolishness. Thus, 
he who wants to become powerful and famous, to have a good time
and enjoy all the good things of life, let him flee from power,
fame, enjoyment and a sufficiency of everything and not seek 
after them. This is the wisdom we are talking about, the wisdom
which is foolishness to the world. 67
The paradox in Luther’s thought on the question of real, saving wisdom
is found in his claim that the wisdom of the cross is the very opposite
to what worldly wisdom thinks it is. It is reasonable to conclude that
Luther’s theology of the cross is a theology of the "radical reversal”,
It is this that constitutes the paradox in his theology.
Before we conclude our brief discussion of Luther's use of para­
doxical language, it is appropriate here to observe the similarity between
Luther's language and Paul's, where the latter is writing to the
Corinthian Christians.
Where is the wise man? Where is the scribe? Where is 
the debater of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom 
of the world? For since, in the wisdom of God, the world did 
not know God through wisdom, it pleased God through the folly 
of what we preach to save those who believe.
For Jews demand signs and Greeks seek wisdom, but we preach 
Christ crucified, a stumbling block to Jews and folly to Gentiles, 
but to those who are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the 
power of God and the wisdom of God, For the foolishness of God 
is wiser than men, and the weakness of God is stronger than 
men, 68
It is indeed striking that Luther (like Paul before him) uses para­
doxical language in his description of his theology of the cross. For 
him, it is the only adequate way of speaking about evangelical theology, 
i*e* theologia crucis. Considering the limitations and inadequacies of 
human language, it is small wonder that the language of the cross, about 
the suffering and crucified God—Man, Christ Jesus, is intrinsically 
paradoxical. .This is the nature of the revelation of God in the hiddenness 
of the cross of Christ.
Moreover, since the cross of the Christian is united with the cross 
of Christ, "the theology of the cross can never be a brilliant statement 
about life's brokenness, because it participates in what it seeks to
69describe. Apart from that participation, it would be empty chatter."
The language of the theology of the cross is experiential language for 
it describes the saving presence of God in Christ in the midst of His 
seeming absence and impotence. Inevitably, therefore, the theology of 
the cross and the theology of glory are at polar ends.
Our discussion of the theology of glory brings us to the point 
where it seems reasonable to conclude that Marx's peculiar anthropo­
centric world-view places his philosophy in the camp of the theology 
of glory. Whereas Marx "broods" over the history of alienation and
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comes up with his concept of man and philosophy of history, the theologian 
of glory broods over creation and comes up with his attributes of God, 
Though the former is inherently atheistic in outlook and the latter 
theistic, or specifically, Deistic, since he thinks of God as being 
removed from the suffering of the world, they are both united in their 
respective means of understanding reality by confining their attention 
and analysis solely upon Creation, They concentrate on different aspects 
of it, but they are united in their conviction that ultimate answers to 
the human situation and the world as a whole, are to be found through 
this means alone.
In the light of Luther's theologia crucis, the theologian of the
cross replies to Marx by claiming that the nature and destiny of man
cannot be fully known by man through his own initiative, Man's nature
and destiny are clouded in mystery and hiddenness because of man1s
fundamental relationship to the God of the cross. Only God can reveal
this hiddenness. Therefore, at best, human insight into man's history
and destiny is only partial and temporary. The truth about man is a
gift of grace that finds only partial expression through human knowledge.
Moreover, man is called to look for the truth about himself by exploring
and comprehending the cross of Christ. Similarly, to the theologian of
glory, the theologian of the cross replies that God cannot be known in
faith as being pro-man, apart from the cross of Christ. The cross of
Christ is therefore pivotal for a true knowledge of God and of man,
70i.e. saving knowledge that pertains to man and his future. Such 
knowledge is contingent upon revelation - God's self-revelation. Walter 
von Loewenich’s interpretative comment on Luther's nineteenth thesis 
is instructive here:
1. For the theologian of the cross it cannot be a question 
of brooding over God's being in itself. For example, he is
not interested in a doctrine concerning God’s attributes that 
substitutes quiescent abstractions^ for living acts. In fact 
he considers that extremely dangerous. God does not want to 
be known in his invisible things but in his visible things.
True theology must understand clearly that it has to be a 
theology of revelation. God has spoken, and therefore we are 
able to speak about God. God has shown himself, and therefore 
we know where we must look, 71
We have already noted that Luther, following Paul, calls us to look
nowhere else other than at the cross of Christ where we find the power
of God revealed in weakness and the weakness of God revealed in the
foolishness of suffering and death. This is no mere speculation about
the God who is described as pro-man in His revelation in the cross.
Rather, it is a knowledge of God which arises out of and is possible
only in consequence of God's speaking to man in his suffering, sin and
death so that man might hear and be healed. God hears the cry of
groaning humanity and graciously acts through the pain of the cross.
Marx's ''ear” for the groaning and sighing of the oppressed proletariat,
genuine though it is, cannot be compared at all with God's "ear" for
the groaning of man and the whole of creation. The radical difference
here lies in the unbridgeable gap between the Creator (God) and the
creature (all men). Furthermore, according to Luther's theology of
the cross, only God can suffer and die for man’s salvation, Marx, for
his part, turns his attention to the creature and the forces of history
to find the solution to man’s "groaning and sighing". In the light of
this, we conclude that Luther’s negative attitude to philosophy applies
to Marx’s philosophy as well as to the theology of glory. In a poignant
summary of Luther's negative attitude to philosophy, von Loewenich writes:
Philosophy has no ear for the groaning and sighing that run 
through nature. How could it? It knows nothing of a need 
for deliverance. It has the view of 'moral man' through and 
through. Just as the theology of glory prefers works to 
sufferings, glory to the cross, power to weakness, wisdom to 
foolishness, so philosophy would rather investigate the essences
and actions of the creatures than listen to their groanings 
and expectations.... Genuine metaphysics would have to 
proceed from the principle that creatures are creatures which 
dare not be absolutized in their being. They are not self- 
contained. Philosophy overlooks this. It is blind to genuine 
reality. 72
This negative estimation of philosophy does not fully apply to Marx’s 
world-view, Por example, it is necessary for an accurate appraisal of 
Marx that we recognize the depth of his awareness of human misery' under 
nineteenth century bourgeois capitalism. His perspicuous analysis of 
man's alienation shows that he is not totally blind to "genuine reality". 
Indeed it is a tribute to Marx that his concept of alienation continues 
to be of special significance in understanding the human condition - in 
socio-economic and political terms - today. However, Luther* s negative 
critique of philosophy is particularly appropriate to Marx's world-view 
which proceeds from the principle that the creature (man) is absolute, 
i.e. he is the centre and standard of human existence. Thus, in the face 
of Luther's criticism of philosophy, Marx's Weltanschauung is not a 
"genuine metaphysics", and, despite its acute awareness of man's aliena­
tion, it is ultimately "blind to genuine reality". What, then, is 
"genuine reality"? "Genuine reality," which pertains to the "sacred 
philosophy" of the Apostle Paul, is thoroughly eschatological. Like 
Marx's philosophy,it embraces history. However, unlike Marx's philosophy, 
it embraces history in terms of the cross of Christ by which it also 
transcends history. It is a "philosophy" of grace.
Luther, it should be remembered, is a very complex thinker. It is 
therefore not surprising that his negative attitude to philosophy finds 
its counterpart in his approving comments about a "sacred philosophy". 
Once again we see the depth of the influence of Luther's theological 
mentor - the Apostle Paul.
Paul appears to him to be a true philosopher. True philosophy 
would, of course, be a complete reversal of the hitherto exist­
ing kind. While the accustomed philosophy occupies itself with 
the being of things, this appears to the "apostolic philosophy" 
as a foolish approach, For the true being of things does not 
lie in their existence and condition, but in their final purpose. 
Therefore the apostolic philosophy is thoroughly eschatological.. 
Such a philosophy is suitable for theology. 73
In speaking about the eschatological dimension .of the "apostolic philosophy 
Luther is not moving beyond or away from the cross of Christ, On the 
contrary, he is attempting to emphasise and further explicate the signifi­
cance of the cross as the source of all definition of the ultimate meaning 
of human existence.
Reflecting on the meaning of transcendent grace in the face of 
Auschwitz, Ulrich Simon provides a lucid description of the eschato­
logical dimension in Luther's theology of the cross. Simon writes,
"The life of Grace both comes from beyond anything this life can offer
74and aspires to an eternal consummation which lies beyond death." He
is careful to point out the real possibility of the distortion and abuse
of this eschatological future. Nevertheless, he insists that the
eschatological perspective is indispensable for our salvation which
begins now and in the light of which our decisions are governed.
The theme of the sowing and the harvest cannot be removed from 
the re-making of life in bondage. Without the eternal perspec­
tive our enslavement reaches the proportions of Auschwitz, which 
Luther seems to have foreseen in his honest, but unattractive 
warning: 'If you believe in no future life I would not give a
mushroom for your God.... do then as you like; for if no God, 
then no devil, no hell.,.; then plunge into lechery, rascality, 
robbery, and murder.' 75
Meaning for human existence is found only in God, not in man, and it is
in the God who makes Himself known in the cross. The cross which is the
paradigm of suffering is not divorced from real suffering but is a real
protest against real suffering. Indeed, it is there that the greatest
and only victorious protest was (and is) made, for it is the protest
of God Himself,
A note of caution needs to be sounded at this point concerning 
equating Marx's philosophy with that which Luther criticized in his 
day. We recall that Harx saw that philosophy had culminated in his 
day in the philosophy of Hegel's Absolute Spirit, Harx therefore argues 
that the problem now was not to promulgate a new philosophy of the mind 
unrelated to the radical transformation of the socio-economic base of 
society. On the contrary, he argued that the time had come for philo­
sophy to be transcended by being realized in practice. The problem 
before man was not to re-interpret the world but to change it, as his 
eleventh thesis on Feuerbach poignantly makes clear. This call to 
radical action - praxis-theoria - was not the result of any blindness 
to human suffering. It was obvious that praxis-theoria was prompted 
by Marx's concern to understand and transform the alienated human 
condition. However, the problem with Marx's analysis of the human 
condition is its unequivocal reduction of all reality to a socio­
economic base. Indeed, the crux of the matter is that man is posited 
as. the definition of himself. It is at this point that the theology 
of the cross stands diametrically opposed to both Marx's philosophy 
and the philosophy (or theology) of glory in Luther's day. The latter 
two have both "lost sight of revelation."
Philosophy crowded out the Bible. Philosophy wanted nothing 
to do with the way of God; it is offended at the cross of 
Christ, the great no to all human endeavor, to all opinions 
of one's own. For that reason philosophy does not speak about 
this.... For that reason also Luther declaims against the 
'seat of the scornful'..., 76
Luther responded to this situation by attacking philosophy and calling
for a return to Biblical faith. He felt that he had been divinely
commissioned to undertake such a task for which, von Loewenich points
out, he was "especially qualified as a philosophically trained theologian.
from a theology or philosophy of glory to a theology of the cross. In
the words of von Loewenich, the clarion call was: "Turn away from
77philosophy and turn to Christ the Crucified." The cross of Christ 
judges all human attempts at defining man in relation to himself alone, 
or in relation to a future bound up with a speculative concept of God 
in His glory and majesty,
Marx’s man - the proletarian collective - exercises a free will 
subject to no one or nothing except himself, i.e. man, and the contingency 
of the forces of production in history, Man as the species-being is 
called upon to assume the place of God, for Marx, borrowing Feuerbach's 
concept, is convinced that God is only a projection that arose out of 
alienation and is kept intact through alienation. In the light of Luther's 
criticism of "free will" in relation to God, and his argument that in 
terms of his relationship to God man's will is in "bondage", it is fairly 
certain that Marx's anthropocentric reductionism with its emphasis upon 
human autonomy would have been rejected. This crucial difference between 
Marx and Luther takes us back to their different conceptions of man’s 
enslavement: in Marx, it is basically a bondage to the alienated socio­
economic base in society; in Luther, it is a bondage to sin, the flesh
and the devil which is reflective of the basic state of rebellion of man
against God. Thus, in Luther, the human will which is in bondage is the
will of sinful men.
Furthermore, unlike Marx who sees that the will of alienated man 
is in bondage because it is enslaved to the distorted and dehumanizing 
mode and relations of production in society, Luther saw that the will 
of sinful man was also in bondage vis-a-vis the will of God, As Hbeling 
explains, "Luther is not content with the statement that the human will
In Luther’s view, the epochal moment had arrived for a "radical reversal":
is under the dominion of sin, and to that extent is enslaved." Instead, 
he "goes on to make general statements concerning the necessity of every­
thing that takes place, and asserts the impotence and bondage of the 
human will in contrast to the free omnipotence of the divine will."
Here we have a subtle but crucial difference between Marx's Weitanschauung 
and Luther's theology of the cross. Whereas, on the one hand, Marx 
envisages a historical future where man will become an autonomous being 
living creatively and harmoniously with the material forces of history - 
admittedly, Marx does not make clear how this state will be achieved - 
on the other hand, Luther insists that man, as creature, will not and 
cannot exercise an autonomous will vis-a-vis God. This means that even 
the man who becomes saved through Christ is not and will not ultimately 
be given a freedom which is not in bondage to the will of God, Whereas,
for Marx this represents perpetual oppressive bondage for man, for the
theologian of the cross, it constitutes real, liberating freedom.
Luther's refusal to speak of the "free will" of man in terms of
man's salvation is bound up with his concept of the sovereignty of God,
i.e. with God being God. To speak of the free, creative will of man,
as Marx does in his world-view, is tantamount to attributing deity to
man which is an impossibility in Luther's theology, Ebeling sums up
Luther's argument well by saying:
For Luther says that 'free will is a divine name and is 
appropriate to no one except the divine majesty alone; for 
the latter can and does do everything it desires in heaven
and on earth,' To attribute the term 'free will* to man means
no less than to attribute deity itself to him. Consequently 
this term ought to be reserved to God, and another expression 
used to refer to man. 78
But, does Marx not infer a different term for man by not positing 
man as a god in place of the God of Christian faith? It is instructive 
to remember that it was Feuerbach who claimed that the attributes of God
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were in fact the attributes which rightfully belong to free, unalienated 
man. We have already remarked upon Feuerbach’s influence upon Marx - 
for instance, Marx accepted Feuerbach’s concept of God as a human projec­
tion. However, it should be emphasised that Marx did not explicitly and 
directly argue for the deification of man. Nevertheless, we are led to 
the conclusion that Marx’s concept of man as a free, autonomous being, 
yis-a-vis the Christian faith, is de facto a deification of man. Thus 
his concept of ’’free will” is open to Luther's criticism of "free will”. 
For Marx, man’s wholeness and salvation are inextricably and completely 
bound up with the immanent, actual and real conditions of life, God 
oppresses man and keeps him enslaved. In Luther's theologia crucis, 
on the other hand, man is enslaved by sin, and his assumption of the 
responsibility for his salvation is tantamount to damnation. Only the
God who reveals Himself in suffering and the cross can release man from
79his bondage and make him fully human.
The complexity of the issue of the polar difference between Marx's
concept of man's autonomy and Luther's concept of the autonomy of God
is intensified further by Luther's claim that there is a sense in which
Christian faith can talk about the "free will" of man. According to
Luther, man is not devoid of a will informed by reason which, when
exercised properly, conduces to man's humanization in the world, Man
does not exercise a free will in relation to his salvation, but in
service to his neighbour. There is therefore a duality in the human
will which is simultaneously free and in bondage. As Ebeling explains:
Man can exercise his will with regard to things which are 
subject to man, and this includes, in a limited sense, the 
realm of morality, which we may describe as the sphere of 
activity of secular righteousness, where the concern is with 
works. 80
These are the works which are done for the sake of the neighbour, which,
in the presence of God.
... As soon as we turn to consider man in relation to God, it 
becomes meaningless to speak of free will. In relation to 
God it is impossible for man to be the subject of action, for 
here he can only be considered as one who receives, who is 
acted upon, who is subject to judgement, and who is accepted 
or rejected, 81
In short, in relation to God, "at the end as at the beginning, 'we are 
beggars'.
It is precisely in terms of this relationship that Luther finds 
that man's%ssence" is fully defined; this essence remains the same for 
man even when he is seen in relation to his beighbour and the world.
That is, "the being of man in the sight of God is not something extra 
and additional to the being of man in, and in the sight of the world," 
Moreover, this concept of man is applicable to all men, both Christian 
and non-Christian, Whether man admits it or not, his "being in the sight 
of God defines the meaning of his being in the world." " Thus, according 
to Luther, when one speaks about the "free will" of man, one must do so 
in relation to what is below man and not above him. Here, in the realm 
of reason, man is called to act responsibly and freely for it is within 
his capacity to do so. But even in the sphere where man exercises his 
legitimate lordship over creation "this too is directed by the free will
a  a
of God alone, in the way in which he pleases," This closing remark 
opens the way to further discussion on the ubiquitous question of theodicy. 
However, we shall not pursue this discussion further. For our purposes, 
the remark serves to emphasise that the destiny of man is found not in 
himself, his history, or in his creative praxis, but only in God who 
alone acts freely. In the context of the cross God's activity for the 
sake of man is definitely and decisively fully gracious.
In Luther's theologia crucis, man's "essence is not defined a priori
as Ebeling points out further, are not and cannot be considered salvific
in static terms. On the contrary, it is defined in relation "to the 
event that takes place between God and m a n , T h i s  is most clearly 
expressed not only in the doctrine of Creation, but, especially, in the 
eschatological event of the cross and resurrection of Jesus, I;Ian is 
no longer taken for granted, neither his freedom nor what is considered 
"natural" in him, A whole new and fundamentally different situation 
emerges which leads us back to the question of God. "Who is God,"
Ebeling asks, "if man cannot remain content with defining himself by 
comparison with the animals, but makes God the one from whom the whole
86determination of man’s being, the whole definition of man is derived?" 
This question is most cruciaJL for the theology of the cross since we 
have denied man's claims to freedom and absolute responsibility in 
determining his ultimate future. Returning to Marx, we are reminded 
of the plight of alienated man. Taking the proletariat as paradigmatic 
of the whole of alienated humanity - alienated in Marx's terms, as well 
as in terms of Christian faith’s understanding with reference to man’s 
relationship to God - we ask: Who is God? More appropriately: Where
is He? What answer should the theologian of the cross give? If he is 
to "call a thing what it is" - in this case, recognize the situation in 
which he speaks for what it is - then he cannot be oblivious to such 
stark historical realities as: the suffering of the proletariat (and
of all humanity) and its failure to achieve its liberation through its 
own initiative; the absence of God is acutely pronounced in His impotence 
to act on behalf of the suffering and exploited; the Marxian immanental 
and one-dimensional future, as well as the transcendent Kingdom of God 
are still out there in the future. In his response, the theologian of 
the cross claims that faith sees that the Kingdom of God has already 
come in the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ; and the Kingdom will
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also come. This means that God is paradoxically present in the midst 
of human suffering, working on behalf of man.
Following Luther’s theologia crucis, we claim that God is present, 
standing in solidarity with suffering man, effecting his liberation 
through the cross of Christ. God is therefore known "through suffering 
and the cross”, that is, "the knowledge of God comes into being at the 
cross of Christ, the significance of which becomes evident only to one
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who himself stands (i.e. participates) in cross and suffering," We 
have reached a crucial point of departure between Marx and Luther (or 
the theologian of the cross). Whereas Marx finds that alienation is 
indisputable evidence for the non-existence of any real, liberating 
God, Christian faith insists that the God of the cross of Christ is 
the real and living God, who is most present where man suffers alienation. 
This claim by Christian faith rests on the conviction that God's revelation 
is always indirect and veiled, manifest in its contrary. It is a para­
doxical revelation. As Paul Althaus tells us:
The theology of the cross means that God hides himself in his 
work of salvation and that he acts and creates paradoxically 
while camouflaging his work to make it look as though he were 
doing the opposite. In this Luther feels that God glorifies 
himself as God. God has power to create out of nothing.,,.
God shows that he is God precisely in the fact that he is 
mighty in weakness, glorious in lowliness, living and life- 
giving in death. Thus in Luther's thinking, the theology of 
the cross and God's being are most intimately connected. 88
In the foregoing discussion we attempted to show that Luther's 
theologia crucis is the only meaningful way whereby Christian theology 
might meet the challenge of Marx's radical Weltanschauung. Admitting 
the fact that Luther's preoccupation with the question of finding a 
gracious and righteous God who is pro-man, i.e., who saves and not out- 
rightly rejects, who stands with suffering man, and even enters into 
man’s suffering by embracing pain, and Marx's preoccupation with the
question of how to find free, unalienated man are two distinct and
separate concerns, we, nevertheless, maintained and sought to show that
in the radical concept of God in the theology of the cross there is a
more comprehensive and authentic concept of man vis-a-vis Marx's concept
of man. It was pointed out that God, who is pro-man, frees man to be
man, a creature before God, This is in contrast to Marx's assertion
that man’s future, his salvation and his freedom are his alone to realize
in and through praxis-theoria. In consequence, our concern with Luther's
concept of God was primarily soteriological. This is not a distortion
of Luther's method for, as Moltmann explains, "In fact Luther's theologia
crucis here is a radical development of the doctrine of the incarnation
89with a soteriological intent."
With reference to Marx's challenge which calls for a radical concept 
of God, the theology of the cross points to a soteriology in which God 
enters into human history participating fully in the liberation of man
and the whole of creation. God stands in solidarity with the weak, the
forsaken, and the despised. Solidarity and identification, and cruci­
fixion are salvific in light of the resurrection of the crucified One, 
Douglas John Hall expresses this outlook very clearly as he focuses
attention on the presence of the crucified One:
The theology of the cross is first of all a way of speaking
about the character of God's entry into the sphere of human
history. It is not merely a statement about the death of 
Jesus, but about his life and the meaning of his life for 
our lives. It is not merely a statement about the human 
condition; it is testimony to the assumption of the human 
condition by the One who created and creates out of nothing.
The basic point of this theology is not to reveal that our
condition is one of darkness and death; it is to reveal to
us the One who meets us in our darkness and death. 90
Hall adds that what makes this theology peculiarly a theologia crucis
is not that "it wants to put forward this ghastly spectacle as a final
statement about life in this world, but because it insists that God,
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who wills to meet us, love us, redeem us, meets, loves, and redeems
91us precisely where we are; in the valley of the shadox^ of death."
This talk about God is Christological for it is only in and through
Christ that God is encountered and grasped in faith by man, Ian D.K,
Siggins summarily explains Luther’s thought on the subject when he notes;
He who wants to encounter God must encounter Him where He 
may be grasped as He cannot be grasped in His majesty; in 
the incarnate God, who lives in His mother’s lap, and in the 
crucified God, To cling solely to Christ as He goes through 
death to the Father is the only way to find Qod. 92
Siggins therefore concludes that, according to Luther, "Since God will
not and cannot be found except in and through the humanity of Christ,
that humanity is the ’ensign for the nations’ of Isaiah's prophecy
(Isa, God is available for man to grasp Him, for Christ
is the Emmanuel «- "God with us". He is God incarnate who1‘suffers
death, even death on the cross for the sake of the whole world. Because
of Marx’s Weltanschauung, as well as in spite of it, Luther’s theologia
crucis, with its emphasis upon the salvatory encounter between God and
man in the cross of Christ, is crucially relevant to the proclamation of
the Gospel, in word and deed, in the world today.
In both sections of this chapter we have sought to show that it is
at the cross of Christ that God reveals His essence as suffering for
the sake of man. This affirmation by Christian theology - indeed by
the theologian of the cross — is not an opiate for it calls a thing what
it is; it is hope incarnated in suffering. It is hope in the crucified
and risen Jesus Christ, the God-Man, who opens the way out of suffering
which is, in reality, a way that is present in the midst of suffering
and leads through suffering to the resurrection beyond this world.
Salvation is sola gratia, which is the praxis of God,
Chapter IV.
Proclaiming and "Incarnating" the Gospel:
The double crises of Identity and Relevance.
Introduction,
In this chapter we shall examine the basic features of the theology
-|of Moltmann, on the one hand, and the Theology of Liberation , on the 
other hand. Our overriding concern will be with the respective ways in 
which they both talk about God in the face of the pressing socio-economic 
and political problems which confront the world today. Both Moltmann 
and the Liberation theologians from Latin America recognize that the 
Gospel of Christ has a peculiar relevance to those problems, and in their 
own peculiar way they each attempt to articulate this relevance in ways 
that are rooted in and not divorced from the peculiar identity of the 
Gospel,
The presentation of Moltmann’ s theology is based on the primary 
assumption that his theology of the cross is the fundamental method which 
he uses in his talk about God. We shall therefore refer to several of 
his writings, and not only to any one of them.
By the same token it is assumed that, despite the variety of writings 
on Liberation Theology by a motley group of scholars, there is the 
primary concern in Liberation Theology with the theme of historical 
liberation from socio-economic and political enslavement and oppression.
Finally, we shall show that, to a very great extent, in both 
"theologies" - more especially in Liberation Theology - talk about God 
is in fact a theological explication of the Marxian concept of praxis- 
theoria. In Moltmann, the main emphasis is on the loving praxis of the
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Triune God within Himself and in history, and on the practical-critical 
activity of the believer in the light of God's praxis. In contrast to 
this emphasis Liberation Theology stresses the believer's practical- 
critical activity in history, which is his creative response to the God 
of justice and liberation. Consequently, when Moltmann's theology is 
seen in the light of Liberation Theology it appears abstract and vague 
about the Church's socio-political involvement in any given society.
By the same token, when Liberation Theology is viewed in terms of 
Moltmann's theology it appears that God is so actively engaged in man's 
liberation in history that He seems more like man's co-agent than as 
sovereign Lord. Both "theologies", however, are practical "theologies" 
with significant pastoral import which reflects the tension between the 
universal meaning of the Gospel, and the particular, indigenous meaning 
of that message, Moltmann is more concerned with the first emphasis, 
while Liberation is more concerned with the second,
A.
Moltmann's Trinitarian Political Theology of the Cross - 
A Radical Concept of God.
a.
Political Theology of the Cross.
It is obvious from Moltmann's explicit description of his theology 
of the cross that he is greatly indebted to Luther. In Luther he found 
the radical meaning of the Incarnation most clearly explicated. He 
accepts Walther von Loewenich's thesis that Luther's theologia crucis
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But Moltmann articulates his own peculiar understanding of this theology
of the cross in order that it is not left in the sphere of the abstract
and speculative. Thus, for Moltmann, Luther's theologia crucis as the
method of doing theology must not be viewed as merely a theoretical and
analytical exercise removed from the world of human action. On the
contrary, true theologia crucis is inextricably bound up with liberating
nraxis. In Marxian terms, theoria and praxis are held inseparably
together; in terms of Christian theology, faith in God through Jesus
Christ and love of neighbour are held together in the dynamic activity
of "faith active in love". It is with the liberating praxis, which is
inherent in a theology of the cross, in mind, that Moltmann argues;
And yet it only remains theologia crucis in the context of 
critical and liberating practice in preaching and life. The
theology of the cross is a practical doctrine for battle,
and can therefore become neither a theory of Christianity as 
it is now, nor the Christian theory of world history. It is 
a dialectic and historical theology, and not a theology of 
world history. It does not state what exists, but sets out 
to liberate men from their inhuman definitions and their 
idolized assertions, in which they have become set, and in 
which society has ensnared them. 2
It is obvious that Moltmann sees the task of the theology of the cross 
as that of demonstrating the truth of its doctrine by engaging in 
liberating action on behalf of the oppressed and the dehumanized in 
society. Theologia crucis is seen therefore not so much as an explana­
tion of history but as a call to transform history in order to make it
more human.
Because of Moltmann's explicit concern with the theology of the 
cross "as a practical doctrine for battle", his vocabulary, unlike 
Luther's, is pervaded by praxis-oriented terms. This is not to say 
that Luther was not concerned with practical issues. Such a conclusion
is the distinctive and evangelical method of doing Christian theology.
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would, be incorrect. One only needs to read his teachings on the question 
of Christian liberty, for example, to find that Luther was concerned 
with "faith active in love" in service of the neighbour as the true 
expression of Christian freedom. Therefore the crucial difference 
between Moltmann and Luther lies in the nature of the fundamental question 
faced by each in his particular age, Luther, we are told, was concerned 
with the crucial question: How do I find a gracious and loving God?
For Moltmann, the question is: How do we speak of God in the face of
socio-economic and political oppression?
This is not to say that Moltmann confines reality to the socio­
economic base as Marx does. On the contrary, it is his way of speaking 
about God which seeks to give the fullest expression- possible to His 
transcendence and His immanence. He wishes to take Marx most seriously. 
Consequently, his concept of the "Crucified God" shows God suffering 
within Himself and with suffering mankind instead of merely calling man 
to resurrection hope without participating in the suffering and oppression 
of man. All suffering, and this includes but is not limited to socio­
economic and political suffering and oppression, is taken up into God 
Himself,
Moltmann is careful not to speak of man’s hope for salvation as 
simply the result of God's solidarity with man,^ Transcendent hope in 
the Resurrection of Jesus is indispensable to his theology of the cross. 
Cross and Resurrection are bound together; they are not separated from 
each other. Therefore when Moltmann focuses on the cross of Christ, 
he does so in order to point out that real, transcendent hope which 
characterises Christian faith is already present in the world, i.e. in 
the cross of Christ, He summarises his thesis thus:
The cross of Christ is the sign of God’s hope on earth for
all those who live here in the shadow of the cross. Theology
of hope is at its hard core theology of the cross. The cross 
of Christ is the presently given form of the Kingdom of God on 
earth. In the crucified Christ we view the future of God. 
Everything else is dreams, fantasies, and mere wish images.
Hope b o m  out of the cross of Christ distinguishes Christian 
faith from superstition as well as from disbelief. The free­
dom generated by the cross distinguishes Christian faith from 
optimism as well as from terrorism. 5
Only the resurrection of the crucified God, Jesus Christ, provides hope 
in history and beyond history. This does not detract from the pen­
ultimate meaning human effort has for man’s future. However, man’s 
future is not the future of man's effort, but the future of the crucified 
God which is the real and only basis for man's total liberation.
Moltmann is therefore concerned that talk about God does not become 
divorced from talk about the divine-human activity in the world. For 
him, then, theology of the cross must be "political" theology of the 
cross. Explaining the inclusiveness of this theology which he and 
Johannes B. Metz have both call political theology, Moltmann writes:
For us the field of politics designates the extensive 
field of constructive and destructive possibilities of the 
appropriation and utilization of nature's powers as well as 
of human relationships by human society. Nature and human 
history come together in the process of civilization. In it 
there can no longer be a distinction between cosmology and 
anthropology. For man and nature, politics is becoming a 
common destiny. We take up the ancient concept of theologia 
politica or theologia civilis to point out the fundamental 
situation in which the God-question is raised and which 
Christian God-talk must become relevant today, 6
Continuing the description of his "synthetic" and "ttholistic" 
approach to theology, Moltmann adds that "political" theology of the 
cross is also bound up with the question of theodicy. The political 
question which has replaced the traditional "cosmological theodicy 
question about evil and misfortune" makes it necessary that Christian 
faith in the salvation of God which liberates the world from its self-
imposed enslavement shows itself to be practically relevant to the 
situation at hand. The primary focus of talk about God today must be
the political questions which contemporary man faces, i.e., the questions 
of history and the practical-critical activity of man. Consequently, 
Christian faith should not be restricted to the private realm of indivi­
dual existence and thereby allow the "godless and inhuman powers" to 
have full control over the realm of politics as has been done in the 
past.
The dilemma with which Christian faith is faced as a result of the
dichotomy between the private and political dimensions of human existence
is aptly summarised in the question; How can Christian theology continue
to profess faith in God in the face of the obvious absence of God from
the world? When the world is left to its own whim and fancy and the
creative activity of God is confined to the inner, spiritual sphere of
the individual soul, then, for all practical purposes "God is dead".
Unfortunately, Christian theology is partly responsible for the "death
of God" which has naturally strengthened the cause of Marx and other
"protest" atheists.
That faith which no longer seeks God and his righteousness 
in the world but only in the soul has allied itself with a 
practical atheism which seeks the world without God and 
righteousness, and with it has contracted an alliance of 
death, of the ’death of God* in the world, 7
It is therefore with the aim of recalling theology to the intrinsic 
unity between the activity of God in the soul and His presence and 
activity in the world, that Moltmann articulates his peculiar "political" 
theology of the cross. God’s concern for man, individually and corpor­
ately, and for the world are not separated from each other but held 
together. This is clearly revealed in the salvific suffering of the 
Truine God in the event of the cross of Christ,
No doubt, there is always the danger that any attempt to correct 
the distortion of the Christian faith by way of a political theology
truth of the Gospel of the crucified and risen Christ Jesus that will
be presented, but a distortion of it which inevitably will be tied to
a political system, order, class, etc. Taking full cognizance of this
insidious danger, Moltmann is quick to qualify his concept of a "political"
theology of the cross by stating:
Political hermeneutics of faith is not a reduction of the 
theology of the cross to a political ideology, but an inter­
pretation of it in political discipleship. Political hermen­
eutics sets out to recognize the social and economic influences
on theological institutions and languages, in order to bring 
their liberating content into the political dimension and to 
make them relevant towards really freeing men from their misery 
in certain vicious circles. 8
Political theology of the cross takes up the challenge in Marx’s 
eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, but it does so on its own terms, i.e., 
in terms of the cross of Christ, This means that it is not afraid of 
being subjected to Marx’s critique of ideology. As incarnational talk 
about God, it is concerned to make the Christian faith relevant in the 
face of contemporary challenges to it. Political hermeneutics does not 
lead to a dissipation of the substance of Christian faith even when
political hermeneutics asks: "What is the function of" talk about God
and what effect does it have? On the contrary, instead of any loss of 
the substance of the faith, "faith gains substance in its political 
incarnations and overcomes its un-Christian abstraction, which keeps 
it far from the present situation of the crucified God." It is there­
fore necessary that Christian theology makes clear whether, in its
political formulations and activities, "it is disseminating faith or 
9superstition.
Moltmann1s political theology is a dialectical theology. It is 
a critical-historical theology since it combines talk about God and 
man. Unlike Marx’s atheistic and anthropocentric philosophy, it talks
might result in a political ideology. In that case it will not be the
about God "for man", and does not leave God out of man’s struggle for 
liberation. At the same time, unlike theology characterized by an 
"other" worldly piety and the search for the inner salvation of the 
soul, political theology of the cross talks about human activity in 
the world for the sake of the world. This activity is rooted in and 
built upon God’s gracious and salvific praxis in and through Christ.
It is only by exercising a continual critical appraisal of its talk
about God that political theology of the cross can maintain that
intrinsic dialectical unity between the praxis of God and the praxis 
of man's response to God’s gracious activity in the cross of Christ.
Moltmann is concerned that the political theology of the cross 
which he advocates is a theology of Christian faith and is not reduced 
to politics or to any form of humanism, Marxian or non-Marxian. He 
explains:
If we would in practice put man in place of the divine, we 
would theoretically have to put the human essence in place 
of the divine. If we would change religion into politics, 
as our 'leftist' friends and Marxists demand, politics would 
have to become our religion. The state or the party would 
then become the Leviathan, the mortal god on earth. That would
mean abolishing once again the sacralization of politics which
Christianity has effected. This divinization of politics is 
a superstition which Christians cannot accept. They are 
Christians and hold to the crucified one in order to witness 
to men of a greater freedom, 10
Therefore, in facing the Marxian challenge to theology the Church should
not capitulate to Marx's anthropocentric and socio-economic and political
reductionism, by, for example, becoming a pov/er bloc in society. Instead,
she should stand at the foot of the cross of Christ where all superstition
of politics, economics, man’s capacity to end his historical alienation,
etc. - is exposed and rendered impotent. Christians cannot show the
relevance of their faith in the "crucified" God and maintain their
identity as Christians except by standing with the Lord who is the
crucified One.
b.
Trinitarian Theology of the Gross.
If the caption political theology shows Moltmann1s concern with
relevance, then the caption ntrinitarian theology” shows his concern
with identity. Moreover, the question: What is it that makes theology
of the cross evangelical theology? finds its answer in the peculiar
"trinitarian” character of Moltmann’s theology of the cross. It has
been noted already that Marx’s atheism (and all forms of atheism) cannot
seriously be met by positing theism, for the God of theism is not
necessarily the suffering and crucified God of the cross of Christ,
In place of theism, Christian faith, if it is to be true to its roots,
must point to a "trinitarian” theology of the cross. This is evangelical
theology for it seeks to explicate the event of the cross as an event
of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, It is an event within the "Triune"
God Himself for, as Moltmann tells us:
It is an event between the sacrificing Father and the abandoned 
Son in a power of sacrifice that deserves to be named the Spirit. 
In the cross, Jesus and the Father are in the deepest sense 
separated in forsakenness, yet are at the same time most inwardly 
united through the Spirit of sacrifice. From the event between 
Jesus and his Father at the cross, the Spirit goes forth which 
upholds the abandoned, justifies the despised, and will bring the 
dead to life. 11
This theology of the cross is not a reduction of theology to a theology 
of the Son, the Second Person of the Trinity. It is "trinitarian" theology 
which is characterised by the inherent unity which exists between the 
God who suffers externally for the sake of His people, and the God who 
suffers within Himself, Thus Moltmann1s Christology is not reduced
either to a monotheism of the father or to a monotheism of the Son,
12but is conceived of as the activity of the Triune God.
By insisting upon such a trinitarian theology of the cross, Moltmann 
demonstrates that the quest of the Church for relevance of the Christian 
faith in the world must not shape and give content to the message of the 
salvific work of the crucified and risen God. He claims that to describe 
the contemporary situation of socio-economic and political oppression 
and, then only afterwards, to raise the question of God is not to under­
stand adequately either the situation of man and the world, or the 
presence and activity of God which describe His being. Relevance and 
identity are bound together. They must not be separated into entities 
standing totally unrelated to each other; they are complementary to each 
other.
Moltmann notes, however, that it is a curious phenomenon that where .
the Church finds its identity, the question of relevance arises, and,
similarly, where the Church achieves relevance in the world, the question
of her identity arises. It seems that only one or the other may obtain
at any given moment in history, but not both simultaneously. This
situation presents what Moltmann calls the "double crisis" which may
be viewed more specifically in terms of the Christian faith. When this
is done, it is seen that "each of these crises is simply a reflection
of the other." Thus you cannot have one without the other.
... Both crises can be reduced to a common denominator. 
Christian theology must be theology of the cross, if it is
to be identified as Christian theology through Christ, But
the theology of the cross is a critical and liberating theory 
of God and man. Christian life is a form of practice which 
consists in following the crucified Christ, and it changes both 
man himself and the circumstances in which he lives. To this 
extent, a theology of the cross is a practical theory. 13
When God and man are spoken of together in the theology of the cross,
then there is the explicit concern with relevance and identity.
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Moltmann expresses a profound awareness of and concern for suffering 
humanity. He recognizes that man’s suffering includes socio-economic 
and political suffering but is not limited only to those forms of suffer­
ing, pervasive and acutely pronounced in our world though they are. It 
is out of his concern to bring a prophetic witness to bear on the situa­
tion that he, as a Christian theologian of the cross, places and interprets
the event of the cross in the context of the prophetic theology of the 
14Old Testament. He reminds us of the continuity between ’’the Jewish
God-situation” in the Old Testament and ’’the passion of God according
to the New Testament,"
Christian faith does not have a new idea of God, but 
rather finds itself in a different God-situation. It is 
defined through the passion of God and the cross of Christ.
It is related to the Jewish God-situation, • for the pathos 
of God in the Old Testament is the presupposition for the 
passion of God according to the New Testament. 15
Despite this fundamental continuity, a fundamental difference 
between "the pathos of God in the Old Testament" and "the passion of 
God according to the New Testament" exists. The crucial difference lies 
in the "bipolar" nature of the former, and the "trinitarian" theology 
of the latter. Whereas, on the one hand, "the prophetic theology of 
pathos proceeded from God’s covenant with his people and, on this basis, 
developed a bipolar theology between the pathos of God and the sympathy 
of the Spirit in man," on the other hand, "those who discern the God- 
situation in the crucified one are men from among all peoples." In 
the latter, the universality of God’s pathos is most emphatically made 
manifest. Furthermore, the contrasting difference in the two forms of 
theology is seen in the different way in which each apprehends the 
reality of God; while Israel apprehends God in terms of the covenant, 
Christians have "Christ himself, who mediates the fatherhood of God 
and the power of the Spirit." The latter is distinctly and necessarily
Christian theology cannot develop (as is often done in process 
theology) a bipolar theology of interaction between God and 
the Spirit in rnan. It must, for the sake of the crucified one, 
intentionally become a trinitarian theology. Through the 
crucified one, that dialogical God-relationship is first opened 
up. Through Christ, God himself creates the conditions necessary 
to enter upon a relationship of pathos and sympathy. Through 
the crucified one, he creates a new covenant for those who cannot 
meet these conditions because they are Godless and Godforsaken. 16
Because of the trinitarian nature of the event of the cross, even those
who are without hope - to whom the conditions of existence and their'
outlook on life bear striking witness - are offered genuine hope in
God through Christ.
When he contrasts the "bipolar" theology in the Old Testament with 
the trinitarian theology in the cross of Christ, Moltmann is not suggest­
ing that the phenomenon of God's suffering (even unto the death of the 
Son) for the sake of man, which characterises trinitarian theology is 
lacking in the former. Indeed, "bipolar" theology is characterised by 
the pathos of the suffering God. But the difference lies precisely in
17"the recognition of God in Christ, and above all in the crucified one."
In the crucified one we find the very completion of God's humiliation.
There God has not only entered "into the finitude of man but also into 
the situation of his God-abandonness." This means that Jesus is seen 
as God's representative "as man" for the sake of man. Simultaneously,
He is man’s Saviour and Liberator precisely in the God—forsakenness in 
the cross, God shows that He is the God for the forsaken and alienated 
in the experience of God-forsakenness of His Son. Jesus is for man 
because He is of God and man. At the same time, He acts for God because 
He is the Son of God, In the Incarnation, the two components, acting 
for God and for man, are inseparably bound together. This dialectic is 
in God Himself and in His activity in His Son on the cross for the sake
a trinitarian theology of the cross.
of man and the world.
Summarising the efficacy of this paradoxical activity of God,
Moltmann tells uss
The Godforsaken Son of God takes the eternal death of the 
forsaken and the damned upon himself in order to become God 
of the forsaken and brother of the damned. Every person damned 
and forsaken by God can, in the crucified one, experience
community with God. The incarnate God is present and accessible
to the humanity of every man. No one needs to play a role or 
to transform himself in order to come to his humanity through 
Christ, 18
Man is freed from having to do works in order to be free. Through
Christ, man is freed from and not further enslaved by the responsibility
of self-transformation. This is the work of the Triune God in the cross
of Christ. The dynamic '’essence1* of the trinitarian God is always for
the sake of man. "Nothing more exists that could exclude the lost man
from the situation of the pain of the Father, the love of the Son, and
the life of the Spirit. Without limits and without conditions, unhappy
19man is received into full community with God." In this emotionally 
charged description of God’s gracious activity on behalf of man, Moltmann 
posits a genuine and liberating praxis. It is praxis of the sovereign 
yet humble and loving God who freely suffers the pain of His love for 
the sake of the salvation of suffering, oppressed and alienated humanity.
We returned once again to the question of the danger of talking about 
God "for man" in such a way and to the extent that the sovereignty of 
God is impaired and subordinated to the needs of man. Man, we have 
already noted and emphasised, is always involved in any talk about the 
"crucified" God. But by talking about the dynamic of (and within)the 
Trinity in relation to the double crises of identity and relevance in 
the Christian faith, it would appear as if the needs of sinful, alienated 
man are the primary occasion for the revelation of God in His Godforsaken­
ness in the cross of Christ. This suggests that God’s sovereignty is
violated for He is portrayed as being sub.ject to man's needs. Moltmann 
attempts to avoid this danger by arguing that, on the one hand, to say 
that God reveals Himself for the sake of man is not to reduoe, distort,
or dispense with the concept of the freedom and sovereignty of God.
Indeed, on the other hand, Moltmann adds, God does what He does because 
it already exists within the Godhead. This means that suffering is in 
God Himself,
In the cross of Christ, a rupture tears, as it were, 
through God himself. It does not simply tear through Christ, 
as the doctrine of the two natures states. At first, it sounds
paradoxical if one says that God himself is abandoned by God.
God rejects himself, God cries out to God. Or, as Luther said; 
'There God dies to God.' 20
The solution to the dilemma is contingent upon whether God's revelation
in the cross of Christ is found in the paradox of suffering within the
Trinity itself - the suffering of God by God, For Moltmann, therefore,
man's needs did not occasion a radical transformation in the nature of
God but a salvific revelation of the dynamic of and within the Trinity.
There is an essential unity and harmony within the Trinity. Only because
of this unity and harmony between "the sacrificing Father", "the abandoned
Son", and "the Spirit of sacrifice" that the God-forsaken condition of
sinful humanity could be transformed by the suffering, death and resurrec-
21tion of Jesus Christ.
Moltmann's argument that the cross is both the inner event within 
the Trinity, and the external event of suffering love for the sake of 
man and the world seems to echo Hegel's thesis that Absolute Spirit 
realises itself by positing itself. But there are significant and 
striking differences between the revelation of the Triune God in Moltmann's 
theology of the cross and the self-manifestation of Absolute Spirit in 
Hegel’s philosophy - not least of all is the notable "pathos" in the 
former and the lack of pathos in the latter - to refute any argument
neither to Feuerbach's anthropological reductionism nor to Hegel's
philosophy of Geist. Instead, it seeks to be a Biblical theology of
the cross by embracing the "pathos" of Yahweh in its description of
the trinitarian event of suffering and crucified love in the cross of--
Christ. We will return to this point below.
Here it is appropriate to raise the crucial question of "change"
within God, Iloltmann's trinitarian theology of the cross inevitably
gives rise to speculation concerning the relation between the "dynamic"
activity of the Trinity in the cross of Christ and the tendency towards
"change" in God Himself. Moltmann asserts, "The suffering and dying
of Jesus, understood as the suffering and dying of the Son of God ...
are works of God towards himself and therefore at the same time passions 
22of God." These inner works of God are contrasted with His external
works of "Creation, new creation and resurrection" which were directed
23"against chaos, nothingness and death." Accordingly, when it is viewed 
correctly, the event of the cross reveals a stasis within the Godhead. 
This stasis is linked to the formula "God is love". The dynamic out­
working of love implies of necessity a "change" within God who is other, 
i.e., God turns towards man and assumes responsibility for man's sin.
He "changes" from the God who is wholly other to the God who is "for 
man",
God overcomes himself, God passes judgement on himself, God 
takes the judgement on the sin of man upon himself. He 
assigns to himself the fate that men should by rights endure. 
The cross of Jesus, understood as the cross of the Son of God, 
therefore reveals a change in God, a stasis within the God­
head: 'God is other.' And this event in God is the event on 
the cross. It takes on Christian form in the simple formula 
which contradicts to all possible metaphysical and historical 
ideas of God: 'God is love.' 24
In the light of the event of the Trinity in the cross of 'Christ,
equating the two. His trinitarian theology of the cross capitulates
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the history of God’s suffering for the sake of man is in reality a
dialectical history involving God’s suffering in history, i.e. in the
suffering of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, upon the cross, and God’s
suffering within Himself. Thus, the truth of God’s salvific suffering
is distorted when the dialectic is destroyed and the message of God's
suffering in history is viewed in isolation from God’s suffering within
Himself. "To think of ’God in history’ always leads to theism and to
atheism." However, when history is viewed in a "panentheistic1' way,
i.e., as existing in God, then, theism and atheism are transcended.
"To think of ’history in God’ leads ... into new creation and theopoiesis.
To ’think of history in God’ however, first means to understand humanity
in the suffering and dying of Christ, and that means all humanity, with
25its dilemmas and its despairs." We conclude therefore that Moltmann’s 
trinitarian theology of the cross views history in a dialectical way: 
it is the dialectic of "God in history" and "history in God". As we 
have already shown, his theology of the cross is also political theology 
where the double crises of identity and relevance formed the dialectic.
c.
The "Unreligious" Cross in Christianity and the Critique of
Religion as Ideology.
Any talk about God in response to the challenge of Marx’s 
Weltanschauung must take constant cognizance of Marx’s critique of 
religion as false consciousness. It is therefore instructive to pause 
at this point in our discussion to consider whether Moltmann's theology 
of the cross is an attempt to legitimate the status quo, or any power
grouping, be it economic, political, social or religious. Is Marx's
advocacy of the proletarian cause not matche'd, and, indeed, surpassed
by God’s solidarity with all of suffering humanity? We have already
noted on several occasions that the cross of Jesus refuses to be tied
to any "worldly" system. No one can invoke its salvific efficacy on
the basis of merit. It is always simultaneously judgement and grace,
law and gospel. To say that the poor are blessed by God is not the
same as saying that they have merited that blessing. The miracle of
God’s presence with them is a miracle of grace. By the same token,
to say that those who oppress the poor and the lowly, the "marginal"
people, are judged guilty by the cross of Christ is not to say that
God is without mercy for them. The point here is that the cross is
the place of God's sovereignty even as it is also the place of His
love. It is this sovereignty that prevents the cross from being the
ideological tool or weapon of any group or structure. The cross is
the only true symbol of liberation. Moltmann captures this inherently
"pilgrim" quality in the cross of Christ when he notes:
A rejuvenation of Christianity when it has grown old and 
grey is only possible on the basis of its own origin, and 
becomes a dangerous and liberating reality when faith becomes 
aware of the incommensurability of the cross of Christ with 
the revelation of God, and realizing this, becomes aware too 
of its own strangeness and homelessnesses in its own Christian 
world. 26
The cross of Christ does not conform to the expectations of either 
the religious or the non—religious. The "foolishness of God" leads to 
a "revaluation" of values. This is the paradox of God’s revelation in 
the cross of Christ. It is contrary to human expectations and contra­
dicts human estimation of what is good, beautiful, etc.
If faith in the crucified Christ is in contradiction to all 
conceptions of the righteousness, beauty and morality of man, 
faith in the ’crucified God’ is also a contradiction of
everything men have ever conceived, desired and sought to 
be assured of by the term 'God*. That 'God1, the ’supreme 
being’ and the ’supreme good’, shoiild be revealed and present 
in the abandonment of Jesus by God on the cross, is something 
that it is difficult to desire, 27
Moltmann insists that there is no logical connection between ’’the
religious longing for fellowship with God” and the peculiar "foolish"
revelation of God as the "crucified" One who is powerless and abandoned
"in absolute death," Conditioned as it is by the world’s uncritical
acceptance of human triumphalism, religious longing for fellowship with
God sees in the cross of the "crucified" One, only abandonment, shame
and powerlessness but not the power of God, Consequently, the history
of religion and theology in relation to the cross is replete with attempts
at making the cross less the scandal it is and more a symbol of beauty
and human achievement. This history of distortion and misinterpretation
might be called "ideological" because of the obvious manipulation of the
event of the cross to suit human desire, Moltmann reminds us, however,
that, despite the ideological use of the cross of Christ, it still retains
its insuperable resilience as the definitive and decisive event of God -
of both judgement and grace.
In spite of all the ’roses’ which the needs of religion and 
theological interpretation have draped round the cross, the 
cross is the really irreligious thing in Christian faith.
It is the suffering of God in Christ, rejected and killed
in the absence of God, which qualifies Christian faith as 
faith, and as something different from the projection of 
man’s desire, 28
Thus, even Marx’s critique of religion as projection and as an opiate, 
and the challenge of Marx’s atheistic and anthropocentric world-view to 
Christian theology, as well as the attacks of those of the school of 
"modern criticism of religion" on "the whole world of religious Christ­
ianity", cannot dull the poignancy of the message of the "irreligious" 
cross of Christian faith. Furthermore, all forms of human deification,
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be they religious or secular, are crucified in the cross of Christ.
Marx1s Weltanschauung is not exempt from this judgement but stands at
the centre of it. Speaking about the absolute inclusiveness of the
power of negation (judgement) of the "irreligious” cross, Moltmann writes:
The modem criticism of religion can attack the whole world 
of religious Christianity, but not this unreligious cross.
There is no pattern for religious projections in the cross.
For he who was crucified represents the fundamental and total 
crucifixion of all religions the deification of the human 
heart, the sacralization of certain localities in nature and
certain sacred dates and times, the worship of those who hold
political power, and their power politics. 29
The cross of Christ overturns the "apple cart" of human achievement and
human speculation about the meaning of existence, of history, and of the
future of nan and of the cosmos as a whole. Neither the "religious"
power politics of the bourgeois capitalist class nor the secular, messianic
revolutionary politics of the proletarian class can claim theirs is an
inspiration that is totally sanctioned by the "irreligious" cross without
any distortion of the message of that cross. Properly understood, the
cross of the "Crucified" One does not allow of ideological manipulation;
instead, it negates all ideology. It brings freedom and new life.
The question of the altruistic transformation of the proletarian 
consciousness was inevitably left unanswered by Marx, Yet, the future 
of the proletarian revolution and the possibility of man's liberation 
from alienation is dependent upon it. Marx, we recall, was unapologeti- 
cally critical of any interpretation or re-interpretation of reality 
which left the mode and the relations of production unchanged or even 
just partly changed. According to him, the only transformation that 
is radical, and, hence, liberating is that v/hich would overthrow the 
bourgeois-capitalist system and replace it with the so-called "communist" 
mode. Such a change, he argues, would be real for it would involve a 
real change in the socio-economic (material) base of society. In
transformation is not de-emphasised nor totally rejected. On the
contrary, it is called, for. However, there it is premised upon the
liberating and gracious praxis of God,
Praxis-theoria in Moltmann1s theology differs fundamentally from
what it is in Marx’s philosophy; it is premised upon and made possible
only in the cross of Christ, "The symbol of the cross in the church
points to the God who was crucified not between two candles on an altar,
but between two thieves in the place of the skull, where the outcasts
belong, outside the gates of the city," Praxis-theoria, is directed
towards the liberation of those who are oppressed and are without hope.
The cross does not invite thought but a change of mind.
It is a symbol which therefore leads out of the church and 
out of religious longing into the fellowship of the oppressed 
and abandoned. On the other hand, it is a symbol which calls 
the oppressed and godless into the church and through the 
church into the fellowship of the crucified God. Where this 
contradiction in the cross, and its revolution in religious 
values, is forgotten, the cross ceases to be a symbol and 
becomes an idol, and no longer invites a revolution of thought, 
but the end of thought in self-affirmation. JO
Moltmann places heavy stress upon critical thinking that results in 
transformation of thought and action: reflection upon the cross of
the "crucified God", as the place of refuge, hope and salvation for 
"the oppressed and godless", leads to inner conversion and outward, 
visible fellowship among "the oppressed and abandoned". This is the 
dialectic of praxi s-theoria in Moltmann’s theology of the cross.
Theology which does not call for true conversion even when it claims 
the cross of Christ as its centre and source of life is not a theology 
of the cross but a theology of glory - "revolution of thought" is replaced 
by "the end of thought in self-affirmation,"
Let us turn our attention once again to the question of the para­
doxical nature of the theology of the cross in which, as Moltmann points
Moltmann’s theology of the cross, the need for this ’’materialistic”
out, a "revaluation of values" occurs. Perhaps his finest and most
pungent expression in his writings on this matter is to be found in
his insistence upon the reversal of the title "Jesus Christ is Lord"
to "The Lord is Jesus".
It is only through this reversal of emphasis that this image 
of the ruler is related to the person and history of Jesus 
and thus radically transformed. For early Christianity to 
use titles of rule and lordship in order to term Jesus the
true Lord and ruler of the world - the Jesus who was mocked
because of his helplessness and murdered on the cross by the 
world’s rulers - involves about the most radical reversal of 
the ideal of rule that can be conceived: the Lord as servant
of all; the ruler of the world as a friend of tax-collectors 
and sinners; the judge of the world as a poor outcast.
In support of his argument for the reversal of Jesus' title Moltmann
points out that there is the danger that in calling Jesus "the Lord"
the picture of lordship becomes divorced from "the man from Nazareth",
and, instead, "is derived from the experience of and longing for power."
On the other hand, the title "the Lord is Jesus" is modelled after "the
crucified Son of man on Golgotha." This gives it a distinctive and new
meaning. The gospels show Jesus as the servant "for freedom". Jesus,
who is not only the crucified and risen Son of man, but also "Lord of
the world", stoops low and "washes His disciples’ feet like a house
slave (John 13:1-16)." For the sake of liberation, Jesus empties Himself
and chooses the way of radical obedience and "self-surrender" instead of
32the path to violence and oppression.
In keeping with this theme of the "revaluation of values", there 
is also the emphasis upon the "agape" partisanship of Christ's solidarity 
with the poor and the oppressed. This partisanship does not negate the 
universal scope of the gospel of Christ, On the contrary, it is the 
paradoxical way of proclaiming the message of universal salvation in 
the crucified God in the midst of the ambiguities of existence. Though 
"the goal of glory is intended for all men," God has chosen to bring
this about by being partial to the "humble", "Because not all are 
’people* in the same way, as far as their means, rights and freedom 
to live are concerned, the fellowship in which all are to see the glory 
of God ’together* is created, through the choosing of the humble and
■z-z
through judgement of the violent."^ Thus partisanship on the part of
God is inevitable and intentional* Its function is not to ultimately
exclude any from, but to include all in the salvation of God, Hence,
partisanship and universalism are dialectically related for they are
held together by universal love.
This form of partisanship does not destroy Christian universal— 
ism, nor does it deny God's love for all men; it is the histor­
ical form of universal love in a world in which people oppress 
and hate each other, Jesus turned to the sinners, tax-collectors 
and lepers in order to save the Pharisees and the healthy as 
well, Paul turned to the Gentiles in order to save Israel too, 
Christian partisan support for the oppressed is intentional 
and its goal is to save the oppressor also, 34
God's partisanship is therefore not an end in itself. His rejection
of the oppressor is not the last word of the cross. Love, acceptance,
and the will to save them are the ultimate motivations, not the thirst
for revenge. Rejection is to have a positive, cathartic effect for those
who oppress others: "Masters are rejected because of their oppression,
so that they may experience the fulness of the common humanity, of which
35they are depriving themselves and others,1* The oppressor is himself 
a victim of his own (and fellow oppressors') oppression! But the suffer­
ing love of God is open to all, including the rich and powerful. Further­
more, this love is not available for use as a legitimation of any acts 
of revenge by the oppressed. Such an interpretation is a distortion 
which is, in turn, judged by this sacrificing love.
However, to talk about the universal salvation of the "crucified"
God runs the risk of being abstract and speculative unless this partisan­
ship is practiced by the Church, Moltmann recognizes the need for a word
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of caution here lest the very attempt at avoiding1 mere abstraction and
speculation ends by being simply a reversal ’of places between the
oppressors and the oppressed. When that happens the Church is no longer
the broken community serving the world in love for the sake of and in
the name of Christ - the Lord who is Jesus. Rather, grace is replaced
by a new form of Law. Moltmann therefore soberly reminds us concerning
Jesus’ teachings:
But he did not call upon the poor to revenge themselves upon 
their exploiters nor the oppressed to oppress their oppressors. 
Theologically, this would have been no more than the anticipa­
tion of the last judgement according to the law, but not the 
new righteousness of God which Jesus revealed in the law of 
grace. Instead, its consequences is: ’Love your enemies and
pray for those that persecute you,1 36
Hence the liberation of Christ, which is offered to all people everywhere,
may be described as the revolutionary praxis of agape. It is the” ’human
revolt’ of Jesus.”
d.
Definition of Man,
We continue our discussion of Moltmann's theology of the cross 
with a brief consideration of the nature of man’s being. Recalling 
Marx’s theses that man makes himself, and that history is the process 
of man’s creation of himself, we note the influence of Marx’s world­
view in Moltmann's emphasis upon man's realisation of himself "in mission”. 
Moltmann argues that man is defined in relation to the divine mission 
and call of God. This mission reveals the gap between man and the ful­
filment of his mission which he is incapable of fulfilling.
The dominant question of all anthropology - who or what is 
man? Who am I? - does not arise in the biblical narratives
from comparing man with the animals or with the things of 
the world. Nor does it arise simply Coram Deo, as Augustine 
and the Reformers affirmed. Rather, it arises in face of a 
.divine mission, charge and appointment which transcend the 
bounds of the humanly possible. 38
Moltmann finds Biblical support for his argument, Nor instance, he
notes that:
... Moses (Ex. 3-11) asks in the face of his call to lead the 
exodus of the Israelites from Egypt: ’Who am I, that I should
go unto Pharaoh, and that I should bring forth the children of 
Israel out of Egypt?’ Thus, too Isaiah (isa, 5-5) in face of 
his call recognizes himself to be personally guilt-laden in the 
midst of a guilt-laden people: ’Woe is me’ for I am undone;
because I am a man of unclean lips.’ Thus Jeremiah in face of 
his call recognizes what he is and what he was: ’Ah, Lord God:
behold, I cannot speak: for I am a child’ (Jer, 1-6) 39
He therefore concludes that in the face of his discovery of the obvious
gap between the ’’divine mission" and man's "own being", man learns "what
he is", "what he is to be", and, above all, that by and/’of himself"
he cannot be.^
Man is not defined by past and present but by the future. His
nature is not fully revealed but still hidden with Christ in God, He
is homo absconditus.
The very call to the possibilities of the future which are 
as yet obscure, makes it clear that man is hidden from himself, 
a homo absconditus, and will be revealed to himself in those 
prospects which are opened up to him by the horizons of mission. 
The mission and call do not reveal man simply to himself with 
the result that he can then understand himself again for what 
he really is. They reveal and open up to him new'possibilities, 
with the result that he can become what he is not yet and never 
yet was, 41
In the scriptures, the call of those who are given special tasks includes 
a "new name and a new nature and a new future." The hidden nature of 
man is not fixed and static, it is dynamic, and it will unfold itself 
in the future to which God has called man. What man discovers about 
himself through his participation in this future will be new and different
from what man thought he was before he became aware of God’s call.
Mow, in speaking about the future of man, Moltmann does not wish 
to deny the significance of the past and the present for man's identity. 
Indeed, his concept of man embraces the past and the present, but seen 
from the perspective of the future. In this way, he points beyond the 
possibilities of man's creative activity to the creative and gracious 
call of the "crucified" God who alone can lead man out from his enslave­
ment and sin to freedom and a new and complete humanity. In the context 
of God's gracious call, man's total passivity is simultaneously a call 
to a totally human and liberating praxis of radical obedience. The 
"crucified" God not only calls forth the believer, but He also dwells 
within and stands alongside of him. The believer and his world are 
totally embraced by God. Consequently,
In his call man is given the prospect of a new ability to be. 
What he is and what he can do, is a thing that he will learn 
in hopeful trust in God's being with man, Man learns his 
human nature not from himself but from the future to which 
the mission leads him. 42
What man is will be revealed in the history of the call of God which
man experiences within the wider and totally inclusive embrace of the
twofold history of the Trinity, This unfolding of man's nature in
history is therefore totally the result of grace - the praxis of love.
However, man is also engaged in the unfolding of this mystery, i.e.,
as a creature of response.
In spite of Moltmann's attempt at maintaining the dialectic of the
freedom of God (grace) and the secondary and creaturely freedom-in-
bondage of man, the problem still remains of whether man has not been
circumscribed within political history which is partially calculable
and manipulable. In answer to the question of transcendence which
raises itself here, Moltmann points out that real eschatological history
is both "God in history" and "history in God". He therefore departs from
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Marx, Bloch and other Marxists who limit history to human projection 
and achievement, by remaining within the domain of orthodox Christian 
theology. Hence man’s future is firmly planted in the ’’history” of 
the Trinity in the ’’cru.cif.ied” God, There is therefore an indispensable 
tension between immanence and transcendence, history and eschatology,
Man is not oppressed by a definition of his nature exclusively in 
terms of the socio-economic and political forces in history. His future 
transcends those forces for it is inextricably tied to the mission he 
receives from the ’’crucified” God, At the same time, man’s nature is 
not conceived in docetic terms, i,e,, as being totally separated from 
those historical forces.
In the context of the cross, God understands human suffering to 
the extent that he suffers within Himself for the sake of man. The
’’praxis of pathos” in the event of the cross takes with utmost serious­
ness the pervasiveness of human sin, meaninglessness and death, and 
offers forgiveness, reconciliation, hope, and life, both within and 
beyond history. Even now, the believer, in the midst of suffering,
3 _ /can celebrate in the ’’Spirit of sacrifice”, who is the ( k p p a f j u i v  
(2 Cor. 1:21; 5*5) > that salvation has come and will come through the 
suffering, death and resurrection of Christ - the Lord who is Jesus.
e,
A Critique of Moltmann’s Radical Concept of God.
There is no doubt that speaking about God in terms of the theology
of the cross presents a radical concept of God, We have repeatedly 
referred to the pathos in Marx’s description of the suffering of alienated
man in capitalist society. It was pointed out that in spite of its 
one-dimensional character, Marx's concept of' man must not be by-passed 
by Christian theology but must be seriously faced in its entirety. By 
engaging in such a dialogue, Christian theology places itself in the 
situation in which it must articulate the radical concept of God which 
Christian faith confesses is to be found only in the cross of Christ.
In this dialogical situation, Christian theology is challenged by the 
question of relevance, relevance of its talk about God in relation to 
human suffering. This includes socio-economic and political oppression, 
but is certainly not limited to those "historical" forms of suffering.
For Christian faith, the question of sin, evil and death are most crucial.
In Moltmann's view, the challenge of relevance of the Christian 
faith in the situation of suffering is found in the concept of the 
"crucified" God. The "crucified" God comprehends human suffering and 
takes it into Himself because His nature is love, and this makes Him 
"open" to the pain of suffering. When the tragedy of the human condition 
is seen in the context of the suffering within the Godhead, then, as 
was already noted, the crises of identity and relevance find their 
solution there as well. What can be more relevant about the Christian 
faith than that God incarnate suffers in solidarity with suffering 
humanity? What can be more definitive of the Christian faith than 
that suffering finds its true definition in the cross of Christ? As 
Moltmann says:
In the passion of the Son, the Father himself suffers the 
pains of abandonment. In the death of the Son, death comes 
upon God himself, and the Father suffers the death of his 
Son in his love for forsaken man. Consequently, v/hat happened 
on the cross must be understood as an event between God and 
the Son of God. In the action of the Father in delivering up 
his Son to suffering and to a godless death, God is acting in 
himself. He is acting in himself in this manner of suffering 
and dying in order to open up in himself life and freedom for 
sinners. 43
But Moltmann1s radical concept of God is not without difficulties 
which cannot be overlooked in our attempt to formulate an evangelical 
theology of the cross. Has Moltmann fully dispensed with "philosophical 
axioms" about God? Has he dispensed with the mystery of God as Wholly 
Other? Is there no necessary place for talk about man’s nature coram 
Deo? We will offer some tentative criticisms of Moltmann’s theology 
in the light of these questions.
In the face of the meaninglessness and hopelessness that characterize 
human existence today, Moltmann’s emphasis upon the suffering of God 
for the sake of man is of significant pastoral import. It is comforting 
to hear that God who is love fully identifies with us in our suffering, 
sin and death. Jesus, the Son, suffers Godforsakenness and death, while 
the Father does not suffer death but the pain of His love in His Son’s 
Godforsakenness and death. The Spirit of sacrifice - Moltmann is not 
clear on this - "suffers" the pain of such a sacrifice. Suffering is 
in the Trinity itself; hence the concept of the "crucified" God in the 
cross of Christ,
But God not only identifies with suffering humanity, He suffers 
the death of the Son for the sake of healing broken humanity. Absolute 
Love cannot do, nor be otherwise; • it must suffer the extremities of 
pain which is intrinsic to such love. God as Absolute love is therefore 
not equated with Hegel’s Geist. Moreover, love must suffer pain because 
of the existence of "non-love", Moltmann is very careful to place the 
latter, suffering for the sake of alienated humanity, in the context 
of the former,- suffering of love in itself. Salvation is sola gratia. 
What we have here is a dynamic God, All three Persons of the Trinity 
are actively engaged in the cross of Christ for the sake of love and 
the liberation of humanity.
The problem is, however, how do we know this? -Where is the Totally 
Other God, the One who remains fully hidden ’from human scrutiny?
Admittedly, God as Totally Other "remains”in terms of the peculiar 
twofold nature of His love: love of God in Himself and love of God
for humanity. Still, Moltmann’s dynamic of the "crucified" God is 
unavoidably partly speculative. Though Moltmann does not capitulate 
to Hegel’s concept of Geist, his concept of the dynamic God in the cross 
of Christ is nevertheless influenced by the concept of the all-embracing 
nature of Absolute Spirit, But Moltmann’s "crucified" God feels pain - 
did not Yahweh feel wrath and love and joy, etc,? In the cross the 
suffering love of God becomes universal love. This is achieved because 
a stasis occurs within God Himself; the Wholly Other becomes wholly 
pro-man. The Trinity is no longer enshrouded in total mystery.
It is true that the event of the cross embraces the whole of creation, 
but in the face of human suffering, sin and death the believer can only 
say that God in Christ understands and suffers because Christ suffered 
death on the cross, God who loved the world and allowed His Son to die 
for humanity and all creation knows the pain of loving. That is comfort­
ing to the believer. But the event of the cross does not reveal even 
to the eyes of faith that the "Wholly Otherness" of the Triune God has 
been totally transformed into being totally pro-man. The dynamic of the 
Trinity in the event of the cross does not exhaust the mystery of God 
who, as Totally Other, remains hidden and eludes definition even in 
such a concept of the Trinity. This "hidden" God remains in the back­
ground; He is not our concern. Our concern is with the gracious and 
loving God whom we meet in the man on the cross. Through the Spirit, 
humanity is called to reconciliation to and fellowship with the Triune 
God,
By speaking of the God who is transcendent future and who calls
man to mission, Moltmann partially minimizes' the criticism that he
distorts the concept of God as Totally Other, As Absolute Future, God
remains a mystery which man cannot unravel. However, this mystery is
weakened because this God is all that God is. But God is more than the 
God of loving praxis; He is also necessarily the One who is not always 
active, calling man to a liberating future. In spite of this criticism, 
however, it is ultimately crucial for man that the God who reveals 
Himself to man is totally pro-man.
When Moltmann describes the passion of Christ as the passion of 
the Trinity - the "crucified” God - he is not formulating "a new idea 
of God", Instead, he is pointing to the fact that talk about God today 
is being done in "a new God-situation", i.e., in the realm of politics. 
This process replaces the old theodicy question about evil in the cosmos. 
But in making this transference, Moltmann unwittingly places evil in 
God Himself, The "crucified" God, who is unlike Hegel’s God who cannot 
suffer pain, is in fact like Hegel's God for He embraces everything.
Thus history and its ambiguities and dilemmas, and sin and evil are now 
placed within God, This implication is contrary to Biblical and 
Confessional theology where evil is not in God. This problem needs 
further exploration which is beyond the scope of our study. In appraising 
Moltmann’s radical concept of God and its universal scope of the' passion 
in the cross, evangelical theology of the cross sums up the present 
dilemma thus: how do we proclaim the word of hope that the love of 
God "embraces" all suffering and distortion, including sin and evil, 
and transforms it by bringing healing and wholeness through the passion 
of the cross of Christ, without, at the same time, placing not only the 
potentiality of evil but the actuality of evil in God? Can we resolve
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this dilemma within the context of the church's historical confession 
of the two natures in Christ?
Moltmann suggests that we can do so only partially, as is evident 
from his peculiar trinitarian theology of the cross by which he attempts 
to go beyond the traditional explication of the suffering love of God 
in the cross of Christ. God who loves unreservedly and unconditionally 
is "the other", Man cannot and is not such a God but needs such a God.
This love suffers infinite pain for "God dies to God". In the event 
of the cross of Christ, the Son of God experiences Godforsakenness and 
death. At the same time, God the Father experiences the Godforsakenness 
of his Son, Moltmann argues that in the latter emphasis, the implication 
concerning God's love must be embraced in a radical concept of God.
This implication is speculative and, as we have already seen, must 
be viewed in tension with the concept of God who is totally pro-man, 
and at the same time is Totally Other, not only in the sense of suffering 
and embracing love, but also as the Totally Other whose feelings we 
cannot know, directly or indirectly. Theology of the cross does not 
exhaust the mystery of the Deus Absconditus. Therefore, in our attempt 
to appropriate Moltmann's explication of the cross, we maintain the 
historical doctrine of the suffering love of God in Christ, for, as 
we have seen, in both Luther and Moltmann, man learns about the gracious 
and loving God precisely through the cross of the Lord who is Jesus,
The believer looks to the cross and sees the suffering and death of the 
Son, the God-Man, who loves both the Father and the world. By implica­
tion, the Father who loves both His Son and His world, suffers as well.
God is love. Theology of the cross is a practical-critical activity 1
which is done within the context of Christian faith.
Despite Moltmann's refusal to accept the Marxian one-dimensional
definition of man, his own concept of man’s nature is significantly 
influenced by the Marxian concept of historical transcendence. We 
recall that Moltmann defines man’s nature in terms of the missionary 
hope to which God calls him. Such a definition is inadequate for it 
fails to account for the evil in man (and in the world) - unless it 
places it in God’ Man is not totally perfectable in history. Sin 
cannot be adequately described in Marx's concept of alienation. It 
is more pervasive than that. The gap between sin and grace cannot be 
bridged by man, not even by man participating in missionary hope. Han 
does not have to run after God who is out there in the future to know 
who he is, God is already here and coram Deo man knows himself. He 
is fundamentally separated from God. Despite the static nature of the 
concept of ’’original sin", it cannot be dispensed with in our definition 
of man. To do so would not ultimately liberate man but further enslave 
him. Therefore in defining man's nature, we would speak of man as being 
basically estranged from and in rebellion against God, who calls man 
to a future which is shrouded in mystery - it is hidden in Christ,
Such a definition of man obvio^^sly has implications for the way 
we talk about the event of the cross. The praxis of love is not the 
transformation of Hegel's G-eist into a being of pathos who dynamically 
continues to embrace the whole of creation without end. Rather, the 
praxis of love is primarily the love of the Triune God who experiences 
the pain of the death of the Son for the salvation and reconciliation 
of sinful humanity and of all creation. Through the Holy Spirit - 
the Spirit of sacrifice and fellowship - all are invited to see the 
gracious God in the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ, This 
invitation is also a call to fellowship with Him and all of His creation 
which He has redeemed. The "crucified" God alone is the revealed God
who is pro-man«
B.
Liberation Theology: A Theology of Human Brotherhood,
The following discussion is based upon two of the pivotal works 
in Latin American Liberation Theology: Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology
of Liberation, and Jon Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroads, Gutierrez’s 
initial exploration into theology as a critical reflection on human praxis 
in the light of the dawning of the Kingdom of God is taken a step further 
by Sobrino1s formulation of a critical Christology in which the Kingdom 
of God and not just fellowship with God is seen as Jesus’ ultimate focus. 
The two ’’theologies” are therefore not opposed to each other but are 
functionally complementary.
Unlike the ’’theologies” of Luther and Moltmann, Liberation Theology 
comes out of a situation of widespread socio-economic poverty and poli­
tical oppression. Consequently, Liberation Theology is more pervasively 
bound up with the problem of socio-economic and political liberation.
Its themes of ’’universal brotherhood”, ’’justice for the poor”, ’’solidarity 
among the oppressed”, ’’destruction of all that injures or totally prevents 
the emergence of the Kingdom of God which Jesus claimed has come” - 
themes which are all related to the primary motif of ’’liberation as
salvation” - significantly reflect the profound influence of Marx’s
Abworld-view upon Liberation Theology. There is an obvious attempt to 
articulate a radical concept of God who is God of the Exodus, of justice 
and freedom, of the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Here we 
are confronted with a God who sides with the oppressed against the
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oppressor, in the concrete, historical conditions of life, for the sake
of both the oppressed and the oppressor.
Liberation Theology sees the task of theology as a process of
critical reflection which is done in the context of the socio-economic
and cultural issues that actually exist in society. Critical reflection
is done by the Christian community which attempts to make its talk about
God relevant to the needs of the oppressed. But the content of critical
reflection is not just the material conditions of life; it includes
that which is peculiarly Christian and theological as well. There is
therefore an ongoing dialogue between theology and sociology. The
Christian community is always listening to both the scriptures and the
human condition. Presuppositions are altered, corrected or totally
rejected in the light of praxis which is also informed and corrected
by the scriptures and the symbols of the Church. This is the hermeneutic
circle. By maintaining the hermeneutic circle, the Church moves away
from being a supporter of the oppressive status quo to being a community
for liberation and justice in society.
According to Gutierrez both Church and society are criticized to
the extent that "they are called and addressed by the Word of God".
This Word serves as a critique of any critical theory which emerges
out of theological reflection. The authenticity of any theology is
determined by its positive evaluation in the light of the Word and its
46call for genuine liberating historical praxis. Writing in the same
vein, Sobrino distinguishes between inauthentic and authentic theology
in terms of "an inherited faith that is rather abstract", on the one
hand, and "a concrete faith that is truly liberative", on the other 
47hand. Let us now look more closely at some of the main emphases in 
Gutierrez, and then in Sobrino,
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a.
Gustavo Gutierrez - Theology of the Neighbour.
In keeping with his emphasis on "theology as critical reflection 
on historical praxis", Gutierrez insists that theology is not concerned 
simply with the liberation of the privileged minority in the Church, 
but with the universal liberation of the whole of humanity. Indeed, 
it is because of its basic concern with "the liberating transformation 
of the history of mankind" that it is consequently concerned with "that
A O
part of mankind - gathered into ecclesia - which openly confesses Christ,"
This claim is based on the conviction that as a result of the
Incarnation of God in Jesus, the erroneous distinction between the
religious and the secular realms has now become dissolved, "Since God
has become man, humanity, every man, history, is the living temple of
God. The ’pro-fane,’ that which is located outside the temple no longer 
49exists," The God of the Exodus and of the cross of Christ reveals 
Himself to all men; He is available to all men everywhere. Every person 
has a new dignity because of Christ. Socio-economic and political, and 
other distinctions, which have been hitherto used to divide and separate 
humanity into superior and inferior classes, are no longer operative as 
far as God is concerned. Divisions and separations which exist are 
therefore to be historically abolished. The mandate to do so comes 
from God Himself.
But God not only calls man to engage in liberating praxis, He leads
the way by generating that living faith and hope that are b o m  out of
involvement in praxis and continually nourished by Him precisely where
such liberating activity occurs.
Where oppression and the liberation of man seem to make God 
irrelevant - a God filtered by our longtime indifference to
these problems - there must blossom faith and hope in him 
who comes to root out injustice and to offer, in an unfor-
seen way, total liberation. This is a spirituality which
dares to sink roots in the soil of oppression - liberation. 50
51Liberating love and faith are "the gift of the Kingdom of God,"
Gutierrez reminds us that love of humanity, of the neighbour, does
not violate the sovereignty of God for it is precisely in the concrete
love for man that God becomes God, Hence man should be loved for his
own sake and not merely for the sake of God. Only in this way can love
for man not distort the dignity of man but promote and strengthen it.
Man is not a means to an end; he is a person created in the image of
God. He must not therefore be made into "an instrument for becoming
closer to God." Only when man is loved for his own sake can there be
a genuine encounter with God, Love of man and love of God form a
dialectic of love fully embracing the dignity of man and the sovereignty
of the liberating grace of God. "That my action towards another is at
the same time an action towards God does not detract from its truth and
52concreteness, but rather gives it even greater meaning and import,"-^ 
Gutierrez is acutely aware of the fact that theology is a human 
exercise which is equally concerned about God and man. He insists there­
fore that if talk about God distorts the dignity of man, then it is 
irrelevant and illegitimate. It is not grounded in the liberating Word, 
Such ideological discourse about God must be replaced by a "new way" 
of making God relevant and necessary to the needs of the majority of 
exploited humanity, Gutierrez pushes his point so far that it reads 
thus: the existence of God as love in history is dependent upon the
concrete praxis of love for the liberation of man.
Gutierrez points out that love of man for his own sake qualifies 
as love of God, not only because man "has been made in the image and 
likeness of God," but, more especially, because man is "the sacrament
of God." Man cannot come to an authentic knowledge of God by mere
theoretical reflection which is removed from the concrete socio-economic
and political struggles in society. If man wishes to encounter God he
must draw near to those whose wretched existence is an offence to God.
Both the self-satisfied religious person and the earnest seeker of God
are reminded that "to oppress the poor is to offend God himself; to
know God is to work justice among men." Man knows that he is in the
presence of God when he joins the struggle for the liberation of his 
53neighbour.
When Christian celebration of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist
is divorced from a radical commitment to liberation, then there is no
genuine celebration, but only "an empty action," According to Gutierrez
the loving fellowship between the Triune God and man is the basis for
the brotherhood of the poor and the oppressed. God initiates and nourishes
that twofold bond of unity - between man and God, and among men. In the
Eucharist the bond is "effectively recalled and proclaimed" provided
that there is "a real commitment against exploitation and alienation".
Only on this basis can those who participate in the Eucharist gain God's
54acceptance of their celebration. ' Worship and "living" are two aspects
of one fundamental activity - living and even dying for the sake of
others. There is no other way of effectively remembering and celebrating
the fellowship between God and man,
'To make a remembrance' of Christ is more than the performance 
of an act of worship; it is to accept living under the sign of 
the cross and in the hope of the resurrection. It Is to accept 
the meaning of a life that was given over to death - at the 
hands of the power of this world - for the love of others. 55
The cross of Christ means cross and suffering for the Christian community.
But the cross of the Christian community is not just any cross; it
is a specific cross, i.e., a cross of solidarity among the oppressed.
Knowing that one encounters God in the neighbour, the Christian must 
therefore make his neighbour’s suffering his own, and join in the struggle 
for liberation. Such an unequivocal call seems to leave little or no 
room at all for the gracious presence of God among those who fail to 
maintain the unity between worship and liberating praxis. Sola gratia 
has become impaired. There is less grace for those who are not involved 
in the specific praxis for liberation, than for those who are. To follow 
Christ is to walk the way of the cross. But it is the way of grace 
without merit or praxis. This sanguine reminder needs to be more clearly 
sounded in Gutierrez’s theology.
Furthermore, it needs to be clearly stated in any theology of 
Liberation that sin is still more Inclusive than alienation as a descrip­
tion of the human condition. By the same token, salvation includes 
historical liberation but points beyond it to the more inclusive recon­
ciliation and fellowship with God in His Kingdom beyond this world.
Mien this is forgotten or its significance reduced the theology of the 
cross is turned into a theology of glory - resurrection glory transforms 
the cross into an ideology of liberation.
Gutierrez's reflections on a "theology of the neighbour" and the 
shortcomings in his theology must be understood in the light of Jesus' 
discourse on the last judgement in Matthew 25:31-46. We shall therefore 
turn attention now to a summary of his interpretation of. that text as 
it pertains to his theology.
Matthew 25:31-46 - Discourse on "Christ in the Neighbour,"
According to Gutierrez, to many people this vision or discourse 
of the last judgement with which Matthew concludes his eschatological
discourse appears to summarise the very "essence of the Gospel message," 56
In the light of the preoccupation of Liberation Theology vtith the solid­
arity of God with the oppressed, it is not at all surprising that 
Gutierrez, among others, expressly enunciates a "theology of universal 
brotherhood" premised primarily upon Matthew* s discourse here and upon 
a reading of various scriptural texts which speak above love of neighbour.
Reviewing Jean-Claude Ingelaere’s elaborate study of the text,
Gutierrez points out that the two basic questions which Ingelaere finds
the
in the text are: "Who are the nations judged by/Son of God and who are
’the least of the brethren* of the Son of Kan?" In Ingelaere’s answer 
to those two questions, Gutierrez notes that there are three possible 
interpretations: universal judgement of all people, both Christian and
non-Christian, on the basis of their love for the neighbour, and 
especially of those in need; judgement of Christians in relation to 
"their behaviour towards the disadvantaged members of the Christian 
community itself"; and, finally, it is a "judgement of pagans based 
on their attitude towards Christians," The third interpretation, which 
is expoused by Ingleaere, is rejected by Gutierrez because of the res­
trictive and selective judgement it describes. Since Gutierrez himself 
agrees with the majority of the exegetes who support the first inter­
pretation, it is not surprising that he argues that "the two restrictions 
in this third exegesis,,. go against the obvious sense of the text and 
the context, which stress the universality of the judgement and the 
central and universal character of charity." He is in agreement with 
the conclusion that "all nations" (v.32) clearly points to the universal 
sense in which no distinctions are made between Jews and Christians,
and pagans. In short, all men, pagans, Jews and Christians are included
57in the term "all nations".
This conclusion provides a solid Biblical basis for Gutierrez’s
argument that God is encountered in and among men, i.e., that man is 
the sacrament of God, Furthermore, on the question of the meaning of 
"the least of my breth£$h" (v. 4 0)» he declares his support of the 
view held by most scholars that here we have another expression of the 
universal scope of the brotherhood of man. All the needy, both Christian 
and non-Christian, are included in the designation "the least of my 
brethren," In keeping with his agreement with the "universalist" school 
of interpretation, Gutierrez emphasises three points pertaining to the 
texts "the stress on communion and brotherhood as the ultimate meaning 
of human life; the insistence on a love which is manifested in concrete
actions, with ’doing' being favoured over simply 'knowing'; and the
58revelation of the human mediation necessary to reach the Lord,"
At this point it would seem appropriate to ask: How do we encounter 
the Lord? recognizing that such a dynamic encounter answers the questions: 
Where do we find God? How do we get to know Him? It is reasonable to 
conclude that, in the light of Gutierrez's three emphases, his response 
to these questions is to be found in a reiteration of the central argument 
in this discussion of Liberation Theology: God is encountered in history
in our encounter with fellow human-beings, especially the culturally, 
economically and politically exploited and oppressed. Gutierrez concludes 
that, in Matthew 25:31-46, what Christ reveals to us through His identi­
fication with the poor is that the locus of God's salvation in the world 
is found among the poor. Consequently, "our attitude towards them, or 
rather our commitment to them, will indicate whether or not we are
directing our existence in conformity with the will of the Father." 59
226.
Id.
Jon Sobrino - Christology of Radical Di'scipleship.
In his attempt to talk about God in a meaningful and relevant way
in the context of Latin America, so that the movement from an inherited
faith to a liberating faith may occur, Sobrino formulates a radical
"relational” Christology which is trinitarian in outlook. This is the
only way of doing Christology in the face of the "material" challenges
in Latin America today.
Christology is possible only if,the Father continues to be 
the ultimate horizon of reality, the Son continues to be the 
definitive example of how human beings can correspond to the 
Father, and life according to the Spirit of Jesus continues 
to be the authentic Christian way of acting that makes us sons 
and daughters in and through the Son. 60
One cannot know God except through Jesus. But to know Jesus one must
follow Him in radical discipleship. Thus the Son, the Spirit and the
Father are seen to be related to each other through the praxis of love,
and both God and man are related to each other through the praxis of
the Father in the Son through the witness of the Spirit of Jesus.
Understanding and participating in the relational dynamic within
the Trinity involves liberating praxis in the world. Apart from such
a participation man cannot "understand and appreciate the Jesus who 
61sends the Spirit". Genuine knowledge of God does not arise out of 
theoretical and abstract reflection upon the "numinous" mystery of God’s 
being; nor does it arise simply from some other reflection on praxis 
tied to the status quo. Rather, authentic knowledge of God results from 
man's engagement in the praxis that is prompted by the Spirit of Jesus. 
Knowledge comes from action which is not simply mental activity - God 
is not a metaphysical being whom man knows before and apart from his 
encounter with the neighbour.
The definitive criterion of all -praxis is the history of Jesus 
Himself. Jesus' love of the Father is not a theoretical or a senti­
mental love; nor is it a love that is mechanically exercised. On the 
contrary, it is a love of the Son who struggles against oppression and 
sin on behalf of the oppressed and suffering. This synthesis between 
love of God and love of neighbour was historically fashioned throughout 
Jesus' earthly ministry. The confident love which Jesus displayed 
in his address to God as "Abba" "reaches its culminating point in the 
agony in the garden, Poles apart from some ideological optimism,.it 
becomes a confidence that has been thoroughly tried and tested."
Jesus' confident love is well founded for it is in God who is 
"greater" than human beings. For Jesus to have such a God "means respond­
ing to the demands laid down by love. It is in and through the historical 
unfolding of those demands that the reality of God as someone 'greater' 
is made concrete horizontally in history," The ultimate test of the 
truth of love is incarnation and praxis. Jesus responds to the demands 
of love placed upon Him by God by a life of radical obedience even to 
the point of death on the cross. The cross is the culmination of love 
that is fashioned in the encounter with the material world. Such is 
the nature of His love which cannot violate the sovereignty of God - 
the ultimate horizon.
Neither conflict, nor failure, nor rejection, nor death 
itself can set limits on God's demand. This is the way in 
which the greatness of God is brought out in history and 
respected to the very end. At no point in his history can 
Jesus get a 'fix' on God once and for all. 63
It is precisely through Jesus' historical and existential commitment 
and obedience to and love of God that the sovereignty of God is hist­
orically displayed. This is the very revelation of God Himself.
In the cross of Jesus we therefore see the triumph of Absolute
Love (God). Love that is grounded in God and historically fashioned
in the real material conditions of life will not remain negated in
suffering and death. It will ultimately triumph because Absolute Love
remains its source and horizon. This is the confidence of the love of
God in the cross of Christ, But in looking for God, one is not called
to reflect upon Absolute Love, but upon the historically fashioned love.
"In the Christian view his [GodT s} locus is not only the resurrection
but also the cross of Jesus," Today, the cross of Jesus (God) "is to
be found in the crosses of the oppressed rather than in beauty, power,
64or wisdom." This is the -praxis of the love of Jesus in the Spirit.
It is in the context of Jesus’ praxis of love that the Christian 
learns about God and comes to know Him through his imitating praxis 
of love. The Christian must recognize that he cannot love God directly - 
that is impossible - but only indirectly through the mediation of a 
historical love. This mediating love is an unconditional and unreserved 
love of the neighbour. Sobrino writes:
When Christians talk about love of God, then, they are 
talking materially about real, historical love for human beings. 
It is the formal nature of this love of neighbour that deter­
mines whether it can also be called love of God. If that love 
is displayed unreservedly and unconditionally, if it is done 
in the conviction that those who love to the utmost have lived 
life in all its fullness no matter what happens, then the 
historical experience of love for neighbor is formally meaning­
ful as love for God, 65
This love for neighbour, like the love of Jesus which it emulates, is 
n°1' a priori or mechanically received from the Spirit, Instead, it is 
b o m  and nourished in the midst of liberating engagement for the trans­
formation of the world. The love of neighbour creates a brotherhood 
which reveals both the genuineness of the Christian’s love of God and 
neighbour as well as the very existence of God Himself.
Brotherhood is not just an ethical consequence deriving from 
a God already constituted and known; it is the very way in
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which God really is the Father, and in that sense, God, In 
Jesus' eyes, a God who does not create brotherhood simply 
is not God at all, 66 (Emphasis mine)
The "existence" of many "false" gods is a real possibility, and, 
in fact, it does occur. Sinful man is not easily persuaded to partici­
pate in liberating praxis for the sake of the neighbour, and thereby 
to come to know God. Idolatry was present in Jesus' time, no less than 
today, Sobrino soberly points out that Jesus presents us with a radical 
concept of God: "a God who stands in complete contradiction to the
existing religious situation. His God is distinct from, and greater 
than, the God of the Pharisees."0 Jesus' God loves, unconditionally 
and unreservedly, all people, especially and including the poor, those
who are without hope, and who are therefore in need of a miracle from •
68God to transform their situation. From the standpoint of Jesus' life, 
the privileged place of access to God - which Jesus widened - is not 
the temple but people themselves. "More specifically, it is the person 
who is poor, who has been forced into impoverishment." This salvific 
partisanship is precisely the way in which we come to know God, To 
speak of "access" to God is to speak of knowing Him in the way He chooses 
to make Himself known to us, which is by making contact with the very 
people whom the religious mentality of the Jews saw as completely 
estranged from God: the alien, the heretic, the ritually impure person,
the sinner, the distinherited, the poor, the orphan, the widow, and the
69enemy.
The poor are not man's way to God but the medium — chosen by God - 
through which man comes to know Him. The salvatory "contact" with the 
poor is a consequence of God's sovereign grace. Thus "making contact" 
with the poor does not mean the poor are "simply the 'passive material' 
on which one works to attain access to God through virtuous dealings
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with them," One cannot experience the liberating' power of God through 
the poor without an unconditional and unreserved love for them, Nothing 
short of an actual struggle to transform the material conditions of the 
poor to bring to them true dignity as persons, as Jesus intends, can 
qualify as solidarity with the oppressed and as "making contact" with 
the poor. He who would know God through such solidarity must imitate 
the way of Jesus,
Sobrino's onesided emphasis upon knowing God through loving the 
neighbour does not do justice to the Mew Testament teaching on sola 
gratia. Admittedly, he wants to correct the ethical "quietism" of so 
many Christians who remain unmoved by human suffering perhaps because 
they feel confident in their knowledge of God which does not demand 
radical action in society. But Paul's writings represent a significant 
part of the New Testament which are necessary for a more inclusive 
Christology, Just as we need those writings which speak of the impera­
tives of the Gospel which remind us that the indicative of the Gospel 
is not "cheap grace" so we also need Paul's writings, in particular, 
with their emphasis upon the wholly gratuitous nature of God's love 
which invites man to life in the Spirit.
Sobrino is correct in his emphasis upon the ultimately triumphant 
power of Absolute Love, but he neglects to emphasize that the grace of 
God allows for failure and blindness, and continues to accept the 
unacceptable, the proud, the mighty, the self-sufficient, and not just 
the poor, humble and the oppressed. Care should be taken that in 
emphasizing the inclusive na,ture of Jesus' love, in terms of the poor 
and the outcast, the marginal people, we do not fall prey to an exclu­
siveness that limits the saving presence of God to the marginal people. 
The tendency towards such an exclusiveness arises in spite of Liberation
Theology’s claim that all men are the sacrament of God. There is there­
fore the need for a more inclusive concept o'f the poor that transcends 
the socio-economic and political factors which delineate the poor. At 
the same time, such a concept must be radical in its attempt to do justice 
to that large majority of humanity that actually experience material 
poverty and oppression.
In Sobrino’s presentation of the material and dynamic development 
of Jesus’ messianic consciousness which is characterized by ’’confident 
love” we are given a stimulating theological explication of the Marxian 
concept of praxis-theoria. Like Harx’s proletariat Jesus’ comes to an 
awareness of His messianic mission through His participation in the real 
material conditions of life. His consciousness of His mission is not 
given mechanically, it does not simply unfold itself as if it were pre­
programmed: that is not what ’’incarnation” means. Rather, Jesus’ mission
and His consciousness arises through practical-critical activity. But 
we should not push the Marxian parallel too far, for Sobrino explicitly 
states that Jesus’ ultimate horizon is the Father and the Kingdom, and 
this includes humanity. This is in direct contrast to the proletariat’s 
horizon of man and history.
When we turn to the development of the Christian’s life under the 
cross in the material conditions of life, we find that both Sobrino and 
Gutierrez use Jesus' "experience” as the paradigm for imitation. It is 
not that the Christian repeats the life of Jesus; instead, he follows 
Christ in radical discipleship by seeking out the poor and creating 
human brotherhood. Solidarity and brotherhood are found precisely in 
those very situations that deny them and make talk about God seem irre­
levant. So far Liberation Theology is a theology of the cross. Bat 
Liberation Theology abbreviates the Word of the cross, the scandal and
foolishness of the announcement that in spite of the failure to create 
brotherhood, to love unconditionally and unreservedly, God accepts us. 
Theology of the cross is both life under the cross and Word of the cross. 
The two are indispensable, Indigenization of theology must not silence 
or eclipse the universality of the cross and the preaching of the Word, 
Despite Sobrino's and Gutierrez's emphasis upon both praxis and theoria, 
the paradoxical Word of the cross has been circumscribed within the 
sphere of radical discipleship.
Furthermore, the abundant life to which God calls us through Christ 
cannot be equated with living life, in the midst of ambiguities, suffering, 
sin and death, with unconditional and unreserved love for the neighbour. 
This is only a foretaste which is received in paradox. There is also 
the hope of the "resurrection and eternal life" which God offers to all 
unconditionally. Realized eschatology, in terms of such confident love 
for man, and, consequently, for God, can awaken,correct and transform 
the longing for the Kingdom of God and fellowship with God beyond this 
temporal life. By the same token, it can make such confident love an 
end in itself and thereby abbreviate hope.
This discussion of Sobrino's Christology of radical discipleship 
leads us to a more elaborate critique of Liberation Theology as a whole. 
Some of the foregoing criticisms of Sobrino's and Gutierrez's "theologies" 
will be repeated in the hope that a clearer picture of the theology of 
the cross, which is being formulated in this work in response to I-iarx's 
world-view, will emerge.
c.
Critique of the concept of God in Liberation Theology.
It should be clear by now that in the "Theology of universal human 
brotherhood" considerable emphasis is placed upon the immanence of God 
vis-a-vis His transcendence. Though Sobrino, in particular, speaks 
about the Father as the ultimate mystery and horizon beyond Jesus the 
Son, i.e., the God who as the "other" is "greater", there-is no question 
that Liberation theologians are primarily concerned with a God who is 
present in history among humankind actively engaged (and engaging them 
as well) in real human liberation in history. The paradigm of God in the 
Bible shows us One who participates in Exodus and in Cross and Resurrec­
tion - always within history, not above, outside or beyond it. Of course, 
this does not mean that God is wholly immanent; such a conclusion is a 
distortion of Liberation Theology. Rather, it means that transcendence 
is subordinated to immanence for the sake of man. The liberating God 
acts on behalf of man and is thereby simultaneously revealed. To know 
who He is and where He is acting, we need to look for "signs" of the 
Kingdom, Where a situation of oppression and dehumanization exists, 
there you will find God, The fragmentary indications of various and 
incomplete forms of solidarity among the alienated and exploited masses 
are expressions of the presence of the Kingdom. God as divine love 
exists wherever we find there is solidarity among the poor. But this 
is a peculiar solidarity: solidarity that leads to and is not divorced
from genuine liberating praxis. God is given a "face" whenever and 
wherever there is a concrete expression of love for the neighbour. It 
is the "praxis of love" and not merely the ethics of love which says 
that God is, and that He is love and justice and freedom.
The problem with this kind of discourse about God is that the
primary emphasis is placed upon the critical reflection and analysis of
the human condition in the quest to know where God is, i.e. where He is
acting. Revelation becomes reduced to the findings of "critical reflection"
and authentic Christian faith is viewed as a consequence of correct
practice (praxis). Thus Paul’s encouragement to the Corinthian Church:
"For we walk by faith and not by sight," is reversed - sight and not
70faith determines the Christian "walk".
On the critical question of how do we therefore talk about God, 
it is to be noted that .in Liberation Theology the motif of the Seus 
Absoonditus is downplayed. If God is not up and around effecting notice­
able historical, transformations in the oppressive and inhuman structures 
in society, then He does not exist, or, if He does, He is merely the 
ideological idol of the oppressive class in society. The true God is 
the One who is characterised less by mystery and more by His increasing 
unambiguous presence among the poor and needy to whom He is thereby
revealed. Such a conception, however, does not take seriously the
God
inherent discontinuity between/revealed in the suffering of man, and 
God who is always more than what man is and who stands above him and 
his suffering, even as He is'simultaneously present in that alienated 
and sinful situation.
It is not surprising that the "mystery" of God, the Deus Absconditus, 
is absent from Liberation Theology. This crucial omission which severely 
distorts the truth of the Gospel seems inevitable when one operates 
within the framework of Marxian categories as Liberation Theology does.
"The impact of this alliance is to press religion into the straitjacket 
of political humanism, the idea of transcendence being consequently 
flattened out and confined to a ’negative dialectic’ in the material
course of history." In dialogue with Marx’s philosophy, the breadth 
and height and depth of evangelical theology is reduced to those aspects 
of the Christian faith which are more amenable to the Marxian over­
riding emphasis upon liberating praxis and the human future. Consequently, 
the indispensable tension between immanence and transcendence is eclipsed 
through the absorption of the latter in the former.
When we view Liberation Theology’s emphasis upon the immanence of 
God in the light of the theology of the cross, which was discussed above, 
it is to be noted that the emphasis upon "God for man" in the former 
sounds a primary note found in the latter. For example, it was emphasized 
that in the theology of the cross God reveals Himself in history as 
always being "for man". Instead of speculating about the hiddenness of 
God shrouded in mystery, i.e, the "otherness" of God which we cannot 
see, it was pointed out that we should be concerned with the God who 
meets us in the cross of Christ in judgement and grace. However, the 
theology of the cross does not reduce God to the dialectics of history 
for it proclaims the "resurrection of the body and the life of the world 
to come". In short, true and ultimate liberation transcends history, 
even though it begins in history. This is crucial to our talk about 
God. God— the "crucified" One— is totally concerned about the historical 
condition of man. He is pro-man and He comes to man and the whole of 
creation as Absolute Future, But He is simultaneously present in the 
cross of the crucified and risen Christ, We therefore maintain the 
tension between His immanence and His transcendence. History cannot 
exhaust the transcendence of God; and transcendence should not be seen 
as a check on God’s immanence but rather as a check upon the euphoric 
triumphalism of man’s hope in his efforts to eradicate all oppression 
and sin and u.sher in the age of freedom here on earth. In other words,
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without the transcendence of God, man will he confined to history, 
whether history as his own creation or history as a co-creation with 
God, In either case, history circumscribes his future.
When Liberation Theology presents man as God’s co-worker for man's
liberation (in history), the result is that, on the one hand, it is
not so much man who is chosen by God to be His co-creator, as God who
comes to man's aid to free him to create, i.e., God is man's co-agent
for liberation, and on the other hand, the truth that man’s freedom is
a gift of grace is distorted and made into "a sophisticated new form of
Pelagianism" in which "God is seen as needing man to help him create 
72the future," In both instances the sovereignty of God is violated.
In Liberation Theology, the freedom to create which is given by grace 
is so much wrapped up with man's praxis that grace is made partial in 
man’s salvation: sola gratia is made to read sola gratia plus human
praxis. This is a modern form of synergism. While the indicative and 
the imperative of the Gospel must never be separated from each other 
if theology is to remain evangelical, it should be remembered that the 
imperative arises out of the indicative. Freed by God, we are free to 
serve the neighbour in love. Hence we do not serve in order to assist 
in our salvation.
Unfortunately, as Liberation theologians, among others, know only 
too well, the message of sola gratia has been so very often distorted 
by an ethical "quietism" that allows inhuman and oppressive structures 
to remain intact without being seriously questioned and attacked with 
the practical intention of transforming and humanizing them. The truth 
of this accusation is borne out by the history of the Church, In its 
own attempt to respond theologically to the challenge in the historical 
context of Latin America, Liberation Theology has not, however, avoided
the equally distorting conversion of Gospel into Law. Instead of Gospel 
as "cheap grace", Liberation Theology, in overstating its case for know­
ledge of God as "doing", presents us with Gospel as Lav/ - the imperative 
of the Gospel has abbreviated the indicative of the Gospel, In spite of 
the hermeneutical circle in Liberation Theology, in which the final 
horizon of theological praxis-theoria is the liberating Word of God 
and the Kingdom of God, this abbreviation of the Gospel occurs. Indeed 
it is, more significantly, because of its peculiar theological hermen­
eutics that such a distortion arises. The reason for this is tv/ofold.
On the one hand, since the horizon of Liberation Theology is not a meta­
physical reality which is known apart from praxis, but one which becomes 
known and proves its authenticity through praxis-theoria, that horizon 
becomes subordinated to the dialectic of history. The dialectic pf 
history de facto is given priority over any horizon which is merely a 
v/ord about objective, vicarious liberation. Accordingly, on the other 
hand, when the indicative of the Gospel is subordinated to the ethical 
imperative, i.e., made subject to the demands of and for liberation - 
programmes and strategies for liberation are continually being formulated 
and evaluated in the light of praxis - the result is Lav;, not Gospel.
We return once again to the dilemma of maintaining the necessary 
tension between the freedom of the will (God) and the bondage and freedom 
of the will (man). In the ongoing attempt to resolve this dilemma which 
is elusive of any final historical resolution - it presents itself in 
various forms - the theologian of the cross maintains that the V/ord of 
the cross of Christ and, consequently, the cross of the Christian, must 
be affirmed and proclaimed, Indigenization of the cross of the Christian 
does not encapsulate the whole of the Gospel. We are not suggesting 
that the V/ord of the cross is to be separated from the cross of the
Christian - they rightfully belong together. However, the Word of the 
cross, its scandal and foolishness, is the sovereign Word of grace whose 
"demand” for liberating praxis-theoria is an "invitation" to a disciple­
ship of radical grace and brokenness.
This point brings us back to our earlier emphasis upon the trans­
cendence of God which has an historical character, but which transcends 
history and moves into the realm of eternity. In addition, it reminds 
us that even before we.begin to engage in liberating praxis, the word 
of grace from the cross is addressed and is real to us in faith. This
does not deny that this word may be and is heard in the midst of the
struggle for better socio-economic and political conditions of life.
In fact, the word of grace frees man for such action. But that word 
remains the word of grace because it announces forgiveness and hope and 
new life to all those whose praxis have met with partial success or ended 
in disaster. The loving God whom man meets in the Christ of the cross
is the sovereign Lord. He is free to have mercy on whom He will have
mercy. Thus, the word of grace is also available to the oppressor who 
is confronted by the word of judgement. Likewise, the oppressed, despite 
their chosenness for the Kingdom are no less sinners than the oppressors. 
To both of them, therefore, the word of judgement and grace are offered. 
Gazing at the man upon the cross who is the risen Lord, the Church cannot 
be true to Him if it reduces the gospel to law and turns the message of 
grace into an ideology for liberation, however pressing and imperative 
the need for real material liberation is. The Church must be ever vigi­
lant in its proclamation of the Gospel and its separation of Law and 
Gospel without dispensing with either. She must insist upon the dialectic 
of the divine indicative and imperative and guard against the danger of 
capitulating to political or other euphoria which openly or subtly identif
with the indicative what is achieved in obedience to the imperative 
of the gospel, Jesus Christ is not just an example for man to follow;
He is not a political agitator; He is not an ideological weapon of the 
oppressed or oppressor, though He has been thus abused. He is the Saviour 
and Lord of the world.
This brings us to the crucial question of sin and grace. As 
presented in Liberation Theology, man the oppressed and needy is a 
victim of exploitation and alienation. In Marxian terms, he is alienated 
from the mode and relations of production, from his fellow human beings, 
and from himself. In Latin America such alienation is pervasive and 
there is no question that the socio-economic and political structures are 
largely responsible for the human misery we find here. These structures 
are sinful: they dehumanize rather than humanize man. They do not
conduce to "abundance of life" but to increases in "unfreedom" and 
wretchedness. But this description of structural and "human" sinfulness 
does not exhaust the meaning of sin. Sin is more basic than that, and 
redemption more inclusive than socio-economic and political emancipation 
in history, "The qualitative opposition between sin and grace is more 
fundamental in the Christian interpretation of history than in the
73opposition between unliberated and liberated, oppressed and oppressors". 
Thus, even if man were able to achieve socio-economic and political 
emancipation - with or without the aid of God - and thereby achieve a 
level of freedom hitherto unattained by man, man would still be a sinner: 
"for it is in freedom that we all sin." We need to constantly remind 
ourselves that there is a real and necessary distinction between the 
consequences of sin and sin itself, which is fundamentally a brolcen- 
relationship with God. Only God can restore, or, better still, create, 
a new relationship. Langdon Gilkey writes:
24.0.
The freeing of freedom, liberation, achieves the conquest 
of the consequences of human sin in history (i.e., fate) 
and so - let us repeat - is an ess'ential aspect of Christian 
concern and action, nevertheless, it does not represent the 
conquest of the sin itself out of which fate and fatedness 
continually arise. Only a new relation of mankind to God, 
to self and to the neighbor can achieve that goal, an achieve­
ment far beyond the range of political activity, 74
Undoubtedly sin separates humanity into classes but this "is not the
same thing as the universal solidarity of humanity in the structure of 
75sin against God,"'^
In keeping with the concept of unconditional grace, the message 
of justification by grace alone is paradoxical in its implications.
We argued earlier that Liberation Theology as "a theology of universal 
human brotherhood" places emphasis upon the salvific efficacy of human 
praxis to the detriment of sola gratia and sola fides. Now, in contrast 
to the demand in Liberation Theology for manifest signs of the solidarity 
of brotherhood based on the gospel of love, evangelical theology of the 
cross calls for such manifestations, and it also dares to celebrate that 
brotherhood as a prolepsis. This celebration constitutes a crucial 
difference between evangelical theology and Liberation Theology. V/hat 
might appear to some as ludicrous, and as a violation of the Gospel is 
acknowledged as intrinsic to the existential experience of the Gospel, 
Therefore it should not be dismissed as being ideological quietism, 
even though unfortunately, there are historical grounds for so arguing. 
Carl Braaten sums this paradox very aptly when he says:
According to the message of justification by grace alone, 
we can already celebrate and practice a unity of brothers and 
sisters in Christ. We can already declare that in Christ 
there is no East or West, no rich or poor, no slave or free 
man, no male or female, no Jew or Greek, no Black or white, 
no Brahman or pariah, no prince or pauper. None of these 
distinctions counts as the ultimate mark of human identity.
Yet this fact is not a self-evident truth. It is a gift of 
the gospel already shared as a datum of eschatological salvation
even prior to its actualization in history and in spite of 
the ambiguities of present social reality, "J6
It is only in such a paradoxical celebration that the triumph of the
cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ are held together and man is
given the courage to transcend his oppression and alienation in whatever
forms he finds and experiences them, knowing that his justification is
in the "Crucified" God, and not in the failure or success of his human
endeavours.
Finally, a word about critiquing Liberation Theology is in order 
at this point. No responsible critique of Liberation Theology based on 
an evangelical theology of the cross should attempt to proclaim "cheap 
grace" to those who are made uncomfortable by the socio-economic and 
political critique of society and the consequent radical demand for 
revolutionary change made by Liberation Theology, The critique of society 
based on Marxian sociology is very incisive and cannot be dismissed 
because it is Marxian, In a real sense, to do that would be to provide 
salve for stricken consciences by removing Law and judgement. It would 
be another form of idolatry - having a God whom we can manipulate. 
Liberation Theology has arisen out of a context of real "material" 
oppression which places humanity in a situation where the extravagance 
of some means the poverty of many others. In such a situation, no 
theologian of the cross can summarily conclude God desires it to be so 
and remain a theologian of the cross. Nor can he argue that the "extra­
vagances" of those who have are the blessings of God for them, and that, 
consequently, there is no need to suffer pangs of conscience for the 
sake of the poor neighbour whose life is both miserable and really all 
that he or she has. When we paint the conditions in Latin America (and 
elsewhere) in such vivid terms, it seems "unbelievable that man can be 
so blind and insensitive to the needs of his/her neighbour.' Why? Gan
the Church point the way towards a creative and "material" response?
As a result of its peculiar theological method, Liberation Theology 
de fan to attempts to do that: to make the world hear the cry of the
oppressed in and among whom Christ dwells. Liberation Theology talks 
about the God who fully understands suffering for that is the meaning 
of the Incarnation, This theology is not afraid of talking about the 
God of the oppressed, the Christ who is found in the needy, even if 
such a description falls prey to idolatry and ideology. It is confident 
in the liberation of God and in the God of liberation.
, When, for example, liberation theologians speak positively of 
their programme and strategy for the praxis of faith and love in their 
context, should we, from a political standpoint and in a theologically 
irresponsible way, simply denounce and reject their praxis as ideological 
- as so often happens - by using our own ideological premise? Are not 
both forms of ideology judged by the cross of Christ which has no 
handles for an individual, group or society to grip and control? Before 
God all men stand as beggars with .open hands: all are in need of His
grace. This is a Creative Word of freedom, hope and love for all, which 
is active here and now, but which points beyond history to its escha­
tological 'fulfilment.
Pointing out the inadequacies and deficiences of Liberation Theology 
without listening to and talcing seriously its clarion call to struggle 
for a better world, so that the Gospel may be preached and people hear 
and believe and live in, and in the light of the Gospel, is unfair to 
Liberation Theology and an injustice to the Gospel. We are free to 
hear criticism because it is Christ who makes us free. The theologian 
of the cross needs to remember, however, that the credibility and efficacy 
of the Gospel does not ultimately depend on how much justice and freedom
and solidarity (or lack thereof) are to be found in society. The 
efficacy of the Gospel is the work of the Ho'ly Spirit. Furthermore, 
the Kingdom of God is present in the most sinful situation, and may 
even be ultimately fulfilled when all the 'feigns" point to the absence 
of God and His Kingdom. This is the paradox of the Kingdom,
Chapter V.
Christianity, Marxism, and the Caribbean.
Introduction
In our study so far we have presented Marx’s concept of man and 
his theory of history, followed by a discussion of the question of a 
radical concept of God. This radical concept, we claimed, was the 
essence of the critical and decisive challenge to the Christian Church 
arising out of Marx's Weltanschauung. Such a concept of God is found in 
a theology of the cross whose chief exponent was Martin Luther. Of 
course, this association with Luther does not deny its fundamental 
Biblical roots, especially in Paul. In addition to the Reformer's 
theologia crucis, we looked at Jurgen Moltmann's "Trinitarian political
theology of the cross", and, then, finally, we asked whether there was/
a clear and explicit theology of the cross in the Theology of Liberation.
In the theology of the cross it was seen that God, far from forsak­
ing man in his sin and suffering, and even further oppressing him, was 
most close to man and present in his suffering. He is present in that 
He suffers with man and for man. This knowledge is made unmistakably 
clear in the cross of the crucified and risen Jesus Christ. Marx’s 
radical concept of man in which man has not only alienated himself 
through his participation in the alienating and alienated mode and rela­
tions of production, but who will also, eventually, through his own 
"Promethean" efforts, historically transcend his alienation and liberate 
himself and the whole cosmos, is countered by a theology of the cross 
which argues for a more ^holistic and comprehensive view of man. In 
this theology man's "nature" is not limited to his relation to the 
socio-economic conditions of life and to the history and future of man's
own creation. His nature, history and future are radically defined in 
the cross of Christ. His future is hidden with God in Christ. Through 
faith in Christ, man knows that in spite of his failure, he is and will 
be totally liberated.
Turning our attention now to the Caribbean, we will attempt a 
presentation of the state of Caribbean society in terms of its critical 
and acutely crucial challenge to Christian theology. In the Garibbean, 
our primary focus will be on the so-called ''Caribbean man", his history, 
his consciousness, his vision or lack thereof, his longings and aspira­
tions. This is a very difficult undertaking, as we shall see below, for 
we are dealing with a very complex issue which is punctuated by subtle­
ties and nuances which are easily, and, hence, often lost to the casual 
observer of Caribbean society and Caribbean man, be the observer an 
outsider from the region, or even Caribbean man himself. Our task is . 
made more difficult by the fact that our discussion involves not two 
parties, Caribbean man and Christian theology, but three parties because 
of the inclusion of Marx's anthropology and view of history, as well. 
Therefore, with Marx's anthropocentric Weltanschauung presenting a 
serious challenge to the mission of the Church and the future of man, 
i.e. man's salvation, our dialogue shalL proceed, for the most part, with 
Caribbean man and Marx, on the one hand, and Christian theology on 
the other.
Our repeated emphasis upon the salvation of man sola gratia and upon 
a definition of human nature in terms of man's relationship to God, in 
contrast to Marx's socio-economic reductionism, leads us to a critical 
consideration of Luther's doctrine of the Two Kingdoms. This will 
follow our attempt at formulating a "Theology of Alienation and Recon­
ciliation in the Caribbean."
Finally, we enter into this dialogue recognizing that Christianity
has both a dialogical and proclamatory character. It is instructive to
note E. J. Neuhaus1 s comment on Theme 5 of the Hartford theses on the
question of the false dichotomy between the prophetic and priestly
ministries of the Church which must be overcome in order that social
action and evangelism may not be crippled further,
• , • Christianity must have a dialogical relationship to 
other ways of putting the world together. But Christianity 
is proclaraatory as well as dialogical. As embarrassing as 
it may seem in a world sated by the deceits of subjectivism, 
Christian claims present themselves as objective and normative. 
Related to many cultural' idioms, historically conditioned in 
ways beyond number, seen through the prism of myriad world 
views, the Word nonetheless goes out: Jesus Christ is Lord. 1
Moreover, recognizing that the Church has often neglected evangelism in
its pursuit of its ministry to the socio-economic needs of people, Neuhaus
adds the sober warning:
To abandon that Word and the mandate to proclaim it, is to lose 
all claim to Christian identity. Christians proclaim it, not 
necessarily (or not G n ly ) in order to prevent other people from 
going to hell but because they believe it as true, because they 
believe it is the most important single thing to be said about 
human existence, and because they are commanded to proclaim it. 
The failure to proclaim that Word with clarity and courage is 
one of a part with the capitulation to political agendas that 
are designed either in indifference or in overt hostility to 
the lordship to Christ, 2
These insights are very relevant to our response to the challenges 
facing the Church in the Caribbean today. Those challenges may be summed 
up in terms of the interrelated crises of identity and relevance which 
are peculiar and intrinsic to the Church1s presence and ministry in the 
world. Though identity and relevance have been separated innumerable 
times in the history of the Church, they must always be held in dialec­
tical unity if the Church is to be true to the Gospel that has called it 
into being and which continues to give it life. Thus, it is only through
dialogue and proclamation that the Church can attempt to establish and
maintain that dialectical unity of identity and relevance.
Furthermore, to meet the challenge of Marx in the Caribbean (and 
elsewhere), Christian theology must have a genuine openness to the cry 
of the human condition as expressed in that society, admit failures and 
defeats, be willing to be corrected on its false assumptions about 
Caribbean man and his society, as well as criticise the false assumptions 
and shortcomings of its dialogical counterparts. However, and most impor­
tantly, it must also proclaim the Lordship of the suffering Christ if 
it is to be faithful to its roots, its source of energy and power, and 
bring with it to the dialogue, its "whole” perspective, and not merely 
part of it, i. e., the apparently more amiable and compromising aspects 
of its perspective. This is the way that evangelical theology may seek 
authentic expression of the Gospel with relevance and identity inextri­
cably and dialectically bound together.
A.
Alienation, Marxism, and the Caribbean:
A Challenge to the Church.
, In the first chapter of this study entitled "Marx1s concept of Man” 
we noted that Marx* s description of man was based on the concept of 
alienation. Marx, we saw, conceived of man's "nature” in socio-economic 
terms. Since the productive process was dominated by the capitalist, the 
worker found himself alienated from himself, his fellow workers, his 
product and his species-being. Marx, it was mentioned above, based his 
analysis of alienation on his observations of nineteenth century burgeois, 
industrialised western Europe. Philosophically, he stood within the
Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment traditions. He was therefore 
influenced by many and varied thinkers who preceded him. It was Hegel, 
above anyone else, and to a lesser extent Feuerbach, who influenced his 
thinking on alienation. Thus, it is fairly obvious that Marx is histor­
ically, philosophically, and in many other ways, removed from the 
contemporary Caribbean situation. Simply to apply his ideas on man and 
history, however critically, to twentieth century Caribbean society 
without paying due consideration to this hermeneutical distance would 
be ahistorical, and it would be unfair to both Marx and Caribbean man. 
Indeed, such a transference would run the risk of denunciating Marx for 
being ideological.
It does come as a great surprise to the student of Caribbean history 
that Marx paid no attention to plantation slavery. Instead, he concen­
trated primarily on proletarian alienation in industrialised European 
societies. Anyone who studies the sociology of "New World" slavery, 
where the slave was a part of plantation property, a mere chattel who did 
not even own himself or herself, let alone their offspring, and compares 
the situation of the slave with that of the proletarian worker, would have 
to conclude that the former was no less alienated than the latter.
Perhaps there are even some who would argue that the slave vis-a-vis the 
proletariat was more alienated. Without entering into such a debate, 
we find it useful for our understanding of Caribbean man today to use 
Marx's concept of alienation, albeit with considerable reservations and 
qualifications.
Who is Caribbean man? What are his characteristics? Is he the 
descendant of African slaves, or of East Indian, Chinese, Portuguese or 
European indentured immigrants? Is he of mixed parentage —  for instance 
European and African? Is he the descendant of Aboriginal Indians who
were there before Columbus came to the West Indies? Is he not an enigma?
If he is an alienated man, what is he alienated from; and, what is 
alienated from him? What precisely do we mean when we use the concept 
alienation in the context of the Caribbean? The answers to these and 
other relevant questions are partly found in the history of the Caribbean. 
There can be no serious attempt to describe Caribbean man which does not 
make the history of the region of central importance* For instance, of 
central importance is that portion of the history of the Caribbean which 
began with the arrival of Europeans, followed by Africans and then by 
Asians, of various tribal, national, linguistic and cultural varieties.
Such a detailed study is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it 
is difficult to avoid describing in some detail, explicitly and implicitly, 
some of that very history. This will become obvious to the reader as 
we proceed with our discussion. Attention will be focused on Caribbean 
man as he is today. It is to be recognized that there were over four 
hundred and fifty years of domination and exploitation under colonialism 
which have shaped the consciousness, the language, and the cultural and 
religious expressions of the Caribbean peoples.
a.
Alienation and the Caribbean Man: An Historical Overview.
The history of the Caribbean is a history of colonialism, of the 
plantation system, of slavery and indentureship. It is a history 
characterised by the domination and exploitation of the masses by a 
disproportionately smaller elitist ruling class motivated first and 
foremost by the desire for economic gain,^ The legacy of this history
hangs like a millstone around the neck of Caribbean man. It is a legacy
that eludes transcendence and even leaves Caribbean man without any
lasting answer to the question of who he is. Philip Mason succinctly
sums up this predicament when he states:
But it is the essence of colonialism, and indeed of most forms 
of rule of the many by the few, that the few impose on the 
many a spiritual yoke which comes to govern their day-to-day 
actions, more constantly and pervasively, if less obtrusively, 
than the physical force which lies in the background. Nowhere 
did this happen more completely than in the Caribbean. Whole 
societies were persuaded to imitate a way of life that was 
quite unfamiliar to them, one they had little hope of attaining 
and not in itself particularly estimable; what was more serious, 
they came to despise themselves and their own way of life. 5
Because of the grouping together of peoples from Europe, Africa and Asia,
during the centuries of colonialism, the subject peoples were directly
and indirectly forced to imitate the values and patterns of behaviour of
the plantocracy. Their Consciousness of themselves, of their roots
vis-a-vis their supervisors1, was determined by the ruling class. Their
values were therefore alien to them, having been imposed upon them through
coercion, at first, and, later, through servile and dehumanising imitation.
Whatever values the slave or indentured immigrant brought with him from
his ancestral land was relegated to an inferior status relative to
European values, mores, patterns of behaviour, etc* Barbadian novelist,
George Lamming, gives us another negative appraisal of colonialism when
he writes:
It is the brevity of the (British) West Indian's history, and 
the fragmentary nature of the different cultures which have 
fused to make something new; it is the absolute dependence on 
the values implicit in that language of his coloniser which has 
givern him a special relation to the word, colonialism. It is 
not merely a political definition; it is not merely the result 
of certain economic arrangements. It started as these and 
grew somewhat deeper. Colonialism is the very basis of the 
West Indian’s cultural awareness . . *.A foreign or absent 
Mother culture has always cradled his judgements. 6
This dependence mentality which always looks to the outsider for its
cue, which despises the locally manufactured commodity and exalts v/hat
is manufactured and imported from abroad, i.e., especially, from Europe
and North America, has left Caribbean man in a quandry as to how to
govern himself politically once he has gained political independence from
the Mother country. In his novel, The Overcrowded Barracoon. Naipaul
gives us a vivid description of his own perception of Caribbean man's
predicament when, with characteristic pessimism, he claims that
These Caribbean territories are not like those in Africa and 
Asia, with their own internal reverences, that have been 
returned to themselves after a period of colonial rule.
They are manufactured societies, labor camps, creations of 
empire; and for long they were dependent on empire for law, 
language, institutions, culture, even officials. Nothing was 
generated locally; dependence became a habit. How, without 
empire, do such societies govern themselves? What is now the 
source of power? The ballot box, the mob, the regiment? When, 
as in Haiti, the slave-owners leave, and there are only slaves, 
what are the sanctions? 7
Any return to ancestral roots in Africa, Asia and Europe, even if that 
were possible —  it is doubtful whether that is really a viable possibil­
ity —  will be, at best, only a partial solution, or, more particularly, 
an aid to a solution to Caribbean man’s search for his identity and for 
sanctions with which to govern himself with dignity and increasing 
’’humanity". Whatever is imported today from outside of the Caribbean, 
i.e., from Europe and North America, does not automatically apply to 
the Caribbean. It must still be "Caribbeanized". The Christian Church 
must be firm in its insistence upon an empathetic understanding of and 
attempt at a solution to the problem of alienation in the Caribbean. The 
good of one group must not be promoted and realized at the expense of 
making other groups suffer the reduction to marginality in society.
Both Lamming and Naipaul write as if colonialism as an alienating 
experience has left an indelible mark on Caribbean's man’s consciousness. 
Caribbean man has never known real freedom for he has never been
responsible for the selection of the criteria which defined (and even now 
continue to define) him as a person. He possesses a slave mentality 
which sees people as things, objects, rather than as persons, independent 
and other. Both master and slave, under slavery, were alienated. But 
it was the master who dominated the slave. In a curious way, however, 
the master found that his identity was bound up with the master-slave 
relationship in which he had placed himself and his slave. Hegel’s 
observations on this phenomenon are helpful for our purposes. For example, 
in his Phenomenology of Mind, he says that in the master-slave relation­
ship
It might seem that the master has now obtained recognition as 
an independent being. But since this recognition is accorded 
him by the slave, who is not an independent being but merely 
does his master’s will, it does not constitute, an objective 
confirmation of the master’s identity.
The slave, on the other hand, realizes himself and objectifies 
himself through work for the master. In shaping and forming 
the natural world, he can find in the product of his work an 
objective and lasting expression of his own identity, whereas 
the master, whose relationship to the natural world is entirely 
one of desire and consumption, is incapable of doing this. 
Moreover, the slave has experienced fear, fear for his life, and 
therefore knows that his whole existence has been at stakej 
through the experience of' service, this fear has spread itself 
over his whole lifej and consequently he has experienced to the 
full that consciousness of his own existence which can be 
given objective expression in work. 8
We need to be careful here that we do not push Hegel’s analysis of the
master-slave relationship too far. It must be recognized that he did
not have plantation slavery in mind, but the concept of slavery in
classical Greek and.'Roman societies. Furthermore, Hegel’s analysis is
philosophical, and, therefore, it does not take full cognizance of the
pervasive influence of socio-economic and political factors which are
so characteristic of plantation slavery. Again, Caribbean societies
were characterized by absentee-ownership which meant there was a great
geographical distance between the slaves and the real plantation owners; 
and the culture in which the master was immersed was one from which 
slavery was absent. Despite these differences, however, Hegel's descrip­
tion of the master-slave relationship in which the master was in a 
curious way dependent upon the slave for his (master’s) plantation 
identity still remains.
It should be pointed out from the outset that in terms of plantation 
slavery in the Caribbean the slave, far from realizing and objectifying 
himself through his work for his master (who was not necessarily, and,
more often than not, the plantation owner), was alienated from his work,
9in Marxian terms. In slavery, he experienced an almost total loss of 
self. Moreover, as was pointed out above, the master was not dependent 
on the slave for his identity, in Hegelian terms. The master perceived 
himself in terms of European values which gave him his sense of cultural, 
and other, superiority vis-a-vis his slave. But the master* s conscious­
ness of himself as political ruler invested with economic and sociological 
power, was nevertheless, enslaved by the unshakable conviction that 
freedom for the slaves would be tantamount to ruin for the colonies. He 
did not know how to rule when the sanctions that bolstered slavery no 
longer existed. It was therefore not surprising that he tried to cling
tenaciously to his power during the short-lived apprenticeship system 
1 fi(1834-1833). Moreover, the slave mentality of the former slave masters
persisted during the period of indentured immigration whose description,
"A new system of slavery", aptly describes the continuation of the
alienated "master" mentality even after slavery had been legally abolished
11by an Act of the British Parliament. This is the mentality that has 
characterized colonialism.
But it was not only the plantocracy that was unprepared for
Emancipation; the slaves were unprepared as well. The apprenticeship
scheme was an inevitable failure, and the newly freed slaves were left
without any liberating pattern of behaviour which they might emulate in
order to be, and act as free men. All they had were the centuries of
schooling in imitating European ways without any hope of gaining full and
equal status with, and recognition from, their former master. A reading
of reports of ex-slaves* views about the meaning of freedom reveals an
odd mixture of visions of being like "Massa", being free of agricultural
labour, etc. There was certainly no clear picture of returning to a
primordial African paradise, or even of creating such a paradise in the 
12New World. The crucial point is that there was a lack of a Marxian
proletarian solidarity among the ex-slaves, as well as any concerted
i 3effort to achieve a primitive communist utopia. Slavery had taken care 
of that. It is against this background that Eric Hobsbawm perceptively 
writes that the Caribbean region is "a curious terrestrial space-station 
from which the fragments of various races, torn from the worlds of their 
ancestors and aware both of their origins and of impossibility of return­
ing to them, can watch the remainder of the globe with unaccustomed 
1/detachment." ^ Commenting on Hobsbawm*s observation, Sidney Mintz
raises the question of Garibbean man* s vision of his future;
Indeed, if enslavement disjoined once-free men from a past 
they would have preferred to cling to, then renewed freedom —  
freedom from slavery —  must prove a very different state 
from preslavery. The special enigma of Caribbean peoples 
may well lie in their never having settled for a vision of 
history as something that must or should repeat itself. 15
Freedom from slavery has left Caribbean man with an ambiguous mixture 
of ingredients with which to carve out a new and liberated future. But 
though he does not w is h  to repeat the past, he cannot avoid its debili­
tating legacy. It is sobering to recall that the principal ingredients
that make up contemporary Caribbean society were not selected either by 
the ancestors of the Caribbean peoples, or by the Caribbean peoples 
themselves. For example, as Mintz explains, the "unusual ethnic and 
physical heterogeneity of the Caribbean region . . .  reveal the economi­
cally motivated intents of distant rulers." He therefore concludes 
that "it would be fair to say that almost no one who was not European 
ever migrated to the Caribbean region freely; and surely no non-European
born in the region was ever consulted about the advisability of additional 
16migration."
With this peculiar history in mind, it is no wonder that politicians, 
academics, literary artists, church-leaaers, among others, who have 
emerged from the ranks in the Caribbean, have been calling on their 
people to begin building their own liberated future. It is argued that 
it is only the people themselves who are capable of creating their own 
destiny. The truly independent and free Caribbean man will only emerge 
through the self-assertive, self-sacrificial efforts of Caribbean man 
himself. He must extricate himself from the enslaving colonial legacy. 
Only he can do so, i.e., by drawing from that legacy those liberating 
cultural fragments which have been passed down through the centuries.
Political and ideological sloganeering, however, is a far cry from
1 7true human dignity as a person. Political independence is a mere step, 
however significant a step, in the direction of achieving total human 
liberation. We do not need Marx to remind us of this; we need only to 
look at the history of our independent territories since the achievement 
of independence for us to realize that alienation is still with us.
Several times above we used the term "Caribbean peoples" instead of 
"Caribbean people". The plural form was chosen with care. Nowhere can 
anyone accurately say that in the Caribbean there is a pervasive feeling
among a majority of the people of being first and foremost a Caribbean 
people in contrast to being simply many peoples with more significant 
characteristics separating them from each other than those uniting them 
as one people. For example, there is a greater feeling of being Antiguans 
Barbadians, Guyanese, Jamaicans, Trinidadians, etc., than of being West 
Indians. Moreover, even in each separate society, it would be inaccurate 
to say that we have a strong nationalist feeling which is unmistakably 
greater than and takes precedence over any ethnic, colour or class "in­
group" feeling. In short, each separate society is a macro-cosmic view 
of the fragmented, alienated individual West Indian.
Governments in the Caribbean are acutely aware of the deep-seated 
racial, colour and class distinctions and rivalries within their respec­
tive societies as evidenced by the various national mottoes purporting 
to promote if not create oneness and unity among the various and differ­
ing (and oftentimes conflictual) sectors in Caribbean societies. With 
great insight into this phenomenon, David Lowenthal tells us:
Guyana, once the 'Land of Six Peoples,' now proclaims it is 
'One People, One Nation ([and one Destin^'; Trinidad's coat 
of arms reads 'Together We Aspire, Together We Achieve,' and 
the ruling party's slogan is, 'All o' we is one'; Jamaica 
proclaims 'Out of Many, One People,' and the island's Five- 
lear Independence Plan insists that 'racial integration in our 
society, is not merely an ideal; . . .  it is in fact a part of 
life.' 'Nowhere in the world,' asserted Jamaica's premier in 
1961, 'has more progress been made in developing a nonracial 
society . . .  in which color is not . • • psychologically 
significant.' 18
Viewed in terms of the objective realities of Caribbean societies, such 
claims to national unity still represent aspirations and ideals which, 
to many, are more elusive now than at the time when they were each 
announced.
Let us now look more closely at this multi-faceted fragmentation 
within individual Caribbean societies (and, of course, within so-called
Caribbean Society as a whole)• This fragmentation is far more complex 
than a simple Marxian two-class stratification based on ownership and, 
hence, control of the means of production, on the one hand, and lack of 
ownership and control of the means of production, on the other hand, 
would indicate. To describe Caribbean society using Marx's analysis 
of class structure, without paying due attention to factors such as race 
and colour which militate against the development of a genuine working 
class consciousness and solidarity, would be non-Marxian since it would 
be ahistorical.
b.
Alienation and Pluralism
When Caribbean society is compared with North American society 
there are two striking demographic contrasts. Firstly, in the former,' 
with the exception of Guyana, there are hardly any aboriginal inhabitants 
remaining, while, in the latter, significant numbers of American Indians 
from various tribes still exist. Secondly, whereas, in the Caribbean 
the European grouping of the total population is significantly small, in 
North American society, in spite of a large Black minority, the European 
grouping forms the bulk of the population. Throughout the period of 
colonial rule in the Caribbean, plantation society was characterized by 
absentee-ownership. Fewer and fewer European owners lived in the West 
Indies. The majority elected to stay at home and appoint deputy managers 
to take care of their affairs. As was already noted, this practice of 
absenteeism was a crucial factor in the development of Caribbean societies.
Bearing in mind that the Europeans formed the ruling class with the
balk of the population being comprised of African slaves, we are able to
19understand the pyramidical social structure that eventually emerged.
At the top of the pyramid were the European ruling elites and at the
base were the African slaves. In the middle strata, forming a buffer
between the Europeans and the Africans, were the people of mixed blood.
Thus, instead of a two-tiered class system, there eventually emerged a
20three-tiered social hierarchy. It should be noted that during slavery, 
indentured European immigrants were part of the lowest strata. However, 
when their contracts were over they were free to move up in the hierarchy. 
The absenteeism practised by plantation owners served to enhance the impor­
tance of the mulattoes who, because of their European blood, came to 
regard themselves as superior to the Blacks who were invariably below 
them. The Europeans allowed them certain privileges which were denied 
the Blacks. The colour consciousness, where whiteness and close proxim­
ity to it in terms of skin colour, texture of hair, etc., were given 
preference, and blackness was despised, became increasingly acute follow­
ing emancipation in the 1830's. Aspirations of upward social mobility 
meant imitating European ways.
It was soon noticed that colour was an important criterion for 
deciding one's suitability for important jobs and positions in society.
As Mason explains, the termination of the legal distinctions between 
free (white or mixed) and non-free (black), led to an increase in preju­
dice based on the "formal distinction based on colour". Mason continues: 
"When the legal barriers go down, the psychological defences go up. We 
should expect, and do in fact find, that when slavery came to an end 
there would be an increase in discrimination based on shades of colour." 
There is no denying the fact that Caribbean people are both race and 
colour conscious. Mason provides a useful summary of the general picture
of the social structure in the Caribbean at the time of Emancipation.
He does so as he notes the growing significance colour came to play in
the social structure*
In the Garibbean, the main distinction at first was between 
slave and free, but this broad distinction was quickly modified 
by considerations of race and colour. The European indentured 
servants worked out their time and became free; some of the 
children of African women and some of the more skilled and 
trusted slaves were released, and an intermediate class of 
free blacks and free coloured arose. It became a society of 
many grades and distinctions —  but the distinction of slave 
and free continued to be of overriding importance until slavery 
showed signs of coming to an end. At this stage, the free
part of society first closed its ranks against the slaves and
then when emancipation became a fact, established strong barriers 
of discrimination against the former slaves, for whose identi­
fication colour became the principal badge. 21
Following Emancipation, the ensuing shortage of labour for the 
plantations eventually led to the establishment of indentured immigration 
from Europe, China, Madeira, Africa and India. Through the process of 
trial and error it was soon found that Indian (or East Indian as the 
immigrant from India came to be called) immigration was the most viable 
form of immigration. Thus East Indians came to form the largest immigrant 
community in Caribbean society as a whole following Emancipation. They 
were transported to the region between 1833 and 1917* It is the coming
of East Indians, in contrast to any other ethnic group (with the excep­
tion of the Chinese in Jamaica), which led to the further complexity in 
Caribbean social structure. In Guyana and Trinidad, their numerical 
preponderance and near preponderance in the population, respectively, 
became a significant factor in the interracial rivalry between themselves 
and the "Africans". Though they initially occupied the lowest rung in 
the hierarchy which was vacated by the ex-slaves, they perceived them­
selves as superior to the Africans whom they came to dislike. Likewise, 
they were despised by both the European and Black communities. In fact, 
the former thought of them as despicable heathens, while the latter
pejoratively nick-named them "coolies".
What we find emerging here, therefore, are societies in which race, 
colour and class were fundamental criteria for determining cultural 
values, people’s social perceptions of themselves and others, and their 
overall outlook on life. Naturally, these factors militated against 
cohesiveness and integration within each of the societies, and, indeed, 
in the society as a whole. Whereas, on the one hand, significant similar­
ities were found between lower class Africans and East Indians in Guyana 
and Trinidad, and between lower class Africans and Chinese in Jamaica, 
on the other hand, there were significant and divisive differences as
well. For instance, as Mint2 points out, "Colour and ethnicity are not
23neatly correlated with class membership."
Despite this obvious conflictual situation, a growing measure of 
consensus emerged among the various ethnic groups comprising the popula­
tion in each society. This consensus was the result of an acceptance of 
certain common values known as "creole" values which were greatly influ­
enced by values from outside, i.e., from Europe. The sad truth is, 
however, that in spite of perceived improvement toward greater consensus —  
about common values, for example —  a basic situation of divisiveness 
and conflict still persists. There is still a cultural gap between the
0/"poor" class and the more affluent class.
One of the primary problems that emerges from this complexity is 
the extreme difficulty of classifying Caribbean society. In tackling 
this particular problem, many social scientists have opted for the
25"plural" model which was developed by the Dutch scholar, J. S. Furnivall.
In summary, when this model is applied to the Caribbean the attempt is 
being made to take full cognizance of separate and different, even 
conflictual, social groupings, be they based on cultural, ethnic or
22
colour differentials. It is not our intention to argue for or against
the analytical and sociological appropriateness of the plural model as
a description of Caribbean society. Rather, we wish to draw attention
to it in so far as it serves to accentuate the fragmentary and "conflict-
ridden" character of Caribbean society. More precisely, it invariably
draws attention to the fact that Caribbean man is alienated from his
fellow citizens either because of economics, race, culture or colour,
or because of a configuration of these and other factors. This cannot
be denied, and it is to be noted that a significant degree of inter-class,
inter-racial, etc., suspicion and mistrust exists. Such an attitude of
26suspicion and mistrust does not follow rational and logical patterns.
The failure to recognize the "plural" nature of Caribbean societies 
is often the result of a disproportionate feeling of optimism about the 
efficacy and growth of "creole" culture, and/or a naive expectation that 
the legacy of history could be easily transcended without undue conflict 
and loss of individual freedom. The relinquishing of freedom, whether 
willingly or through coercion, in order to gain more freedom, i.e., a 
more total freedom, often leads to a decrease in personal freedom; in 
short, the opposite effect is created. This is not a judgement on 
anybody, nor is it a questioning of motives. It is rather an attempt 
to make a realistic appraisal of historical realities.
In a very lucid study on Socialism in Guyana, which is viewed from 
the perspective of the pluralist model, Paul Singh reaches some very 
sobering conclusions which are well worth noting. Summing up the 
inevitable and disastrous failure of socialist experiments in Guyana, 
he says:
Each ideological approach (transplanted Fabian labourism, 
Jaganite Marxism/Leninism, Burnhamite co-operation) failed 
to take sufficient cognizance of the forces of pluralism.
There was a common gross neglect or common gross under valuation 
of these pluralist forces • • • • Socialism has failed to have 
the desirable impact both as an integrative force and as a 
method for bringing about radical changes in society. It 
lacked the power to enthuse, to inspire, to pull the sharply 
differentiated cultural groups into a common will and a more 
universal acceptance and participation in new beliefs and new 
■ values. 27
Furthermore, noting that Guyanese Marxian socialists have tended to see 
society as having only one basic social division, i.e., between the 
capitalist and the proletariat, Singh goes on to point out that such 
socialists were under the illusion that race prejudice could be elimina­
ted by simply abolishing its root cause: capitalism. This "simplistic 
conclusion" is without historical foundations for nowhere has the 
abolition of capitalism and the emergence of some form of Marxian social­
ism resulted in total solidarity among the various societal and other 
groupings in the particular society in question. Admittedly, a Marxist 
might insist that nowhere has there been a "true" Marxian revolution, 
hence, social divisions remain. But this reply does not remove the 
fundamental criticism of Guyanese socialists. Regrettably, Singh tells, 
the situation in Guyana is characterised by "the absence of unified 
pressure from the working class" and the likelihood of such a conscious­
ness emerging in the near future is still to be wished for in order that 
there might be radical and concerted action to eliminate inequalities, 
poverty, etc. He admits that these are national and global problems and
they call not only for working class solidarity, but, also, solidarity
28among all peoples, both capitalist and proletariat, on behalf of man.
What we find emerging here from Singh's discussion is the point 
that the pluralist forces in Guyanese (and Garibbean) society do not 
allow of an uncritical transference of Marx's theory of the class strug­
gle to that area. The Marxian prerequisites for the proletarian
revolution are simply not present there; of course, certain partial
requirements like a class struggle do obtain.
The Marxist alternative of seeking integration by the 
mechanism of struggle and contradiction assumes a degree of 
class consciousness which is largely absent from the plural 
society. Furthermore, the dialectic in Marxism achieves syn­
thesis by liquidation of the separate identity of the preceding 
thesis. As such it is essentially anti-pluralistic, and 
politically it means that conflicts can be resolved only in 
terms of absolute victories and the elimination of the defeated 
cultural group. The conflict between proletariat and bourgeoi­
sie ends in the total, victory of the proletariat and the utter 
annihilation of the bourgeoisie. "29
In contrast to the Marxist alternative to the plural society, Singh
advocates the "concept of compromise". Instead of the Marxian elimination
of the so-called exploitative class in order to end pluralism, he calls
for "acceptance of pluralism" and "a reduction of violence." This, he
explains, will be achieved through "the proposed form of democratic
regionalism (which) produces a climate of peaceful reconciliation between
the conflicting interests." Furthermore, he argues that the lesson to
be learnt from the Guyana experience is
the necessity for socialists in plural societies to give as 
much emphasis to de-pluralisation.as to egalitarianism. The 
revolt in the plural society is a revolt against privilege of 
class as well as race. A planned socialist programme, with 
clear egalitarian objectives and utilising democratic regional 
and neighbourhood units to place socialism at the doorstep of 
the differentiated cultural groups, is a positive approach 
towards easing the situation. 30
This is the essence of Singh's "concept of compromise".
It would be fair to say that he envisages that "radical" socialism 
would take root in Guyana if its introduction and growth in the country 
is accomplished democratically. In this way, the ostensible and apparent 
central concern of socialism, man, alienated man, would be the genuine 
and real concern. Thus, rather than further abusing and dehumanizing man 
and offending his dignity and contracting his freedom, through the coercive
imposition of another alien ideology with its own system of values, 
democratic socialism would conduce to a gradual de-pluralisation which 
would eventuate in the achievement of an ever approaching approximation 
of egalitarianism.
At this point let us return once again to our original question as 
to the precise meaning of the term alienation as a description of the 
condition of Caribbean man today. Simultaneously, we shall try to 
delineate certain basic criteria by which we may define what is meant by 
the term "Caribbean man". Finally, we shall attempt to articulate the 
multi-faceted challenge which the condition of Caribbean man presents to 
the Christian Church. In the process of doing this, we shall also attempt 
to meet the challenge placed before the Church by Marx1s anthropocentric 
world-view which is evaluated as a "soteriological" system having its 
own prescriptions for the historical achievement of full human emancipa­
tion for Caribbean man.
c.
Towards a more specific delineation of the 
characteristics of Alienation in the Caribbean.
It should be mentioned at the outset that the following list of 
the characteristics of alienation in the Caribbean is viewed as being 
partial and tentative. It may therefore be enlarged, modified or even 
reorganized in order to allow for greater precision and comprehensiveness.
(i) Caribbean man is a stranger to his environment, an environment 
to which his ancestors did not freely choose to come. Thus it is appro­
priate to ask: To which part of the globe does he belong? Africa?
Asia? North America? The Mother Country of England? Another way of
stating this rootlessness is to say that Caribbean man is a lonely person.
This point is related to the second point but it still merits standing
on its own. Responding to Monty Williams1 question: "Do you see any
themes in Caribbean literature that interest you, or any common themes?",
Father Richard HoLung, a Jamaican Roman Catholic priest, replied, "Well,
there are really a number of them. The loneliness of Caribbean man, the
sense that he does not belong to the old simple world of island life . • •
31calypso-style life." In the writings of Trinidadian novelist,
V. S. Naipaul, to take another example, the theme of "strangeness", of
the Caribbean man’s search for an identity in a "home" environment is
very pervasive. In his novel, The Mimic Men, he tells of a West Indian
politician who had failed in the West Indies and so had to turn to London
as a place of refuge. Naipaul writes.: "I know that return to my native
island and to my political life is impossible . . . .  For those who lose,
and nearly everyone in the end loses, there is only one course: flight.
Flight to the greater disorder, the final emptiness: London and the home
39counties."
(ii) Caribbean man suffers from separation from his fellow inhabi­
tants in the region. He does not fully understand them, and, by the same 
token, he is not fully understood by them at least to the extent of 
relating at various levels in society without the negative and debilitating 
use of stereotypes. He is unable to empathetically appreciate the 
cultural, economic, racial, colour, religious, political, social, etc. 
differences among the various groups of people in society. Social 
intercourse is characterised by a high level of subtle but real suspicion 
and hostility.
(iii) In the region fragmentation and disunity seem to be more
dominant than wholeness and unity. Territorial insularity takes 
precedence over the feeling of oneness as a people shaped by a common 
history. Even within each separate political unit (including the inde­
pendent territories) there is the notable absence of a national identity
33and national unity. National mottoes espousing oneness and unity, as 
we have already noted, reflect aspirations for future realization rather 
than describe existing historical realities. Indeed, the declaration of 
such sentiments in the mottoes are an acknowledgement of the lack of 
unity and of the need for a national identity. To reject this appraisal 
of the situation is to descend from noble ambition to ideological fantasy.
(iv) The region suffers an ambiguity in its classification on the
world scene. Today it is common to speak of “First World" and "Third
World", indeed of various worlds with the distinctions being made on the
basis of criteria such as economics, political stability, cultural
advancement, education level of national population, etc. Noting the
enigma of "the so-called Third World", Sidney Mintz argues that "the
3 LGaribbean region can only be part of it figuratively," He rejects
Naipaul's view "that the islands are merely the ’Third World's third
world1," and explains the peculiar ambiguity in placing the Garibbean
in a global perspective:
. . .  these lands were being force-fit into the First World, 
the European World, before the Third World even existed. It 
is being rural, agrarian and poor that makes Caribbean folk 
look like Third World peoples elsewhere; it is being so 
anciently heterogenized, enslaved, colonized, proletarianized —  
yes, and Westernized —  that makes the Third World label 
inappropriate for them today. 35
(v) Finally, Garibbean man suffers from political alienation. As 
we have already seen, his ancestors were never free to decide whether to 
come to the Garibbean, or not. The reins of government were never in his 
hands; it was not until modern times that members of the rank and file
began to assume positions of leadership and importance in the political
apparatus in their respective countries* Sehon Goodridge recognizes this
fact when he says:
The Caribbean man finds himself today part of a state order 
based on a borrowed political philosophy and characterized by 
the absence of ideological choice on the one hand and on the 
other, an escalating constriction of the avenues of constitu­
tional change. 36
Goodridge then draws attention to the glaring and depressing political
failures of the 1950's and 1960's whichhave left the Caribbean region to
be plagued by the lack of employment, human dignity, freedom, and with
the continued presence of corruption. Moreover, he notes that the
inherited political structure is "less accommodative of change".
As a concomitant to ideological barrenness, our political 
systems are becoming less acccvnodative of change. A basic 
premise of the Westminster-originated political system is 
that a regular interchange of power will normally occur between 
the major parties. 37
Unfortunately, historical experience contains scant evidence of such "a
regular interchange of power" and the possibility of it occurring more
frequently in the future is very difficult to predict with any degree of
optimism.
The dark days ahead for the constitutional orders in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean are evident from the increasing 
prevalence of what have been called 'constitutional dictator­
ships' —  the continuing hegemony of one party through 
frequent reordering of voting regulations and the restructuring 
of constituency boundaries. Racial and interest group differ­
ences among the masses are exploited frequently, all adding up 
to make change through constitutional means more and more 
unlikely. 38
In our dicussion of alienation in the Caribbean it was noted that 
we did not strive for a precise definition of the concept, i.e., our 
conception of the meaning of alienation was not characterized by an 
empirical specificity of criteria. In fact, in none of the writings 
quoted above did we find the word alienation used. let we have
persisted in using the term, implicitly arguing that it is a useful 
concept for summarising the predicament of Caribbean man. Certainly, 
from the peculiar features of his history, it is evident that Caribbean 
people are different from any other people, be they from Europe, North 
America, Asia, Africa or Latin America. This is not to deny that 
Caribbean man shares a common humanity with the rest of humankind. What 
we are saying is that Caribbean man is still to find himself and his 
"home1 •
Returning to our earlier discussion on "Alienation in Popular Usage," 
we find that alienation in the Caribbean qualifies as another popular 
usage of the concept. With respect to the Caribbean, we did not speak 
of alienation in terms of a separation between "essence" and "existence"; 
neither did we claim that Caribbean man is alienated because he chose, 
of his own volition, to be separated from European culture —  for example - 
in the same way as we noted a religious Jew or a Christian may actively 
and positively separate himself/herself from the world and its corrupting 
influences. Hence Caribbean man is seen as a victim of colonial historical 
circumstances.andtheir enslaving legacy. It should be recognized that the 
problem of making a contrast between Caribbean man as a passive victim of 
alienation and the Christian, who actively separates himself/herself from 
the world, is further complicated by the fact that the majority of the 
Caribbean people are nominally Christian. This point leads us to a 
consideration of the meaning and function of religion in the Caribbean.
We shall give a summary treatment of this topic below. Before we do so, 
however, let us turn our attention once again to Marx.
In our treatment of Marx’s concept of man and his theory of history, 
we argued that Marx does not posit a fixed "essence" of man. We saw 
that this "essence" or "nature" was related to human "needs" which were
tied to the nature of the productive forces in society. Man, Marx says, 
in fulfilling both his animal and species-needs, continually produces 
new matrices of his nature. At the inner core of this dynamic activity 
are the mode and relations of production. Thus man Is free to create 
himself, but is limited in scope by the existing level of production at 
any given point in history. However, Marx did envisage that the ever 
advancing technology would produce ever increasing and widening possibil­
ities for man's creativity, and for the fulfilment of his total needs.
The key to the achievement and enjoyment of such a total and liberating 
fulfilment was the attainment of harmony between human needs and libera­
ting human praxis, and the possibilities for the fulfilment of those 
needs in the productive process. This means that man will have to be 
able to discern the arrival of the kairos and act decisively and with 
revolutionary zeal. It is the proletariat who is going to embark on 
such a revolutionary and emancipating praxis. As the most dehumanized 
class, they are the only ones qualified to recognize and capable of 
grasping the kairos when it arrives, and to act upon it.
When we turn to the condition of Caribbean man, we find that Marx’s 
description of proletarian praxis has a particularly inviting and 
salutary appeal. Caribbean man is alienated and he lives in an explosive 
situation. He was forced to "misshape" himself and his history; ■ and, if 
we accept the Marxian thesis that it will be only Caribbean man himself 
who will ultimately emancipate himself, then all that Caribbean man needs 
to do is act. He looks around and he finds that he is producing for 
another's benefit —  the rich at home and abroad. He does not own the 
means of production; and neither does he control the distribution of 
what he produces« He has inherited an economic system in which the 
relations of production and the concomitant hierarchy among the workers
were determined by a small administrative class. Because of race, colour 
and class, and other differentials, he has been denied the freedom of 
upward mobility —  economically, socially, politically, etc. Only a few 
ever move-up, and then only by hard work and favour. Attempts from the 
top to alleviate the situation are moderate and futile because they are 
based on the premise that the existing system must be preserved at all 
costs. The system is primary, people are secondary. All talk about 
improving the lot of the masses is mere ideology. Such an explosive 
situation, it would seem, would be a fertile breeding ground for the 
"revolutionary" enactment of Marx's eleventh thesis on Eeuerbach: "The
philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways; the point, 
however, is to change it," and his clarion call in The Communist Manifesto: 
"The workers have nothing to lose but their chains; workers of all 
lands unite.
But the situation in the Caribbean, however explosive it may be, 
does not possess the principal characteristics of the kairos that Marx 
envisages. In fact, nowhere in the world, even in communist and socialist 
countries, "real" and so-called, where "proletarian" revolutions have 
occurred, followed by the introduction of socialism and communism, has 
Marx's vision come to fruition. There has been no situation where a 
revolutionary vanguard and elitist party did not promote and usher in the 
revolution. It is to be noted that either those societies are still in 
a state of continual revolution, or else the proletariat has been betrayed, 
since we find oligarchies existing in those societies, instead of prole­
tarian governments. In the Caribbean, not only is there the absence of 
a genuine proletariat, in Marx's sense, but there is the notable and 
obvious lack of natural resources and ever advancing technologization in 
the region. The Caribbean simply does not fit the scheme for Marx's
description of the alienated proletariat. This is not to deny that the 
plight of Caribbean man is in need of radical and imminent redress. But 
it is certain from the experience of other nations and from the uniqueness 
of the Caribbean situation that Marxism, whether in its pure or in its 
Marxist-Leninist form, will not conduce to the enjoyment of greater 
freedom by Caribbean man, and to the emergence of a Caribbean identity 
without the loss of human dignity and the erosion of fundamental political 
and economic power of the majority of the people, in addition to the 
destruction of their cultural and religious uniquenesses. Notwithstanding 
the differences that exist between the Sitz im Leben of Marx's proletariat 
and that of Caribbean man, however, the revolutionary call to alienated 
man to accept the challenge and responsibility to historically transform 
himself and his real and actual conditions of life presents one of the 
most crucial problems facing the Church in the Caribbean today. Once 
again, it is being called upon to reaffirm that its identity is found 
only in the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and that its utmost relevance to 
the total condition, past, present and future, of the whole human person, 
is definitively and decisively bound up with that Gospel. The Church 
must not be afraid to face this challenge, nor too proud to openly acknow­
ledge her failure to boldly proclaim, and relentlessly seek to make 
concrete, the message of the love of God in the crucified and risen Christ. 
Her history in the Caribbean shows many things of which she can be proud, 
as well as many other things which will cause her to hang her head in 
shame and admit her guilt. But she knows that she was born out of the 
forgiving love of God and that her present and future remain tied to this 
forgiving love. The life of the Church is therefore one of continual 
dying to "self" and rising in Christ.
But, we ask, what relevance does this have for the mission of the
Church in the Caribbean today? The answer to this question will unfold 
itself as we proceed below.
d.
The Centrality of man to the task of doing 
theology in the Caribbean.
In the first two chapters of this thesis, we directed our attention 
to Marx*s anthropocentric Weltanschauung. We noted that Marx's concern 
for man —  that he is alienated and needs to be emancipated —  serves as 
a unifying theme in his early and mature writings. We discussed his 
critique of religion as false consciousness, as an opiate, and as ideology. 
Marx did admit that religious suffering was real suffering and a protest 
against real suffering. Nevertheless, he claimed that the idea of God 
as Creator and Redeemer is false, and that it also dehumanizes man. 
According to Marx, man is the real centre of the universe. He is his own 
creator, and only he can be and is his own liberator. He even has to 
liberate himself from his need of God. This he will achieve after he 
has transformed the productive process.
Furthermore, from our discussion of Marx's anthropocentric Weltan­
schauung, we proceeded to discuss the theology of the cross as a 
critique and response to the Marxian challenge to Christian theology.
In the theology of the cross, it was argued, we find God is for man and 
not against him. Through faith in Christ, man sees God as the One who 
frees rather than enslaves him. Moreover, in the midst of sin and 
alienation, suffering and even death, God does not flee and consequently 
become absent; on the contrary, He is most present when He seems to be
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absent. This is the paradox of the Gross and Resurrection. It should 
not be construed that when we speak of the liberation or salvation of man 
through the activity of God that there is no place for human participation 
in God’s Kingdom which is proleptically present in the world, Indeed 
the commandment to love our neighbour which is inseparably linked to love 
of God, bears out that the Church is called to care for the neighbour.
In the context of the Caribbean, the Church is faced with the challenge 
of mediating this love of God-for-the-neighbour through those structures 
in society where power is exercised in justice. In the command to pro­
claim that Jesus is Lord and to serve as unto the Lord who is Jesus, the 
Church knows that its response should be based on loving and willing 
obedience, and not, simply, on fear of punishment or on guilt. Even when 
it thus responds, the Church still runs the risk of being described, in 
the light of Marx* s concept of ideology, as reactionary, and as the 
advocate for a dehumanizing and alienating base in society. It is there­
fore instructive to our task to reiterate the question: Does the Church
vis-a-vis Marx argue for a more authentic humanity? Our affirmative 
response was formulated in terms of the theology of the cross. The task 
before the Church now in the Caribbean is to articulate an indigenous 
evangelical theology of the cross, tfhat follows will be our attempt at 
moving in that direction. Finally, the idea of attempting to explicate 
the Christian faith in a new and different environment is in keeping with 
the dynamic activity of the Triune God, and with the formation of the 
scriptures themselves which bear witness to the very revealing activity 
of God.
274-.
B.
In her attempt to seriously apply herself to the task of articulating 
an indigenous Caribbean theology, the Church in the Caribbean must listen 
to the criticisms, reflections and suggestions that are emanating from 
the people of the region, both Christian and non-Christian, if her concern 
for indigenization is to be. more than an empty word. In this way she 
will be able to take due cognizance of contributions that are peculiar to 
Caribbean man. The process of theologization will therefore include 
cultural forms that are more Caribbean than European or North American. 
Thus the Church will be announcing through its theology that there are 
many cultural, social and even political and economic expressions, which 
have arisen out of our historical experience, which are legitimate forms 
of expression for Caribbean man in the same way as European expressions 
are legitimate for Europeans. There is no way-that the Church can avoid 
doing this in response to the challenge to "incarnate” the Gospel among 
the people. This process is intrinsic to the task of indigenization.
Her theology must reflect the Sitz im Leben of Caribbean man if it is to 
be an indigenous theology. In the past, indigenization was done partially 
and often unconsciously; the task now is to engage in "theological ' 
indigenization" in a more complete and explicit and conscious way.
But indigenization of theology is not simply allowing the situation 
to be reflected in the Church’s worship and liturgy, pastoral care and 
ministry, social action and preaching. That is only a necessary part of 
the process. The Church must also maintain its distinctive character 
and message, for it has a peculiar origin, source of life and identity 
in the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Identity must not be submerged by
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relevance. The two must continually form a dialectic. The quest for 
relevance in the Caribbean must not lead to ’the situation where the 
conditions of Caribbean man and society not only shape the message of 
the Gospel but also give it content. This would mean that the Church 
has lost its peculiar character of being "Christian". At the same time, 
the Church should not proclaim a message that is irrelevant to the real, 
concrete historical hopes and fears, joys and sorrows of the Caribbean 
people. Such a message would appear as being docetic. Furthermore, it ■ 
would lead to the unconscious or even conscious imposition of a particular 
"foreign" cultural pattern upon the people whose own cultural values 
would thereby be rejected or made inferior. The content of the message 
of the Gospel must be presented in cultural forms and expressions of 
Caribbean people.
The task of maintaining the dialectic of identity and relevance is 
a very difficult one, and it must be tackled critically and with openness. 
Moreover, the Caribbean theologian needs to remember that the Gospel 
always comes wrapped in a cultural package and it is therefore impossible 
to strip it, for example, of all its Western cultural packaging and then 
re-wrap it in a Caribbean form. Likewise, the opposite applies equally 
as well. In the context of Christian theology, the process of indigeni- 
zation (or "incarnating" the Gospel) calls for vigilance and openness: 
vigilance in discerning Law from Gospel and openness to both Law and 
Gospel, judgement and grace. It is with the view of taking note of the 
suggestions being made by Caribbean people concerning the task of doing 
theology in the Caribbean today that we now turn to the appropriate 
writings of four Garibbean writers: Michael Campbell-Johnston, S. J.j
The Reverend Idris Hamidj The Reverend C. 3. Reid, and Dr. Paul Singh.^ 
Campbell-Johnston, Reid and Singh focus attention on the specific
question of a Ghristian-Marxist dialogue in the Caribbean, whereas 
Hamid concentrates primarily on the question’ of ’’theology and alienated 
Caribbean man". However, the reflections, criticisms and suggestions 
of all four are directly pertinent to our main concern with how to 
"theologize" in the Caribbean in the light of the alienating and explo­
sive situation that prevails, in which Marxism and Socialism present a 
very critical challenge to the Church and to the people as a whole.
a.
/1Paul G. Singh: On Synthesizing Christianity and Socialism.
According to Singh, there is an indispensable need in the Caribbean 
for "a radical God" and "a revolutionary Marx". The two are functionally 
necessary for the ongoing development of the Caribbean, and for the present 
and future welfare of the people. His conclusion is based upon an 
historical appraisal of the needs of the Caribbean people which have 
arisen out of the historical experience of exploitation under colonialism, 
slavery and indenture. Today, Caribbean man is faced with the problem 
of satisfying basic human needs: food, clothing and housing.
In this situation, Singh argues, a Christian-Marxist dialogue is of 
particular significance to the Caribbean. Noting that there is an unfor­
tunate absence "of an indigenous philosophical tradition which clarifies 
the meanings of such basic concepts as justice, freedom, equality, 
democracy, brotherhood, truth within the Caribbean construct," he suggests 
that such a dialogue could lead to the creation of such a humanising and 
unifying tradition. He adds that in the process of the transference of 
cultural values from Europe to the Caribbean those values were
significantly distorted. It is hoped, therefore, that a Ghristian-MarxLst 
dialogue will serve to generate a peculiarly Caribbean ideology which is 
not only appropriate to the needs of "a new Caribbean" but which is also 
acceptable to an overwhelming majority of Christians and Socialists.
In the eyes of the Socialist, such an ideology must reflect the funda­
mental concern with the condition of the working-class who have been 
exploited under "colonial capitalism", while, in the eyes of the Christian, 
it must reflect the "functionally deeper religious experience" of the 
people which cannot be easily dismissed "as a mere ’opium of the people* .
It is obvious that Singh is thinking of a particular brand of
Socialism as well as a particular theological expression of the Christian
faith. On both sides there must be the desire for neither confrontation 
vanor accqfnodation, per se. but synthesis. It is only through a synthesis 
that Singh finds the ideology for development emerging. This synthesis 
will not emerge from a dialogue between "both the imported forms of 
conservative Christianity and vulgar Marxism". Both "conservative Chris­
tianity" and "vulgar Marxism" need to be transformed and thereby be made 
open to each other, i.e., to a creative synthesis of the two.^
In this synthesis whereby a "radical God" and a "revolutionary Marx" 
meet, the overriding concern is with the needs of Caribbean man.
According to Singh, this meeting will allow for a ^holistic approach to 
man. At the same time, neither Christianity nor Socialism will suffer 
distortion, if, ultimately, they are both concerned first and foremost 
with man in his particular historical situation. In the creative synthesis 
where the "radical God" is needed to give the people "greater hope, courage 
and spiritual strength," and the "revolutionary Marx" is needed "to 
provide them with a quicker and bigger supply of better food, housing 
and clothing," the two are mutually complementary. Man's basic needs
are separated into two realms existing simultaneously: the inner, spiritual
realm, and the external, material realm. Neither is dispensable in this 
life, but the Christian message is seen as transcending temporal exis­
tence, and as completing and fulfilling the partial and fragmentary 
redemption and happiness enjoyed in this world. Moreover, Singh points 
out, eschatological hope acts as a check against naive optimism in the 
possibilities for human liberation which Socialism offers, and this 
function does not necessarily qualify eschatological hope as "opium of 
the people".
Poverty cannot be eliminated in a hurry. Planned Socialism 
can definitely hasten the process of alleviation. But while 
this is going on from generation to gereration, people must 
live and die, fortified by the superior Christian hope of 
absolute redemption and eternal happiness. 4-5
In his discussion of the question of a Christian-Marxist dialogue 
in the Caribbean, Singh shows an acute awareness of the danger that, 
despite its present dominance, Christianity may disappear from the 
consciousness of the people. This danger stems from the fact that 
Christianity has allowed itself to be too closely and uncritically allied 
to exploitative capitalism. Thus the worker who has traditionally thought 
of the two as being synonymous with each other, in rejecting capitalism, 
comes to reject Christianity as "an opium of the people". It is therefore 
with the view of avoiding this danger that Singh opts for a sacramental 
theology. Such a choice is inevitable considering his argument for a 
synthesis between Christianity and Socialism. In this theology, man, 
in his daily life, comes to have a satisfying experience of God. Speaking 
in the context of Guyana, Singh argues that theology must use non­
religious terms in order that the Guyanese person might meet God in the 
material world which is outside of the formal structures of the Church 
and worship.
Singh does not, however, elaborate on v/hat he means by man meeting
God in the material world. Instead, he reminds us of the dilemma facing
the Church as she seeks to "theologize" in the Guyanese context.
Those Christian leaders who do not wish to see religion being 
swept out of human experience have two options: either reconcile
Christianity with Socialism and hope that the worker will meet 
God in his secular condition, or make people aware of the tran­
scendent presence in the midst of life and work in such a way
that the secular becomes the possibility of the sacramental
when faith opens their blind eyes. 4-6
He rejects the former which represents a reduction of Christianity to
the point where it becomes subservient to Socialism, and shows his obvious
preference for the latter when he notes a further positive function it
might play in correcting certain inherent excesses in Socialism. That is,
in addition to satisfying "certain social, psychological and spiritual
need", sacramental theology, which upholds the total dignity and freedom
of man, therefore
. . .  functions to remind over-zealous Socialists of what has 
been overshadowed by the over-emphasis on conformity, co-opera­
tion, togetherness, groupness: the view that the human person
ought to be independent, self-directing, autonomous, free —  
that is, an individual, a unit distinguished from the social 
mass rather than submerged in it. 47
There is no doubt that Singh wishes to preserve talk about God in 
Guyana and in the Caribbean as a whole. He is also concerned that a 
democratic form of Socialism be implemented for the development of the 
region. Both are necessary for and in the interests of the future of 
Caribbean man. Therefore he advocates a synthesis between a positive 
Christianity and a progressive Marxian-Socialism. The theology that 
emerges out of this debate for a synthesis is sacramental and, consequent­
ly, indigenous. Unfortunately, Singh fails to make clear how the 
sovereignty of the "radical God", who forms a synthesis with "a revolution­
ary Marx", is maintained. This failure is noticeable in his emphasis upon
the primacy of the condition and future of Garibbean man in the whole 
discussion on the question of a Ghristian-Marxist dialogue in the 
Garibbean. It is also precisely this emphasis upon Garibbean man that 
leads to the impairment of the concept of the sovereignty of God.
b.
to
Michael Campbell-Johnston, 3. J.: Christian Socialism
Campbell-Johnston, in appraising the critical question of how the 
Church in Guyana might respond to the growing challenge of Socialism, 
argues for a particular, synthetic Socialism: Christian Socialism. His
argument stems from his basic conviction that properly qualified, "the 
basic aspirations of socialism are profoundly Christian in their inspira­
tion". Consequently, he finds that "there is no reason why a Christian 
cannot be wholeheartedly a socialist," According to him, as long as 
Socialism promotes those values which are intrinsic to human development, 
then the Christian should not be afraid of wholeheartedly supporting it. 
This means that in the context of Guyana, the Church could freely join, 
and even play a leading role, in building a socialist society without 
losing its Christian identity. Campbell-Johnston explains what he means 
by a "Christian-socialist" society by quoting from Pope Paul VI1s letter 
on "The Development of Peoples":
!A world where every man, no matter what his race, religion or 
nationality, can live a fully human life, freed from servitude 
imposed on him by other men or by natural forces over which he
has not sufficient control; a world where freedom is not an
empty word and where the poor man Lazarus can sit down at the
same table with the rich man.1
Christian-Socialism, vis-a-vis any other form of socialism, as well
as the existing capitalism in the Caribbean, allows for the total 
development of man and not just for the satisfaction of physical and 
material needs, however important and basic they are. Thus Gampbell- 
Johnston criticizes Capitalism for its preoccupation with "private gain 
and profit", and Socialism for its preoccupation with "merely economic 
growth and material standards of living." Both systems do not ultimately 
focus on the "fully human life" but only on significant facets of it. 
Consequently, where socialism attempts to correct the inherent evil of 
capitalism it errs by reducing man to mere material and socio-economic 
needs and their satisfaction. It Is only in Christian-Socialism that 
"man does not live by bread alone" and, instead, "a person is valuable 
for what he is rather than for what he has." Moreover, under such a 
system, the liberating benefits of technology are maximized while the 
potential for human enslavement in technology is held in check. The 
primacy of man over structures and technology is unceasingly championed 
to ensure such a balance.
Reflecting on the divisions within Guyanese society ’which are made 
on the basis of race, colour, class, etc., Campbell-Johnston points out 
that "the fully human life" which Paul VI spoke about in his letter means 
that in Christian-Socialism all forms of discrimination are anathema.
He therefore argues that any programme for the redistribution of the 
wealth in society on a more equitable basis cannot be determined by 
either race, colour, class, or political affiliation, etc. Rather, it 
must be "based on the assumption that all men are equally entitled to it." 
Christian Socialism insists upon a radical equality among all members 
of society. It is in this vein that Campbell-Johnston soberly warns that 
"as long as race continues to be a major divisive element in our society, 
then the road to true socialism will be effectively blocked." The
situation is made worse when the issue of racism is overlooked or down­
played as it is in classical Marxism where society is divided only along 
class lines.
Campbell-Johnston acknowledges that Socialism as an ideology did 
not have its origins in Guyana or anywhere else in the Caribbean. It 
is a "foreign" import. Therefore, it is absolutely essential that 
Socialism emerge from below, i.e., become indigenized. In this way it 
will become true Socialism relevant to the needs of the Guyanese people. 
Rejecting that form of Socialism which is characterized by the "dictator­
ship of the proletariat" or by "the dictatorship of the Comrade Leader 
of the Peoples" because it destroys rather than builds up the individual 
and intensifies oppression rather than abolishes it, Campbell-Johnston 
maintains: "True socialism cannot be forced upon a people.nor can it
flourish in an atmosphere of mistrust, fear or hatred. It has to grow 
from below in a climate of brotherly sharing, mutual respect and love."
Furthermore, he points out that the Marxian assumption that the 
abolition of private property would lead to the eventual eradication of 
socio-economic exploitation and oppression has not been verified by 
historical experience. This is because state ownership of the means of 
production and state control of distribution of the wealth produced in 
any given society, which are achieved through a programme of nationaliza­
tion, are not synonomous with real and effective control of the productive 
and distributive processes by society. Under certain brands of Socialism, 
nationalization has led to various kinds of state exploitation and 
enslavement of the worker. In the light of this, Campbell-Johnston asserts 
that the "Christian socialist" must opt for a "mixed" economy of state 
control and private ownership. He explains that the "mixed" economy he 
has in mind will "both guarantee an individual's right to own and
posses the fruits of his labour and also ensure that his private property 
is not used to exploit someone else." He adds that Christians should 
diligently work to ensure that the socio-political climate that is engen­
dered in the society is characterized by a balance between individual 
and societal freedom. Moreover, in full awareness of the historical 
context in which he speaks, he emphasizes that his concept of freedom 
is very inclusive of certian basic freedoms: "Freedom of thought,
freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of education, 
freedom of travel, freedom of election.1
Finally, Christian-Socialism is where • . THE POOR MAN LAZARUS 
CAN SIT DOWN AT THE SAME TABLE WITH THE RICH MAN." This means that a 
concerted unrelenting effort must be made to gradually erode economic 
distinctions among the people in the society so that the gap between rich 
and poor might grow increasingly narrow. The purpose behind the struggle 
to bring about genuine fellowship between rich and poor is twofold: to
"guarantee the widest possible participation in decision making at all 
levels", and, contingent upon that, to provide an effective means of 
preventing a new elitist class from emerging and occupying "the positions 
of power and privilege vacated by the former oppressors."
c.
The Reverend C. S. Reid: Towards critical but friendly
IQcollaboration between Christians and Marxists.
Unlike Singh who calls for a synthesis of "a radical God" and "a 
revolutionary Marx", and Campbell-Johnston who advocates Christian- 
Socialism. Reid cautiously suggests that Christians and Marxists should
co-operate with each other in tackling basic problems such as the allevi­
ation of poverty. Where such co-operation occurs, both parties need to 
recognize and appreciate what binds them together —  concern for the poor 
and the oppressed, for example and not delude themselves into believing 
that there are no fundamental and irreconcilable differences between 
them. He points out that, for instance, the two parties will need to 
recognize that there is a basic theological disagreement between them: 
the Christian is inspired in his social concern by his faith in God, 
while the Marxist, who is an atheist, is motivated by his love for man. 
Thus, for there to be a significant and meaningful co-operation between 
them, both must be guided in their attitude and action by the tenet
"that' one of the precious rights which makes man human is the right to
50dissent from the next mani"
Furthermore, he criticizes the false assumption made by Marxists, 
in particular, "that to be a Christian is to become innocuous, or a 
non-oerson." At the same time, Reid reminds Christians that even where 
Marxists are seen as the "enemy", Christians are commanded to love and 
not despise them.
Christians who enter into collaboration with Marxists 
must know with whom they are dealing and keep their eyes wide 
open. Marxists are not men of God —  but they are men for 
whom Christ died. Therefore, they are not to be seen as 
Social lepers. And their agitation and action have brought
great gain to the peoples of the world. Even where they have
not gained power, the force of their existence and Criticism 
has created conditions for Change. The Psalmist says, ’He 
maketh the wrath of man to praise Him.’ 51
On the question of whether the Church in the Caribbean has been 
irrelevant to the needs of the people, Reid challenges Marxists to re­
examine the historical record of the Church from a peculiarly Caribbean 
perspective. That is, instead of being "textbook Marxists" who merely 
imitate Marx’s and Lenin's polemics against a reactionary Church,
Caribbean Marxists should show that they are progressive and open in the
light of the significant differences in the conditions in the Caribbean
5?vis-a-vis those in Marx’s Europe or Lenin’s Russia. '* Referring speci­
fically to Jamaica, Reid notes that Marxists need to honestly face the 
fact that the Church has played an invaluable role in education, in land 
reform programmes, and "in every working-class institution for the better­
ment of the masses". Thus, if Marxists are really concerned about the 
poor and the oppressed, they should not distort the Church’s past in order 
to gain political power. It .is obvious that such an act would not lead
to an indigenous Marxism;_ instead, Marxism will remain a "foreign" importa-
53tion and an exploitative imposition.
The "alienness" of Marxism in the region is accented further by the 
way in which "successful" poor people are condemned and ostracised by 
Marxists. "Successful" poor people are treated as if they form part of 
a large and widespread bourgeoisie. But, Reid tells us, "we are not 
cursed with too great a body of bourgeoisie in the Caribbean." It is the 
poor who are widespread not the "successful" poor. The latter have been 
helped by their poor parents "to be less poor", and, therefore, in the 
midst of their "success" they carry with them the burden of many obliga­
tions to others. In Reid’s view, Marxists (and others) need to see in 
the "success" of the poor "the symbols of the ability of man to rise out 
of the dust of poverty" rather than the grounds for abusing and 
ostracizing man.^
Reid sounds a strong note of the unique obedience of Christians to 
Jesus who is the transcendent Lord. According to him, it is Christianity 
and not Marxism that is more indigenous in the Caribbean. Furthermore, 
he insists that Caribbean people have had a unique history which does not 
fit Marx's or Lenin's analysis of society. On the crucial question
of "theologizing" in the Caribbean, he implies that it should be done in 
the light of the Church’s discipleship to her Lord who calls her to love 
the "enemy". Finally, "theologization" does not mean that the challenge 
of Marxism must be made of central importance. Dialogue with Marxism 
calls for significant co-operation on socio-economic issues and not for 
a creative synthesis, Singh’s or Campbell-Johnston’s.
d.
The Reverend Idris Hamid: Towards a theology of human
55development in the Caribbean.
The writings of Idris Hamid are seminal in the development of a
Caribbean theology. They contain one of the most radical critiques of
the dehumanizing influence of colonialism, slavery, indenture, and, even
of neo-colonialism, in the Caribbean. The significance of his critique
is made even greater by the fact that it is made by someone from the
"inside". Hamid writes as one who has inherited a "colonial mentality",
and who participates in a "sub-culture" which is what Caribbean culture
is to him. In his critique, he severely attacks the Church for having
allowed itself to be an accessory in the crime against Garibbean man."'
For example, he points out that when the historical role of the Church is
seen in the context of the centuries of colonial exploitation, it is
found that it has had a noticeably debilitating and domesticating influence.
Hamid writes: "when domestication meant a channeling of our energies
and instincts into creative ways, this was not altogether wrong, but this
57was not the kind of domestication that took place." The domestication 
that took place was equated with Christian conversion which was therefore
very often regarded not as a process "of quickening of the spirit but 
of accqjhodation.
This process of domestication was not surprising when, as Hamid
points out, it is remembered that in the theology of the Established
Churches God was very often presented as the One who subscribed to and
preserved the status quo. He was made captive to the politics, economics,
sociology, etc., of the ethos of colonialism. He was therefore foreign
to and even absent from the suffering and oppressed masses. He was made
a partial God who favoured the exploitative ruling class. The Church was
indeed an instrument of colonialism, albeit very often an unwary instrument.
This situation was made even worse by the Church’s failure to listen to
and heed the prophetic voices'which were present in some quarters in it.
Consequently, the end product of her labour is tfColonial Man" who is still 
59with us today.
Hamid explains that when the open and crude forms of violence of the 
earlier period of colonialism were replaced by equally dehumanizing but 
subtler and less blatant forms of violence, the Church, by and large, 
failed to assume its prophetic role. Colonialism is both blinding and 
debilitating. Thus, the vision of liberation which was born among the 
oppressed was transformed into "assimilation". Hamid states: "Now the
oppressed were worshipping at the same altars of the oppressors, striving 
to imitate their life styles, and accepting their values. Liberation 
now meant beating the oppressor at his own game —  even wanting to be an 
oppressor:"
The message of God’s partiality towards the powerful and dominant was
emphasised by the notable and "conspicuous absence of the Exodus event as
61a meaningful symbol among the main-line churches." Such a distortion 
of the Gospel of Liberation and freedom through omission, Hamid reminds
us, was consistent with the Church's capitulation to the ethos of colonial­
ism. He says, "the Churches that accepted the ethos of colonialism 
could not have used the biblical Exodus motif with its implication for 
deliverence without calling into question that ethos."
Despite the misrepresentations of the message of the Gospel in the
main-line Churches, God as Liberator was felt and experienced by the
subjugated people as being present among them. He was seen as the mighty
Deliverer who accepted the people as they were, and who was working for
their historical as well as spiritual freedom. Hamid argues that it was
paradoxical that God was more present here than in the Established
Churches and His partiality was more towards the poor and the oppressed
than towards the mighty and dominant in society.
In the innumerable and intangible ways in which he gives grace 
to men he gave to the oppressed and the down-trodden. He was 
present more in the canefields then in the cathedrals, more in 
the barracoons than in the basilicas, more in the 'protest't 
than in the 'obedience', more in their sorrows than in the 
sacraments of the Church. 63
The suffering masses experienced God in ways consonant with their real
historical experience. Such an experience, it should be noted, inevitably
contrasted with that prescribed by the theology of the ecclesiastical
establishment in the Caribbean.
When the Church preached many listened through the ears 
of their experience. God and Jesus Christ were understood in 
ways far different from that presented. This Christ is the one 
who sustained the people of the Caribbean when they were in the 
grip of civilized barbarity. He quickened their weary hearts 
to work for freedom, to hope in the midst of despair, to fight 
when the evil was overbearing. Thus God was working to under­
mine the establishment, not to stabilise it. And in so doing 
he worked against and in spite of the church at times. 64
By His actions on behalf of the poor, this God surprised the God of the
Establishment.
The problem with this argument is that it tends towards projecting
two Gods. In terms of a theology of the cross, what Hamid says about the 
God of the oppressed is apt and evangelical. However, he fails to make 
clear whether the "two" Gods are not in fact one God, or not. This may 
be done in terms of using the Law-Gospel dialectic by speaking of a 
theology of glory where the Gospel is transformed into Law to legitimate 
the ascendancy of the ruling class over the masses, and a theology of the 
cross where God is paradoxically present among the poor and the oppressed 
working for their salvation which includes, but is not limited to concrete, 
historical liberation. In the latter, God who is sovereign Lord, surprises 
both the ruling elite as well as the subjugated class by refusing to be 
tied to the status quo and by befriending the poor and powerless. However, 
He is one Lord and not two, and His presence among the dominated class 
was not given for revenge on the dominant class. He cannot be made the 
ideological weapon of the poor and still remain sovereign Lord whose 
nature it is to love. Hamid fails to overcome this danger as we shall see 
when we come to his discussion on how theology may be done in the Garibbean.
In the light of his argument that the suffering masses experienced
and responded to God in Christ in their own peculiar ways, he concludes
that "in a sense there has already been an indigenous theology at work 
65in the Garibbean," He points out further that this "radical" response
was a constant cause of disappointment among missionaries who were too
tied to the ethos of colonialism where faith was expected to produce
domestication and accqjnodation among the masses instead of the desire for
and orientation towards freedom in the cultural and structural forms in 
66society. The fragments of an indigenous theology which Hamid finds in 
the history of the Church in the Caribbean are crucial for his own 
description of a theology of human development in the Garibbean. In 
attempting to elaborate on this theology, it is instructive to ask:
If, as Hamid persuasively argues, the situation in the Caribbean today is 
one which is characterized by "an inherited foreign structure, with a 
laity whose vision is largely colonial, and with a theology which is
67the theology not only with blind spots but also colonial orientation",
how do we therefore attempt to do theology in the Caribbean?
In answer to this question, Hamid suggests that we need to begin
with a decolonialization of theology. This is a process which recognizes
that political independence of individual countries is not equivalent to
real and complete human emancipation. However, the former is a necessary
step towards the achievement of the latter. The Church needs to recognize
this in terms of its attitude toward society as a whole, as well as in
terms of its theological reflections and praxis as a distinctively
Christian community. As Hamid explains: "Decolonialization seeks to
come to terms with this violent history and the new surge of social
energy for deliverance. Decolonialization means the death of the Church
as it is now: or to say it more mildly —  it means radical transformation
68of the Church as it now is." It is therefore a negative and positive
process, both death and resurrection. Also, it is simultaneously a
movement away from one undesirable state of things and a movement toward
a desired state of things. That is, the Church "has to move from the
posture which produces a Colonial man and a system of values, theology and
so forth, which validates the Colonial ethic, to forging a vision of a
new man and providing the spiritual resources and theological underpinning
69for such a vision." Furthermore, Hamid insists that the theme of 
Freedom or Liberation must be made central to the talk about God in the 
Caribbean. This is the only way in which a truly historical Caribbean 
theology may be fashioned to meet the current challenges in society.
Only when Caribbean man himself engages in the process of theoiogization
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in which the primary focus is on alienated Caribbean man and his need for
genuine and wholistic liberation, Hamid reiterates, can we have a distinc-
70tive Caribbean theology of human development. Hamid's emphasis upon 
the conditioning influence on "all forms of human thinking", which the 
social context has, leads us to ask the question: What does he see as
the universal core of theology and how is it related to the social context? 
The answer to this question illustrates further Hamid* s emphasis upon the 
"redemptive" nature of the decolonialization of theology.
In summary, he explains that the universal core of theology is the 
"living WORD" concerning "the activity of God". Whereas theology is a 
human activity of thinking and acting —  of reflection and response —  
in a particular historical context, and, therefore, theologies are tem­
poral, the WORD is eternal. Furthermore, theology is usually done "within 
a community of faith and experience". Hamid perceptively notes, however, 
that the theology of any believing community, which, it is hoped, emanates 
from the prompting and guidance of the living V/ORD, "never becomes that 
living WORD". This distinction is crucial if theology, is to be distinc­
tively Christian. Thus the decolonialization of theology "should not 
be considered an attempt on the part of the Church or churchmen to keep
up with the current field, but rather as an attempt by the Church to come
71to an understanding of its mission in the new situation."
As to what exactly he means by the "living WORD", Hamid does not 
make clear. This lack is understandable in the light of the suggestive 
and tentative nature of his writings which remain very brief. Neverthe­
less, his challenge to speak about the activity of the liberating God in 
the context of the Caribbean remains crucial, an aspect which the Church 
should not minimise or fail to recognize outright in her struggle to be 
faithful to her Lord. The significance of this fact is heightened when
it is recognised that, as Hamid argues, "the church is not in the world
to service the world and keep it up. Rather the church, drawing its
inspiration and stimulus from the future which God promises, challenges
72this world and calls into question the present world." Thus, instead 
of developing a definitive understanding of the concept of the "living 
WORD", Hamid points us in the direction of eschatology, and to a much 
lesser extent, in the direction of Christology as the possible routes 
which Caribbean theology must begin exploring in great depth. Here escha­
tology, and Ghristology, viewed from a soteriological standpoint, are
placed in the service of ecclesiology which is Hamid1s main concern. In*
fairness to him, it should be noted that despite the primacy of ecclesi­
ology in his theology, he does not indicate a separation between any of 
the major doctrines of the Church: they are all intertwined. He finds
the eschatological dimension of the Christian faith especially applicable 
to the Garibbean situation.
The future we abandon is the fruitless and futile futuristic 
hope. We now see the future as closer —  as tomorrow. So 
close that it impinges on the present and draws it forward. It 
does not lead to resignation but to action. He calls us to 
create a new vision of the future. This means the weight of the 
past injustices and the present dilemma is not left fatalisti­
cally for history to correct itself but that the Christian 
Gommunity will labour toward the future. 73
He envisages a revolutionary participation of Christians in the 
struggle for a more just and human world. In this struggle the traditional 
divisions between faith and works, individual and communal freedom, 
material and spiritual, profane and the sacred, body and spirit, etc., 
will be dispensed with in preference for a more liberating unity which is 
closer to the truth of the "living WORD". Once again the fundamental 
question between the world and the Kingdom of God arises. This will be 
taken up in our discussion of Luther1s doctrine of the Two Kingdoms.
According to Hamid, in the context of the Caribbean, a new approach to 
the Incarnation must be guided by the central concern by destroying the 
false dichotomy between body and spirit, etc. What he fails to recognize 
is that even modern eschatological theology suffers from a distorting 
dichotomy: between the Absolute Future which is coming and is already 
proleptically present, and the past which is being transformed by the 
radical inbreaking of the Absolute Future* As Langdon Gilkey poignantly 
states:
The qualitative opposition between sin and grace is more 
fundamental in the Christian interpretaion of history than is 
the opposition between unliberated and liberated, oppressed and 
oppressors, and a fortiori more fundamental than the temporal 
opposition between past and future within history. 74-
This criticism is most appropriate in view of Hamid’s undue optimism 
concerning the imminence of the liberated future which is as close "as 
tomorrow". There is "a qualitative opposition between sin and grace" 
which still remains after, and inspite of the attainment of human libera­
tion. Thus talk of two Kingdoms may not be anachronistic in the Caribbean, 
and in the world as a whole, today.
In the light of his emphasis upon an indigenous Caribbean theology 
which abolishes the false dichotomy between faith and works, theory and 
praxis, Hamid boldly claims that the Church must even "take the risk of 
preaching a theology of worksi" By so doing, the Church will make her 
theology relevant to the material needs of the Caribbean people. As 
Hamid points out, "Once we sweated in labour of non-creative activity; in 
the era of independence we are faced with prospects of inactivity. From 
mal-employment to unemployment1" A theology of works is therefore 
necessary to the process of decolonization of theology. Through such a 
theology, the Church will be able to show that she is seriously concerned 
about the question of "human creativity within the purpose of God and
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75the fact of the destructiveness of that gift in our history.” Thus, 
whereas during slavery and colonialism, work* was an enslaving activity, 
now, in the situation of political independence and post-colonialism, it 
must become a creative and liberating activity which is inseperable from 
the faith and worship of the believing community. Hamid admits that this 
synthesis does already exist ”in the best of Christian theological under­
standing.” What he is therefore calling for "is not the mere setting up 
of new attitudes to work," but the redemption of "work itself in the
76community; involving such things as for whom and to what end work is used.”
At this point, it is worthwhile to ask: How does Hamid’s theology
of human development compare with the theology of the cross? Like the 
Theology of Liberation and Moltmann’s Political Theology, his theology 
points to an overriding concern with praxis-theoria and the human future. 
Furthermore, he shares an affinity with Liberation Theology in his 
argument that the process of theologization involves taking alienated 
man —  from the Caribbean —  and his social context seriously, i.e., to 
the exlent that the starting point of theology is alienated man himself. 
Concern with God is therefore primarily soteriological. But the direction 
in which his understanding of soteriology moves shows that he is particu­
larly interested in soteriology as human liberation and development.
Talk about God "for man” has as its primary objective the humanization 
of man. Thus, in Hamid’s theology immanence eclipses transcendence, and 
theology is reduced to an ideology of liberation. Moreover, in his 
attempt to theologize, in the Caribbean, in a responsible and relevant way, 
Hamid proceeds to minimize the themes of sola gratia and sola fides.
Finally, the fundamental Christological centre of evangelical theology, 
that God meets us in Christ even before we ever begin our militant praxis, 
is described in such a way that the God of the oppressed is not quite
the God of the oppressor. This contradicts the message of the Church 
that when God reveals Himself in the paradox of the cross of Christ, He 
does so for all people, both rich and poor, powerful and powerless; and, 
not only are the latter surprised to find He is on their side, but so 
are the former, as well. But God is also for the powerful. Judgement
grace are for them as well as the poor and the oppressed. Furthermore, 
the proclamation of the message of the presence of God in Christ who 
liberates all of creation from sin and the powers of evil is a call to 
life under the cross where real and ultimate, immanent and transcendent, 
hope is found. Therefore the call to liberating work is always a call to 
the response of grace, not a call to achieve merit in place of or through 
the aid of grace. It is a call to hope in God in the shadow of the cross,
instead of hoping in the results of our human efforts to make God's
tomorrow arrive today —  that is impossible to doI Thus an indigenous 
Caribbean theology must begin with the cross of Christ for it is only 
there that we find Cross and Resurrection are held together in a dialecti­
cal unity. In short, theologization in the Caribbean must lead to the 
theology of the cross, where the identity and relevance of the Christian 
faith form an intrinsic unity, if it is to remain firmly rooted in the
decisive and definitive paradoxical revelation of God in Christ for the
salvation of man and the whole cosmos.
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C.
Towards a theology of Alienation and Reconciliation 
in the Caribbean.
One of the ways in which the Church may respond, creatively and 
meaningfully, to the challenge to articulate an indigenous theology of 
the cross in the Caribbean is by exploring the theme of a theology of 
alienation and reconciliation. This theme naturally suggests itself in 
view of the history of alienation in Caribbean society. Furthermore, it 
provides a unifying centre for an evaluation of Marx's Weltanschauung, 
the theology of the cross, and the task of theologization in the Caribbean.
It has been noted already that Marx's primary preoccupation was with 
alienated man and the historical process by which man may transcend his 
alienation. This concern with man finds an affinity with the interest in 
man displayed by the theology of the cross. In the latter, it was 
emphasized, all talk about God, who reveals Himself through Christ, was 
simultaneously talk about man since the gracious and loving God, whom 
man comes to know in faith, through and in Christ, has revealed Himself 
in this way for the sake of man. Thus, in the theology of the cross, we 
speak of the God "for man". This talk about God "for man" is, however, 
diametrically opposed to Marx's atheistic and anthropocentric world-view, 
in which God is a priori and methodologically dismissed from any talk 
about the humanization of man. According to Marx, God enslaves, not 
liberates man. In spite of this qualitative difference, however, Marx's 
emphasis upon man's liberation of himself and society through praxis- 
theoria has been significantly influential in many modern "theologies", 
not least the Theology of Liberation. Though his influence in the 
theologization process in the Caribbean is still in its nascent stage,
nevertheless, his call for historical liberation from ail forms of socio­
economic alienation —  the root of all alienation —  provides a challenge 
to the future, not only of Garibbean man, but of the Christian faith 
itself. Concern for the welfare of man and the proclamation of the Gospel 
go together —  in the form of relevance and identity —  but the two 
must not be equated and the distinction between them dissolved.
In the face of the pressing need for the liberation of Caribbean man 
from the enslaving legacy of colonialism, there is the constant danger 
that the Church may reduce the message of the Gospel to the task of ending 
alienation. Such a reduction may result not only from the more obvious 
and blatant accommodation of the Gospel to the Marxian ideals, but also, 
and, more significantly, from the attempt at forming a synthesis between 
the Gospel and Marx's philosophy for the sake of man. This point brings 
us to the crucial question: How do we define the "nature" of man? Are
sin and alienation the same phenomenon?
In Marx's view, man does not have a fixed "essence" but one that is 
constantly changing in relation to the mode and the relations of production. 
To posit an eternal and static "essence" is to distort and dehumanize man 
and keep him in perpetual bondage, Marx therefore rejects any concept 
of "original" sin even as he rejects the Christian (and religious) belief 
in the existence of God. He argues that the only radical criticism of 
man is that which restores man to his rightful place, i.e., at the centre 
of all historical reality. Since 3uch radical criticism ends with the 
call for the abolition of alienation, Marx's anthropological reductionisra 
goes beyond Feuerbach's by calling for the revolutionary transformation 
of the socio-economic base of society.
When Marx's concept of alienation is made the functional centre of 
any theological approach to man, it is very difficult for the Church
to avoid the danger ox ultimately contributing to the further enslavement 
of man by reducing him to a creature of real, material needs which can 
and will be historically satisfied. This danger occurs even when we talk 
about the praxis of the liberating God of love. In fact, when God is 
brought into the picture, it seems that He is made the instrument for 
humanization, manipulated and manipulable by man. All forms of "triuraphal- 
istic" praxis-theoria must be judged by the cross of Christ: they do not
have their own self-legitimating principle. Where they seem to do, the 
sovereignty of God is minimized.
Moreover, an indigenous theology of the cross needs to emphasize, 
again and again, that the miracle of God's love is that He loves the poor, 
outcast and downtrodden whose lives can only be transformed through such 
a miracle. But God also extends His love to those who are classified as 
exploiters and oppressors. Only through the miracle of His love can they, 
too, be saved from idolatry and sin. If God's love is partial towards 
the poor and the oppressed, then His love is not universal and fully gra­
cious. When today's oppressed becomes tomorrow's oppressors, can it be 
said that the love of God intends that? In the New Testament, the miracle 
of Jesus' love for the poor is not that He loves them instead of the 
Scribes and the Pharisees. Rather, it is that He loves those who belong 
to the Establishment, but also those who are "disestablished1' by the 
Establishment,
Now, in contrast to the radical socio-economic immanent!sm found in 
Marx, which is significantly present in Liberation Theology, evangelical 
Christian theology proclaims the Gospel of reconciliation through Christ.
It declares that the crucified and living God is both present in the 
world and is also coming as Absolute Future to transcend and heal all 
brokenness, alienation and sin. Hope based upon the promises of the
God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob . . . and of Jesus Christ, sees the presence
of the Kingdom of God in history as a gift; and, it sees it coming from
beyond history. There is therefore a tension between "in history" and
77"beyond history", between the "already" and the "not yet".
This talk about the prolepsis of the Kingdom of God seemingly obscures 
alienated man and his present historical condition • However, this obscur­
ity is only apparent and not real in the theology of the cross. As we 
have repeatedly stated above, man1s total alienation is more fundamental 
and pervasive than his alienation from the socio-economic and political 
conditions of life. According to evangelical Christian theology, man is 
basically alienated from God, and, therefore, man's past, present and 
future must be seen from the perspective of his relation to God from whom 
he is separated. In existentialist terms, man's separation from God is 
expressed in his feeling of separation from himself and from others.
The end of socio-economic alienation, through human effort, with or without 
the help of the praxis of God, which dissolves man's separation from 
others, does not constitute total humanization and reconciliation of man: 
man still remains a sinner separated from God. This fact does not mean. 
that the Church must not engage in the struggle for the liberation of man. 
On the contrary, it is a call to such a struggle but with the recognition 
of the fundamental separation between man and God which man cannot bridge 
or heal. Only God can do that. This separation must not be confused 
with the creatureliness of man and the "Greatorhood" of God. Certainly, 
this duality constitutes a qualitative difference between man and God.
But man is separated from God because of his sin and not because of his 
finitude as a creature. To be a creature is not dehumanizing; to strive 
to be God is I
Caribbean man, like all people, is alienated from God. This fact
needs to be clearly stated in any attempt at indigenizing theology even 
as it is being stated that Caribbean man is a peculiar "creature" because 
of his history, etc. In true egalitarian style, he, too, stands before 
God as a sinner. He stands alongside his colonial and neo-colonial 
exploiters and oppressors, as they (oppressed and oppressor) are both 
confronted by the cross of the crucified and risen Jesus Christ. Before 
God, both stand as beggars —  with open hands —  displaying no merit or 
grounds for His favour. That God should choose that His Son, the exalted 
Lord, should be served in the "least of the brethxam" is His prerogative, 
not man's. His revelation is always paradoxical for it is never devoid 
of mystery. In Luther's terms, revelation is always done in "hiddenness".
By now, it should be clear that we wish to have a more inclusive 
concept of alienation than that posited by Marx. Recognizing the indis­
pensable need to include the Marxian sociological account of alienation, 
we insist that sin embraces the individual, psychological, ontological and 
cosmic dimensions of alienation. In short, it takes us back to the 
primary alienation from God. Admittedly, such a concept does suffer from 
the inadequacy of presenting the human condition in static, not dynamic 
terms. However, in spite of its inadequacy, it still serves as a check 
on any fanatical and overly-enthusiastic expectation that the Kingdom of 
God, whether in its religious or in its secular form, will be achieved 
through human activity. This check still stands even when it is argued 
that man is seen acting in cooperation with God as a co-creator. But its 
usefulness is not only functional, but also evangelical, i.e., it is 
derived from the theology of the cross which we have advocated in response 
to Marx’s Weltanschauung.
Our argument for the more inclusive concept of "sin" vis-a-vis the 
concept of alienation, leads us to a brief consideration of the concept
of "Original Sin". If the end of socio-economic and political alienation 
will not mean the total "humanization" of man, then, it is argued, the 
human condition transcends such alienation; alienation is a primary but 
partial description of the human condition. On the question of "Original 
Sin", Article II of the "Augsburg Confession" reads thus:
It is also taught among us that since the fall of Adam 
all men who are born according to the course of nature are 
conceived and born in sin. That is, all men are full of evil 
lust and inclinations from their mother* s wombs and are unable 
by nature to have true fear of God and true faith in God. 
Moreover, this inborn sickness and hereditary sin is truly sin 
and condemns to the eternal wrath of God all those who are not 
' born again through Baptism and the Holy Spirit.
Rejected in this connection are the Pelagians and others 
who deny that original sin is sin, for they hold that natural 
man is made righteous by his own powers, thus disparaging the 
sufferings and merit of Christ. 73
Caribbean theology must therefore examine the meaning of "Original 
Sin" as it seeks to work on behalf of man, in the name of Christ. Can 
theology remain Christian, Biblical and Confessional by obscuring or 
removing outright the concept of "Original Sin" from its vocabulary?
Can it continue to talk of the decisive and definitive act of God in 
Jesus Christ for the salvation of the world while it articulates a 
"soteriology" based upon divine-human cooperation in the world to tran­
scend sin as alienation? These are difficult but crucial questions 
which must be faced squarely if the Church's confession of, and life in 
the faith is to be evangelical and simultaneously relevant to the needs 
of man. As we have already noted this combination forms a dialectic.
At best, to man, it remains ambiguous. In this perspective, faith in God 
through Christ plays a decisive role in distinguishing between ambiguity 
and paradox, Law and ideology, and Gospel. Once again, we turn to the 
Augsburg Confession and note, in Article IV on "Justification":
It is also taught among us that we cannot obtain forgiveness 
of sin and righteousness before God by our own merits, works,
or satisfactions, but that we receive forgiveness of sin and 
become righteous before God by grape, for Christ's sake, through 
faith, when we believe that Christ suffered for us and that for 
his sake our sin is forgiven and righteousness and eternal life 
are given to us. For God will regard and reckon this faith as 
righteousness, as Paul says in Romans 3: 21-26 and 4: 5. 79
The question to be asked here is: Can such "justifying" faith become
active in love for the neighbour at the individual and societal —  spiri­
tual and structural —  levels of human existence to the extent that such 
an expression of the faith is not seen as being tied to the status quo
in society? Can it do so by talking about Jesus as the "Liberating One",
BOthe One whose name means "Freedom", without reading the conditions of 
alienated (Caribbean) man back into the life, death and resurrection of 
Jesus so that it is the condition of man and his society that both 
explicates and shapes, as well as provides the content of the message of 
hope and salvation? The Confessions of the Church, used as an ongoing 
historical aid to the interpretation of Scripture, can certainly serve 
to recall the Church from any dehumanizing distortions.
This brings us to the central thesis of our argument: Ghristology
is the key to doing theology in the Caribbean., and elsewhere. Any talk 
about the power and presence of God in the midst of Caribbean man's 
predicament must be Christological, embracing the cosmic as well as 
individual dimensions of God's work of reconciliation through Christ. 
Reflecting on the need for the talk about cosmic reconciliation in the 
face of widespread alienation and sin in the world, John Macquarrie 
writes:
As I see the situation, the problem for religious commun­
ities is to find the best means (which will no doubt vary from 
one area to another) of bringing their vision of a cosmic over­
coming of alienation to bear on the alienation of contemporary 
societies. 81
In specifically Christian terms, this means that the emphasis must be
placed on God's reconciling work in Christ. Writing in this vein,
WoIfhart Pannenberg argues that the "the unity of one history" that
the
has been effected through/event of Christ embraces "antiquity, modern
8?times, and their future." ~ This means that the history of Caribbean 
man is not left isolated and alienated, without the hope of participating 
in Christ's cosmic redemption. The Christian tradition is a "unifying 
bond" which keeps antiquity, modern times and their future from falling 
apart. This is a message of hope to Caribbean man who does not need to 
reject his present because of its alienated and alienating antecedent; 
but, in critical awareness of his past, he can, in the light of the 
vision of the future transcendent reconciliation, work creatively to 
proclaim hope in the world and beyond it. His hope is not rooted in a 
future separated from the present, but in a future that is already present 
in the cross of Christ. Resurrection hope and liberation in and through, 
and, ultimately from suffering are seen through the "eyes" of faith in 
the cross of the gracious God who is Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Let us 
now look more closely at Pannenberg's comments about man's nature and 
"the unity of one history".
He argues that man, as creature, is inherently dependent upon God.
Man is created to be in a relationship of trust in God, not in a relation­
ship of control of his own future. Thus, contrary to Marx's concept of 
man as his own creator, Pannenberg points out:
Man always perceives himself as dependent on something before 
which he stands: beyond the world on God and within the world
itself on the material basis for all technological development. 
He is dependent on the social and intellectual traditions out 
of which he lives, even where he turns against them. He is 
dependent on what happens to him from day to day and from hour 
to hour without his cooperation. He is dependent on the men who 
are with him, and upon everything that is given to him through 
them. In all that and beyond that he is dependent on God. 
(Emphasis mine.) 83
Furthermore, man1s essence is not limited to the socio-economic conditions
in society, for, "Just as exchange and the division of labour do not
necessarily lead to the loss of man’s essence, so the pressure of serving
mammon is not a fateful power. This is a direct refutation of the
Marxian thesis that man is alienated through the division of labour and
by seeking the monetary rewards of his labour, instead of finding his
fulfilment in the enjoyment of what he has produced. Pannenberg does
admit, however, that "money frequently becomes an idol to which a person
sacrifices everything else." But he refuses to accept the definition of
human nature in terms of the existence of money, for example. Money, he
insists, is merely a functionary and an expression of the more pervasive
evil: greed. He explains that
greed is always present first as the dominating impulse. It 
is not man1s alienation through money which brings to power 
the sense of possession, as Marx thought. It is rather the 
latter which sets the former process in motion. Only where greed 
for money already completely fills a man can money attain such 
a power over him that everything else, things as well as men, 
has significance only in relation to money. Only where man has 
become entirely enslaved to covetousness does the automation 
of the economic development of capitalism, which Marx described 
so impressively, take place. 85
At its very root, such covetousness is a consequence of man’s separation
from God. Therefore, while it is accepted that economic and political
systems need to be radically transformed —  they have demonically
enslaved man and distorted his humanity —  in order that they may conduce
to man's enjoyment of a more humane existence, it is to be recognized,
at the same time, that this separation through rebellion can only be
overcome through the gracious act of God. According to Pannenberg, man's
control over the world must be distinguished, though not separated, from
his relationship of trust in God —  control is derived from trust. "Only
faith in the infinite God of the Bible, who is beyond everything finite,
has given the world of finite things completely into man's control.1’
In other words, "the power to control the world has its origin not in
man himself bat in trust in the infinite God, through which man soars
86out beyond the limits of his finitnde." Pannenberg concludes that 
"where control over the world becomes its ora end, the perversion has 
already taken place." (Emphasis mine.) Consequently, "life becomes 
absorbed in procuring the means of life; life is no longer received as
ona gift. 1 (Emphasis mine.)
Finally, we turn to Pannenberg’s description of the "unity of history".
He paints a picture of the Biblical hope in the transcendence of all
separation, alienation and sin. Unlike the Marxian vision of an unalienated
future in history created by man alone, his is a vision of "the future
of God". This future is centred in and promised through Christ. "Through
Jesus men have a future of salvation with God beyond all earthly suffering,
which was concentrated in Jesus’ cross." Participating in this future
through faith, the Christian loves Jesus for the sake of his neighbour.
As Pannenberg says: "Such a person can now open a future for other men
in a similar way, through the loving devotion that corresponds to what
88he himself has already experienced from God."
Moreover, the poi^er of this message of hope for man (including Carib­
bean ’man) is not exhausted by human suffering. Aware of the problem of 
theodicy that arises in the face of so much inexplicable and demonic 
suffering in the world, Pannenberg, nevertheless maintains that in the 
unity of history that is rooted in the God of Israel, who uniquely revealed 
Himself in Jesus of Nazareth, "man’s destiny attains its unified configu­
ration, which incorporates each individual man with his uniqueness and
89his particular path." Reconciliation is given through the death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ. In the unity of the destiny of all men,
the individuality, the personhood of each unique individual, is not
destroyed nor damaged, but fulfilled and recreated. In Pannenberg's view,
the "unity of history as it is established in Jesus1 fate makes it
possible for each individual to attain the wholeness of his own life by
90knowing that he, together with all men, is related to that center."
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the Church in the Caribbean would find the critical need for a 
theology of alienation and reconciliation as she seeks to fulfill her 
mission in society. Such a theology, we have tried to point out, must 
deal with the historical experience of alienation of Caribbean man, but, 
it must also go beyond that to deal with the question of sin as separation 
from God. In meeting this challenge, the church will need to explicate 
the individual and cosmic dimensions of the- Incarnation. It was with 
this aim in mind that we briefly examined Pannenberg’s concept of univer­
sal history.
Now, the question of man’s ereaturely control over the finite things 
of the world leads us back to the concept of the "Two Kingdoms". We 
will therefore turn our attention below to a discussion and a critical 
appraisal of Luther’s doctrine of the Two Kingdoms. This undertaking will 
be done in the recognition of the need to place man’s activity in its 
proper perspective vis-a-vis God’s work of redemption and reconciliation 
through Christ. In the Caribbean, the Church is confronted with the task 
of finding a way of participating meaningfully in the building up of the 
future, liberated Garibbean man and his society. Is this a task that is 
firmly planted within the kingdom of the world? How might the Church 
theologize on this issue in order that she may faithfully proclaim the 
Gospel and administer the Sacraments which are her primary tasks? These 
and other pertinent questions are strategically placed before us as we
prodeed with our discussion of the doctrine of the Two Kingdoms.
D.
91Luther’s doctrine of the Two Kingdoms.
We have already noted that when Harx wrote, "The philosophers have 
interpreted the world in various ways; the point however is to change it," 
he issued a critical challenge not only to philosophy but also to theology. 
This challenge, we argued, surrounds the task of describing the world as 
it is, and, more particularly, of enunciating and implementing a compre­
hensive strategy for the radical transformation of the world. To simply 
talk about the state of the world without engaging in revolutionary praxis 
is to indulge in the process of ideologization and, in doing so, to 
provide further legitimation for the status quo. Theory which does not 
result in liberating praxis may and can only bring partial freedom which, 
according to Marx, will be eventually overshadowed by the actual intensi­
fication of alienation.
Thus, in order to achieve the historical transcendence of alienation, 
there must, and will be, a creative synthesis between theory (theoria) and 
praxis among the proletariat, the most dehumanized class in society. Out 
of this synthesis, man will be able to create real human history and 
genuine and dynamic, human "nature". In Marx’s ethics, man is the measure 
of himself; he is answerable to himself alone. This means that there is 
no transcendent Creator, who is the ground and source of man’s life and 
creative capacities, to whom he is answerable. The truth about man is 
that he is in fact his own and only creator. According to Marx’s concept 
of man, man's response to his needs, his accountability to himself,
is not a response to grace, but of human necessity. In theological terms, 
this means that man creates his own merits, his own "righteousness", 
through human effort in order, to "justify" himself in the community of 
production. Therefore, he does not depend upon the graciousness of God 
or any other transcendent being in his quest for authentic, unalienated 
existence.
In the theology of the cross, however, we speak about man as a 
creature whose freedom is bound up with his response of faith to the 
God whom man experiences as gracious and loving in the crucified and 
risen Lord, Jesus Christ. As a creature, man is dependent upon God, 
and in his sin, he is incapable of transforming his condition of rebel­
lion against God. Only God can heal this broken relationship that is 
the result of man's active rebellion against Him. Thus, in doing so, 
through His gracious act of suffering the death of His Son for the sake 
of man, God reaffirmed man1s condition before Him as a creature of response* 
Before God the Creator and Redeemer, man is always in the situation in 
which he may respond in faith or "unfaith" to the grace of God. Acceptance 
or rejection of the grace of God does not abolish the fundamental condi­
tion in which man is placed, that of creature, vis-a-vis God. Moreover, 
whatever man's response may be, God, who meets man in the contrariness 
of cross and suffering, is also sovereign Lord. It must be said, however, 
that it is only to those who respond in faith in Christ that Jesus is 
de facto Lord; and, to those whose response is rejection Jesus is de .iure 
Lord, i.e., Jesus’ Lordship remains hidden.
The response of faith is not without implications for the Christian 
in society. Indeed, such "saving" faith is characterized by love for 
the neighbour. Thetwo — faith in God through Christ and love of the neigh­
bour —  are inextricably bound together; they form the dialectic of
Christian existence in the world. Properly experienced in the life of 
the Church, this dialectic calls for neither an ethic of quietism and of 
withdrawal from the world through a total concentration on the develop­
ment of an exclusively inward piety which has no direct bearing on the
in
life of the Christian/society, nor a praxis of justification by concen­
trating on the transformation of the world into the Kingdom of God or of 
Christ (or its closest approximation), to the extent that one is justified 
before God by such praxis . In the former, there is a dichotomy between 
"other worldly" and "this worldly" piety so that the world is seen to be 
in the hands of the evil powers, and God is absent from it. In the latter 
this dichotomy or dualism is replaced by an equally distorting monism in 
which the Kingdom of the world is, fully and totally, the only Kingdom 
of God, In an evangelical Christian theology, both dualism and monism 
are seen as distortions of the Gospel. Thus it insists upon maintaining 
the dialectic of faith and love, the transcendent and the immanent, as 
the authentic expression of the encounter between God and man in the 
world.
Our argument here therefore leads us to a critical examination of 
Luther1s doctrine of the Two Kingdoms where he explicates the dialectic 
of Christian existence in the world we have just been describing. Luther1 
understanding of the Two Kingdoms is viewed frctfn the perspective of his 
theology of the cross. Thus his ethics of love is seen as arising out 
of his doctrine of justification. Acts of love which the Christian per­
forms, are directed towards the neighbour and not towards God who does not 
need them for Himself. Yet, in acting on behalf of the neighbour, the 
Christian is simultaneously exercising his faith in God "in terms of 
obedience, and of thanks and praise to God." Moreover, at the same 
; time, the Christian is responding in the freedom of the Gospel since he
no longer needs to worry about his own salvation. Christian freedom that
is rooted in our justification by God, through faith in Christ, is made
concrete in the form of care for the neighbour and him/her alone. As
Paul Althaus explains:
The man who does something to gain his own salvation really 
cares only for himself, tkrwever, God has already provided for 
my needs —  therefore I do not need to be concerned about 
myself. Indeed, God gives me what I need in advance when I, 
through faith, receive his grace and favor. Beyond that, nothing 
more is needed. 93
Luther’s doctrine of the Two Kingdoms is therefore practical and 
experiential, not theoretical and speculative. It is concerned with the 
activity of God in the life of the believer, and, also, in the life of 
the unbeliever, for both are His creatures. Let us now look more closely
at some of the main features of this doctrine.
9 /From his study of scripture,' Luther concluded that, from the
perspective of faith, God exercises a twofold rule over and in the world.
There is a spiritual rule and a secular rule, corresponding to a spiritual
kingdom and a secular kingdom, respectively. He writes:
o . • we must divide the children of Adam and all mankind into 
two classes, the first belonging to the kingdom of God, the 
second to the kingdom of the world. Those who belong to the 
kingdom of God are all the true believers who are in Christ and 
'under Christ, for Christ is King and Lord in the kingdom of God 
as Psalm 2 (: 6) and all of Scripture says. 95
It should be noted that though it is through the Church, which proclaims
the Word and administers the Sacrament, that people are called to faith
in Christ —  by the power of the Holy Spirit —  this does not mean that
the Church is equated in Luther’s thought with the Kingdom of God. Sven
to the "eyes of faith" the Kingdom of God is only partially revealed, for
Christian existence is always under the paradox of cross and suffering.
This necessary distinction between the Church and the Kingdom of God is
and evangelical critique of any ecclesiastical triumphalistic
pretensions and tendencies. We shall return to this point below.
In his assertion that the two classes o f humanity stand before God 
in different relationships, Luther uses fairly clear language. He 
explains that, whereas those in the Kingdom of God are "under Christ", 
those in the Kingdom of the world "are under the law." Here we see his 
use of the Law-Gospel dialectic to describe the nature of man’s relation­
ship to God. He claims that if there were Christians alone in the world 
then there would be no need for the restraining influence of the lav;.
In saying, "There are few true believers, and still fewer who live a 
Christian life, who do not resist evil and indeed themselves do no evil," 
Luther is suggesting that the believer who lives out the freedom of the 
Gospel is less tempted by evil than the unbeliever. Therefore, because 
there are both Christians and non-Christians in the world, God has had 
to make provisions to restrain those who would be given to the practice 
of evil, i.e., the unbelievers.
For this reason God has provided for them a different government 
beyond the Christian estate and kingdom of God. He has sub­
jected them to the sword so that, even though they would like 
to, they are unable to practice their wickedness, and if they 
do practice it they cannot do so without fear or with success 
and impunity. 96
We notice here that Luther uses the concept of "government" as well 
as the concept of "kingdom" in his description of God’s way of dealing 
with His Creation. The two are related to each other: God's rule in His
two kingdoms is exercised through two governments which He has set up.
In the Kingdom of God we have the spiritual government, and in the King­
dom of the world we have the secular government. Whereas the term "king­
dom" may suggest withdrawal (of God), the term "government" suggests a 
more dynamic and active presence of God in the spiritual and secular 
realms. According to Heinrich Bornkamm, this means that "both duality
and unity thus seemed to be preserved." Commenting on the fact that
God has established these two governments, Luther notes:
. . • God has ordained two governments: the spiritual, by
which the Holy Spirit produces Ghristians and righteous people
under Christ; and the temporal, which restrains the un-Chris- 
tian and wicked so that —  no thanks to them —  they are obliged 
to keep still and to maintain an outward peace* 93
We return once again to the use of the Law-Gospel dialectic in God* s 
twofold rule in the "world" —  by the Law in the secular government and 
by the Gospel in the spiritual government. Again, it should be emphasized 
that the relationship between political government and God's secular 
government, as well as the relationship between the Church and God's 
spiritual government is a dialectical, not a natural and unambiguous one. 
Furthermore, the terms "kingdom" and "government" must not be separated 
from each other nor seen in opposition to each other. Rather, as Born- 
kamm argues, both their duality and their dialectical unity must be pre­
served in order that they may "indicate the two inseparably intertwined 
aspects of the whole, the realm of lordship ('kingdom1) and the mode of
lordship ('government'), and [that} they may be used to distinguish these 
99aspects." The originality in Luther's thought, Bornkamm adds, lies 
precisely in the fact that he combines both perspectives of two kingdoms 
and two governments which means that, on the one hand, there is "the 
ruthless separation of the world and the kingdom of Christ as well as,
on the other hand, the governance of both of them by the will of God
according to the modes of his love." ^
In distinguishing both kingdoms and governments from each other, the
Christian must remember, at the same time, that they are both necessary. 
Only Christ's government makes people righteous. Thus the temporal 
government must not be allowed to usurp the place of Christ's government. 
Noting the indispensable nature of Christ's government which extends
97
beyond history into eternity, Luther argues that where Christ* s kingdom
is abolished or becomes absorbed by and is therefore indistinguishable
from the temporal government and only the latter "or law alone exists",
"there sheer hypocrisy is inevitable, even though the commandment be 
101God's very own." In this case we will have a theology of glory, not
a theology of the cross. By the same token, Luther adds,
where the spiritual government alone prevails over, land and 
people, there wickedness is given free rein and the door is 
open for all manner of rascality, for the world as a whole 
cannot receive or comprehend it. 102
Notice that here Luther does not speak about the doctrine of justification
and its distortion. According to his understanding of the function of the
spiritual government, the absence of this form of rule will not mean that
God's righteousness, which justifies the sinner, will become impaired.
Instead, its absence will result in libertinism and its accompanying
wickedness and violence. The body may be harmed but the soul will remain 
103unscathed. It must be emphasized, however, that the Kingdom of the 
world is established to serve the Kingdom of Christ, i.e., by preserving 
peace and preventing chaos, the temporal government allows for an atmos­
phere in which the Gospel may be preached and the Sacraments administered.
But even where such peace is absent and chaos reigns, the Church is still
10/called upon to carry her ministry for her existence is always sub cruceQ 
From our presentation of Luther's teaching concerning the Two King­
doms, it should be noted that there are certain serious ambiguities and 
contradictions. For example, he speaks of Christian existence as being 
under the Gospel and not under the Law, while non-Christian existence is 
under Law, not Gospel. The result of such a separation between Law and 
Gospel is a false and dangerous dualism between Christian and non-Christian 
existence, and an eclipsing of the fact that the Christian is simul .1 ustus
et peccator. The Christian, who is simultaneously righteous and sinful, 
needs both Laif and Gospel. As sinner, he ne'eds to be restrained by the 
civil and political law —  and not judged by the "spiritual" law alone —  
so that he may not injure or neglect his neighbour. This does not deny 
the truth that the Christian is freed from the Law as a means of right­
eousness before God, nor that he has the guidance of the Holy Spirit 
available to him. Indeed, because of his freedom through the Gospel —  
he needs to hear this message again and again —  in contrast to the non- 
Christian, he is called to a higher obligation to the secular government 
in the Kingdom of the world. He needs to be constantly reminded that in 
this kingdom he is serving God and not someone else. This is precisely 
how the unity and duality (not dualism) of the Two Kingdoms are maintained: 
through the life of the Christian in both kingdoms. Of course, this does 
not mean that God does not —  the truth is that He does —  use those who 
have not as yet come to faith in Christ to carry out His will and purpose. 
The distinction between God1 s \-/ork in His Two Kingdoms may be seen
in terms of Luther’s use of "proper" and "alien" to describe God’s activity
nAin the Kingdom on the "right" and the Kingdom on the "left", respectively.
The first and the second Articles of the Creed, on Creation and Redemption,
1 0 7respectively, are therefore seen as forming a unity. In terms of
Luther* s theologia crucis, the personal word of grace for man is seen in
the context of Christ, while the preserving work of God is seen in His
provision for continuing and sustaining life. Bornkamm provides a useful
summary of Luther’s understanding of the unity of God's love for and
work in the world when he says:^
The fundamental tenet of Luther's political ethics grew 
out of the center of his theology. It rests upon faith in the 
unchangeable relation of God to the world, which has not suffered 
alteration in will or purpose because of the abyss that sin 
has opened up between them, but has only changed in means.
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Because of sin, the free community of love which God has
wanted humanity to be, and which gleams again in the life
together of true Christians, has changed into an order of law 
and coercion. The distinction is similar to that between God* s 
^strange work* and his 'proper work1 about which the young 
Luther liked to speak. 108
Another ambiguity in Luther's thought, which is related to the problem
of the proper understanding of the use of the Law-Gospel dialectic in
both kingdoms, concerns the Lordship of Christ in the Two Kingdoms. We
spoke of both kingdoms as being the realm in which God's activity occurs.
Thus the Kingdom of the world, and not only the Kingdom of God, is also
the sphere of God's love as well as His wrath. However, we did not refer
to this Kingdom as being Christ's. Does this mean that the Lordship of
Christ, that is proclaimed in terms of cross, resurrection and exaltation,
does not embrace this realm as well? If, as Althaus points out, "God —
and not Christ —  institutes" the secular kingdom, which is indeed God's
not Christ's, and "Christ is concerned only with the spiritual- kingdom.
He concerns himself about secular government as little as about God's
109working in nature —  as about storms, for example," does this not lead 
to a false and debilitating dichotomy between the presence of Christ's 
Lordship in the spiritual kingdom and the absence of His Lordship in the 
secular kingdom? We return once again to the distinction between the 
de facto Lordship in the former, and the de .i ure Lordship i:i the latter. 
This is a paradox. Christ's universal Lordship is real but hidden for 
it awaits eschatological fulfilment. Describing His Lordship in terms 
of a paradox is inevitable in view of the fact that Christ's Kingdom is 
in the heart of the believer, It is a Kingdom that emerges through the 
activity of the Holy Spirit who moves people to faith through the pro­
claimed Word. The Holy Spirit builds up the Kingdom of Christ through 
the Word, the Sacraments, and brotherly consolation. By this means, the
316.
de facto Lordship of Christ is achieved. It needs to be pointed out, 
however, that the building up of the Kingdom* of Christ is not to be equated 
with the triumphalistic Christianization of society by gradually absorbing 
everyone into the Church. In the light of the theology of the cross, 
the "growth1 of this Kingdom can only be perceived partially, and, then, 
only through the "eyes" of the cross. The surprise of those chosen in 
the final judgement, according to Matthew 25: 31-46, is a clear reminder 
against any definitive quantification of those who belong to the Kingdom 
of Christ.
At this point it is appropriate to ask: Since Christians, in view
of their membership in both Kingdoms, have a higher obligation to serve 
the neighbour in love as unto Christ Himself, what sort of ethic of the 
cross is to be suggested for Christians? Furthermore, since the Christian 
is called to renounce all claims to self-glory and attempts to merit God1s 
favour and grace, can this ethic ever be a mere imitatio Christi? In 
answer to the second question, it must be initially pointed out that 
imitatio Christi. whether it leads to "worldly11 triumphalism or to suffer­
ing, shame and even death, is not a way of salvation, and, also, is not 
really possible in terms of contemporary conditions in the world. Certain­
ly, an ethic of the cross calls the Christian to bear his/her cross, but 
in the particular situation of his/her own existence. Mere imitatio 
Christi is rather static and runs the risk of making Christ and His Gospel 
into Law. Yet, the truth is that the Christian is called to follow 
Christ, and to experience anew daily his baptism, i.e., a continuous 
dying to self and rising in the crucified and risen Christ. Douglas John 
Hall writes:
The beginning of the ethic of the cross is the identifica­
tion of this people (Christians under the cros0 with the 
Crucified One. It is the reduction of this people to nothing,
110
beggarliness, and brokenness. Only through that reduction, 
continuously accomplished, is it possible for this people to 
be truly identified with God’s work in the world. 111
Thus the ethic of the cross embraces the duality of Christian
existence which is simul Justus et peccator. The Christian is free to
stand in solidarity with all people, irrespective of their race^religion,
class, etc., in the struggle to bring greater dignity, humanity and
wholeness to human living in the world. He is not afraid to admit his
beggarliness before God, nor does his "hiding" in the righteousness of
Christ mean that he is to be blind to his experience of total sinfulness
112coram Deo in common with all humankind. As Hall notes, the Christian,
on the basis of the social ethic of the cross, even dares to stand with
the Marxist —  of course, from a responsible and critical perspective.
Thus the point of departure for this social ethic may be • 
the only one that is finally legitimate, even in terms that 
secular men, such as Marxists, can recognize: namely, a real
solidarity with those who suffer. Only as the Christian 
community permits itself to undergo a continuous crucifixion 
to the world can it be in the world as the friend of those who 
are crucified . . . .  Real solidarity with those who suffer 
recognizes that their condition is our own: we are all beggars
together. 113
With Hall, we suggest that an ethic of the cross of Christ means 
that Christians are to see their cross as meaning suffering with those 
who suffer. If we expand the meaning of the word suffering to include 
both spiritual suffering —  i.e., in relation to God —  and material 
suffering —  i.e., socio-economic and political suffering —  then it can 
reasonably be concluded that the crucified and risen Jesus Christ is 
present, though veiled from human eyes, in both forms of suffering. 
Through the proclamation of the Gospel, He becomes revealed to the eyes 
of faith. The Christian therefore bears his cross in the world because 
he believes in the hope of Christ in the world and for the world. Once 
again, we are confronted with a dialectical unity: the unity of the
Lordship of Jesus Christ in the Two Kingdoms through the presence of
Christians in both kingdomst that is, the paradoxical unity between the
11/cross of Christ and the cross of the Christian in the world. "+
The issue we have been debating thus far may be aptly summarized thus:
How does God continue "to keep alive a world which has fallen prey to
death, after the new aeon in Christ has already been inaugurated in its
midst and has become a reality in the life of Christians through the 
115Holy Spirit1'? In pointing out that Luther responds to this question 
in terms of the concept of the Two Kingdoms, we insisted that the bwo 
kingdoms must neither be separated from, nor equated with each other. 
However, in arguing for a creative dialectical harmony between the Kingdom 
of God and the Kingdom of the world, it may have appeared that there is 
the absence of conflict or struggle between the two. The truth of the 
matter is that there is a real struggle which the Christian should feel 
all the more because of his twofold existence. The Church must be 
vigilant in maintaining this struggle not as an end in itself but as a 
reminder that the Kingdom of Christ has not been fully revealed? ’Must 
this is the sign of the eschatological situation, which is not yet the end 
itself."117
In his description of existence in the secular kingdom, Luther speaks
positively about the role of reason. As Carter Linberg argues, "This is
the radical element in Luther's theological-political thought. The
ecclesiastical legitimation of the state is overturned and replaced by
113the legitimation of reason." At first glance, this idea of "the legiti­
mation of reason" in Luther seems to contradict his emphasis upon a theology 
of the cross. But this is not a contradiction but a tension for reason 
has a rightful place in the secular sphere where both Christian and non- 
Christian are called to act "through law and justice, to preserve the
world from chaos," In doing so they, participate in the sovereign 
power of God, This is another mode of God's*love which is often experi­
enced as wrath because of sin. That is, "there is an inherent and 
necessary element of coercion which contradicts the free order of love 
in the kingdom of God", When reason is used in the context of the 
secular kingdom, there is a relativization of all social structures.
These structures are de-absolutized and freed for rational analysis. This 
does not mean that they are devalued or that God is no longer present in 
the realm in which they exist and operate. Rather, it means that Christians 
are free to serve their neighbour in love through a recognition that all 
structures are relative and temporary; only the Kingdom of God is eternal. 
But does this radical relativization not. lead to withdrawal from the 
world and the process of humanization? Does "penultimacy" not result in 
a reduction of Christian commitment to the world? Unfortunately, the 
history of the Church does show instances of an affirmative answer to
these questions. But this does not invalidate our argument for the
necessity of the doctrine of the Two Kingdoms. Indeed, as we have repeat­
edly emphasized above, the tension between the tx^ o kingdoms, between reason 
and revelation, Law and Gospel, is intrinsic to an evangelical theology 
of the cross. It is in this vein that Linberg, writing on the temporaliz- 
ing influence of reason on the social structure of Luther's day (and those 
that have since emerged), says:
In other words, the Christian is to take seriously the task of 
world-building and the maintenance of culture, and civilization, 
but always with the condition that every culture, every system
of justice, and every political structure is only relative and
instrumental for the humanization of persons. Tradition is to 
be conserved with insight into its dehumanizing aspects and 
its penultimacy. Reason and love are to be active in the contin­
ual task of socialization in the recognition that God, not the 
Law, nor the past, nor the empire, nor the church, is sovereign 
in history. For Luther, faith alone grants the security to
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live within the insecurity of relative structures. It is only 
by faith that persons can avoid the defensive sanctification of 
past, present, or future goods and. values. Faith enables persons 
to be persons because it lets God be God. 121
We see, then, that reason, when exercised in relation to the neighbour
and to socio-economic and political structures, i.e., in relation to the
secular government and kingdom, does not contradict, nor conflict with
God's universal love for humanity nor His specific love in Christ, Rather,
it acts in harmony with it. Such a conclusion, according to the theology
of the cross, is based upon faith.
Our discussion of the doctrine of the Two Kingdoms brings us to the 
critical point where we must now appraise Marx's Weltanschauung from the 
standpoint of that doctrine. Whereas, before, in our discussion of the 
theology of the cross we were attempting to formulate an evangelical 
Christian response to the challenge which Marx's concept of man and theory 
of history presents to Christian theology, at this point, it is appropriate
to reverse the order. When we do this, it becomes very obvious that
Marx's discussion rightfully belongs to the secular realm, to the realm 
of reason. He is concerned about man, society and nature, which, accord­
ing to the theology of the cross, are all temporary and transitory. They 
will pass away. Marx himself recognized this but this did not mean that 
he thereby became open to the transcendent power and Kingdom of God. 
Instead, in terms of his understanding of historical and dialectical 
materialism, he posits an eternal and dynamic process of mutation in 
human history which, under the "free" future, will be unalienated, and 
will continually produce an unalienated human world.
Though it is being argued that Marx's Weltanschauung "rightfully" 
belongs to the secular realm, it should be pointed out that, because of
its atheistic base, it stands at polar ends with the theological talk about
man coram Deo. His "ethics", for example, are not built upon a theolo­
gical but an anthropocentric and "materialistic" base. Moreover, his 
radical immanentism, in which there is a monistic, not dualistic view of 
reality, is an antipode to the theological concept of the Two Kingdoms. 
Thus, his naive optimism about the emergence of the liberating proletarian 
revolution is to be rejected. let, in doing so, the theology of the 
cross must recognize that it must not minimize the centrality of Christian 
celebration in Christian worship and existence. It must guard against 
using the concept of the Two Kingdoms as an ideology of the status quo 
which seeks the preservation of the "old order" because it is seen as 
being absolutely binding since it was ordained by God, and/or because the 
transformation of the "old order" will mean an end to the privileges and 
dominance of a particular class or elitist group in society.
But, it is not only Marx's atheistic and anthropocentric world-view 
that is judged by the doctrine of the Two Kingdoms) any theological formu­
lations that would suggest that sin is not basically a separation from 
God from which all other societal forms of alienation are derived, but 
that it is primarily socio-economic and political alienation, are likewise 
judged and condemned by the Law. Such a reduction of sin does not fully 
conduce to human liberation since it does not allow God to be God. Reason 
has usurped the place of faith. In the light of this, any synthesis of 
Christianity and Marxism which is not seen as no more and no less than an 
appropriate strategy for humanization of man and society, but is seen as 
a definitive expression of the Christian faith, is to be rejected. In 
the ongoing quest for an indigenous expression of the Christian faith, the 
Church must guard against reducing the Gospel to Law by making the impera­
tive into the indicative of the Gospel.
Finally, the Church is called to be the Church of Jesus Christ and
not an agency for social action, while it works for the humanization 
and not the Christianization of the world, it mast ever be vigilant in 
its proclamation of the Word and the administration of the Sacraments, 
and in its solidarity with the poor and the oppressed. It proclaims that, 
in the eyes of the crucified and risen Christ, even the misfit, the 
unproductive and "colonialized" person is invited to share in the Kingdom 
of Christ and experience in faith the de facto Lordship of Christ in his/ 
her life and in the world. The Christian, who is simul .1 ustus et peccator, 
is a citizen of two kingdoms but of one world.
The overriding concern in this thesis has been with the question 
of confessing the Christian faith in the Caribbean. It was pointed out 
at the beginning that this task points the way towards an explication of 
the theology of the cross where we find God is paradoxically revealed in 
hiddenness. Where God seems most absent, i.e., in the cross of Jesus 
Christ, there He is most present, revealing Himself as gracious and 
loving.
In our discussion of the Church’s mission of confeasing the faith, 
in word and deed, in the Caribbean, we approached the question of a 
theology of the cross as a response to the challenge of Marx's Weltan­
schauung. Moreover, we also attempted to show that in responding to the 
challenge of the Caribbean situation, the Church is called to speak about 
God in terms of a theology of the cross. We pointed to a theology of the 
cross not only because of its particular relevance to the situation in 
question, but, more especially, because it is a sound evangelical theolo­
gical method, universally applicable to the task of doing Biblical and 
confessional theology. Accordingly, we followed the method of Luther's 
theologia crucis, in particular, as well as Moltmann's "Trinitarian 
political theology of the cross" and Liberation Theology in our attempt 
to articulate a theology of the cross. Looking at the thesis from an 
overall perspective, it will be seen that there are three significant 
facets: a theology of the cross; Marx's concept of man and his theory
of history; and the alienation of Caribbean man and the need for the 
transcendence of his alienation.
In the foregoing critical description of Marx's anthropology, the 
concern was with showing that Marx's writings, both early and mature,
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contain a peculiar Weltanschauung, in which man was viewed as the centre 
of his existence and of all historical reality. It was asserted that 
this anthropological preoccupation is more evident in Marx's early writ­
ings rather than in his mature writings. Thus, our presentation of 
Marx's Weltanschauung was derived primarily from his early, philosophic 
writings, especially the 1811 Paris Manuscripts. However, the primary 
assumption in this discussion was that there is a fundamental continuity 
between the early and. the mature Marx which was based upon Marx' s basic 
concern with alienated man under developing and increasingly degenerate 
capitalism. This anthropological concern was not replaced in Marx' s later 
writings by any other concerns such as describing the economic laws of 
history. On the contrary, the philosophic and humanist perspective 
sketched out in the early writings continued to provide the inspiration 
of Marx's other, later emphases.
Marx's world-view, it was pointed out, functioned (and functions) as
a soteriological system by which man, not God, has the sole responsibility
for the transformation of the very basis of society, the mode of produc­
tion, and for the "recreation" and redirection of the forces of history 
so that they will eventuate in the transcendence of alienation, and 
continually conduce to man's creation and enjoyment of real human freedom.
It was argued that in the concept of alienation, which he borrowed
from Hegel, Marx found an inclusive concept with which to describe the 
condition of man in the history of the world so far. According to Marx, 
even before the emergence of industrial capitalism in western lurope, in 
the nineteenth century, which marked the apogee of human degradation, man 
lived under alienation. Indeed history up until Marx's day was regarded 
as the history of alienation. He called this period pre-history. More­
over, alienation was supposed to continue until after the occurrence
of the proletarian revolution and the emergence of the future society- 
under communism. Communism was itself viewed as a transitory phase, 
for it v/ill in turn be transcended ad infinitum by future "free" societies. 
This whole process was to be the creative activity of man himself —  
freed from all dependence upon or enslavement to gods or God, or any other 
transcendent power or being which might have hitherto claimed man1s 
obedience.
Marx' s insistence that man is the real architect of his own destiny, 
the creator of his own essence and future, must be seen in the light of 
Marx's understanding of the forces of history. In his view, the forces 
of history were comprised of two fundamental components: the mode of
production, and the relations of production. However, it was the former 
that was the primary determinant, though the latter also influenced the 
former. One of the fundamental theses in Marx's philosophy was that 
revolutionary changes occurred in history whenever the mode and the 
relations of production came into conflict) out of this conflict, a new 
dialectical harmony was created.
It is crucial for an accurate reading of Marx's Weltanschauung to 
remember that, according to him, man's ultimate liberation will only occur 
through the critical and revolutionary activity of the proletariat„ As 
the most dehumanized class in society, Marx found that they alone are 
capable of acting as a universal class to transform the socio-economic 
base in society. Such a revolution will only occur when the material 
conditions of society (forces of production) reach that critical conflic- 
tual point, mentioned above, and when, simultaneously, the proletariat 
are possessed of a "liberated", messianic consciousness? The "kairos" 
will have then arrived.
Unfortunately, Marx was far from clear and unambiguous in his
description of this "kairos". He failed to maintain the indispensable 
tension between both the primacy of human freedom and the primacy of 
the forces of production, in his argument for the eventual emergence of 
"final" communism from alienating capitalism. He was not totally empiri­
cal in his analysis of the capitalist mode of production, and in his 
anticipation of its radical demise. Despite Marx’s own feeling to the 
contrary, it is conclusive that his analysis of capitalism and of the 
alienation of the worker were ethical in inspiration and intention. This 
conclusion is tied to our argument that Marx's world-view functioned 
(and functions) as a soteriological system. In Marx's view, his so-called 
non-ethical pronouncements stemmed from his actual discernment of certain 
"laws" of history.
The main argument in the presentation of Marx’s concept of man and 
theory of history was that throughout his entire writings, both early and 
mature, Marx was preoccupied with man. He was convinced that his philoso­
phy of man was far more humanizing than any other philosophy, both religious 
and secular (and this included Hegel's and Feuerbach's), which had been 
hitherto promulgated. In fact., his concern was with real, living man, 
and with genuine historical, liberating praxis-theoria. It was, finally, 
his radical reduction of all reality to human history, to an atheistic, 
anthropocentric, immanental reality, where man is viewed as the final 
arbiter and standard of himself and of his future, and where the material 
forces of history dialectically conduce to human liberation, that consti­
tutes the fundamental component of Marx's Weltanschauung.
The central argument in the discussion of the theology of the cross 
was that Marx's world-view posed (and poses) a crucial challenge to 
Christian theology: how might it continue to speak about God? And, who
is this God? Where is He? Put more elaborately, the question was:
how might Christian theology give due consideration to the legitimate 
criticisms of religion explicitly stated by Marx, not by opting for a 
Marxian hermeneutics, or for a Marxian future vis-a-vis any version of 
the Christian hope, but precisely by arguing from an explicitly Biblical 
and theological base, in its confession of the faith? Noting Marx's 
obvious and, indeed, noble struggle on behalf of man, Christian theology 
found itself faced with the task of once again explicating the faith so 
that the truth of God’s transcendent and immanent concern for man was 
most visible. Such an enterprise, it was argued, may be effectively 
undertaken in an evangelical theology of the cross. This enterprise was 
construed as a call for an explication of the radical concept of God 
contained in that theology. It was a return to the paradoxical revelation 
of God through the cross of Jesus Christ. Furthermore,, it was pointed out 
that cross and resurrection were held together and not separated from 
each other. Hope in history and hope beyond history, i.e., in the Absolute 
Future of God, were seen in the context of the cross of Jesus. There we 
find the gracious God. God is paradoxically present in the cross of 
Jesus Christ. It is the cross of the risen Ghrist Jesus who had been 
crucified for the sake of man. The last word of the cross is. not despair 
and nihil, but hope: hope in the presence of the God of wrath and of love.
In the theology of the cross we are given a description of God who 
reveals Himself, not in glory and triumph, and power —  according to the 
world's standards —  but in shame and defeat, and powerlessness, i.efl, 
in the suffering and death of Jesus Christ upon the cross. Through the 
Holy Spirit, the Ghurch bears witness to the message that the liberation 
of man as well as the true definition of man’s nature are not and cannot 
be the product of human effort; instead, it occurs solely through the 
efficacy of the Word of God in the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ.
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When man raises the question of the tragedy of human existence, he is to 
look to the God of Jesus Christ for there he' will find a gracious God 
hidden in His wrath. He wills to be ultimately gracious. He does not 
turn a blind eye nor a deaf ear to human suffering, pain and death. The 
Triune God suffers for the sake of man. Only through the God of the 
cross can man find real, human freedom. To ask man to liberate himself 
is further enslaving and will lead to demonic consequences, as history 
has vividly demonstrated. Salvation and reconciliation are sola gratia.
It was maintained, however, that human praxis, because of the gospel 
of justification by grace alone, was free and humanly fulfilling in 
relation to the neighbour. In other words, being reconciled to God 
through faith in Jesus Christ, the Christian is free to serve his/her 
neighbour in love. This service involves both individual 'and corporate 
action, and it also calls for both inner spiritual transformation as well 
as external transformation of the socio-economic, political, and other 
material structures of human existence. It is especially in relation to 
the latter that Christian theology may and does find some significant 
grounds for dialogue and co-operation with Marxists. But it does so on 
the basis of the conviction that God in Christ acted decisively and 
definitively for the sake of man. Like the Marxist, the Christian works 
on behalf of man$ however, unlike the Marxist, the Christian is motivated 
by his/her obedience in discipleship to the crucified and risen Lord,
Jesus Christ. Such a motivation, it was argued, does not impair the 
dignity of man, nor does it display a concern for man which is subordinate 
to that of the Marxists1 • On the contrary, it is a confession that man1s 
!,being" transcends man’s ox^ n self-definition, for it is bound up with the 
suffering and crucified God Himself.
This point leads us to note, in passing, that our concern, in
responding to the Marxian challenge, was not with the Christian-Marxist 
dialogue per se. It was certainly evident in our discussion that we 
were aware of that phenomenon. However, in the context of our primary 
concern with the mission of the Church in the Caribbean, we sought to 
engage in that dialogue only indirectly. Instead of concentrating primar­
ily upon finding common ground for dialogue and co-operation with Marxists, 
attention was directed to the question of how the Church in the Garibbean 
might continue to speak about God and confess her faith in Him and in 
His presence in the world, as well as confess the hope in the resurrection 
of the dead, and in the eschatological fulfilment of reconciliation 
through Christ.
Here it should be noted that the theology of the cross which was 
articulated was not simply a presentation of the difference between sin 
and grace, human freedom.and divine freedom, etc. These were necessary 
aspects of the theology of the cross which is both a practical method for 
"talking" about God as well as an evangelical proclamation of the Gospel 
of Jesus Christ. Those motifs are all interrelated to each other and 
their foundation and focus is the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ.
Following the discussion of the theology of the cross, attention was 
drawn to the peculiar history and dilemma of Caribbean man. It was pointed 
out that the appeal of Marx in the Caribbean was not because of the 
presence of a proletariat in the region, nor because of the presence of 
the degradation and alienation that have accompanied the ever advancing 
technologization of the society. The region is mainly agricultural, and 
certainly not industrialized on any such scale comparable to what Marx 
may have envisaged when he viewed and analysed western .European society 
and its future. Furthermore, it was emphasized that there are pervasive 
plural divisions and forces within the societies in the region. Therefore
Marx* s division of society into two fundamental classes —  the capitalist
*and the worker —  was found to be far from ah adequate description of 
any of the Garibbean societies, and, certainly, of Caribbean society as 
a whole. There is the notable and crucial absence of a Marxian proletarian 
consciousness among the masses in the region. In short, according to 
the Marxian view, the conditions are not "ripe" for the proletarian 
revolution.
However, in spite of the obvious absence of those components which 
are necessary for the occurrence of the proletarian revolution according 
to the predictions of classical Marxism, the Caribbean region is a very 
explosive situation. It is a situation which has arisen out of the econom­
ic, social, political, racial, etc., problems which plague Garibbean 
societies. The challenge to the Church, which these conditions pose, did 
not arise out of her own failure, oer se, to fulfil her social mission as 
best she could; rather, it is the result of the failure of capitalism 
whose roots go back to the very formative years of Caribbean society which 
was founded upon the alienating plantation system. Under this system, a 
small European oligarchy enslaved and exploited a disproportionately 
larger non-European population. These were the conditions under which 
Caribbean man's ambiguous mentality was formed and historically passed 
on from generation to generation.
In comparing Marx's description of the alienation of the worker with 
the alienation of Caribbean man, we acknowledged that the two were not 
the same though they shared significant similarities, such as lack of 
ownership of the means of production, and powerlessness in relation to the 
overall economic structures in society0 With reference to Caribbean rnai, 
it was argued that he was an enigma, that he was neither African, nor 
Indian, Portuguese nor Chinese, European nor North American. Moreover,
to say that he is a West Indian or a Caribbean person, which points to 
his historical, cultural and geographical orientation, does not solve 
the problem, but merely contributes a significant and necessary ingredient 
to the definition of who Caribbean man is.
It is merely wishful thinking to argue, as Marx-does, that the aboli­
tion of private ownership of the means of production will generate the 
radical proletarian changes in the attitudes and behaviour of the masses 
which Marx anticipated it would. This criticism is not intended as a 
dismissal of the acute need to end economic exploitation by large, imperson­
al corporations. It needs to be recognized, however, that the real
symbolic power in communal ownership of the means of production, in Marx1s
terms, is mitigated by many factors, not least of all the inaccuracy and 
naivete of his utopian predictions based upon his obvious positive human­
ism. In the context of the Caribbean, the factors noted above in our 
discussion of alienation and pluralism severely diminish the symbolic 
power in "worker" ownership of the means of production. The conclusion 
therefore is that ideas and consciousness as a whole —  i.e., the super­
structure —  have an inherent life of their own in the sphere of human 
reality. This superstructure is shaped and influenced by the socio-economic 
conditions in society. However, they are not derived solely from that 
base. Thus awareness of and dependence upon God is not the result of the 
alienated productive process. On the contrary, it results from the fact 
that the question of God is intrinsic to all reality —  and this includes 
human reality —  and to the quest for authentic humanity, both historical 
and eschatological.
On the question of doing theology in the Caribbean, we looked at 
some tentative suggestions of four Caribbean churchmen. They provided an 
ecumenical and pan-regional flavour to the debate. It was found that all
four writers were acutely concerned with Caribbean man. In their writings, 
there was an explicit awareness of the alienation of Caribbean man, and 
of the need to work for his real historical liberation. Singh, Campbell- 
Johnston, and Reid openly discussed the question of a Christian response 
to Marxism. In Hamid's presentation there were obvious echoes of this 
concern, though there was no clearly stated reference to that particular 
problem. On the whole, in these Caribbean ."voices1’ of the Church, the 
three primary factors, which the Church should consider in its confession 
of the Christian faith, and which we have attempted to describe in this 
thesis were present: Christian identity in Christ and the need for a
kerygmatic, "servant" and sacramental theology; Marxist/Socialist way to 
human liberation and the building of the future utopia; and the alienated 
condition of Caribbean man and his society.
the firstThe central thesis in our argument above has been that/ of the three 
factors is the overriding concern of Christian theology. But it is precise­
ly that concern that leads to a critical consideration of the other two 
factors. The content of the Christian message is revealed in the cross 
of Christ. It does not arise out of a speculative appraisal of the his­
torical context in which the message is proclaimed, in word and deed.
When the church does not take the situation seriously, she runs the risk 
of proclaiming a "docetic" Incarnation. By the same token, when the 
situation shapes and gives content to the message of the Gospel, an 
ideology of glory results.
Moving from the discussion and appraisal of the Caribbean "voices", 
we then turned our attention to the question of a theology of alienation 
and reconciliation in the Caribbean. It was emphasized that the peculiar­
ity of Caribbean man (of his history of alienation, etc.), should not 
minimize or obscure the inherent commonality of the fundamental separation
from God which he shares with sinful and reconciled humanity. Garibbean 
man is also fundamentally separated from God’ and can be ultimately 
reconciled to God, to himself, and to his fellow human persons, through 
faith in Jesus Christ. Such a reconciliation is not triumphalistic for 
it is experienced sub cruce: the cross of Christ leads to the cross of
the Christian. It is only through Jesus Christ that the Kingdom of God 
has come and will come. Therefore Caribbean man's salvation and reconcil­
iation are also sola gratia.
It was argued, further, that only in the context of sola gratia that 
human praxis is placed in its true perspective which is the basis of, 
and conducive to real, human freedom. This freedom was described as 
eschatological in scope, and is not merely confined to history where it 
is proleptically present. However, instead of speculating about who and 
where such a God is who offers this salvation and reconciliation by grace 
alone, we argued that Christian theology looks to the paradoxical revela­
tion of the love of God in the cross of Jesus Christ. There it finds its, 
hope, both historical and eschatological. Consequently, attention was 
finally drawn to Luther's doctrine of the Two Kingdoms, where, it was 
argued, a critical use of this doctrine is necessary to maintain the ten­
sion between the "already" and the "not yet", between historical antici­
pation and eschatological fulfilment of God's reconciliation of the world 
to Himself through the suffering, death and resurrection of His Son,
Jesus Christ.
If the Church's existence and mission arise out of the activity of 
the Triune God in the definitive and decisive activity of God in the God- 
Man, Jesus Christ, which means that the "nature" of the Church comprises 
both an historical and an eschatological dimension, then the Church cannot 
avoid concrete, incarnate and loving action In society on behalf of man;
nor can it avoid pointing to the presence of transcendent hope in the 
world today. Concrete action alone, even in response to the Marxian or 
other challenge, without the accompanying proclamation of the presence 
of faith and hope in the midst of and beyond the results of human praxis- 
theoria, is in danger of reducing the Church to "the status of j ust another 
social relief agency. Moreover, it would not be the most loving thing to 
do for the sake of man. As we have shown above, it does not constitute 
a fully radical and wholistic view of man; and, certainly, it is not 
radical obedience to the God of Jesus Christ. The Weltgeist is not the 
Holy Spirit. Scriptural texts, such as Matthew 25: 31-4*6 —  whether taken 
by itself or in the context of the rest of scripture —  do not legitimate 
such an exclusive interpretation of the Church’s mission in the world, or 
in any particular society.
However, proclamation of faith and hope in God, when divorced from 
real, genuine and loving action, is a blatant distortion of the Gospel, 
and it leaves the impression that the message of the cross is just a 
speculative message among other messages, and not the peculiar message of 
the scandal that God the Son became incarnate and suffered and died and 
rose again for the salvation of the whole world. Here faith and hope 
are empty of meaning in the world, and the cross is no longer central to 
Christian theology.
The message of the love of God becoming incarnate which does not 
find expression in concrete action, including simple acts of kindness 
and radical acts for the transformation of structures which dehumanize 
man as well as allow for unchecked manipulation of human sin and greed 
in the lives of individuals and groups, and in society as a whole, will 
seem hollow and ineffectual. It is a distortion of the evangelical 
meaning of the powerlessness of God. In other words, the power of God
in His powerlessness on the cross does not provide the basis for Christian
or so-called Christian societies, or any individual or group, to enslave
and dehumanize individuals, groups or societies0 Such an ethic is not
an ethic of the cross, but of a theology (and ideology) of glory. Both
the history of Christendom and of Marxism have repeatedly fallen victim
to this distortion which has led to demonic consequences. When such an 
*
ethic is practised by parties identifying themselves as being Christian —  
and who are identified by their victims as such —  God is presented as the 
promoter of injustice and oppression, instead of as the One who supremely 
suffers on behalf of man to the extent of allowing His Son to die on the 
cross to break the power of sin and the demonic forces, and to pay the 
cost of human sin. It is true that the Church is made up of sinners, but 
this is not an excuse for inactivity, or indifferent or distorted activity 
Rather, in the name of Jesus Christ, those very sinners, and this means 
al1, who are freed by the Gospel, are called to engage in both individual 
and corporate liberating activity on behalf of the neighbour. By neigh­
bour is meant those "who are of the household of faith" as well as those 
who are regarded as being outside that household. In other words, the 
neighbour is to be found both within and without the visible Church. This 
is the way of. Jesus who came for sinners.
Finally, it is sobering to note that Marx' s philosophy, as a Weltan­
schauung, might easily gain a strong footing in society through the 
"legitimate" route of "protest" atheism. As a social institution, the 
Church must be open to criticism, including the Marxian critique of 
ideology. However, the Church must not allow herself to be guided or 
manipulated by such criticisms. The Church must remember that she is also 
a divine creation and she is judged and forgiven by the Lav/ and the Gospel 
not by Marx's "principle of ideology critique". Through Word and
Sacrament, which find simple and radical, and, at best, ambiguous and 
fragmentary expression in concrete action among believers and in society, 
the Church is called to be faithful to her Lord, Jesus Christ. In the 
face of the challenge of Marx's Weltanschauung, the Church dares to 
proclaim Jesus Christ and him crucified, that God was in Christ reconcil­
ing the world to Himself, that Christ will come again to judge the quick 
and dead and to bring His Kingdom to completion. In other words, the 
Church dares to articulate a theology of the cross.
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CHAPTER V
1 Peter L. Berger and Richard J. Neuhaus, Against the World 
for the World (New York: The Seabury Press, 1976), p. 158, 
’’Hartford Theses” is the name given to the text of "An appeal 
for Theological Affirmation”, which was tissued on 26 January, 
1975, in Harford, Connecticut, The eighteen (IS) signatories 
of the affirmation included well-knci/n Christian laypersons 
and theologians from the Protestrant, Roman Catholic and Eastern 
Orthodox communities, in North America. The summary of their 
affirmation reads thus: ”The renewal of Christian witness and 
mission requires constant examination of the assumption shaping 
the Church’s life. Today an apparent loss of a sense of the 
transcendent is undermining the Church’s obility to address 
with clarity and courage the urgent tasks to which God calls
it in the world. This loss is manifest in a number of per­
vasive themes. Many are superficially attractive, but upon 
closer examination we find these themes false and debilitating 
to the Church’s life and work”. Thirteen such false themes 
were listed; see The Presb?/-terion Layman (March, 1975), p. 5. 
For an elaborate and lucid account of the "Hartford Theses”, 
see Berger and Ileuliaus, op.cit.
2 Ibid.
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3 Among the factors of crucial importance in any consideration 
of using Marx’s concept of alienation to explicate the past, 
present, and, even future of Garibbean man, are : the obvious 
historical distance between Marx and today; the relative lack 
of industrialization in the Caribbean vis-a-vis Marx’s day (in 
Western Europe), and certainly of other Hew World countries,
1'Iorth America being the example oar excellence; there are 
various ’’official” brands of authentic Marxism; finally, 
alienation, as used in Marx, does not fully describe either 
the particular conditions of Garibbean man, or the fundamental 
condition of a broken relationship between God and man in which 
man stands. In other words, the concept of ’’©riginal Sin” must 
be central to any theological e;q?lication of the condition of 
Garibbean man, even, and, precisely, where Marx’s concept of 
alienation is used as a heuristic device,
4 There is general agreement among scholars that economic con­
siderations were primary in establishing and promoting human 
e:q?loitation under slavery in the Hew World, See Mintz,
Caribbean Transformations, pp. 63 - 64* Eric Williams,
Capitalism and Slavery (chapel Hill: Universitycf North Carolina 
Press, 1944)? tor example, in noting this point, goes even further 
in arguing that the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade, and
of plantation slavery itself, in the New World, was prompted 
primarily by economic motives, and, only secondarily, by human­
itarian and Christian considerations,
Philip Mason, Patterns of Dominance (London: Oxford University
 ^ Press, 1970), p.
6 George Lamming, The Pleasures of Exile (London: M, Joseph, I960),
p, 60, quoted in Slavery, Colonialism, amd Racism, ed, by Sidney
W, Mintz (New York: W.W.Norton and Co,, In,, 1974)? p. 45.
(Mintz’s emphasis)
7 V,S, Naipaul, The Overcrowded Barracoon (Mew York: Knopf, 1973)? 
p. 254? quoted in Mintz, Slavery, p, 45.
5 G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans, by J.B, Baillie 
(london, 1931)? pp. 234 - 237? and 237 - 240, respectively, 
quoted in Richard Norman, Hegel’s Phenomenology : A Philosophical 
Introduction (London: Sussex University Press, 1976), p. 50.
9 Under the plantation system, the slave was a mere chattel. He
did n<bt own his labour, his product, nor his life, He belonged 
totally to his master. Moreover, on the question of his relation 
to his species-being, it was very evident that the slave was 
considered an inferior human species. Community life was regulated 
by the plantocracy who were at liberty to break-up ’’marriages” and 
family clusters according to the economic climate of the time,
10 Dwarka Persaud, ’’Light and the Evolution of the free society:
An Appraisal of Governor Light’s administration, 1838 - 1848” 
(unpublished Long Paper, History 401, University of Guyana,
24 May, 1974)? pp 3 - 4? states: ’’When the momentous decision
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was made to abolish slavery, it was strongly felt that it would not 
be prudent to terminate the system unconditionally on 1 August, 
1834* but rather have a ’phasing-out1 system of apprenticeship. 
Ostensibly and ideally, this provision was inteilded to re­
educate and acclimatize the planters and the ex-slaves for their 
new roles as employers and eomployees in the ’free1 society .... 
Its success depended Almost entirely on the support of the 
plantocracy. Unfortunately, such support was withheld. Con­
sequently, the British Parliament decided to terminate app­
renticeship prematurely on August 1, 1838, two years before 
the original date for its termination”.
11 Hugh Tinker, A New System of Slavery, the Export of Indian
Labour Overseas 1830 - 1920 (London: Oxford University Press,
1974)* provides a most informative and detailed study of the 
phenomenon of Indian indentureship which emerged after the 
failure of the apprenticeship system. Tinker, p. 383> states:
”For slavery is both a system and an attitude of mind. Both 
the system and the attitude are still with us”. See also, pp.
18 - 19. The irony of the persistence of slavery even after 
it had been declared illegal by an Act of The British Parliament 
is also well illustrated in ill an II. Adamson, Sugar Without Slaves. 
The political economy of British Guiana, 1838 -1904 (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1972).
It is instructive to recall Marx’s thesis that consciousness 
cannot be radically transformed by merely re-interpreting the 
world. Real, material transformation in the superstructure 
(and this includes ideas and consciousness as world-view) will 
only be achieved through the revolutionary transformation of the 
socio-economic base of society. Despite the fact that history 
has not demonstrated the total accuracy of Marx’s thesis, it is, 
nevertheless, of significance to remember that neither legisla­
tion no*; coercion or both can transform human consciousness over­
night. Unfortunately, even Marxists suffer from such an insidious 
”loss of memory” which leads (and has led) to dehumanizing and 
demonic consequences.
See Mason, op.cit., pp. 285 - 290.-
13 See Sidney Mintz, ”The Rural Proletariat and the Problem of Rural 
Proletarian Consciousness”, Journal of Peasant Studies. 1 (1974)* 
291 - 325.
14 Eric Hobsbawm, Uew York Review of Books (February 22, 1973)* p. 8,
review of Irene L. Glendzier, Franz Fanon: A Critical Study,
quoted in Mintz, Slavery, p. 4 6.
15 Mintz, Slavery, p. 4 6.
16 Ibid., p. 47.
17/
372 .
17 V.S. Naipaul, The Mimic Men (London: Penguin Books, 1977), p. S,
in his characteristically cynical tone*, writes of the colonial 
politician : "We lack order. Above all, we lack power, and we 
do not understand that we lack power. We mistake works and the 
acclamation of words for power; as soon as our bluff is called 
we are lost".
13 David Lowenthal, "Race and Color in the West Indies", Daedalus,
Vol. 96, no. 2 (Spring, 1967), pp. 560 - 591.
19 For tv/o excellent studies on the development and nature of
Caribbean social structure, see Orlando Patterson, The Sociology 
of Slavery (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1967); and Elsa V.
Goveia, Slave Society in the British Leeward Islands at the
end of the Eighteenth Century (London: Yale University Press,
1965 y .
20 See Mason, op.cit., pp. 278 - 279.
21 Ibid., p. 281.
22 On the question of some of the stereotypes held by Africans ani
Cast Indians of each other, see Mason, pp. 296 - 297. On the 
question of the European "officials’" attitudes to this conflict- 
ridden situation, see Paul Singh, Guyana : Socialism in a Plural
Society (London: Fabian Society, 1972), p. 20, where he' points
out: "The British constitutionalists have from time to time 
camouflaged the antagonism that flared up repeatedly in the plural 
society. They propagated the popular concept that crown colony 
government provided for an equitable representation for different 
groups and that the attitude of the governor and chief administa- 
tive officials was one of impartiality to the various groups.
They spared no pains to point out that they had no particular 
concern in wanting to promote the interest of any section of the 
population at the expense of the others, and they were well 
equipped to hold the scales evenly".
There is a measure of truth in such claims by colonial officials 
which must not be overlooked in the anti-colonial animosity that 
has been surfacing in the post-colonial era. At the same time it 
must not be forgotten that the dominance of that minority group, 
not only in politics but in every significant aspect of West 
Indian life conduced to the growth of such stereotypes as arose 
among the masses. The defining values operative in Caribbean 
society were imported from Europe, more specifically, Britain.
23 Mintz, Slavery, p. 53.
24- See Mason, pp. 290 - 294-.
25 J.S. Furnival, Golonial Policy and Practice : A comparative study
of Burma and Netherlands India (London: Cambridge University Pres 
194-8); see also, M.G. Smith, The Plural Society in the British We 
Indies (Berkley and Los Angeles : University of California, 1965).
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26 It is very distressing and perplexing to notice young children 
displaying hostility and suspicion towards children and older 
members of another ethnic group. Prejudice and stereotypes are 
easily picked up by children who observe the adults with whom 
they socialize. Though this phenomenon is by no means peculiar
to the Caribbean, because of the "closeness" of social intercourse 
there, prejudice is acutely felt. We cannot go on blaming our 
history or those who are ethnically, culturally, etc. different 
from us for the continuation of the problem which this phenomenon 
represents. Breaking down walls of prejudice is one of the pressing 
tasks facing the Church today.
27 Singh, op.cit., p. 20.
28 Ibid.
29 See Roger Garaudy, "As Marxists, we are struggling on Behalf
of Man", Background Information for Church and Society, no. 34
(December, 1965) (Geneva: Worl^ d Council of Churches), pp. 5 - 9 .
30 Singh, p. 24.
31 Father Richard Ho Lung, "Perspectives on Caribbean Culture",
interview with Monty Williams (published from a recording on 
tape), in GISRA'(The Guyana Institutefbr Social Research and 
Action), Vol. 5, no. 4 (December, 1974), P* 61.
32 Naipaul, The Mimic Men, p. 8.
33 Mintz, Slavery, pp. 47 - 48, perceptively points out: "From one
perspective, of course, the Caribbean region is merely American 
- for all American societies are migrant societies, and all are 
composed in some measure of the descendants of strangers. But 
with several significant exceptions - the hispanophone societies 
in particular - the people of the Caribbean region are marked
by the absence of a central tradition through which migrant 
populations could mediate their relationships to each other.
The lack of just such a tradition has affected qualitatively 
the emergence of an ethnically based national consciousness, 
and has required of Caribbean people a social innovativeness 
more in tune with the modern world than with the world of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Neither perceived diff­
erences in physical type nor in ethnicity has been irrelevant 
in the development of that innovativeness, but such differences 
may well have intensified one variety of consciousness".
In North America, the ethic was that derived from the Puritan 
religion. Thus, it is common to speak of American civil relig­
ion as an outgrowth of Puritan religion which began on North 
American soil with the arrival of the first settlers. For a 
Protestant treatment of this theme, see Robert N. Ballah, The 
Broken Covenant. American Civil Religion in Time of Trial 
(New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), especially, pp. 1 - 35.
K.V. Parmasad, "By the Light of a Deya", Tapia. 22 (1971), p. 5, 
reminds his readers that an Afro-Caribbean culture is not the 
authentic culture of the East Indians in Trinidad. He recog­
nizes the need for a social order in Trinidad that transcends 
the/
374
the alienated past. However, he insists that if the price 
of gaining such an identity and national spirit is the 
stripping of other ethnic groups of their uniquenesses, then 
such a national spirit is a misnomer for it promotes al­
ienation even further. It is very sobering to reflect upon 
the mission of the Church in this complex and frustrating 
situation.
34 Mintz, Slavery, pp. 47; see also, Mintz, Caribbean Trans­
formations, pp. 37 - 38.
35 Ibid.
36 Sehon Goodbridge, Politics and the Caribbean Church : A
Confession of Guilt. CADEC, Study'Paper, no. 2. (Barbados,
'7.1.: Catholic Hews Pr&ntery, (nvd.)) ,p, 6,
37 Ibid. On the question of the need for a Caribbean ideology
for change and transformation so that the new, liberated Car­
ibbean man may emerge, see William G. Demas, Change and Re­
newal in the Caribbean, ed. by David I, Mitchell (Barbados : 
Caribbean conference of Churches Publ. House, (n.d.)).
38 Ibid., pp. 6 - 7 .
39 Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p* 44.
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Hamid is a Fresyterian from Trinidad and Tobago, C.S. Reid a 
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Redeemer Lutheran Church, Georgetown, Guyana, 16 Hovember,
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Caribbean. This does not mean that someone from the "outside” 
cannot write sympathetically and with deep insight about the 
experience of colonialism in the Caribbean,
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+ New York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1970), God of the 
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also, p. 164.
76 Ibid., p. 166.
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p. 229, as quoted in Paul Althaug, The Theology of Martin Luther, 
trans. by. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), 
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Fortress Press, 1959), p. 29.
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